Center for a New American Security

The F-22 Raptor program is a premier example of America's continuing strength in the manufacturing sector. Our company employs hundreds of people from the Chicagoland Area as a result of projects like the F-22 Raptor. -- Bruce Liimatainen, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, A. Finkl & Sons Company

STEEL FORGERS IN CHICAGO.
95,000 JOBS ACROSS AMERICA.
ALL WORKING TO BUILD THE F-22 RAPTOR.

To the people of A. Finkl & Sons, the F-22 Raptor means the pride of a job well done. And the security of a well-paying job. To Chicago's Near North Side, the F-22 means millions of dollars circulating through the local economy annually. To America, the F-22 means 95,000 people working today in companies large and small all across the country. For their future, keep them working. For America's security, keep the F-22 program flying.

Palestinian camps are another instrument in the regional tug of war. For the West and its Lebanese allies who currently hold power, challenging the status quo in the camps is one way of advancing both Lebanon’s sovereignty and the cause of disarming all groups, Hizbollah included. The internal Palestinian conflict opposing Fatah and Hamas also manifests itself in the camps. For Syria, some of the Palestinian armed groups are cards to be used both in the context of negotiations with Israel and as allies on the Lebanese domestic scene. Finally, the spread of militant Islamist groups within the camps suggests they are becoming recruiting grounds for international jihadist movements.

Hizballah has had since mid-January, we're told, to assess their level of exposure by the operation, so the lag between everyone else finding out was probably put to good use. But what I am hearing is that so many vehicles were tracked for so long that it's assumed that any significant meeting place, operational area, safe house, or bunker is probably compromised to some degree. Lebanese authorities sympathetic to the group say they've had to abandon more than a few key facilities.

The big question looking backward -- considering the tracking seems to have happen over a four-plus year period -- is how much did this operation hurt them in 2006 when Israel seemed to have an uncanny ability to hit apartment buildings used on some level by Hizballah. A lot of those mysterious explosions where people asked 'why this building?' seem less random in light of this.

But looking forward, we know that Hizballah was forced to move the majority of its fixed positions back behind the Litani river after the 2006 war, to stay out of the way of UNFIL troops. So if the vehicles used by commanders were being tracked by the Israelis, then it must be assumed that a significant amount of their response to 2006 has been compromised. Probably time to build some new bunkers and command/control facilities: all critical ingredients to how Hezbollah fights. More than most militant groups, Hizballah relies on a very effective and modern communications, command and supply infrastructure that could well have been exposed. So it's not only the fighters having a bad week, but the logistics guys as well. But with what appears to be most, if not all, key Hizballah vehicles tracked by the Israelis, you do have to ask how come there weren't more targeted assassinations. One source implied Nasrallah's vehicle fleet itself could have been tagged. But Lebanese sources explain that most of the vehicles appear to have just had tracking devices, not eavesdropping gear that might tell them exactly who was inside the car at any given time. Some intell sources suggest the GPS data is far easier to mask coming out of the car than streaming audio, so maybe they could watch the trucks move with little idea who was driving. that could be a small consolation to the Hizballah members this week.

Well, we'll see if they invite me to stay in the long-dormant "Terry Anderson" suite. But jokes aside, this is not the same group from the 1980s. They have a professional press operation that will be more than happy to point out errors or other aspects of the story that annoy them. But usually they stay dead-quiet on intell-type stories, just like any professional agency. Plus, it's not like the Israelis don't know how many trucks were tapped and for how long, so it's not really hurting Hizballah that much in terms of tradecraft.

I will say that a Hizballah member once warned me that, in light of how I cover the group, that I need to take extra care to get things right. He explained that if the story is accurate, even if it pisses them off somewhat, then it's generally ok. But errors are often seen as indications that a journalist might be part of a propaganda operation to hurt the group. So while all reporters should be very careful, I really sweat the details on stories like these.

Hizballah members are insistent there will be a response. They also claim to have evidence that it was an Israeli operation with help from some 'Arabic-speaking traitors' which we all take to mean Syrian intell guys. But they're are not the brain-dead mopes with uncontrollable blood-lust that some people describe. When Hizballah pursues an operation, they consider all of the possible outcomes and possibilities. We saw this with Nasrallah's apology to his people for the 2006 war for underestimating the Israeli reaction.

Look, the group certainly wants war with Israel but they have a complicated -- and hardly unified -- view internally on the best timing. One major issue is internal politics -- Hizballah has to keep its people happy. While the peeps were stoic in the face of 2006's destruction, many in the group say that while they want a fight, they know they can't been seen as starting it or else the people of the south might really hate them. "I'm sorry" only works once when you're talking about a million displaced people and lots of homes flattened.

There have been several reports of attempts by Hizballah to retaliate already, but we really can't get many specifics. One rumor that has seen some factual backing was an attempt at an Israeli target in Baku. This would make some sense: no matter how much natural gas they're sitting on, having solid diplomatic relationships with both Israel and Iran makes Azerbaijan a natural arena for an operation. The rumors about Europe, while maybe true, make a little bit less sense. A serious strike on an Israeli or Jewish target in Europe would draw an awful lot of heat on the Shiite Diaspora that Hizballah relies on worldwide for operations, intell and fundraising.

I still want to know how he made Major. Maybe he's on the Sanchez-track in the reserves. The 'W' clearly stands for 'Walter,' as in 'Mitty.' And let me be the second to credit him with the following scoops (he vigorously credits himself for them): Iran funds Hizballah. Syria helps Hizballah get weapons. Hizballah doesn't like Israel. The Lebanese Army, while nice, doesn't exactly have the stuff (in any way) to take on Hizballah. And, a personal fav: Hizballah used acid bombs to destroy the chassis of dissident cleric's family cars. The group I cover prefers more tried and true methods, like traditional bombs, or even shooting people in the face. But hell, you can't top 'Acid Bomb' as a key word.

But to be serious: Major Junior, please come back. It's safe for you here. Honestly, your reporting was so factually lame, I doubt anyone in the group even knows your name. In fact, I've got $20 that no member of the military wing has ever heard of you. They're too busy with that 'acid bomb' program to see you coming.

I'd ask Nick, but it's his turn to be a hostage. Hizballah imprisons one of us at all times to make sure the other does a decent job reporting. So we swap. I'll be going in later in the week -- while he pursues the acid bomb angle. Don't screw up, habibi. Last time, they water-boarded me for his coverage of Nasrallah's speech. Nick botches part of the translation, and I end up puking water for an hour. But hey, at least I have a job.

I love most of Christopher Hitchen's work, except on Iraq. He's right on paper about the morality of taking action to help the oppressed. But a lot of my friends died -- not to mention tens of thousands of people I didn't know -- so his buddies in Kurdistan could expel Arabs from their homes and have their own state. Do the Kurds deserve their own land? Sure. Was it worth the price in blood, treasure and international reputation? Let's just say that showing too much certainty that it was might be seen in poor taste in light of the epic brutality and incompetence on both sides.

But it was great to hear about how Saddam had to go because he ran his country like a mafia family for his own needs, followed by the a call to support the courageous members of Lebanon's March 14th movement. Samir Geagea, Walid Joumblatt and Amin Gemeyal have been beacons of light, hope and liberal democratic values every since they 'burst' upon the Lebanese political scene in the 1970s. Hitch seems pretty comfortable with supporting democrats who consider throat-slitting to be a legit vote suppression effort.

1) Torino. It's too cramped. Too smokey, but it's home.

2) Next door at Godot is always a nice move if there's no seats at Torino, but the Phalangist bartenders are a wealth of information of how stupid Syrians are.

3) Buy a bottle of whiskey, and take it to the Alfa Taxi office. Have a seat and listen to the insane mix of former Christian gunmen discuss politics. Drink every time someone says something racist. Drink when asked if America is planning to invade. Drink twice if the questioner makes it sound like a good idea. Drink three times if America is offered Tripoli in return.

4) Mayass, an Armenian restaurant. But even as a bar, it's just lovely. Great spicy food, lovely dark bar and always the chance someone will order Turkish coffee for a bit of wackiness.

5) The roof of the Albergo Hotel. Yes, it's too posh. Yes, Ghaith [Abdul Ahad] refuses to speak Arabic near it for fear they'll hear his Iraqi accent and call the cops. But the view and service offer a glimpse of how classy old Beirut must have been before the middle class and aristocrats were chased off by the civil war and replaced by the craven offspring of warlords. Innocence might be the first casualty of war, but it's closely followed by the death of good taste.

Every relationship has its peaks and valleys. But one thing has consistently troubled me about the relationship between the United States and my country. Once the base was set up, I saw a fairly radical change in American attitudes. Before, Washington had consistently juggled a series of priorities -- broadly speaking, they were security concerns, economic concerns, and advocacy of human rights and democracy. But once the base was established, it became clear that while other concerns might be voiced from time to time, only one thing really mattered: the air base. In the end, this shift served neither country's interests.

When you were in Afghanistan in 2002 we were winning. By the time I arrived in 2003 the ground was already shifting under our boots. More than five years later, it's hard to believe there was once serious consideration of drawing down from 10,000 total U.S. troops to a smaller footprint. I thought that the story of Afghanistan after the invasion, as we stumbled into COIN blindfolded and handicapped by insufficient resources, was worth telling.

Sharing chapters, and later drafts, with my soldiers was extraordinarily difficult. First, I was concerned about getting the details right. I didn't want to dramatize the facts, I wanted to tell the story as I remembered it with spare enough language that the story would be dramatic on its own. So, like I'd learned as a historian, I spent six weeks collecting every scrap of evidence from our platoon's experience before writing a thing: maps, radio logs, after action reports, letters home, emails, etc. I interviewed the key actors that I could find. Only then did I write. After I shared the first draft, my men helped me correct inaccuracies until I had the best version of the events I could.

My second concern, however, was a tougher challenge. As the only participant writing a book, I knew that my story would serve for many as the only written account of their story. Describing "what it was like" -- not from a descriptive perspective, but from a psychological perspective -- was a heavy burden. The book opened a lot of wounds for me and for my men. I had emails and phone calls describing sleepless nights and afternoon tears. But one by one my men thanked me for my honesty in laying out in the open the fears and anger and guilt we all shared. I had to use the pen to slay some of my dragons and I know I helped many of my men confront their own.

How have their families responded? I can only speak for the family of Private First Class Evan O'Neill, KIA 29 SEP 2003. Giving the book to his parents, Mike and Barbara, was harder than going on patrol on the border. I had no idea how they would react to a book that describes their own son's death on the battlefield. I worried for weeks. Eventually, I heard from Barbara and then from Mike. They told me two things that I'll never forget: "1. It's not your fault. 2. No one's really dead until they're forgotten. Thank you for remembering Evan and keeping his memory alive."

I spent a lot of time while working on the book thinking about that very question. At a very basic level, studying the region's history at Oxford gave me a historical context for understanding the continuities and challenges of the region and the people with whom we interacted. At Oxford I also met my wife Meena who taught me enough pidgin Urdu to make small talk with tribal elders and bark commands to Afghan soldiers under fire. I had not expected to find the common ground in my interactions with local Afghans to be Bollywood pop culture. The larger value of graduate school and travel for me was changing my perspective. Traditionally, lieutenants and NCOs were handed missions / problems and they were expected to solve them within given parameters. "Answer this question. Solve this problem." In today's operating environment, and particularly in a counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, the hard part is defining the question and problem in the first place. Studying and traveling abroad continually exposed me to ambiguous, uncertain, and unscripted environments. I couldn't have asked for better preparation for the unfamiliarity of rural Afghanistan.

My wife Meena is working at HHS on health policy. She should be able to help you with the health insurance issue. I still can't figure out how to get a dentist appointment off-post.

During the first draft, I made a conscious effort not to write much about Meena. She's a much more private person than I am and I wanted to respect her privacy. However, I realized after reviewing the draft that a critical part of the story was missing. I couldn't tell the story of my experience as a student, soldier, and veteran without talking about the ways she shaped and supported me through that transition, particularly during my time in Afghanistan. Before I wrote the second draft we had a lot of conversations about her experience of the deployment. I re-read all of our correspondence back and forth by letter, email, and IM. One of the things I hadn't realized was the degree to which her training as a surgeon, and the constant exposure to mortality in the operating room, reflected my own learning process. We were both dealing with situations in which the officer (or surgeon) can never be in control of all the variables. You can do everything right and still lose a soldier or a patient. Finding that connection, and others, was one of the unexpected benefits of producing a book.

Serving in Afghanistan is, I think, for anyone a humbling experience. You are continually humbled by the geography, the complexity of the society, and the weight of history. Understanding in your bones how long a drive thirty miles is without a road. Feeling in your stomach eyes watching you from canyon rims. Seeing the mixture of sorrow and hope in a child's eyes and the disillusioned stare of an adolescent with no options. That stays with you and gives a texture and reality check that is valuable when sifting through dry memoranda and contemplating strategic options.

You have to train to be adaptive. A cadet should understand that the war he or she joins four or five years from now will be a different war altogether. The war in Afghanistan in 2009 is totally different than the war I fought in 2003-2004. A well-rounded education including self-directed outside reading and broad exposure through travel may not give you the specific answers about the culture, terrain, or enemy of tomorrow's battlefields, but it will at least give you the questions to ask so that you can adapt faster and smarter than your adversary.

Have you asked Nagl yet? I hear he's looking for a publicist.