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American Power and Choice in the Middle East
Though Kindred Winecoff may have written this about Stephen Walt, it also speaks to Pankaj Mishra's op-ed today predicting the allegedly inevitable US decline in the Middle East:
How does any of this indicate that the geopolitical position of the U.S. has been weakened? The U.S.'s antagonists are quite literally fighting for their lives....regional democratization is underway -- albeit not in the way they had expected -- and the broader transformation of the region is proceeding in a direction that is amenable to the U.S.'s long-term interests. The Middle East is less engaged in proliferation than it was a decade ago, Tehran's intransigence notwithstanding. There are fewer security dilemmas in operation than at any point in decades...the frictions that many believed had developed between the U.S. and its NATO allies over Iraq appear to have been transitory rather than permanent.
Dan is also correct that, contrary to recent analysis, the Russians, Chinese, Brazilians, and other external powers also still sit on the periphery of Middle East power relations. This structural realist line of analyis doesn't address the societal changes Mishra describes, but his argument is unconvincing on that level as well. The postcolonial wave has been a consistent challenge globally for US foreign policy since the 1950s, but it never posed a overwhelming threat to American power in the Middle East. Why? Its effects are not uniform across states, and always remain vulnerable to national, regional, and extra-regional dynamics. This isn't to say that people do not share strong political commonalities or even necessarily weak civilizational ones. But in the case of the Middle East, the regional challenge to American influence never really emerged. In fact, as the Cold War deepened and post-colonial fervor hit its height the United States actually increased its power and alliances in the Middle East.
If Nasser and the forces he unleashed could not drive the US out, it's highly unlikely that the Arab Spring will. Had the idea of Arab unity been able to seriously mobilize a preponderence of power, it would have succeeded in its recurring series of projects aimed at regional unity. Yet whether in the confused strategy of the Arab states that lost the 1948 Israeli war of independence or the failure of the United Arab Republic, we've never seen a cohesive force able to really dispel external influence. One can take a constructivist explanation, as Michael Barnett does, or a standard neorealist explanation oriented around anarchy and the balance of power to figure out why. Either way, Mishra does not convince as to why today's upheaval is different.
This sort of talk unfortunately obscures the real issue: the variable shape of American involvement in the Middle East and how highly contingent that involvement really is on American perception of value. The US is not going to "withdraw" from the Middle East--we're yoked to it for cultural and economic reasons that cannot simply by wished away. But so are a host of other powers that nonetheless have different postures in the region than we do. In the absence of a Soviet strategic threat to the Persian Gulf and Iran's declining strategic position, how long the United States chooses to maintain its current network of alliances, political relationships, and force deployments will likely depend, as Dan has said, on both domestic opinion and policymakers' conception of costs and benefits.
Plainly put, the US intervenes in the Middle East to sustain and sometimes modernize US alliances structures and political relationships. It also sporadically intervenes to try to change the Middle East's domestic and cultural spheres, with varying degrees of success and failure. Though American intervention is mainly political and economic there is also a heavy military dimension. The former is unduly ignored and the latter is often unfairly blamed for America's problems in the region. The larger point: political and strategic relationships do not sustain themeselves. They have be constantly refreshed and defended, The US can skimp on that cost in the hope that clients and partners will, on their own, pick it up at the expense of competing domestic priorities. But it will find that those costs---like a rent bill--do not pay themselves. The Arab Spring, Iran, and emerging 2nd wave jihadist challenges pose political and diplomatic costs. The political-military "landlord" (to continue an awkward metaphor) also must be paid in Asia too, if the post-Vietnam American policy there is to be sustained.
Sometimes the bill can be paid by other actors, but not necessarily in the way the US desires. We are seeing a dramatic example of this in the South China Sea. Japan and China are engaging in a kind of conflict that was prevented in the past by the US' postwar policy of keeping Japan from becoming a threat to China and providing stability for Japanese economic and political development. American policies of dual containment in the 1990s against Iran and Iraq came as a consequence of the failure of attempting to play both against each other in the 1980s--a failure that prompted direct American military intervention to protect economic interests.
Right now, the US is willing to pay the costs of the current policy. But external shocks in other regions and further economic disruptions may shift this calculus. We should not also rule out nationalism as a possible factor in American policy shifts. In the past, as Dan notes, isolationism was originally expressed as an American feeling of superiority over a morally corrupted world dominated by European power politics. The popularity of the recurring "Muslim rage" concept plays on an traditional American idea that the blame for American failures to transform the societies of others should be laid at those societies themselves. So while we shouldn't bet on anything more than near-term US retrenchment (a different thing than decline) in response to current economic realities, retrenchment that leads to a different conception of achieving American interests shouldn't be conclusively ruled out in the early 21st century. But contra Mishra, that would have more to do with factors external to the Middle East than Frantz Fanon 2.0.
A some point between 1945 and
A some point between 1945 and now, we forgot that our involvement in Europe, the Middle East, the Pacific Rim etc. was always intended to be temporary, to help those places avoid being dominated by a power hostile to us until they no longer needed our help to do that. Now that's coming about, it frightens us.
Sure, the loss of Syria will
Sure, the loss of Syria will be very bad for Iran but I fail to see good reasons to believe the general trend in the last two years is in US interests. Let's start off with the two places America originally intervened in. Iraq is a total mess and no one really knows how it will end out. What we do know is that it is a deeply divided state with massive internal political problems, violence still continues, it is at the very least mildly friendly towards Iran and certainly not confronting/challenging Iran. Afghanistan is a total mess and it is unclear what its fate will be after 2014. There is no way any state can sustain such a large army and police force with such a small and weak economy and state. So far it doesn't look good.
Now let's look at the countries which have had revolutions (or military coups in the case of Egypt):
Tunisia looked like it was set on a favourable direction but every now and again there are 'hiccups' which don't look too good. Regardless Tunisia is fundamentally unimportant. Can it serve as a model? Sure but it is still perhaps the most unimportant state in the larger region. Libya? Domestic problems do not seem to end and while protesters and the security forces have 'driven out' the militias the government simply appointed two colonels to take command of the men. This kind of integration takes time and even then it's questionable how important Libya is. It certainly is more important than Tunisia due to its energy importance however its really nothing in comparison to that in the Persian Gulf Region. Aside from that its own domestic political orientation in the future is far from clear. We are left with three countries now: Egypt, Syria and Yemen. There is really no point talking about Yemen as it is universally recognized as a mess and the growing influence of terrorist groups is certainly not progress. Egypt: How has Egypt's direction under Morsi been in US interests and influence? We clearly see that Egypt will not be 'subservient' to U.S. interests and Israel is deeply worried by this development and events in Syria (and potentially Jordan). When the Israel-Arab state conflict flares up again it is definitely a bad turn of events for the U.S.and a sure sign of waning U.S. influence to maintain stability in the region. Now the question of Syria: Will it be pro-Iran after Assad? Most likely not but this is a far cry from it being friendly to let alone 'quietest' regarding Israel. There is the important question of who will replace Assad but based on the kind of people we see doing the fighting and Syria's history with Israel (especially the Golan issue) I would not bet on Syria-U.S. relations being very good and certainly nothing near the level of U.S.-Gulf Monarchies.
Also please remember all the not so liked (by their publics) Arab dictators that the US still likes and depends on: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, Oman, Jordan, Algeria, Morocco. This is an incredible collection of 'yet to be toppled' allies. The ones in the Gulf that seem most ripe for 'changes' are Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. 'Losing' either will be disastrous for the U.S. Bahrain's will not forget how the U.S. stood buy in their base in Manama while the regime ruthlessly suppressed the opposition in what is very much an apartheid state. They will also not forget how the U.S. backed the monarchy and armed it over all these years. Good news for the U.S.? I beg to differ. Saudi Arabia: The economic implications of a change in Saudi policy towards the U.S. will be massive. Saudi Arabia's attempts to maintain oil prices stable and essentially subsidize and lubricate the U.S. defence industry are a key part of U.S-Gulf relations. The removal of the monarchy or even a change in policy due to massive domestic pressures will not bode well for the U.S.
My personal view on the Arab Spring is that it is essentially chaos. The status quo is the only party that stands to lose. The U.S. will not have such helpful allies in autocrats as these regimes become more democratic and they will not stay as silent and simply acknowledge U.S. policy decisions. Will Iran suffer? Of course but Iran is not the only one that has suffered. All the autocracies (i.e ALL the states) in the region have been put off balance and now have to make serious policy decisions on how to make their populations content. I question the viability of future American involvement in the region as the masses (who generally are not exactly pro-American) begin electing their leaders. Yes the U.S. has to remain to maintain it's economic and security interests but it will be ever harder to do so and more importantly American action will carry a steeper political price.
Note: You provided a link to Kindred Winecoff's piece about Steve Walt. I have never heard of this person before but after reading their bio (which says they are a Ph.D candidate) and reading the person's claims I am quite amused. For example:
"in which the U.S. is less dependent on the region for energy supply than it has been in decades,"
Oil is a fungible commodity and the decrease in U.S. energy dependence from the region really has not been that drastic. Even if it is it's still irrelevant as the market price will still go up due to turmoil in the Middle East due to the fact that A) the majority of the worlds reserves are in that region B) the majority of conventional (i.e cheap and easy to access) oil is in that region and perhaps most important C) pretty much all of the worlds spare production capacity comes from one country: Saudi Arabia. Oil economics is one of near total interdependency whether you are a supplier of a consumer.
"in which the U.S. is able to laugh off a threat from Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz."
And this is why lots of smart officials, planners and strategists are spending many hours and much resources to find ways to counter the Iranian 'A2/AD' threat? This is why the U.S. is keeping TWO aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf (done so by cutting the interval for rest and training between the arduous long deployments)? This is why the smart people at places like the CBSA are advocating what is essentially a form of containment due to the vulnerability of traditional American modes of power projection to Iranian military developments? The authors claim is pure fantasy. Since December 2011 and Iranians inflammatory rhetoric to close the Gulf and threaten the U.S. carriers entering it we have seen DoD images showing sailors manning 12.7mm M2 machine guns on aircraft carriers and destroyers. The U.S. Navy and the rest of the DoD is certainly not 'laughing off' the Iranian threat, it is incredible that this person is.
"The Middle East is less engaged in proliferation than it was a decade ago, Tehran's intransigence notwithstanding"
This point is simply intriguing. How many countries were proliferating in the Middle East a decade ago (the conventional assumption is that proliferation here refers to CBRN weapons). Last I checked Syria already had it's chemical weapons a decade ago, Israel already had its nukes, Iran already had an active weapons program [the NIE says it ended in 2003 which shouldn't solely be attributed to the raw demonstration of American power but also the removal of Iran's chief strategic threat] and we found out that Iraq didn't have a nuclear program. Libya was and remained an outlier to these events and gave up its nuclear program in a separate quid pro quo. I fail to see what the US has really accomplished then.
Lastly:" A region of the world that has troubled the U.S. since World War II has now lost enough significance for the U.S. to "pivot" away from it to East Asia."
This comment is near ludicrous. It is not that the Middle East has 'lost significance' but that East Asia has risen in it. If anywhere (in military terms) has lost significance for the U.S. it is Europe and the Atlantic and that is where the forces are being sent to Asia from. It's also worth noting that when you look at the planned change in U.S. naval force structure the deployment of forces to Asia is only a shifting of 5% of the fleet to Asia, this really is not a massive change. More important is the concept of AirSea Battle which is perhaps the only real logical military answer to Chinese A2AD defences. Even so the U.S. is unable to concentrate forces in East Asia only. The navy is being stretched to its limits with the 'Two Hub' (Pacific + P. Gulf) approach and lots of energy and resources is being put to counter the other A2AD threat : Iran (AirSea Battle Applies to Iran as well in certain aspects).
I should note that I am a second year undergraduate student studying International Relations but I am amazed and the poor quality of work some scholars and aspiring scholars/PhD candidates make. Kindred Winecoff should be writing much more factually based and high quality work than this. It is extremely disappointing. [Final Note: please do keep up with the excellent posts and I apologize for the long post]
"I should note that I am a
"I should note that I am a second year undergraduate student studying International Relations but I am amazed and the poor quality of work some scholars and aspiring scholars/PhD candidates make."
Some of those scholars have a political or foreign agenda. Why do you think Intelligence Agencies (many different sides) recruit Fulbright students?
Then again many scholars are heavy drinkers....and got a wet brain.
Stay off the booze and keep studying kid. You'll do fine.
Just because the US of A can
Just because the US of A can afford to do something doesn't mean it should.
Only interest that the US has in the ME is trade and diplomacy yet there is a cold war flavor to insuring democracy and Israel is never left out of the discussion. The US likes to export its way of life, not Nationalism defined by Isolationism or Muslim Rage, which drives American policy in the ME because that export can be packaged and sold domestically to the United States taxpayer paying for the agenda. In the mixed are the social tensions of religion and politics that have been bottled up since the Ottoman Empire and the end of Dictatorships. Because of America's cold war past it has an association with the things that people in the Middle East have learned to hate. It was easy for America to insure trade and diplomacy by bonding with heavy-handed governments to keep the dominoes from falling to the USSR.
Trade and Israel motivate the special interest, which gives incentive to US politicians, USG office holders like to keep their positions, and it is their career and ego. It is the US politician that sells their policy to the American people as polish on the shining city. Americans have let Middle East politics become their own. Now the US has HLS on steroids and terrorism domestically.
It is not Isolationism, Nationalism, or Muslim Rage that motivates my thinking. Respect for sovereignty and willingness to let the people of the ME decide their own way of life is what gains diplomatic respect universally.
The US of A should have been and in the future a neutral trading partner with the ME.
Lack of neutrality is the mistake that Americans made. If there is any cost involved with the ME, it is purely self-inflicted by Americans themselves.
BTW.....Hillary Clinton is telling Muslims how to treat their women. Why should anyone in the US care about how Muslim women are treated? How Muslim Women are treated is purely between the people in the ME to determine on their own schedule, not on an American political two or four year calendar.
See the problem? Americans laying a US Nationalist template over a sovereign state when all the USG really wants is trade and diplomacy. That is why Americans are considered arrogant, we constantly go from problem to solution without considering the middle.
Problem with today's US politicians is they can not get anything done without first making a crisis, they are only effective in a reactive mode.
Ahmed - My overall point was
Ahmed -
My overall point was not that everything in the ME was great for the US. It was that it's never been great for the US, so we need to look at the situation in comparative perspective. I.e., it's not enough to point to one or two developments and say that everything has gone bad for the US (as Walt did); we need to compare the situation today to the situation in the past. It's not enough to say that Iraq has major problems still (as you do) without noting that, those problems notwithstanding, Iraq is much less of a problem for the US now than it was in 2001 (say). When we look at things in comparative perspective it seems pretty difficult to make the case that the US's interests in the ME are more threatened today than in the past.
To your specific claims:
1. I know oil is a fungible commodity. I know the US doesn't get anywhere near a majority of its oil from the ME. I know that pretty much all the oil the US does get from the ME comes from SA. I know that prices are set in global markets. That doesn't mean that anything I wrote is wrong. The US is in a better position w/r/t energy today than it was a decade ago.
2. I'm sorry, but I'm not persuaded that the US was scared of Iran's threat to close the Strait. Preparedness is not the same thing as nervousness. Iran's threat was clearly not credible, which is why it hasn't been followed through.
3. I wasn't only referring to CBRN -- which is why I followed the "proliferation" sentence immediately with "There are fewer security dilemmas in operation than at any point in decades": proliferation and security dilemmas go hand in hand -- but even if we do consider CBRN: A decade ago (loosely), AQ Khan's weapons network was still in operation, and his clients included Iran and (most likely) Saudi Arabia. The Saudis were considering activating a nuclear program as late as 2003, and most likely would have had the regional situation not greatly changed in their favor. The Pakistan/India situation was much more nervy that it is now. You dismiss Gaddafi but could you imagine the situation in Libya today had he not given up his weapons program? A decade ago Syria was still occupying Lebanon, as was Israel intermittently, and the threat level between Israel and Syria was quite high; as you say they both had CBRN capabilities. Afghanistan was a safe haven for a global terrorist network with aspirations for acquiring CBRN, which they may have been able to do via Khan or some other source. And the situation in Iraq was not in a permanent equilibrium... something was going to have to give there, and it was likely going to be very bad whether the US was involved or not. Now none of those things are true. All of those things have changed in ways conducive to the US's geopolitical interests, at least relative to the status quo a decade ago. Are you really saying that there's been no significant movement? Are you really suggesting that the US is in a worse place than it was in 2001? 1991? 1981? Be serious.
4. Has E. Asia risen in importance to the US over the past decade? Yes, I think so. Has the M.E. declined in importance to the US over the past decade? It's difficult to argue that it hasn't (and you didn't bother to make the case... saying my claim is "near ludicrous" does not constitute an argument). Both can be true simultaneously. I did not argue that the US was removing itself from the ME entirely, nor that a "massive change" was taking place, nor that the Navy didn't face challenges, nor any other view that you seemingly ascribe to me. I simply said that -- a decade ago -- the US felt that its interests in the ME were sufficiently threatened to mobilize massively and invade two countries with full force; now it is re-deploying elsewhere. As this fact is incontrovertible I have no idea why you think it's ludicrous.
Elsewhere you write "The U.S. will not have such helpful allies in autocrats as these regimes become more democratic and they will not stay as silent and simply acknowledge U.S. policy decisions." When was that ever the case? The relationship between the US and autocratic regimes in the ME was never comfortable. The US never got everything it wanted from them. The US dealt with who was in power out of necessity. It will continue to do so. But I am more optimistic that, over time, the situation you (rightly) describe as chaos will normalize, and the long-term trajectory will be one that is more amenable to the US's interests than the previous equilibrium. Democratic regimes don't have to love the US for this to be true... look at former communist countries where the new governments often dislike the US, but where relations have still unequivocally improved from the Cold War status quo.
Think bigger.
Kindred: And the situation in
Kindred: And the situation in Iraq was not in a permanent equilibrium... something was going to have to give there, and it was likely going to be very bad whether the US was involved or not.
Thank you! This is THE key point that eludes critics of Bush's decision to resolve the Iraq problem. ("resolve": the highly preferred resolution was not regime change but for Saddam - under credible threat of punitive invasion - to just comply with the UNSC resolutions, which he should have done in 1991-92, let alone 2002-03.) However, I disagree with you on "whether the US was involved or not". There was no "or not" choice for us. The US was inextricably entwined with Iraq since 1991 so any solution to the Iraq problem would have involved us no matter what.
My perspective on Operation Iraqi Freedom:
http://learning-curve.blogspot.com/2004/10/perspective-on-operation-iraq...
Eric, I agree with you on
Eric, I agree with you on this: "There was no "or not" choice for us. The US was inextricably entwined with Iraq since 1991 so any solution to the Iraq problem would have involved us no matter what" as a point of fact. In fact, I don't think the US history w/r/t begins in 1991... the dynamic had been forming long before. I present the argument the way I do to try to head off those who say that the instability and violence in Iraq *only* occurred because of the US presence there. Really? And how do they think Iraq would've fared in the Arab Spring if Saddam was still in control?
Absolutely---our Persian Gulf
Absolutely---our Persian Gulf security situation is Cold War vintage.
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