Abu Muqawama: August 2008

Abu Muqawama retains its autonomy and the views and beliefs expressed within the blog do not reflect those of CNAS. Abu Muqawama retains the right to delete comments that include words that incite violence; are predatory, hateful, or intended to intimidate or harass; or degrade people on the basis of gender, race, class, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or disability. In summary, don't be a jerk.

  • Congratulations, you've been selected as a combat advisor.

    So, what to do next? Kip is hoping you have a bit of time for some professional development. The US military, you see, has learned some lessons along the way on advising. Alas, it has forgotten as much as it has learned...but whether you're a professional soldier or just interested in the most important military mission in Afghanistan and Iraq, here are some selections for you to look at.

    Lieutenant Colonel John L. Cook's The Advisor: the Phoenix Program in Vietnam is perhaps the best book Kip has encountered on being a combat advisor. It explains the dynamics of a team, the training received, and gaps in the understanding and knowledge of the advisors. And it offers some true gems as first lieutenant and then captain Cook works with his South Vietnamese counterparts to defeat the political infrastructure of the Viet Cong.

    From Cook's Vietnamese counterpart Quy, a lesson for every advisor:
    "But you insist on doing it as if my people were not Vietnamese but Americans. All the things that are good for you are not good for them," he explained. "You talk of marketplaces and economy and income. It is all difficult to understand. Why must a rice farmer make much money? Why must people have houses with wooden floors and running water? Why should he make more than he can use? We can only eat so much and sleep in one bed. A good life here is not the same as the good life in America. You must first ask yourself what the Vietnamese need and want. We must answer these questions. If you offer them much in the beginning, they do not understand."
    The book shares the close tie that successful advisors develop with their interpreters, the men who serve as cultural advisors to the military advisor:
    I had grown to know Chi quite well during the time I'd been in Di An. We had walked through the long, hot days and the endless rice paddies together. We had shared the same canteen, the same box of C-rations, the same risks. When we suffered losses, they had been mutual losses, a phenomenon Chi was not able to understand at first ("How can an American care about the death of a Vietnamese or pretend to be sorry when a Vietnamese dies?"), but was forced to accept as being true ("why else would an American risk his life to save a Vietnamese unless he cared?"). All of these things had been vital in building a relationship that was free of deception and dishonesty. We had reached the point where Chi no longer told me only the things he thought I wanted to hear--a common condition that plagues most advisor-interpreter relationships--but everything he thought I should hear.
    In the book, you can feel the same frustrations that advisors in Afghanistan and Iraq feel today:
    Being at the bottom gave me an advantage those above me did not have; I could see the difference between what was supposed to happen and what was actually happening, and the two had very little in common.
    In its totality the book offers not only a practical view of what effective advising looks like but also offers glimpses into other aspects of the effort ought look like, from the type of training received by advisors to the work done at Combined training centers in which South Vietnamese and US counterparts trained together (and which seem to have been far above what is offered today at Afghanistan's and Iraq's in-theater training centers).

    Kip originally found this diamond on advising hidden in another jewel from the Combat Studies Institute, a compilation of articles on advising entitled Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present. The compilation by Robert Ramsey includes some spectacular observations on what is required to be an effective advisor, not just of the individual, but also of the institution.

    From Gregory T. Banner, where Kip found the recommendation on Cook's The Advisor, there is this observation:
    It appears to me that our effort in El Salvador was likewise conducted without a serious study of Vietnam or an effort to learn what we could from that or other conflicts....For all the difficulty of conventional operations, they are not even in the same ball-park as far as the need to be innovative, creative, and juggle a host of political, military, social and economic requirements. The fact is that nobody is adequately trained for the work and that makes a complex job extremely difficult. Nevertheless, I feel that the difficulty of the challenge does not excuse poor performance. We get paid to tackle such problems, analyze what is going on and find solutions. I am embarrassed at how little I have accomplished here and only through hearing similar feelings from other advisors have I been able to keep some measure of professional self-respect. I have no doubt that the job could be done better. My one great hope is that we can do it better and take the time to really study the problem and develop workable solutions. We are not there yet and we owe it to our country and those we want to help, to get our act together and figure out how to do this type of mission.
    Surely to the chagrin of the original author, the observation could easily have been pulled from Kip's After Action Report of his time in Afghanistan.

    Lawrence's Twenty-Seven Articles, timeless as ever, are included in the work. Captain James F. Ray, a Rhodes scholar and infantry captain killed in action, reminds us that military personnel learned lessons on political advising during a counterinsurgency from which the members of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) might still learn. Later, Major General John H. Cushman writes that "insight" is the most important quality for any advisor. It is a compilation that ought to be read by both maneuver commanders who employ advisors and the advisors themselves.

    This it shares in common with Robert Ramsey's preceding Long War Paper, entitled Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador and the Commander's Handbook for Security Force Assistance.

    Colonel Timothy R. Reese summarizes Ramsey's findings on what we ought to have learned from previous advisory efforts in the introduction:
    Among the key points Mr. Ramsey makes are the need for US advisors to have extensive language and cultural training, the lesser importance for them of technical and tactical skills training, and the need to adapt US organizational concepts, training techniques, and tactics to local conditions. Accordingly, he also notes the great importance of the host nation’s leadership buying into and actively supporting the development of a performance-based selection, training, and promotion system. To its credit, the institutional Army learned these hard lessons, from successes and failures, during and after each of the cases examined in this study. However, they were often forgotten as the Army prepared for the next major conventional conflict.
    The Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance's Commander's Handbook is perhaps more stunning. In writing that mirrors what a doctrinal publication on advising ought look like it offers in view of our advisory efforts to date some spectacular criticism:
    2.33. Not everyone is suited for SFA, and not everyone understands SFA. SFA operations usually involve a steep learning curve and extensive experiential learning events. It is important that the goals, objectives, frustrations, and typical phases of SFA operations be laid out for all leaders and their forces setting appropriate expectations up front. This will mitigate misperceptions and unproductive friction between coalition and HN forces.

    2.34. Planners and senior commanders must identify and select leaders who have an affinity for austere environments, are quick to learn, communicate well up and down the chain, and are flexible and adaptive. These individuals, in turn, must instill these same qualities in their subordinates and those they advise. The opposition and threat will evolve when faced by improved security forces. The SFA forces and FSF must evolve faster and more effectively than the threat. This places a burden on the lessons learned sources to accurately capture, analyze, disseminate, and integrate the evolving tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) and character of the threats as they develop. Commanders should consider the following qualities when selecting advisor teams: maturity, professionalism, competence, patience, knowledge, flexibility, innovativeness, motivation, confidence, cultural effectiveness, and situational awareness.

    2.35. Effective SFA requires senior political and military leaders who view SFA as critical to U.S. foreign policy and deserving of their fullest support.
    Beyond that the handbook is an excellent tool by which advisors can articulate their roles and responsibilities to Coalition maneuver force commanders--a key friction point discussed poignantly in Greg Jaffe's "Camp Divided," which merits inclusion on reading lists for both commanders and advisors.

    Some good tactical articles on advising unfortunately remain behind firewalls in US Army tactical journals such as Infantry and Armor. A number of others, however, are available both in the media and in Military Review. Recently, Candace Rondeaux's "Ragtag Pursuit of the Taliban" covers the challenges of one team in Afghanistan's northern province of Kunduz and gives a good, brief view of the skills of an advisor.

    In Transition Teams: Adapt and Win, Captain William C. Taylor offers advice on organizing an ad hoc advisor team for success in the field and then successfully advising with it. Major Mark M. Weber offers in U.S. Military Advisors: a Need for Guiding Principles some thoughts on the bedrock principles by which advisors must abide and which they must also convince their foreign and Coalition counterparts to follow. In Twelve Urgent Steps for the Advisor Mission in Afghanistan, Captain Dan Helmer argues that continued under-resourcing of the advisor mission in Afghanistan will lead to failure of the counterinsurgency effort in that country. Finally, in this month's Military Review (and CAC, Kip is so mad at your re-designed and far less usable website right now after trying to find articles that he would like to launch a new discussion on electronic warfare--sorry, readers, there will be no link this time), both Dr. John Nagl and Major Michael D. Jason offer in seperate articles two close but different views on how the Army should permanently insitutionalize an advisor capability.

    Kip would also be remiss in failing to mention the Special Forces Advisor Guide and the emerging ALSA MTTP on advising; the former is available on USAPA and the latter is only in draft. The Center for Army Lessons Learned also offers an advisor guide constructed by transition team members. These documents are only available to our military readers as they are behind firewalls, but they are worth seeking out. For everyone, Kip would be remiss if he failed to mention Chapter 6 of FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency, which covers advising foreign security forces in some detail.

    Despite the articles, some of our readers would rather spend their time buried in a book. They could not go wrong by reading carefully Bing West's The Village. West covers the attempt by one US Marine squad to advise Popular Forces in the village of Binh Nghia. Far under the rank of advisors currently undertaking these types of tasks (more akin to what you might find at a compat outpost in Iraq, but not really), this handpicked squad of Marine advisors offers lessons for today. For instance, West talks about what political primacy really looks like:
    Trao had complained to McGowan that, although the captain had good motives, his handouts had disrupted the assistance projects of the village council, undercut the authority of the hamlet chiefs and eroded the discipline of parents. Those who lounged around the market drinking and who gathered the scraps others dropped had organized into gangs. They were the ones who clung to the captain's jeep and smiled and pawed at hime while pusing other villagers aside.
    The Village offers thoughts on how a successful team protects the populace:
    Although the Americans were gradually becoming involved in nonmilitary matters in the village, their primary effort and the focus of their attentions remained tactical. But after nine months of some of the hardest village fighting in Vietnam, Binh Nghia was still intact. There was never an air strike called in the war for that village. It was a battle fought with rifles and grenades at such close quarters that both sides used their senses of smell and hearing as much as their eyesight. The villagers did not stroll around at night, and in the firing at sounds, flashes, and shadows, it was usually the participants on both sides, not the villagers, who died. There were exceptions, but they were exceptions.
    Then there are lessons on why your counterparts might at times might not be as eager for you for non-stop action, or about their need for tactical level advising:
    Regular military units--American, Viet Cong, or North Vietnamese--have periods of rest and stand-downs between engagements. For Suong as a village militiaman, there was no rotation, no surcease. Suong completed roughly two thousand patrols. An American soldier with one hundred patrols would be highly respected among his peers. Suong had engaged in the close-in combat of the hamlets for twelve years. In comparison, over a thirty-year career, an American soldier may be in a "combat environment"--near enough to hear shooting--for two or three years. At no time in our history has an American soldier been asked to endure twelve years on the line.
    It is a book that takes you right into the action and where Bing West weaves the lessons of fighting and advising the tactical level counterinsurgency without you realizing immediately your indoctrination.

    Of course, some of our readers may wish to take their lessons from more recent experience. Books by the very nature of the publishing industry are never current, but Marine Captain Eric Navarro offers in God Willing: My Wild Ride with the New Iraqi Army the first long-form account of advising in Iraq (there is no equivalent for Afghanistan).

    With no training and an unclear mission, Navarro is thrown into an advisor team. Navarro, who initially suffers acute culture shock that seems to morph into an unhealthy multi-page fascination with where Iraqi soldiers defecate, does the best he can with what he has available to him, and occasionally learns the kind of things that Kip hopes advisors who peruse this reading list can learn before they get to theater, not after:
    Once the Iraqis were crowded into the small house, Staff Sergeant Sullivan and I made contact with India's company commander to figure out when we were going out on patrol. Tomorrow was the short answer, which came quickly after making our introductions. The timing was not up for discussion with the Iraqis. Major Ali had no input in how his troops would be used. I had not anticipated the mission going this way. I thought we were supposed to be helping the Iraqis stand up their army so that they could go and fight. As an adviser I was told I was not in charge of the Iraqis. Apparently, the Marines of India Company were under no such restrictions. This put me in a difficult position. I was the bridge between the Americans and the Iraqis, but I had no real power with either side. I could only influence events. My negotiation skills would be tested.
    Reading these difficult lessons learned from an articulate, hard-charging Marine does still make Kip wonder what we could do if we identified men like him with the ability to figure it out, gave them targeted training as advisors, resourced them for the mission, and adjusted our force structure to support ongoing commitments and future contingencies. Regardless, we will be supporting advisor missions in Afghanistan and Iraq for some time to come, and Kip hopes that readers might discuss further and offer additional suggestions in the comments section.
  • The Khanaqin issue Iraqologist referred to in his AM guest post has escalated. Khanaqin is a majority-Kurdish district in northern Diyala occupied by peshmerga in the immediate aftermath of the invasion, and is consequently one of the “disputed” territories whose status is to be resolved along with Kirkuk’s according to Article 140. In the course of the recent military offensive in Diyala, the Iraqi Army tried to order the peshmerga to withdraw from Khanaqin and, at least according to Azzaman, vacate government buildings. The current situation appears to be a standoff, with the IA outside the city and the peshmerga refusing to withdraw.

    Barzani’s office issued a statement saying it’s odd, since Khanaqin is a pretty safe place, that the IA would enter ostensibly to combat terrorism. Another prominent Kurdish official went on to claim that the “government mobilization” on Khanaqin was intended to preempt its resolution by 140. Then Maliki said that it was the “right of the army to enter any province or region in Iraq without exception” [emphasis added to highlight inflammatoriness]. Barzani responded by saying that the KRG was ready to “play cards it has never played before,” including withdrawing support from Maliki’s government.

    From a constitutional standpoint (PDF here), Maliki unquestionably has the better argument. Article 110.2 is explicit in granting the central government the power to “formulate and execute national security policy,” while the best the Kurds have is Article 121.5, which grants regions only the right to the “establishment and organization of internal security forces.” There may be some legislation or CPA order to the contrary, but my reading of the legal situation is that the IA can surely enter Diyala at will and probably the KRG as well. This has just never been tested before, to my knowledge, since the Kurds have been a strong participant in every post-2003 central government. Keep in mind too that Kirkuk is in an almost identical situation: it’s not part of the KRG, but peshmerga (mostly PUK) keep the “peace” there. The only difference between Kirkuk and the other disputed territories is that annexing Kirkuk, via 140 or other means, would not require redrawing provincial boundaries.

    The back story here is well-known. The Kurdish parties have been, from the beginning of the war, the most organized and strongest of all the Iraqi factions, most of the rest of the which were weak and divided. They’ve leveraged their relative strength to secure their long-term future vis a vis the rest of Iraq. In a highly non-inclusive process, they won a constitution that is extraordinarily decentralized by any standard and guarantees them de facto autonomy. The insertion of 140 itself would never have happened had the drafting process been at all representative of the rest of Iraq. In his memoir, Paul Bremer uses Barzani’s threat of secession to justify the dissolution of the Iraqi army. (Iraqologist doesn’t have the book on hand to check this reference, but hey, this is blogging!) While this disastrous decision is hardly solely Bremer or the Kurds’ fault, his account is indicative of the Kurds general MO the past five years.

    While Kurdish separatism is currently having a disastrous effect on Iraqi stability, their motivations are understandable: they were in open conflict with and faced oppression from Baghdad for two decades preceding the invasion (and on and off before that). Looked at in the context of Iraqi history, they’re getting what they can, while they can. Their dominance in the current central government (at the moment threatening to come unglued) and their legal autonomy are a major victory for them, and totally without precedent in the history of Iraq. Getting hold of Kirkuk, Sinjar, Khanaqin, etc. is the next step in this broader effort. The difference now is that the Arabs are starting to get their act together.

    The PUK/KDP had as a tactical ally in this effort ISCI, with whom their relationship goes back to at least 1992, not borne out of the exigencies of post-2003 politics as many assume. ISCI was a full partner in the drafting of the constitution, even though its own region-formation ambitions appear to have faded for now (pace Visser, and I’ll have another post on that soon). ISCI has supported Kurdish claims on Kirkuk, but since they no longer appear much interested in creating a balanced, symmetrical federalist system in Iraq, it has less strategic interest in taking this position. In other words, since ISCI appears committed to dominating Iraq from Baghdad, it’s not in their interest to be effectively ceding territory. They certainly don’t seem to be standing in the way of Maliki/IA’s recent agitation against the Kurds.

    Perhaps more importantly, though Maliki has glommed himself onto ISCI in most respects, he is still his own man and does come from a much different ideological background. Iraqologist tends to explain current Iraqi politics in terms of money and power rather than ideology, but it may be worth pointing out here that Maliki has never been much of a fan of federalism (cf Visser). Even if that’s not convincing, his current much-discussed overconfidence and strongman ambitions should be enough evidence that he’s not about to give in to the Kurds, despite their being a pillar of his government. Arab Iraqis are getting pretty fed up with PUK/KDP territorial ambitions—especially after their obstructionism on the PEL—and he can get a lot of mileage out of this.

    Anyway, the big point here is that the main ISCI/Kurd/Maliki bedrock alliance of the past two years is showing some strain. Iraqologist could go on and on speculating about the implications of this, how much is the result of chance (and the recent Maliki psychodrama) vs. how much it’s a consequence of the “center” emerging in Baghdad and how that affects calculations on all sides. He’ll save that for later posts—his inaugural post has become a marathon and does not bear the jaunty, refreshing blogging style to which he aspires. Better to leave these thoughts half-formed and get busy enjoying his holiday weekend.

    All right, bring on the “Green Zone American” attacks!
  • Thanks, Dr. iRack, for the kind welcome, and congrats on your impending nuptials.  It's an honor to be pinch hitting for you and to begin my blogging career in such an illustrious venue.  After toying with the idea of staying anonymous, I've decided to come clean from the start.  I am Sam Parker, a Program Officer at USIP.  I've guest-posted here and there, but this is my first regular gig.  

    Iraqologist hasn't decided yet if he's going to do the third person thing--he'll try it out.  
  • Dr. iRack is taking an extended break from blogging. He's very much enjoyed sharing his thoughts on Iraq with the readers of AM . . . and, believe it or not, has gotten a kick out of getting slammed for being everything from a neo-imperialist occupation-lover to an American-hating defeatist! Hey, if you're getting hit by the extremes on both side, you must be on to something!

    But now Dr. iRack has to get tenure, get married to the soon-to-be Mrs. Dr. iRack, go on his honeymoon, and finish his book. Dr. iRack hopes to return in a few months. We'll see.

    So, for a while at least, the Iraq "beat" will be placed in the capable hands of Iraqologist, another DC-based Iraq analyst who happens to be way smarter than Dr. iRack anyway. Good luck, man, and have fun!
  • Charlie awoke to find this email from The Namesake this morning (it seems he's forgotten how to lovingly write in the 3rd person since leaving the world famous blog):

    Charlie,

    I was flipping through the archives here in Beirut this morning and came across this absolute gem by Robert Fisk. I'm sure the blog's readership will love it.
    "ARIEL SHARON has done it again. ... Israel's new Prime Minister is accusing the Iranians of transferring new long-range missiles to Lebanon - capable, so he claims, of hitting the centre of Israel - and accusing Syria of using Lebanon's airports to transfer these fantasy missiles. It's important to use the word fantasy. In the hundreds of miles I travel across Lebanon every month, I have yet to see a long-range missile, let alone a transporter. Satellite pictures would easily identify such a rocket and Beirut airport is these days so hide-bound with security that you couldn't move a rifle through its terminal."
    - Robert Fisk, The Independent (London), 30 March 2001.
    Well! If Robert Fisk says they don't exist, they don't exist. Right? Because the odds of one of the world's most secretive guerrilla organizations being able to hide an advanced weapons system from Robert Fisk and his trusty driver Abed are approximately 0.00/1,000. You have no secrets that you can hide from Robert Fisk, Hassan Nasrallah, so don't even bother trying. He knows where you are right this very minute, in fact, and is coming to interview you this evening after he drives his obligatory hundred miles around the Bekaa Valley. (You're in Zahle today, right? Having ice cream? Fisk knew that. He also knows you summer in Ehden. No one else would have guessed that, but Fisk did.)

    That 600mm Zelzal-2 (max. range 210km*) Hizballah tried to launch in 2006, by the way, must have been a special fantasy Zelzal-2. That was probably also a fantasy F-15 that the IAF claimed destroyed said fantasy Zelzal-2 in July 2006 and a fantasy Iranian official who admitted in August 2006 to supplying Hizballah with such fantasy weaponry.

    *Or, for those of you who can't do the metric conversion, "capable of hitting the center of Israel."
  • Carlos has long wondered about the differences in the virulence of two different insurgencies in Southeast Asia. One in the Southern Philippines, the other in Southern Thailand. Not being one for monocausal arguments, there are many factors that have been raised to explain the differences.

    1. Buddhism vs. Catholicism as a major religion and its associated tensions with Islam.

    2. The role of a King who is above politics, but has moral authority and a true bully pulpit. (The King of Thailand isn't necessarily respected in the South, where part of the claims for separation rest on separate kingdoms, but could the King's position in the rest of Thai society be a factor in societal relations in the South?)

    3. Income differentials for the regions, as well as connection between the "haves" and whatever particular section of society.

    4. Role of the Afghanistan experience? Many Filipinos fought against the Soviets, and I cannot say there were no Thais in that fight, I cannot on the other hand think of any off the top of my head. (This, though, isn't really an explanation, but simply an expression of the same phenomenon--why the Southern Philippines fighters have transnational connections and less so with the Southern Thais).

    So there continue to be differences, but there may be unfortunate inroads (so far, only tactical) from transnational influences into Southern Thailand. Recent bomb attacks show a shift in targeting (not to mention the simple tactic of the car bomb itself) towards first responders and increasing casualty counts. This is certainly a troubling development, given the recent reports by the International Crisis Group (Carlos' favorite place for current SE Asia information and analysis, incidentally) that there have been advances for the government in the South.

    The ICG report also notes that these advances due to shifts in the application of military power will not (statement of the obvious to follow) address the more fundamental grievances of the insurgents.

    The Thai government is currently distracted from this issue due to more pressing concerns closer to home, as the current PM is facing (literally outside his door) a massive popular protest. (Again in some contradistinction to the Philippines, there is something about "revolutions" in Thailand that are different).

    ASIDE: To add on to Rivers' post above, Carlos remembers a quick stopover in Bangkok, during which there was a massive protest over (I think) government salaries being cut. The mass of people made the terrible traffic in Bangkok even worse, but it cleared out when the protesters left for the weekend. They would be coming back Monday.

    ASIDE 2: The food vendors in SE Asia are the creators of some of the greatest cuisine known to humanity, and one should always partake whenever possible. They are also some of the best HUMINT in the region. When they are not in an area that they usually populate, be wary; when they arrive in even greater numbers than one usually sees, this is either: (1) a Festival (which you can confirm with a calendar and newspaper) or (2)a massive protest is coming.

    Samak Sundaravej, the current Thai PM is under fire for being a proxy of the previous one, the billionaire Thaksin Shinawatra. Thaksin was under investigation for multiple corruption charges when he fled the country. Thaksin and Samak remain quite popular in the outskirts of the country, but definitely have their share of enemies among the urban population and "traditional elite" in and around the capital.

    Yeah, I don't know of any other country that has a situation like that (/sarcasm)

    While the protesters generally agree Samak should go, asking who will or should replace him is to open up a whole host of questions. Many anti-Thaksin folks believed he stirred up the problems in the South for political advantage (fat lot of good that did him), but with this ongoing turmoil, any advances that might be made in the South are almost sure to be lost.
  • Sports writing often compares great contests to epic battles.

    But perhaps in our efforts in Afghanistan, the reverse is a better comparison.

    Reporting on the Beijing Olympics puts China's expenditure on those games at about $44 billion.

    Meanwhile, total US expenditure on aid to Afghanistan barely merits a place on the podium: a total of $26 billion in seven years.

    Of course, we have come nowhere near the Marshall plan promised Afghanistan in 2002--an effort whose proportions are worthy of consideration as we try to correct course. One year of the Marshall Plan (1948-1949) cost approximately $7.4 billion. A similar effort in today's dollars would cost just over $64 billion (adjusted by the Consumer Price Index), or put differently, $14 billion more than the total requested by the Afghan government in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy over the course of five years instead of one.

    This would not cost nearly as much as the Marshall Plan as a share of the GDP. A nation at war spending similarly in order to support its security in response to the largest attack on US soil in history would have to fork out in assistance about $382 Billion--1.5 to 2 times the annual cost of the first major US tax cuts in a time of war.
  • According to Reuters, the 2011 date for a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces was a compromise. Looks like Bush wanted a longer stay, asking for authorization until 2015. The Iraqis countered with 2010, and the compromise was 2011. The date is not finalized, and it not clear what if any U.S. presence there might be after 2011 (since, even under Maliki's recent formulation, the Iraqis could ask us to stay longer in a support role after that.) But if you want to know why our leverage has gone down, you now know. Because Bush was begging to let us stay longer than the Iraqis wanted, we had to give the Iraqis concessions instead of vice versa to let us do so. This whole thing should have been crafted to get the Iraqis to convince us we shouldn't leave sooner and convince us we should provide them with residual support (counter-terrorism assistance, training and advising, deterrence against external foes, etc.)--but instead we begged to stay longer. Totally backasswards. It also points to the significant downsides of any presidential candidate signaling that he would like to stay for a long, long time (a decades-long "Korea-style" presence, for example). If the next president tells the Iraqis this is what he wants, the Iraqis will be extracting concessions from us when it should be the other way around.
  • The NYT reports that Prime Minister Maliki is calling for a fixed timetable for the removal of all U.S. forces by the end of 2011.
    Days after top Iraqi and American officials suggested that a draft of the security pact between the countries was close, Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki toughened his language, reiterating earlier Iraqi demands for a fixed date for the withdrawal of American troops.

    “It is not possible for any agreement to conclude unless it is on the basis of full sovereignty and the national interest, and that no foreign soldiers remain in Iraqi soil after a defined time ceiling,” Mr. Maliki said in a speech to Shiite tribal leaders in Baghdad’s Green Zone.

    What is going on? The straight forward explanation is that Maliki is asserting Iraqi sovereignty and demanding the full withdrawal of the occupier. But Dr. iRack thinks the answer may be a bit more complicated than that.

    A fuller explanation should start with the recognition that Maliki's current position is simultaneously strong and weak. He is increasingly (over)confident as a result of successful ISF operations in Basra, Sadr City, Mosul, and Amara, and is attempting to fashion himself into a strongman figure.

    At the same time, the prime minister is in a weak position over the long-term. His Dawa party has little grassroots support, the once united Shia front is fractured, and escalating Arab-Kurd tensions mean the Kurds are no longer reliable coalition partners. The Sadrists long ago left his coalition, and the rest of his coalition is fraying. This weakness makes him vulnerable in upcoming elections.

    This combination of near-term strength and long-term vulnerability is causing him to rush to consolidate power now before it is too late. This is manifesting itself in several ways:

    1. Maliki's efforts to undermine the Sadrists (not just militarily, but dismantling their political apparatus in the south).

    2. Maliki's efforts to stall the integration of the Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi Security Forces, and
    detain and harass the Awakening Groups/SOIs in Diyala, Abu Ghraib, and Baghdad.

    3. Maliki's continued efforts to consolidate command over various elements of the ISF (including Iraqi SOF and Emergency Response Units) and intelligence services, and the use of various "Operations Centers" in Baghdad, Basra, Ninewa, and Diyala to directly command the Iraqi Army (and supersede local police).

    And last, but not least:

    4. Maliki's domestic political positioning vis-a-vis the SOFA which attempts to enhance his nationalist credentials by demanding a timeline for a U.S. departure.

    So, does Maliki want the Americans completely out? Not yet. If he did, he could get us to leave immediately. All he has to do is not agree to any SOFA or UNSCR re-up or bridge agreement and we will have to leave. Period. The fact that Maliki wants some agreement (any agreement) suggests that even Maliki recognizes he needs us -- at least for a while longer.

    Does Maliki really want all forces out by the end of 2011? Maybe, but Dr. iRack remains dubious. Dr. iRack suspects that Maliki wants all combat forces out, but not all support troops. Indeed, as the NYT notes:
    Though Mr. Maliki seemed to be referring to all foreign troops in his statements, Iraqi negotiators have said recently that an agreed-upon 2011 date is for combat forces only, and that “training and support” forces could remain after that if invited by the Iraqi government. On Monday, a senior Iraqi official said he understood that even a departure date for combat troops would be “conditions driven.”
    The Iraqi consensus--both civilian and military--is that Iraq's Army won't be able to defend their country from external aggression for a decade. That is why Maliki and other Iraqi leaders have pushed for an external security assurance within the context of the Strategic Framework Agreement. It therefore seems unlikely that even Maliki would risk having zero U.S. support assets in Iraq post-2011.

    So why talk about all troops out by the end of 2011? Here an aide to Maliki provides some insight to the WaPo:

    "The agreement will be met with significant public discomfort," said an aide to Maliki. "So Iraqi officials will resort to using the dates mentioned in the agreement to sell it to the public, even though they might be intended to be used in a guidance way."

    The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to talk to the media, added: "If you ask the prime minister, 'What happens if the situation on the ground changes before 2011?' then he would obviously say that the dates might need to be changed."

  • If you click on my profile, you'll notice "juggling" among the more usual interests of someone who would contribute to a COIN blog (Like...shoes. Um, moving on....). Carlos has a respectable 5-ball juggle and knows a bunch of tricks. I maintained what little sanity through grad school that way (recognizing the diminishing returns, if I had got to 7, I'd probably never have finished the dissertation).

    The juggling community is small, most folks only 2-3 degrees of separation apart. On one of the forums, there had been a thread on advice for teaching kids to juggle without use of language. The reason? The questioner was heading to Afghanistan to work with the Afghan Mobile Mini Circus. Obviously, I think this is a wonderful program, and I bring it to your attention on the wonders of laughter even in the toughest of societies. I also bring bring it up to ask those who've been there if they've seen the AMMC and their work, and if they have any impressions of what they're doing.

    Some cool pictures can be found here. And a profile of Zach Warren, one of the AMMC's juggling teachers and performers, as well as Harvard Divinity Student, can be found here. Zach raises money for the AMMC not only by unicycling, but also by marathon "joggling," where one runs an entire marathon while juggling three (sometimes more) objects. (In 2006, Zach broke the world record, with a sub three-hour run most folks would be proud of *without* juggling, and bested his joggling rival in the race. Zach's rival, Michael Kapral, took the record back, as Zach noted on his website. Zach also holds the current record for fastest mile riding a unicycle (3min 26 sec, 17.45 miles an hour).

    I've become increasingly interested in the role of reconciliation in postconflict environments, and it strikes me that these kinds of programs could have an even deeper impact than many would suggest. Too frequently, we talk about "hearts and minds" as if the words and objects run together. Well, that's crap. How often have we done things where the mind knows better, but the heart is what we follow. (Um. Or other parts. Let's move on). "Hearts and minds" is wonderful in combination, but Hearts OR Minds might not be bad places to start. Especially with the youth.
  • Kip has watched recently the emerging debate over whether the 21-Year-Old drinking age in the USA causes binge drinking on college campuses with interest.

    A report in the NY Times reports that two college presidents dropped their names from a petition after the MADD mafia began to shout (and several more added to the list).

    Kip remembers vividly when Governor Corzine of New Jersey said a couple of years ago that he would support lowering the drinking age to 18 as men and women were dying in Afghanistan and Iraq at that age--and then reversed position faster than a "Time Line" transforms into a "Horizon."

    Kip could frankly give a damn whether or not college students are allowed to drink. But he thinks it remains fundamentally unfair that soldiers can die in a war for their country, but their countrymen can't buy them a drink. It's too bad that our Congress will allow MADD to run roughshod over our ability to treat these soldiers as adults; it will entrust our servicemen and women to decide life or death at the tip of the spear but not allow them to have a drink responsibly when they come home. Furthermore, Kip is sure that the drinking age contributes to a whole host of problems in the military from preventing those who need substance abuse counseling from going to get it because of fear of punishment for underage imbibing to leading to non-reporting of sexual abuse for fear of punishment for illicit drinking.

    Kips not even asking for a wholesale change in drinking laws, just an addition that says 21 unless you present a valid military ID.

    But then my namesake said it much better than I:

    I went into a public-'ouse to get a pint o' beer,
    The publican 'e up an' sez, "We serve no red-coats here."
    The girls be'ind the bar they laughed an' giggled fit to die,
    I outs into the street again an' to myself sez I:
    O it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' "Tommy, go away";
    But it's "Thank you, Mister Atkins", when the band begins to play,
    The band begins to play, my boys, the band begins to play,
    O it's "Thank you, Mister Atkins", when the band begins to play.
  • For all our loyal (American) readers--in uniform and out--who will be overseas on election day in November, do yourselves a favor and register for an absentee ballot.  (The Marines seem to think the deadline is 7 September.)

    Questions?  Check out the FAQ.
  • One of Abu Muqawama's less appreciated achievements was to introduce a corner of London affectionately known as the 'Stow to the wider world. So, it's with a little saddness that Londonstani announces that the AM-'Stow connection will draw to a close at the end of August.

    Sometime last year, when AM and Londonstani contemplated where they might call home for a year, the decision was settled by the number of Walthamstow locals arrested in connection to terror attacks. (OK, the price and quality of the Algerian coffee helped too). AM - were he to comment - might well say the 'Stow gave him an insight into London's multicultural modern reality that he would have found hard to come by living amongst foreign students on generous grants. Londonstani met many people who helped him gain a deeper understanding into the deep and depressing roots of urban British dislocation and dissatisfaction, which would have been a far more foreign and distant problem if he had been hanging out in fancy parties with poncy media types.

    Things are changing in the 'Stow. The permanently empty Pakistani no-nonsense barbers has become a busy frills and lace Polish beauty salon. The Baker's Arms - once the R&B magnet of northeast London - stands near empty night after night following its transformation into a Polish pub.

    However, some things remain the same. Londonstani and AM never did figure out where the hot Polish girls hang out. And sadly, desperation, frustration and anger are present - as always - in abundance; as this BBC story about the latest victim of London's teenage violent crime epidemic shows.

    Stories that remain untold - probably rightly so; including AM's unfortunate run-in with a 12-year-old girl who threatened him with actual bodily harm, Londonstani's unexplicable popularity with large West Indian single mothers and the same sex Indian and White gerriatric couple who meet for amourous liasons at a bus stop.

    But never fear, Londonstani might be moving to a slightly less grimey part of town, nearer to where he grew up but he will carry on doing his social life no favours by allowing himself to be drawn to snooker halls, kebab shops and crime infested public parks instead of cafes, gastro pubs and artisan bakeries.
  • Another good story on the Iraqi government's campaign to crack down on the Sons of Iraq in the LA Times. The piece also confirms the June 2009 date Dr. iRack noted on Thursday for the complete handover of the program to the Iraqi government. According to LTC Jeffrey Kulmayer, the coalition officer in charge of overseeing the SoI program: "Our goal is that by June 2009, the Sons of Iraq are out of business." According to the LAT, BG Dave Perkins, the MNF-I spokesmen, claims that Maliki is "well aware of the sacrifices the Sons of Iraq have made, that they were a critical element in bringing the security situation under control and that it is in their strategic advantage to assimilate them peacefully and orderly into Iraqi society." But Perkins' boss--Petraeus--is complaining about Iraqi government stalling.

    Meanwhile, the government is arresting and chasing off SoIs in Diyala and, now, Abu Ghraib, and Haidar Abadi, a lawmaker from Prime Minister Nouri Maliki's Dawa Party quoted in the LAT piece, makes it clear that Maliki and his allies are very reluctant to accommodate these guys: "The ones [SoIs] in Baghdad and Diyala province just changed their T-shirts. There are large numbers who were really Al Qaeda. We have to really look hard for those elements without blood on their hands." (See also this NYT piece.)

    Mounting evidence seems to support this conclusion from CFR's Steve Biddle: "We want to have our cake and eat it too, support Maliki and the Sons of Iraq. . . . Maliki wants to make that as hard for us as possible. He wants us to choose him."

    And in the context of the emerging SOFA timeline, the United States seems increasingly likely to make this choice by next summer. The LAT quotes Mullah Shihab Safi, the commander of the SoIs in Baqubah, who notes:
    "We don't know what our stance will be if other things happen from the security forces, the Iraqi government or the Americans," Safi said. He recognizes that things have changed with his U.S. allies. "The Americans have made their compromises. They want the Iraqi central government authority to prevail, so they can withdraw to their bases."
    Indeed.

    Update: From the AP:
    Iraq's government is grateful to U.S.-allied Sunni fighters but won't allow them to keep their weapons indefinitely, the prime minister said Saturday, hinting at a more intense crackdown on the Sunni groups. . . .

    In a speech to Shiite tribal leaders in Baghdad on Saturday, al-Maliki mixed praise for the Sunni fighters with a warning. He said armed groups, alongside security forces, were tolerated for a limited period because their weapons were "aimed at the chests of the terrorists."

    "So they (the Sunni fighters) deserve our gratitude and the inclusion (into the security forces) because we adhere to a policy that there are no arms but the arms of the government," he said.

  • At the end of his recent guest post, Sam Parker asked "readers on the ground" to provide some extra details on the Diyala situation. A "well placed source" responds:
    "In my initial reading of your post, I focused on the points that I found weak or incorrect. In re-reading, I find it overall remarkably good given your dependence on media for your info. Here are just a few points:

    Notwithstanding that Ghanem had been extremely sectarian in his behavior and hated by Sunnis here, the immediate reason for his dismissal by the PC was his high-handed McArthuresque disregard of the PC’s and overall civilian authority. The trigger was his withdrawal of Diyala official (including the Governor’s as well as PC members’) police personal security details. Needless to say they were upset. There was a long history of him going out of his way to disrespect Governor Ra’d as well as the entire PC.

    As for the attack the other night, it was apparently by the PM’s notorious “Quwa Khasa” [ed. "special force" in Arabic]. Linkage to the Ghanem dismissal seems likely but has not been confirmed or explained by anyone. Kind of strange after it was ratified by the Minister of Interior in a surprising (at least to me) acknowledgement of the supremacy of civil authority. Everyone is now asking why, if they wanted to arrest Hussein, they didn’t just direct the local police to do it. Neither the PM nor anyone else has yet explained. The Quwa roughed up everyone at the PC, Sunni, Shi’a, Kurd alike. Strange twist if the attack was sectarian-minded that (a) the Quwa roughed up the PM’s personal representative in Diyala who was sleeping in the GC, and (b) the one fatality, at the Government Center, was also a Shi’a.

    You are incorrect that the Kurds do not participate actively in the DPC. On the contrary, they are extremely active. They are in fact the balance of power in the DPC and enjoy all the benefits that go with it. The Chair of the PC, Ibrahim Bajalan, is extremely active. Aimad Jaleel, a Kurdish member of the PC, is also Assistant Governor for Economic Affairs and very influential.Overall, the consensus here is that what is going on in Diyala now is indeed (as you indicate) preparation for the provincial elections. It is likely that, in a turnaround from the last time when the Sunni boycotted the election, they will win since they are the largest population segment. Not surprising that the Shi’i seem to be taking advantage of their current control of the levers of power to try to tilt the field in their favor in various ways. Tragic that violence and dirty tricks are still considered legitimate instruments in the game of politics in this still incredibly tribal-minded place. Ironic that people seem to care so much about the elections at a time when many in power in Baghdad seem to be trying to undermine federalism and re-centralize power (at least economic) in their own hands. At this point, Baghdad controls far more of the money that gets spent in Diyala than Diyala does. The PC in general is a feeble body that has little power and does very little. And the man in the street cares very little about the PC."
  • Reports suggest that U.S. and Iraqi negotiators have agreed on a text for a SOFA (now called a "Memorandum of Understanding," or MOU), which will be attached to a broader Strategic Framework Agreement. The agreement still has to get approved by Maliki and then the Iraqi parliament, so it's a long way from being finalized--and maybe it won't happen at all. But when reading the leaked details of the agreement, Dr. iRack took note of a key date: June 2009

    Apparently, the SOFA/MOU will call for U.S. combat forces to be out of Iraqi cities by the end of June 2009. Dr. iRack does not think this means that U.S. forces will actually be completely out of Iraqi cities by that date. Rather, he suspects it means that U.S. combat outposts and joint security stations will be handed over to Iraqi security forces by that date, at which point U.S. forces will go back to "commuting to work" from outlying FOBs. U.S. forces are likely to continue to partner, mentor, and advise the ISF, but their visibility on the streets--and their ability to monitor the ISF and influence events--will be greatly reduced. The SOFA/MOU also seems likely to call for the removal of remaining U.S. combat forces by the end of 2011, although this is an "aspirational" timeline. The exact details regarding the kinds of forces that might remain after 2011 remain fuzzy, but it appears that the agreement envisions the possibility of some U.S. troops in a support role past that date.

    But let's stick with the June 2009 date for a moment. This date is important. You see, Dr. iRack has also heard from his contacts that this is the key date for transitioning the remaining Sons of Iraq contracts to the Iraqi government. There are currently 102,000 SoIs. The U.S. goal is to integrate about 16,000 into the ISF by the end of 2008, and provide another 26,000 civilian jobs -- a total of 40 percent of the SoIs would then be off the American rolls. The goal is then to transition the remaining 60 percent of the contracts to the Iraqi government to manage. Dr. iRack was under the impression that this was to occur on January 1, 2009 -- but he's now heard that it will happen in June 2009. Yes, that's right, the same June.

    If true, this cannot be a coincidence. Instead, it likely represents a demand from the Iraqi government made during the SOFA negotiations. It makes sense that if the ISF will officially be "in the lead" in Iraqi cities in the summer of 2009, the Iraqi government would also want full control of the SoI program at that time. This means the Maliki government will be free to employ them if they so desire or, more likely, fire them, detain them, or use all that biometric and biographical information we've collected to do whatever else they see fit with them. Given the fact that Maliki and his allies hate these guys and, according to a recent interview with General Petraeus, the Iraqi government is purposefully slowing down the integration process, it is unlikely that Maliki and his buddies will be generous once they are in complete control of the program. And if recent behavior in Diyala and the newly reported crack down on SoIs in Abu Ghraib are any indication, things could get ugly.

    So, if you're looking for a D-Day in Iraq, it just might just be June 2009, when U.S. forces are pulling back, no longer supervising the SoIs on a daily basis, and handing the whole shebang over the Iraqi government. Fireworks normally happen on July 4th in the United States. They may happen a bit earlier in Iraq.
  • Londonstani was shocked to find out this morning that his local newsagents had sold out of the Guardian. Not the Waltham Forest Guardian, but the real deal, the one with inside political jokes and a media section that only a couple of thousand people living in poncy bits of London read.

    After dodging wheezing overweight east enders with faded tattoos, and Punjabi mothers with errant toddlers, Londonstani finally found a copy, and thinks he understands why: Today's main frontpage story in the Guardian is "Terror: secret MI5 report challenges views on extremists". And Londonstani strongly suggests you have a good read.

    The Guardian has managed to get its hands on an internal MI5 document based on a study of several hundred people involved in violent extremist activity. The main finding is that "there is no single pathway to extremism". In more specific terms the study found that extremists are often "religious novices", some come from criminal backgrounds and carry on activities such as drug taking, drinking alcohol and visiting prostitutes. Agewise, they can range from single loners in their 20s to married men with children in their 30s - so the idea that they are all sexually frustrated saddos dreaming about doe-eyed virgins doesn't stand. Also, they come from varying educational and racial backgrounds - with converts overrepresented compared to their numbers in the community as a whole.

    All of this along with the observation that preachers are no longer key actors in the radicalisation process presents the government with a clearer idea of the problem it faces. Which probably feels in Whitehall like climbing Everest and assuming you only have 500 metres to go until a big cloud moves out of the way and you realise you're only half way up.

    Blaming radical preachers was always the easy option. It allowed the government to avoid worrying about wider societal problems. Terrorism was a Muslim problem and not a British one. Of course, the government also used it to avoid any link to the decision to go to war in Iraq. Self appointed British Muslim leaders backed the government's "few bad apples" outlook partly because they didn't know what was happening in Muslim communities and partly because they wanted to avoid the blame too. But at the same time, they could hammer on about the Iraq war.

    Londonstani sees wider British problems in the report. It talks of extremist groups being accepting of ostracised individuals. It also talks of disgruntled individuals with the slimmest of stakes in the society around them.

    "Members of a terrorist group can provide a sense of meaning and purpose. It can lead to enhanced self-esteem, and the individual can feel a sense of control and influence over their lives," MI5 says in the report.

    This sounds identical to the parallel discussion in the UK about gang violence and teenage crime. In fact, the Guardian has an op-ed a few pages on where the writer talks about "excluded teenagers". The difference is that extremism comes with a pre-packaged ideology that scares people around you and so serves a key purpose if you are properly p***ed off with the world around you.

    Londonstani has seen violence and extremism in various countries and is firmly of the view that eventhough it might be called "Islamist" in many, the label hides a multitude of far more local factors. In Britain, we have plenty of our own. The local London newspapers are keeping score of how many teenagers have been killed in gang related or knife and gun crime this year; the tally stands at 22 so far. The total for 2007 was 26.

    The answer, says the report, is to build on its observation that "individuals in fact make active choices to become and remain in extremist activity" and that "the birth of a child, a new relationship or job could take priority over terrorism". So, once people are invested in the society around them, they aren't so interested in destroying it.

    Paraphrasing, the Guardian says; "It could include providing fulfilling jobs for young people, better integration for immigrants, effective reintegration of ex-prisoners and the provision of alternatives to the extremist pathway out of "ordinary" criminality.

    Sounds to Londonstani like that's what a government is supposed to do anyway.
  • Kip admires the French soldiers in Afghanistan. He worked on the ground with them at times and saw that they could be capable when allowed to do their job. And Kip mourned as he read about the deaths of 10 French soldiers killed in an ambush in Sarobi, just outside of Kabul.

    Moreover, the decision of President Sarkozy to send more troops to Afghanistan despite domestic unease is admirable and a demonstration of his commitment toward rapprochement between France and the United States, not to mention his personal commitment to Afghanistan.

    Alas, Kip is also certain that the French President's trip to Afghanistan in the wake of the deaths sends an entirely different message about French resolve than the speech he made in Kabul.

    The French have lost a handful of deaths over the course of the fighting in Afghanistan. These deaths were a tragedy as all loss of life is a tragedy. But when the deaths of a handful of soldiers (and undoubtedly ten soldiers is a handful in the overall war) require the French President and his top ministers to travel to Afghanistan to reiterate the resolve of France, it not only seems to the Afghans and the Taliban that France and most other NATO Allies are teetering but also must make NATO warnings toward Russia (surely direct support to the Georgians would result in far more than 10 deaths) ring hollow.
  • Very disturbing story by Leila Fadel in McClatchy on growing tensions between the Iraqi government and the Sons of Iraq. She starts by recounting the now well-documented problems in trying to integrate the SoIs into the Iraqi security forces:

    American military officials here have always said that the creation of the Sunni militias was at least as important to the precipitous drop in violence as the presence of 30,000 more U.S. troops, and that incorporating them into the security forces would go a long way toward bringing about the sort of reconciliation needed for long-term stability.

    After initially embracing the idea of bringing the militia members into the security forces, however, Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki hasn't followed through. A committee that Maliki formed to organize the militias' transition to full-fledged government security troops fell apart and was reconstituted only recently. U.S. officials acknowledge that the hiring of the Sunnis has slowed to a crawl.

    U.S. and Iraqi officials agree that the Maliki government never agreed to hire more than 20 percent of the militia members. A Maliki ally said it was unreasonable to expect otherwise.

    "All the Americans are doing is paying them just to be quiet," said Haider al Abadi, a leading member of Maliki's Dawa political party and the head of the economic and investment committee in the parliament. The Iraqi government, he said, can't "justify paying monthly salaries to people on the grounds that they are ex-insurgents."

    The best that most of them could expect is to be placed in vocational training for trades such as bricklaying and plumbing, along with a slew of other unemployed people.

    The government has allocated $150 million for such training. So far this year, the U.S. military has spent $303 million on Sons of Iraq salaries.

    [. . .]

    Abadi, the Maliki ally, was blunt in calling the militias a problem.

    "You've created a problem here," he said. "You can't get rid of a program by shoveling it on the Iraqi government shoulders."

    The Iraqi government has also been stepping up its efforts to detain, chase away, or otherwise exclude the SoIs/Awakening groups. Now, fast on the heels of actions against SoIs in Diyala (and escalating sectarian tensions), a senior Iraqi military commander is threatening a major crackdown in Baghdad. According to Fidel:

    "We cannot stand them, and we detained many of them recently," said one senior Iraqi commander in Baghdad, who spoke only on the condition of anonymity because he wasn't authorized to discuss the issue. "Many of them were part of al Qaida despite the fact that many of them are helping us to fight al Qaida."

    He said the army was considering setting a Nov. 1 deadline for those militia members who hadn't been absorbed into the security forces or given civilian jobs to give up their weapons. After that, they'd be arrested, he said.

    What will the SoI response be? Here's a clue: many of these guys are "former" insurgents.

    Some militia members say that such a move would force them into open warfare with the government again.

    "If they disband us now, I will tell you that history will show we will go back to zero," said Mullah Shahab al Aafi, a former emir, or leader, of insurgents in Diyala province who's the acting commander of 24,000 Sons of Iraq there, 11,000 of whom are on the U.S. payroll. "I will not give up my weapons. I will never give them up, and I will carry my weapon again. If it is useless to talk to the government, I will be forced to carry my weapons and my pistol."

    The conflict over the militias underscores how little has changed in Iraq in the past year despite the drop in violence, which American politicians often attribute to the temporary increase of U.S. troops in Iraq that ended in July.

    [. . .]

    Farouk Abd al Sattar Hassan Mohammed al Obeidi, a deputy Sunni militia commander in the northern Baghdad neighborhood of Adhamiyah, wore a military uniform in an interview with McClatchy last week because he considered his men and himself to be soldiers.

    He voiced frustration that his men had applied repeatedly to join the Iraqi Security Forces, to no avail.

    "We wish we were part of the army. With deep remorse the government is sectarian," Obeidi said. He described his alliance with the U.S. forces as "the enemy of your enemy is your friend."

    "The Sons of Iraq achieved security. Don't they deserve to enter the army?"

    Obeidi will never see that happen. On Sunday, a suicide bomber on a bicycle killed him, along with five of his men and nine civilians.

    And according to a senior intelligence analyst in the Fidel piece:

    "If they only take a portion of them it's possible they will return to their insurgent ways," one senior intelligence analyst said, acknowledging that most of the men now called the Sons of Iraq had been insurgents, for al Qaida in Iraq and other groups that considered themselves resistance fighters against Americans.

    He called the issue the "long-term threat."

    Ya think?

    Some argue that most SoIs would not revert to violence. Maybe. Perhaps most are tired of fighting. Perhaps most are deterred by the fact that the U.S. military (and perhaps the Iraqi government) have their biometric information. Perhaps most will be satisfied being plumbers. But here's a news flash: since there are 100,000 of these guys with guns, it wouldn't take most to revert to violence to cause a big problem. A mere 5-20 percent could cause a heck of a fireworks show. Remember, for years the U.S. military estimated the entire Sunni insurgency to be 8,000-20,000 guys.
  • The following is a guest post by Sam Parker, an Iraq program officer at USIP. Sam is super smart on Iraqi politics, and his post offers an intriguing take on the recent clashes in Diyala.

    ------------------------------------------------------------

    This is my best effort to explain what’s behind the latest clashes in Diyala. It is incomplete and only as good as the sources it’s based on (all media). I present it as a plausible explanation, but I really mean it when I say that it could be quite wrong. With those caveats in place:

    Both the crackdown on the Awakenings and Diyala and the arrest of Hussein Zubaydi are, at least in part, the culmination of a conflict between the Diyala police and the Awakenings in Diyala that has been building over the course of the last year. In late 2007/early 2008, ISCI-affiliated Diyala police chief Ghanem al-Qurayshi fired up to 4,000 police officers in Diyala who had ties to the Awakenings (and who complained of torture while under custody) and replaced them with ISCI loyalists. In response, the Awakenings threatened to turn back to AQI and reportedly began assassinating police officers. All this resulted in public demonstrations and clashes in February 2008. This entire episode was well documented in the media.

    Qurayshi is allegedly a former member of Saddam’s elite Quds Firqa who is currently loyal to/on the payroll of ISCI. Some claim he should have been de-Ba’thifed but has been given a pass because of his connections to ISCI. He was reportedly forcibly installed as the police chief by Minister of Interior Jawad al-Bolani in January 2007, over much protest by the Diyala Provincial Council (DPC), which never voted to confirm him. The DPC’s recent attempt to dislodge him was what led to, or at least contributed to, this recent flare-up. Qurayshi has been accused of ordering all sorts of kidnapping and raiding operations and other nefarious activities. These sources from oppositionist websites go into detail about him, but should be taken with a grain of salt.

    Qurayshi’s main rival in Diyala is Hussein al-Zubaydi, the head of the security committee on the DPC, and member of the IIP, and the target of the recent raid. Earlier this year, Zubaydi accused Qurayshi of trying to assassinate him. As the Awakenings in Diyala have faced intense persecution from Qurayshi and the police, they have turned to Zubaydi for support. Unlike in Baghdad and especially Anbar, the IIP appears to be on fairly good terms with the Awakenings in Diyala. Although the exact nature and extent of Zubaydi’s involvement with them is unclear, his connection to the Awakenings is almost certainly the reason for his recent arrest.

    Confusing matters is the dominance of ISCI/Da’wa in the DPC, where they hold 20 out of 41 seats. The governor of Diyala, Ra’d al-Tamimi, is also a member of ISCI. Even though he and Qurayshi both belong to ISCI, there appears to be wide divergence in their political agendas. Most importantly, Governor Tamimi voted, along with the rest of the DPC, to unseat Qurayshi and quite vocally condemned Zubaydi’s arrest. Tamimi has supported the efforts of the Awakenings in Diyala while, as described above, Qurayshi has led the crackdown against them.

    If Qurayshi is so tightly connected to ISCI, why did the ISCI/Da’wa-dominated DPC and Tamimi vote to fire him and, indeed, never vote to confirm him in the first place? I don’t know. My best guess is that all politics is indeed local and that the standard political categories don’t apply here. Perhaps Qurayshi’s offenses were bad enough that they trumped whatever institutional allegiance the ISCI members on the DPC had for him. Maybe ISCI-affiliated provincial council members don’t take marching orders from Hakim, which would further explain the need for ISCI/Da’wa at the national level to keep Qurayshi in Diyala to keep an eye on things and fight the Awakenings. I’ve certainly met a couple of nahiya- and qada-level politicians that had sort of “chosen” ISCI as a horse to ride, but, for them, this affiliation did not translate into a strong institutional connection with the party.

    If you go through and read the articles and statements on this local Diyala newspaper and the DPC official website, you don’t get the impression that there is a great deal of conflict between ISCI, the IIP and the hybrid Kurd/Turk/Arab list that make up the DPC’s three factions. The lines of conflict in Diyala, apart from the big struggle against AQI, mainly appear to be mostly local vs. central, not ethno-sectarian in nature, or even the expression of national political rivalries on the local level. Now that AQI has been mostly driven from the province due in large part to the efforts of the Awakenings, the central government is trying to marginalize them and exert control themselves. These latest activities are only the latest and most dramatic of the year-long effort to do so.

    So that’s my best effort at seeing through the fog of war. Hopefully you have readers on the ground in Diyala that can clue us in.

    *A final footnote. One unexplored element not mentioned in the media but that could be at play is the role of the Kurds. The Kurds have a surprisingly small representation on the DPC—they’re part of a hybrid list with Arabs and Turkman that has only seven seats. The Kurds’ base of support is in Khanaqin in northern Diyala, one of the so-called “disputed” territories in Article 140. Khanaqin is south of the Green Line but was occupied by peshmerga in March 2003, and has since been effectively part of the KRG. Perhaps this is why the Kurds aren’t as actively engaged in the DPC—because they don’t want to give it credence as a governing body that has any jurisdiction in Khanaqin. In any event, as press reports last week indicated, it was only after getting permission from Arbil that the peshmerga gave way to Iraqi forces as part of the recent crackdown, a clear sign of stepped-up hostility from the Kurds after the PEL-Kirkuk catastrophe. This could be an element in the mix of the recent flare-up, I don’t know.

    Sam Parker, USIP
  • McClatchy has news of a chaotic raid in Diyala by a "special unit" of Iraqi forces (which, if the account is correct, sounds like Iraqi Special Operations Forces/ISOF -- the LA Times describes them as "counter-terrorism" forces). The raid hit the provincial government compound, killing the governor's secretary. Hussein al Zubaidi, a provincial council member and head of the provincial security committee, was arrested and the Iraqi forces involved in the raid seized computers and cars. Oh yeah, the raid also triggered a two-hour gun battle with Iraqi police.

    Elsewhere, a raid arrested the president of Diyala University. All the detained men were Sunnis, triggering an angry statement by the IIP. Diyala's Governor, Raad Rashid al-Tamimi, is Shia, but Sunni politicians were quick to portray both the raid on his office and the arrest of the university president as part of a crackdown against Sunnis. This follows on the heels of recent reports, noted by Dr. iRack yesterday, that Iraqi forces have gone after Sunni Sons of Iraq groups in Diyala during ongoing operations (more here).

    Although Maliki's office denies that he ordered the raids, if the units involved were ISOF forces, this denial rings hollow, since these units now report directly to the prime minister.

    Were Americans involved in the raids? The Diyala Operations Center says yes, and if the units involved were ISOF, it would also be very unusual for U.S. SOF not to accompany them. The U.S. military command claims they were not involved. According to McClatchy:
    American officials disputed this account. Maj. John Hall and Navy Lt. Patrick Evans, both U.S. military spokesmen, issued identical statements saying the operation was conducted "without the knowledge or assistance of coalition forces."
    But, if American SOF were involved, it would not be the first time that they did a raid in somebody else's AOR without the full knowledge of conventional units operating in that area.

    The fog of war is pretty thick here, but let's just say that none of this bodes well for Sunni-Shia relations . . . or U.S.-Sunni relations if our SOF were involved.

    Update: The NYT reports that the gun battle with police lasted 30 minutes (not 2 hours), and that U.S. military helicopters were overhead. But the U.S. military is still saying they had no knowledge of the raid ahead of time. Maliki is scrambling to do some damage-control, calling for an investigation.
  • So here I am, on AM, as the resident “Asia Pundit,” if you will. I’ve spent most of my intellectual life and a great deal of my physical one in and near <?xml:namespace prefix = st1 />Asia, and for anyone who studies political violence, it isn’t as if there isn’t enough to talk about in that region. Operation Enduring Freedom is, after all, more than Afghanistan, and OEF-P (for Philippines) is at the heart of what has been called the “second front” in the war against terror. The threat that groups in the Southern Philippines pose not just within the country but as part of a regional threat is understandable. How one responds to that threat, ah, now there’s the point.

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    Many things are problematic with the imagery of a “second front.” On the purely sensible military note that opening up another front isn’t often the smartest of moves, on the whole war analogy in the first place, “second fronts” aren’t usually good things. (Gershman’s article focuses not on whether we should be concerned with Al-Qaeda type radicalism inserting themselves into Southeast Asia, but whether the military instrument—how one responds to another “front”—is the best way to address such a concern in SE Asia).

    News on OEF-P frequently is articulated as the “good stuff the military is doing in the war on terror.” There has been great validity to that, but that’s not the big story. At least, it shouldn’t be. The thing that is more important to know and understand is how not only the US military, but other aspects of both American and Philippine power are being applied to handle tensions in the southern Philippines. One of those things has been the establishment of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), an effort to give to folks in Mindanao some political buy-in to the central government in Manila by opening up some political space and internal self-rule on some issues. The ARMM, however, isn’t a very large part of Mindanao writ large, so the sense of meaningful representation is, shall we say, a little questionable. August 12 2008 saw the most recent ARMM elections, and while there were some instances of violence, the Philippine government is viewing the elections (so far) as a success. And with an estimated 84 percent turnout (of 1.7 million potential voters), there’s good reason to be optimistic, but not complacent. That same day reports discussed about 130,000 displaced persons in the southern Philippines.


    A great deal of the work for the Philippine government and the effectiveness of their programs to bring the people of the south into the national fold will be seen not in the potential increase of the territory covered by the ARMM, but more in the movement by the population either for or against a larger ARMM territory. Economically, the Southern Philippines is the poorest region, and overlaying gap that is the religious difference (a majority Muslim population in the south, but still a minority to the overall Catholic population in the Philippines total). That’s an easy recipe for discontent. What is critical is whether this domestic grievance can be tied to a larger regional or even global one. On that score, the worst thing for the situation in the Philippines (or SE Asia more generally) is to be any front in the “Global War on Terror.”

  • It is with great pride that Charlie introduces the newest addition to the world-famous blogging team here at Abu Muqawama: gang, meet Carlos.

    In contrast to the insurgency "experts" already writing here, Carlos is more explicitly a (counter) terrorism kind of guy. (Hence the name. I know. Try and keep up.) He is also an expert on all things Southeast Asian, a region that we've woefully neglected. He's worked extensively with government and military officials throughout the region. And Carlos knows more than most federal agencies would be comfortable with about groups like JI, Aum Shumrikyo, and of course, MILF. (No discussion of SE Asian terror groups is complete without mentioning the MILF. The things you learn teaching Marines....)

    Welcome aboard, Carlos!
  • Perhaps the most important news since 2006 in our counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan happened last week when the NY Times broke this article.

    Secretary Gates looks ready to create nearly a single command structure in Afghanistan and set to expand the Afghan National Army by fifty percent over its current authorized size.

    At the same time, the US seems prepared to take command of Regional Command South by 2010 and has been successful in having the Dutch and British agree to one year tours of duty for the next two Regional Command South commanders. Moreover, the commander of ISAF seems posed to gain control over CSTC-A, the command responsible for training and advising Afghan Security Forces. There is also talk of a command relationship between General McKiernan, the US Commander of ISAF, and the senior US military official in Pakistan in order to facilitate a more effective regional approach to the conflict.

    At the same time, GEN McKiernan will have a direct line and subordinate relationship to CENTCOM.

    Kip has often described the confounding command structure in Afghanistan, a structure that inhibits the real day-to-day life of soldiers on the ground and leaves no one really in charge and accountable.

    This would be a huge step in the right direction, and Kip hopes to see it carried to fruition.
  • Dr. iRack has been warning for months that their were signs that the Maliki government was planning to turn on the sahwa/Awakening groups/Sons of Iraq. Maliki considers the SoIs thugs and terrorists who should not be accommodated. Dr. iRack heard this often and repeatedly during his recent Baghdad visit. In the past few months, there have been growing signs that Maliki and his allies are (1) stalling SoI integration into the Iraqi security forces; (2) collaborating with other Iraqi parties to limit political participation by sahwa groups; and (3) arresting SoI members or chasing them out of the country. Dr. iRack has also heard credible rumors that Maliki hopes that his provocative treatment of the SoIs will encourage them to start a fight, giving Maliki an excuse to bring the Iraqi security forces down on them. Hard. Some of Maliki's concerns about the SoIs are legitimate, but a failure to accommodate them could spell big trouble.

    In this context, recent news out of Diyala is deeply troubling. According to the AP:

    The Shiite-led government is cracking down on U.S.-backed Sunni Arab fighters in one of Iraq's most turbulent regions, arresting some leaders, disarming dozens of men and banning them from manning checkpoints except alongside official security forces.

    The moves in Diyala province reflect mixed views on a movement that began in 2007 among Sunni tribes in western Iraq who revolted against al-Qaida in Iraq and joined the Americans in the fight against the terrorist network. . . .

    The effort in Diyala northeast of Baghdad began last month as U.S. and Iraqi forces launched an operation against al-Qaida and other extremists in that region.

    Mullah Shihab al-Safi, commander of Sunni fighters in Diyala, told The Associated Press that many senior leaders of his group had been detained and fighters evicted from their offices. He gave no figures.

    Another senior commander said security forces evicted his men from all but seven of some 100 offices in Diyala. He spoke on condition of anonymity because he feared arrest.

    The U.S. military confirmed the Diyala actions but gave few details. Fighters were only pushed out of buildings they did not own, a military spokesman, Capt. Matt Rodano, said.

    Although there has been no general crackdown on Sunni volunteers elsewhere, some leaders outside Diyala have been arrested in western Baghdad and south of the capital — both one-time al-Qaida strongholds.

    Government officials would not comment on specific claims about the push in Diyala. But aides close to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite, said the government was not willing to tolerate the existence of armed groups with "blood on their hands."

    "The continuation of the Awakening Councils as they are now is unacceptable," said Ali al-Adeeb, a close al-Maliki aide and a senior member of his Dawa Party.

    A top Iraqi security official with access to classified information said authorities were especially suspicious of the Diyala groups because many of their estimated 14,000 fighters had been members of al-Qaida in Iraq.

    But acting against the Sunni movements could alienate the once-dominant minority Sunni Arabs at a time when overtures to them appear to be making headway.

    "We fought the Americans for four years and we fought al-Qaida, too," said al-Safi, a former Iraqi army commando during Saddam Hussein's regime who fought in the 1980-88 Iraq-Iran war. "We are an experienced armed group. We are fully capable of bringing the house down."

    Since the rise of the allied Sunni movement, America has spent some $200 million on salaries, equipment and training for the fighters, which now number nearly 100,000. The U.S. goal is for many of them to be integrated into the Iraqi army or police, providing the fighters with long-term incomes. . . .

    But the Iraqi government has stonewalled U.S. efforts to get most of the Sunni fighters into the Shiite-dominated security forces.

    It has repeatedly changed requirements for enrollment in the police and army, canceling and changing application forms without warning or insisting that training camps were full. . . .

    One Shiite official who is close to al-Maliki said the prime minister believes his successful crackdown this year on Shiite militias has given him enough authority to go after Sunni armed groups without alienating Sunni politicians.

    This is a story that all Iraq watchers should keep a VERY close eye on. Maliki may be making his move.

    Update: "Badger" takes aim at Dr. iRack's analysis by attacking his name. Seriously? OK people, for the last time, the name is a joke. Anyway, a more detailed response is in Badger's comments stream.

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