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The Taliban, Special Operations, and Strategy
One of the preemiment problems with the way that guerrilla warfare is discussed is the almost commonplace idea that it is a fundamentally different type of war, requiring fundamentally different interpretive and operational methods. Last weekend's spectacular assault on Camp Bastion should disabuse everyone of that notion. The assault on the heavily fortified airbase demonstrates an Taliban special operations capability that has yielded strategic effect. Since the 2008 Kabul Serena Hotel attack, the Taliban (likely guided by their Pakistani patrons) have developed a capability for complex, high-risk assaults that now seems to have taken center stage. The war of position has hardened, as swathes of the country remain in the hands of either Mullah Omar or the Haqqani Network and the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) continues what has been a problematic effort to consolidate their gains in the south. The Taliban are now using special operations to bolster the political effect of their territorial holdings and make their mark on Afghanistan's new politics.
James Kiras, a historian of special operations, writes that special operations are "unconventional actions against enemy vulnerabilities in a sustained campaign, undertaken by specially designated units, to enable conventional operations and/or resolve economically politico-military problems at the operational or strategic level that are difficult or impossible to accomplish with conventional forces alone." Special operations generate cumulative moral or material attrition on the opponent in conjunction with conventional forces. Both moral and material vectors are vulnerabilities for the United States and its Afghan ally. Seven percent of the Marine Corps' overall Harrier fleet went up in smoke, and each high-risk assault in a Afghan urban center and targeted killing of an Afghan official adds to the perception of Taliban will and capability. While the Taliban special operations community may not look much like the Anglo-American model of special operations honed in World War II, it is still capable of formidable feats. The raid on the heavily fortified and geographically remote Camp Bastion required solid operational planning skills and intelligence prepartion of the battlefield. As Jeffrey Dressler argues, the complexity of the operation suggests planning and direction from Pakistan's intelligence services.
Under Kiras' model, special operations and regular forces both produce effects to support a political end. That end, as the transition process nears, is political position in Afghanistan's new order. There is nothing particularly unique about that kind of warfare. In major conventional wars after World War II, operations frequently were designed to bolster an overall political position rather than lead to decisive victory. The ending phases of the Korean and Vietnam wars both were marked by intense battles to gain a favorable position before the cease-fire. North Korea has repeatedly utilized a range of conventional and unconventional military tools for brinksmanship over the last few decades, and seems to be expanding its special operations and information warfare capabilities. Special operations, which utilize specially trained and tasked men to undertake difficult missions, are ideal for achieving strategic effect under such political conditions.
The idea that the Taliban could field a special operations capability and deploy it in a manner consistent with historical campaigns is not shocking when one considers that they originally gained political power in Afghanistan through mobile warfare to seize territory in the mid-90s. This required combined arms coordination, operational logistics, and command--all helped by generous Pakistani support. They lost political control through the similarly successful Northern Alliance prosecution of maneuver operations, which leveraged combat power to convince both Taliban elites and rank-and-file to change sides. Force destruction and the seizing of territory certainly can certainly achieve strategic ends all on their own (think Napoleon's most glorious campaigns) but the political element of war is paramount in every mode of warfare. The problem is not that Afghanistan is a uniquely political kind of war--all wars are---but that we forget that strategy involves the use of battle to generate political currency. The opening gambit of the current civil war cycle was, after all, a Soviet direct action raid to decapitate and destroy the Hafizullah Amin regime.
The Taliban are unlikely to use special operations to achieve anything that dramatic. However threatening their recent exploits may be, one concrete lesson of special operations history is that pinpoint raids do not obviate the need to painstakingly eliminate the opponent's ability and will to resist. The culminating point will be reached if the Taliban's reliance on special operations gets too far removed from what their main forces achieve. There are many people in Afghanistan and the wider region with a vested interest in seeing that the Taliban do not return to power, and a hard force-on-force fight looms. But Camp Bastion has demonstrated that Taliban special operations are nonetheless an important threat.
Jeffrey Dressler. Not Jeremy
Jeffrey Dressler. Not Jeremy Dressler.
In the end it is about
In the end it is about resolve. Post WWII history has shown that the US government lacks the political resolve for protracted combat. The winning strategy is to just keep fighting and eventually the US will leave. Germany, Italy, and Japan only surrendered after overwhelming conventional force was applied. Where is the evidence that a different strategy has ever been successful ?
Germany, Italy, and Japan
In fact, this is not really the whole story. First, Italy surrendered after the application of clearly non-overwhelming power. The Italian government had been waiting for a chance to switch sides and they jumped at it when the Allies invaded the Italian continent.
Second, Japan and Germany surrendered after a conventional war. Especially in Japan, the domestic government remained in place and cooperated with the US Supreme Commander, Douglas McArthur. (And they did manage to negate most topics of the American political agenda for post-war Japan.)
Germany surrendered at a time when its military was completely overwhelmed. However, the municipal authorities remained in place, and many state institutions were able to restart work. There were no serious political contenders for power in addition to the Allied Powers. Then, the Allied occupying forces were able to build the German political institutions relatively swiftly, using the existing organisational structures where possible.
Similarly, in Afghanistan, you did conquer Taliban. They lost completely and their leaders went underground. After that, there was a power vacuum. However, you did not disarm non-governmental militias and you did not give the central government overwhelming support. Now, it's too late. The nation-building should have taken place ten years ago.
Ja'far on September 19, 2012
Ja'far on September 19, 2012 - 6:10am
The USG has not lost its resolve to wage protracted combat. What has happened post WW2 is the USG has lost its restraint to stay out of civil wars. WW2 was the transition from the US being mostly a/an rural/agricultural ( that ball was rolling much earlier, guy named Henry Ford helped spin it up) to urban/commercial society. Invention of television and globalized news helped to bring wars and non-democracy into our living rooms. The USG and people have not seen a global pissing contest that they could not refuse (Korea, Vietnam, Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Libya, Burma) . The Cold War helped in that effort since Americans could not resist beating back the dominoes. Spending half of the USG budget on defense is the back drop of the story. Americans are not doing a very good job of balancing the spread of democracy with keeping the liberty tree healthy.
The USG has not put is full effort into winning a war since WW2 because to do so would kill every woman and child in theater and that does not look good when the US Calvary comes racing to the fight. So total war like that waged in WW2 is out the question and the motives are not clear. It doesn't help when the opponent is not wearing a uniform. When the reasons are not clear, there is nothing to win. WW2 was about clear reason.
Aelkus, guerrilla warfare still requires a different mind set to oppose it. Afghanistan is asymmetric and if it is in the political interest of the opponent the guerrilla war will burst out into a Camp Bastion. To think that ISI is not involved would be a mistake since the past can predict the future. Then again to think that the Taliban could not undertake an advanced attack on their own would be underestimating your enemy. More than anything else, the Taliban found Camp Bastion sleeping cause someone on the USG thought that a Camp Bastion would not happen. Thinking something could not happen is when you discover that your believed your own bullshit. What happened to the Consulate in Benghazi is an example of believing your own success (Mission Accomplished?).
BTW....
It is not just happening in Afghanistan. What do you call putting a video camera in a political fund raising event? First we had the 1% and 99%, now we have the 47%. Julia http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ir6gEvmwQtc could have easily been called "The making of an Obama Democrat" (wasn't the advisement produced to motivate voters to go Obama?). The American people are just as split as they have been and it is still true that the next POTUS will hardly be voted in by any margin of the popular vote. Now Obama is saying that he is the President of "all" people. Who are "all" people. Is Europe represented in the Electoral College? Were "all" the people represented in the Republican votes in Congress on Obamacare?
This President has painfully divided America and now he is creating an image of national unity and that is a message you can still believe ??????
This is not "news" and the press should be ashamed of themselves.
News looks like this.
Economy, Foreclosures, Green on Blue in Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, Egypt, China, Japan, Unemployment, Americans on food stamps, QE(forever), Jobs to PAY college loans, and a 14 Trillion dollar debt.
Want more? Sequester.
Talk the issues.
Guided by their Pakistani
Guided by their Pakistani Patrons.
And who is Pakistan's Patron?
aelkus Please explain to the
aelkus
Please explain to the crowd how the LIFG obtained crew service weapons, mortars and rockets, mobilized themselves, waited patiently nearby gathering intelligence for several weeks, (did practice runs at an alternate location) and then attacked an medium fortified installation killing four Americans?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libyan_Islamic_Fighting_Group
Why do you I ask?.... Because this is exactly what happened.
Anyone who says the attack wasn't premeditated is delusional or is saying it was, because people weren't doing their job and are now trying to cover their ass.
Additionally.... the newspapers would likely be taken back when they find out all the barter and trade made with LIFG pawns, between USG and the Colonel.
Dan Trombly and I have
Dan Trombly and I have another thing coming (looking for an non-blog outlet) that will address that. Just not here.
Visitor on September 20, 2012
Visitor on September 20, 2012 - 3:13am: "Anyone who says the attack wasn't premeditated is delusional or is saying it was, because people weren't doing their job and are now trying to cover their ass."
I believe the Obama administration drew a hard line on intervention viz the Arab Spring revolts. Last year, in his speech justifying the US role in deposing Qaddafi, Obama took pains to distinguish his hands-off policy for post-Qaddafi Libya from Bush's decision to stay and help build the post-Saddam Iraq. Bush understood that winning the 1st fight of deposing an autocrat opened the door for the Islamists, so Western help was needed for the 2nd fight for Iraq against the Islamists. Obama explicitly rejected a similar US intervention in the 2nd fight for Libya. Defining the problem frames the solution. The reality-defying spin on the Stevens killing is Obama's attempt to define the problem in a way so as to uphold his policy to avoid intervention by the US in post-Qaddafi Libya. Obama's attempt to deny the 2nd fight in Libya and broader Arab Spring strongly reminds me of the Clinton administration's dogged determination to avoid labelling the Rwandan genocide as a "genocide", despite clear evidence that it was genocide, in order to avoid US/UN intervention in Rwanda.
Add: Susan Rice, who was on
Add: Susan Rice, who was on President Clinton's National Security Council and Director for International Organizations and Peacekeeping from 1993 to 1995, was instrumental in the US avoiding the label of genocide in Rwanda in order to avoid US intervention. Rice appears to be repeating the same mode of operation for the Stevens killing.
Eric on September 20, 2012 -
Eric on September 20, 2012 - 4:49pm
It is a lot simpler than that.
Rice, Clinton, and this administration are avoiding responsibility for the cluster F*ck. It is really a joke to think that a group of people just happen to bring all the equipment to a "mob action" just so an ambush could break out. Think if the weight of carrying around mortars, tubes, and RPGs with spares ( sort of sticks out, surprise attack???). Spinning the Benghazi attack as a chance happening takes away the foresight of security. If Hillary Clinton is found to be negligent it would be cause for resignation.
They are doing some serious butt covering. Got a chuckle out of the spin, both Clinton and Rice were telling the American people what happened on the ground out of one side of their mouth while out of the other saying they could not comment until the FBI investigators finish. That is one heck of a crystal ball or the administration is telegraphing the desired FBI response.
Wall Street Journal did a good article about the attack with time line. The follow-up attack was at a building outside the Consulate that was "sensitive" enough that no USG person wanted to give responders the location of the building. At least 30 Americans were take to the airport from the Consulate complex. That is one heck of an intelligence operation for just a "Consulate".
The word is out.
Adam: In my opinion, it might
Adam:
In my opinion, it might have been worth pointing out at the beginning of your post that unconventional warfare as constructed by the special forces community, and guerrilla warfare are very separate things, if also similar ones.
Guerrilla originated in Spain to describe the small-scale resistance movement that developed in response to foreign occupation, by armed bands of civilians or by scattered royalist military units. It was small-scale war because the Spanish just weren't able to wage the bigger kind. To paraphrase a captured Arab villain in that movie "Battle of Algiers" [whose name i forgot]: given the choice, the resistance would have gladly taken airplanes, artillery and napalm over subway bombs and makeshift weapons.
But unconventional warfare seems to me a very different species of conflict. The Taliban may, as you claim, have a special operations capability. But [correct me if I'm wrong] the militaries that devote the most resources and effort to developing this type of warfare (China, Russia, maybe the Europeans or North Koreans, and us) are also the biggest and most powerful. Special warfare, then, seems less a method of last-resort than an attempt to lever military power into the realm of politics, diplomacy and intelligence. For a number of reasons, not least of which is the minimization both of costs and potential diplomatic fallout, special warfare is an attractive option for armies both powerful and weak.......It follows logically that the resemblance of guerrilla operations to special warfare operations is merely a case of convergent evolution, to borrow a term from biology.
Now with regard to the Taliban, I would suggest that they are hitting us in the only serious way that they can, and unfortunately, this time they were successful. A small victory for them like this one should not, in my view, suggest that we face anything more than a very lethal, smart and determined insurrection. Seems like a good bet that, given the tools, they would have happily contented themselves with a cruise missile to deal with Camp Bastion, rather than throw away a crack squad of their best fighters.
http://mobile.reuters.com/art
http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSBRE88J18R20120921?irpc=932
U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens was overcome by smoke and died, trapped alone inside the burning villa after all the other Americans withdrew. Another diplomat, Sean Smith, and two U.S. security men were also killed that night.
Just had a eureka moment. The time this incident occurred was late at night. Far past business hours when the Consulate should have been closed and "not occupied", especially if it was not a fortified facility.
Then realized they were "living at the Consulate", which is a solid violation of USG security standards. USG employees can not work and live in the same location. It's a pretty simple rule / regulation which obviously wasn't being followed. One can not receive a waiver for this requirement either. It's pretty much in stone "no living and working in the same location, unless it is a fortified facility, which this location obviously was not.
Sad this could have been avoided and no one should have been in that (what should have been a lock and leave) facility.
kylem556 on September 21,
kylem556 on September 21, 2012 - 4:15am
Unconventional warfare is really everything and anything. When Kennedy created the groups in the early days of Vietnam he had no clue of Munchen '72 and Anti-Terrorism as we know it today. Now every one is on the band wagon, SOCOM has never had a larger budget. The subject is so broad that any argument could be made. Think we agree on that.
Don't think the Taliban arrived at Camp Bastion with A-teams looking to set up camps to win hearts and minds. It is really about sustainability, the Taliban are not about to implement kill/capture every night. Camp Bastion was a one off that took valuable resources. Harriers are yesterday's news and the Taliban did the Pentagon and Defense contractors a favor. Your discussion about economy of scale plays here.
As far as damage goes Camp Bastion does not even size up to the cost of all the Anti-American demonstrations that are happening in over 30 countries in the past ten days. Ten year of war and an extension of various proxy wars that Uncle Sam has going on, America really doesn't have much to show for all the treasure and blood. Kids in Pakistan are chanting Anti-American songs like they are at the Mickey Mouse Club, a whole new generation. Not sure if you are paying attention, but the ME just got a reason to come together and agree on something at the West's expense. Bright side of the story is that they finally agreed.
Harriers will be replaced with something else, it is hard to get your nice guy image back.
The attack was launched at
The attack was launched at 9:35 p.m. local time.
Makes sense.
To Visitor..... on September
To Visitor..... on September 20, 2012 - 10:55pm
The connection is Susan Rice. Susan Rice was on President Clinton's National Security Council as the Director for International Organizations and Peacekeeping from 1993 to 1995. Rice was instrumental in the US avoiding the definitional label of "genocide" in order to avoid US intervention in the Rwanda genocide. It appears Rice repeated the same tactic of talking away the truth behind the Stevens killing in order to limit the US reaction and uphold the Obama policy for post-Qaddafi Libya.
Eric on September 23, 2012 -
Eric on September 23, 2012 - 8:42pm
Go higher Eric, the connection is Clinton. Hillary was as much of the Clinton Administration as Bill was.
Now Clinton wants to name her successor to SOS, RICE. Rice is just doing what people of position do to get the brass ring.
What truly amazes me is Bill Clinton dragged the nation through his twisted stories of his involvement with Monica Lewinsky trying to skirt the truth of what happened. Getting a blow job and doing an intern ( who is not your spouse) with a cigar in the White House is not a national security issue, it is just an embarrassment. Clinton got Impeached for misleading people. Now he is in the front pew of the church at the DNC giving speeches.
People believe everything that drop out of these people's mouths? Hillary is still married to Bill and I just do not know what is more amazing the Clintons are the American public.
Not sure why any woman could find any respect for these people.
The real issue in Libya is the State Department is running a CIA operation out of a Consulate safe house under the nose of a sovereign government. It is a Pakistan redux and this administration keeps the American people as much in the dark as the governments they run black ops out of. If a CIA intel op can not see an attack coming, they really are not very useful are they.
See the problem?
To Visitor.... on September
To Visitor.... on September 24, 2012 - 5:43am
In my opinion, the most two-faced thing that Bill Clinton has done is his 180-degree flip on the Iraq mission with a partisan calculation to jump on the anti-Bush bandwagon.
Bush relied on the case and precedent on Iraq developed by the Clinton administration. Clinton initially supported Bush by citing his own recent presidential experience with Iraq.
When Clinton flipped, he criticized the goal of liberal reform for Iraq as a Bush-era choice when Clinton as President officially claimed regime change and liberal reform were necessary to solve the Iraq problem. He also accused Bush of not allowing UNMOVIC enough time in Iraq despite that UNMOVIC was in Iraq for 4 months and Hans Blix had reported Iraq's continued non-compliance to the UN at the 3 month mark. In 1998, Clinton had bypassed the UN altogether with his decision to bomb Iraq based on a * 3-week * compliance test by UNSCOM. Furthermore, Clinton had claimed it was urgently necessary to bomb Iraq ASAP upon receipt of the Butler report so Saddam wouldn't be able to disperse his forces and protect his weapons.
So yeah, Bill Clinton will brazenly lie out of self-interest on the big things, not just to cover his unethical personal behavior.
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