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Robert Haddick has a provocative post at
Foreign Policy suggesting that the rise of strategic
air power and anti-ship weaponry might render carriers obsolete, and cause major inter-service conflict to boot.
He might be right about the second part, but I have strong doubts about the
first.
This isn’t the first time the aircraft
carrier as we know it received an early obituary. In the wake of World War II,
the advent of strategic bombing and nuclear weapons strongly suggested to a
number of overeager politicians, along with Army and Air Force officers, that
the Navy and Marine Corps were on their way out. The arguments? Expensive
supercarriers capable of fielding aircraft that could carry the day’s five-ton
nuclear bombs were too expensive, unwieldy, and vulnerable compared to
strategic bombers, immediate aerial force, rather than support of ground
operations, was the overwhelming concern for rapid response, and access to
theater land basing would be either reliable or unnecessary.
There certainly was a massive breach in
inter-service relations, as the Revolt of the Admirals and the attendant
fallout revealed. Yet the carrier did not die. and indeed it rose in prominence
as an instrument of U.S. power. Today, though, Haddick suggests carrier killer
technologies are sufficiently disruptive, and carriers sufficiently expensive,
to keep them out of useful combat range, to the point where they would require
sortie-limiting midair refueling.
This misses half of the anti-access/area
denial challenge. Certainly, countries such as china and Iran have increasing
access to anti-ship weapons ranging from cruise missiles to small boat swarms.
However, these countries also possess increasingly sophisticated capabilities
to strike land basing. As RAND studies of air
warfare have pointed out,
China could also choose to rain ballistic or cruise missiles on U.S. air bases
in the Western Pacific, forcing the U.S. to operate from a long distance and
rely on tankers anyway. Countries can also simply choose not to provide
overflight or access to theater basing for tactical aircraft.
Haddick suggests that bombers with precision
weapons could elide these issues. Yet the continuous presence of strategic
bombers is still dependent on thorough SEAD. SEAD operations, though stealthy
aircraft can participate, still rely in significant part on specialized
short-range aircraft such as the EA-18G and F-16CJ, as well as hundreds of
TLAMs from naval vessels. Haddick recognizes that longer-ranged carrier
aircraft, such as carrier launched-UAS, could shift this balance (as lighter
nuclear bombs shifted the logic of carriers after the Revolt of the Admirals),
but then asks why intercontinental drones could not work,
Simply looking at carriers ability to
dispense aerial firepower, however, is insufficient to understanding their
value. Carriers project power, not just firepower. Bombers can support troops
in contact in Afghanistan, sure, but Afghanistan isn’t exactly the height of
the A2/AD challenge (and you can see plenty of F/A-18s providing airstrikes
there too). Indeed, with the exception of landlocked countries, anywhere that
the U.S. is providing close air support to American troops in contact, it will
likely have a naval presence nearby. Indeed, if access to theater basing for
tactical aircraft is diminishing, than projecting a ground presence into an
area is more, not less, likely to necessitate a carrier. Carrier Battle Groups
will likely need to integrate their operations more with strategic bombers and
tactical aircraft, to confront A2/AD challenges, but for some kinds of crisis
response, strategic bombers likely won’t cut it.
The best response to a crisis isn’t always
delivering the largest amount of warheads to the largest amount of foreheads.
You can’t evacuate American citizens to a B-2, or drop a JSOC team out of one.
Maritime power remains more flexible than air power for supporting ground
operations thousands of miles away from home, and where maritime power goes, it
is good to ensure a whole variety of tactical aircraft - from helicopters to EW
and SEAD platforms to close-air support and air superiority jets - can follow.
Despite the run of good luck in Libya, The messy business of ground operations
won’t always be easy to outsource, and theater basing will not always be easy
to procure. The spectrum of operations necessary to conduct under those
circumstances will likely quantitatively overburden and qualitatively outstrip
the limits of the bomber force.
As a final point, naval power provides an
effective show of presence and force that intercontinental bombers cannot.
Although gunboat diplomacy may seem like 19th century skullduggery, the ability
to park a huge amount of floating combat power offshore is a more effective
demonstration of presence than strategic bomber patrols, and more politically
flexible (and economically inexpensive, in many cases) than trying to secure
theater basing for non-amphibious ground forces or tactical aircraft.
Ultimately, A2/AD is going to make it more difficult for all
forms of power projection, not just carriers. Even if the platform’s halcyon
days are behind it, the continued dependence of U.S. forces on maritime control
and power projection generally is likely to give the carrier a continued, if
increasingly circumscribed, role well into this century.
An excellent piece. The
An excellent piece. The increased effectiveness of A2/AD weapons threatens land based immensely. I do wonder what the results of Pentagon studies on survivability of their aircraft in al Udeid/Qatar and al Dhafra/UAE will be in the event of a war with Iran and the impact on sortie generation if suitable airbases in the region can't be provided (Saudi Arabia, Yemen), are all within threat envelope (Iraq, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman [to an extent]) or are not suitable for use (Yemen - single runways in the middle of major cities). Other than Turkey (quite unlikely) and Afghanistan the only real remaining options are Israel and Jordan. The former will create a host of political problems (as well as PR) and the latter really isn't that suitable (few air bases, limited space for a surge in numbers).
The carrier Navy's current
The carrier Navy's current dire state is not a function of strategic air power rendering it obsolete - an argument you successfully refute. It's a result of two things: decades of incompetent acquisition management in the Navy that left the carriers with inadequate ability to project power and the advent of unmanned aircraft. Already carriers cannot operate close enough to shore to launch unrefueled strike packages - there is no such thing as unrefueled anything in the Hornet and of course the Navy got rid of all its tankers as well, so they are already dependent upon the Air Force. Meanwhile almost all tactical aviation is soon to be rendered obsolete by unmanned systems. Carriers can be converted to operate drones, however - presuming the Navy could successfuly acquire them, which is a giant presumption. The Navy hasn't successfully procured a new system of any kind since the 1980s, with no apparent new successes on the horizon. Big, versatile capital ships remain key instruments of national power projection, as you correctly noted. They can do lots of things that we routinely need. On the other hand they are very, very vulnerable to modern antiship weapons and have given up most of their self-defense capabilities, thanks to the aforementioned acquisition failures. They would likely not survive very long in a full-scale conflict with a peer competitor launching Flankers, high speed torpedoes, and antiship ballistic missiles at the battle group. So the carriers currently exist in a kind of twilight zone - they are very useful in asymmetric warfare, when we have air supremacy and the enemy has no ability to project power at sea - but they probably are obsolete in a full-scale conventional conflict. This is a very similar situation to that faced by wooden sailing ships in 1860 or battleships in 1941.
kaka
kaka
The A2AD threat to large
The A2AD threat to large surface combatants, and the challenge of updating our SSBN force.
CVNs and SSBN/SSGNs remain the two most expensive warship classes to build and operate, but the two most potent and critical weapon platforms in America's inventory. Like strategic bombers, ballistic missiles are essentially long-range artillery by other means, a fact the Chinese name for their deterrence force, the 2nd Artillery Corps, makes quite clear. CVNs and SSBN/SSGNs fulfill similar missions, but one is fundamentally more survivable than the other. Survivability and stealth are the core attributes of an SSBN/SSGN.
There have been any number of attempts to build and operate submarine aircraft carriers (I wrote about the Japanese I-400 class for "War Is Boring"). The TLAM strikes from the USS Florida (SSGN 728) during the Libyan civil war were one of the earliest combat uses of unmanned attack aircraft launched from a submarine.
Given:
1) the titanic costs of CVN's and SSBN/SSGN's,
2) the fact that the two ship classes between them soak up the bulk of nuclear propulsion assets,
3) the increasing vulnerability of large surface ships to missile/swarm attacks,
it would seem to be worth seriously considering replacement of CVNs with a submarine equivalent based on the SSBN/SSGN concept. A second look at the SSBN(X) program from this perspective might reveal potent new synergies in design, construction and deployment of the Navy's premier capital ship.
The DARPA/Skunk Works "Cormorant" program took a serious look at underwater deployment and recovery of UAVs, but the program has either gone defunct or black. A review of WWII Japanese subs' aircraft hangars, shops, launch and recovery systems would be worthwhile; even more useful would be a second look at the Regulus program. It might well be possible to launch and recover large UAVs from a sub, if the drones are STOL seaplanes. The manta ray-like design currently favored for naval UAV designs is well-suited to hydrodynamic investigations.
Norman Polmar and K.J. Moore explored the history of submarine carriers and transports in Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines, 1945-2001.
Disgruntled Sailor hit on my
Disgruntled Sailor hit on my point...the issue here is largely one of the Navy's own making. To provide a bit of background, the Navy of the '70s and '80s not only had a relatively long legged strike aircraft (the A-6) they also had organic tanking assets (both strike, with the KA-6, that could fly along with the strike package, and stand-off/recovery, with a rather large offload capacity, with the KA-3), in sufficient numbers and capacity to support a large strike package. This was in addition to the relatively long ranged fighter/interceptor in the F-14. Then the Navy bet the farm on an all LO fleet but the A-12 debacle happened combined with the NATF version of the F-22 falling through and Navy tacair basically lost an entire decade of procurement. This was only compounded by the extremely short sighted decision to prematurely retire the A-6 and also do away with the KA-6, leaving buddy tanking as the only organic non-USAF supported tanking option (which is really no option at all for supporting anything beyond a self protection CAP or a VERY limited strike package.) Naval Aviation, through a series of short sighted decisions combined with some bad luck, has come perilously close to rendering themselves irrelevant in anything outside of low intensity conflict and gunboat diplomacy/showing the flag.
One last point, regarding the power projection argument...while I agree that there is an intangible benefit you get from, as the saying goes, parking six acres of sovereign U.S. real estate off someone's shore, I'd suggest you look at the Continuous Bomber Presence at Andersen on Guam and the Theater Security Package deployments of F-22s and other tactical fighters to various points around the Pacific (usually either Andersen or Kadena on Okinawa, and sometimes Korea.) PACOM feels strongly enough about these two things to have had a standing requirement since c. 2004 for a squadron of strategic bombers to be deployed to Andersen at all times, as well as a standing requirement for a squadron of F-22s to be forward deployed somewhere in its AOR at all times (in addition to the permanently based squadrons in AK and HI.) Carriers have that intangible, but don't sell the aircraft short either.
Perhaps the most striking
Perhaps the most striking aspect of this impressive article is that it was written by a 'grunt'. BZ.
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