Abu Muqawama: March 2010

Abu Muqawama retains its autonomy and the views and beliefs expressed within the blog do not reflect those of CNAS. Abu Muqawama retains the right to delete comments that include words that incite violence; are predatory, hateful, or intended to intimidate or harass; or degrade people on the basis of gender, race, class, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or disability. In summary, don't be a jerk.

  • This one comes via a Russian jihadist website:

    Success in guerrilla warfare (the conduct of combat operations on territory occupied by the enemy) by the will of God largely depends on the help of the local population.

    Успехи партизанской войны (ведение боевых действий на территории, оккупированной врагом), по воле Аллаха во многом зависят от помощи местного населения.

    Note to the person who wrote this: blowing yourself up in the subways used by the local population is probably not the most effective way to gain their support. (Thanks, Dan.)

  • From a very good review essay in the Financial Times covering some new books on the Dreyfus Affair:

    The atavistic impulse that spawned the Dreyfus affair, Begley warns, is as malignly robust as ever. Like Emile Zola, Begley deplores the current wisdom that a nation can protect itself from subversion by subverting decency, due process and the liberties on which it was founded. He frets about a future that lacks Dreyfusards. “Will there be,” he asks, “men and women ready to defend human rights, and the dignity of every human life, against abuse wrapped in claims of expediency and reasons of state?”

    Yes, actually. There is, happily, more than a little Émile François Zola in Jane Mayer.

  • Brett Stephens starts his op-ed in today's Wall Street Journal with the following question:

    Pop quiz—What does more to galvanize radical anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world: (a) Israeli settlements on the West Bank; or (b) a Lady Gaga music video?

    You see where Stephens is going with this one, right? I mean, you don't really need to even read the rest of the column, the point of which is that Islamist outrage over decadent western culture is a more significant driver of conflict and anti-American sentiment in the region than Israeli settlements.

    I have no idea if this is actually true. It seems to me that I have seen both empirical evidence and anecdotal evidence lending credence to the idea that outrage over the plight of the Palestinians is, in fact, a driver of conflict and/or anti-American sentiment in the Arabic-speaking world, but there may be more sophisticated research and analysis out there that proves otherwise. And Stephens leans heavily on the writings of Sayyid Qutb to support his arguments, which makes me nervous, because for all his talents, Stephens is no scholar of Islam, and a few things that should not be studied as a hobby include:

    1. Brain surgery
    2. Multilinear algebra
    3. The strands and evolution of Islamist thought

    Many serious scholars have written very good work on Islamic fundamentalism, and for those wishing to learn more, allow me to recommend, among many other works, Marty and Appleby's multi-volume Fundamentalism Project and Hourani's single-volume, highly-readable Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939. The latter is a great primer on the intellectual roots of pretty much all the major ideas in the Arabic-speaking world of the 20th Century -- to include Arab nationalism and Islamism.

    But I am not weighing in to either defend or attack Israeli settlements or to explain the intellectual history of the Arabic-speaking world -- two subjects I know just enough about to know that I should keep my mouth shut and let the experts do the talking. The purpose of this post is to highlight a key lesson of Middle East peacemaking: Leave Lady Gaga the hell out of it.

    Brett Stephens may have read a few books on Islamist thought, but how many Arabic-language music videos has he watched? I ask because I have seen a lot (as they play pretty much 24-7 in 90% of the cafes and restaurants of the Arabic-speaking world), and I have also, this very morning, made a careful study of the oeuvre of Lady Gaga to determine which are more provocative sexually. The verdict? Lady Gaga is, in the words of my office mate (like Sayyid Qutb, an alumnus of the University of Northern Colorado!), "a brilliant art school trainwreck." She is a ridiculous mess who uses sex among many other provocations to entertain. And as I have well-documented soft spot in my heart for Italian girls from Westchester County, I feel I need to stick up for her.

    Haifa Wehbe, meanwhile? Well, judge for yourselves, but whereas Lady Gaga is a Tisch School-trained provocateuse, Hizballah-supporting Haifa strikes me as a less sophisticated one-trick pony pretty much mixing sex with music with, well, more sex. Regardless, with music videos like this one, Stephens can hardly argue that Lady Gaga is the one importing sexual provocation into the Arabic-speaking world and stirring things up, can he?

    And here is Her Gaganess for comparison.

    And, back to Haifa.

    By contrast, look at this tame video from Lady Gaga.

    Uh... Crap. Okay, maybe Brett Stephens has a point. Dang. Me airing that last (in retrospect, NSFW) video might have just started a holy war in some internet cafe in Sana'a. Sorry?

    UPDATE: There are some good and very funny comments below. Thomas Hegghammer even briefly weighs in to shake his head at Stephens's op-ed. Just so you guys know, I obey two simple rules when it comes to studying Islamist ideology (that I have borrowed from Will McCants): (1) Thomas Hegghammer's analysis is correct. (2) If you find yourself in disagreement with Thomas Hegghammer, refer back to Rule #1.

  • Reading Michelle Cottle's piece in The New Republic about Sarah Palin's odds as a potential leader of the Tea Partiers, I suddenly felt I knew what it must have been like to be the careers guidance people at my old university.

    I realise, i know little about American politics, and I definitely know little about Sarah Palin. But i know I know (a bit) about the politics of Pakistan, and I know a career opportunity when I see one.

    Cottle lists the attributes a potential leader needs to become the new shining light of the Tea Party people. Namely:

    1. Anger. The more the better.

    2. Paranoia that the other side is out to get you.

    3. A self-righteous conviction that the other side is not merely wrong but irretrievably evil. (To be fair, this is pretty much a requisite for leadership in any political party these days.)

    4. Sympathy (or, better still, empathy) for the victim mentality, ideally coupled with burning resentment that the other side looks down on you.

    5. Major-league charisma and near-blinding star power to overcome the movement’s petty jealousies, feuding factions, and general disorganization.

    Tea Partiers?!... Forget that! Pakistani politics (hearts) anger in a big way. And as for paranoia, self righteousness, resentment (victimhood)... yep, check all that. And charisma? Well, I always thought Ms. Palin kinda looked like Benazir Bhutto:

    So, if Sarah Palin does decide to walk away from the Republican Party, I for one would advise her to broaden her horizons. Americans aren't the only people who hate taxes, love guns and go hunting a lot.

    And if she's wondering where in the Pakistani political landscape she might carve a niche. My career advice folder would contain the following info:

     

     

    1. Qazi Hussain Ahmed of the Jammat e Islami (religious and right wing)

     

    2. Alfat Hussain of the MQM (firey maverick)

     

    Altaf bhai (Altaf brother) as he's known is my personal favourite. The MQM is a political party based in Karachi claiming to represent native Urdu speakers. You don't need to understand Urdu to know why Ms Palin should be going head to head with this guy:

    "Despite all the talk of ideological purity, Tea Partiers aren’t defined by their ideology so much as their attitude.." says Cottle. In Pakistan, it's ALL about attitude.

    Palin for Pakistan!!

  • Allow me to offer a huge congratulations to my friend-turned-boss Nate Fick and his wife Margaret Angell on the birth of Margaret Ella Fick. Named after their grandmothers, "Ella" is only 7lbs., 4oz. at the moment but with her genes will no doubt be the first woman to break two hours in the marathon by the time she graduates from university. No pressure, though, kid.

  • Laura Rozen's blog post on the Obama Administration's thought process concerning Israel raised a ruckus this past weekend, and Andrew Sullivan went off on Dennis Ross for allegedly being more sensitive to the delicate coalition politics Benjamin Netanyahu faces than to U.S. interests in the region. As this blog knows, I really try to avoid issues relating to Israel and the Palestinians for the sake of my personal health and well-being. But two points are worth drawing out here:

    1. One of the criticisms you often hear of U.S. policy-makers in the Oslo era is not so much that they were too sensitive to Israeli concerns but that they were hyper-sensitive to Israeli politics while not paying anything resembling the same level of attention to Palestinian politics. So they were conscious of how the decisions of an Israeli prime minister might play on the streets of Tel Aviv but not as aware how a decision by Arafat might play out on the streets of Ramallah. I heard Rob Malley make this point at a talk at AUB in 2008, in fact. (A lecture which, miracle of the internets, you can watch here.) Being sensitive to the political realities facing an Israeli prime minister, as Ross allegedly is, is no bad thing in and of itself. But one should remember that another people, with an entirely seperate political reality, live on the other side of the Green Line. And a lesson learned from the 1990s is that you should pay close to equal attention to the dynamics of their political discourse if you hope to create an enduring peace. 

    2. It's worth going back and reading the way Netanyahu is portrayed in Ross's book The Missing Peace. Malley and others complain that Arafat is unfairly the villian in Ross's account, but Netanyahu is hardly a hero. In fact, Ross's repeated exasperation with Netanyahu is clear.

    After Netanyahu was gone, President Clinton observed: "He thinks he is the superpower and we are here to do whatever he requires." No one on our side disagreed with that assessment. (p. 261)

    Ultimately, Ross considered Netanyahu "a leader who had two legs walking in different directions" (p. 493). By that he meant that he may have wanted to make peace on some level, but his loyalty to his political base meant that he also made moves entirely counter to a lasting peace with the Palestinians. That strikes me as one way to interpret Netanyahu's behavior over the past few months. He opens the door to a Palestinian state, but then allows his coalition to make moves regarding settlements that undermine any process that might bring that state to reality.

    I should say that I have little interest ever getting involved with U.S. policy regarding Israel and the Palestinians but very much respect Dennis Ross for stuff that has nothing to do with the Oslo process. He's managed to have a really successful career in this town while enjoying a happy marriage and raising three great kids. In the 202 area code, that's nothing to scoff at. And when I left a year-long fellowship at the pro-Israel Washington Institute (which is a great place to work, by the way) to go do my dissertation under one of the Palestinian negotiators during the Oslo era, Ross was among the most supportive of the move. So I like the guy, personally and professionally, even as I have been more than a little critical of decisons made by Ross and other U.S. policy-makers in the 1990s concerning Israel and southern Lebanon.

  • Great speech, but I'm more curious as to how the talk with Karzai went.

  • I've been mulling over for days what it is about the recent talk of "strategic dialogue" and the "new relationship" between the US and Pakistan that just doesn't sit right with me. It's not the nagging question as to what has actually changed in the past month or so. It's not even the elephant of American popular image in the nicely decorated Pakistani drawing room. 

    Today, while reading this article in the Foreign Affairs journal, I finally figured out what it is. The writer, Haider Mullick, a fellow at the US Joint Special Operations University and a bunch of other impressive stuff, isn't actually commenting on the recent talks. He's talking about Pakistan's counterinsurgency efforts in Waziristan.

    Mullick makes some really interesting points. The Pakistani army isn't trampling around Waziristan creating more enemies than it kills or captures, he says, instead, it's learning from its own experiences as well as those of others to implement a comprehensive strategy that's securing the population.

    "The fate of the internally displaced was the Achilles' heel of our mission," said one senior military officer involved in relief efforts. "Without protecting them, we would have no local partners, good intelligence, or popular support to carry on."

    Sounds like a great starting point. After which, Mullick goes on to outline how the Pakistani army reassured the population, worked with international partners to establish well-run camps, re-tooled the soldiers in the field to try and limit the negative impact on locals. He even goes on to outline a future plan which involves the Pakistanis working with the Afghanis, Indians and Americans to "flip" someone like Hekmateyar in order to kick start the process of re-integrating the Taliban. Yep, you read it right and it's not a typo.. "Indians".

    Anyway, right at the end, we have...

    "But even these well-designed initiatives will fail in the absence of a comprehensive plan that targets growing problems in Pakistan's government, judiciary, and military. The government is unable to efficiently use the foreign aid that it receives, and widespread corruption plagues development efforts."

    This is my gripe. While the big men (and women) of international politics smile for the cameras, corruption, bureaucracy, mismanagement etc make no more than a fleeting mention in the post script. But, really, these issues are the key to all else. Read the autobiographies of several Pakistani former presidents and prime ministers and you quickly realise that military dictator or civilian populist, they all struggled to get the simple functions of state done.

    Allow the AM blog to assist if it's not quite clear. We could run a little programme for journalists and policy makers. If you need to get a feel for what is involved in making words into deeds in Pakistan, come to Islamabad and apply for a driving license. Compare the stated cost and time scale with how long it actually takes and how much you have to pay. Make a note of the difference. It accounts for much of the "credibility deficit".

    If a government doesn't have a handle on the levers of power, grand international handshakes are meaningless. What Pakistan actually needs help in is delivery.

  • I do not usually make it to think tank events in DC, but I made the time today to sit in at the start of the Brookings Institute's Defense Challenges and Future Opportunities confab put together by the awesome Pete Singer, he of Wired for War fame. Dave Kilcullen moderated the first panel of the morning on irregular war, and the first presentation of that panel was a keeper.

    Veteran intelligence analyst Matt Frankel, on leave from his service in the intelligence community as a federal executive fellow at Brookings, gave a compelling presentation on high value targeting (HVT) campaigns and their utility. His findings:

    1. HVT campaigns are more effective against centralized opposition -- but decentralization is the trend.
    2. HVT campaigns do not work in a vaccum. They have to be connected to a broader CT or COIN strategy.
    3. Indigenous attacking forces have the edge in HVT campaigns, mainly due to local knowledge.
    4. Along the same line, third party HVT campaigns are less likely to succeed, and in order for them to do so, the objectives of the host nation must be alligned with those of the third party.
    5. Capture when you can, kill when you must. Obviously, the intelligence yield is better in the case of the former. Dead mean tell no tales.
    6. Understanding enemy organizational dynamics is vital. What will the effect on an enemy organization be? And -- and this is my concern -- are we killing the people we might need to do a deal with later?

    Frankel's presentation matches up with a lot of what I have often argued, which for the most part has been based either on my personal experiences (I learned the danger of ignoring Lesson #2 in Iraq in 2003, for example) or case study analysis (fun fact: Hizballah's HVT campaign against the SLA in southern Lebanon was more successful than the IDF's HVT campaign against Hizballah, lending support to Lessons #3 and #4). I am pretty sure Frankel's analysis supports a lot of the concerns Dave and I have had about the drone program in Afghanistan and Pakistan (namely, that it ignores Lessons #1, #2 and #6), but I would want to see Frankel's presentation in an article supported by footnotes and with methodology laid out in greater detail. Regardless, Frankel's presentation was a great one, and I was sorry that an obligation at CNAS kept me from hearing the discussion that followed it.

  • Talking about Swat, the Christian Science Monitor's Issam Ahmed has a nice feature out of Swat on how the region is doing a year after the government decided to kick out the militants.

    "Nine months after Pakistan's military cleared the Swat Valley of a brutal Taliban occupation, the region has made steady gains in improving security and rebuilding infrastructure. But its progress remains vulnerable, threatened by sporadic militant attacks, stilted economic recovery, and growing frustration among residents at the strong military presence"

    For me, this underscores the point that a military operation is just the start of a government's commitment when it decides to deal with militants who have set up shop on its territory. 

    The article also gives you a hint as to why the U.S. military is helping the Pakistanis with counterinsurgency:

    "Haider Ali, a school principal in Mingora, complains about some soldiers' arbitrary and arrogant behavior. "They will enter our buildings to use the toilets without permission, they will eye our women while searching cars. Things will not be alright until they leave," he says."

  • As everyone has been getting all excited about the "new relationship" the Pakistanis and Americans have been forging in Washington, I've been trying to figure out a way to express my pessimistic grumblings without coming over like a grouchy old git who enjoys letting the air out of the footballs local kids kick into his garden.

    Finally, I've figured out a way. I'm gonna let a former Reuters colleague look like the man who stole Christmas.

    Michael Georgy has a great story from Swat spelling out the reality in Pakistan in the places that are no longer in the headlines.

    "The drive to win over the population by providing better economic opportunities and basic services is moving at a slow pace, as evidenced by grim living conditions, joblessness and lack of industries."

    The point highlighted by the story is that, yes, you can talk about developing infrastructure, social services and the rest of it. But it all means very little without the ability to make it a reality on the ground. And, in Pakistan, the gap between commitment and realisation is the sticking point.

    "We expect a lot from the government," said one of the men, who looked far older than his 47 years, perhaps from the stress of fighting and the ruins it left behind. "We have no jobs now."

  • I picked up the paper this morning to see that Bing West has written a fantastic review of Matt Gallagher's new book, Kaboom, for the Wall Street Journal. I think you all know by now how much I loved this book and how much I am encouraging readers of this blog to buy it. I liked Kaboom so much, in fact, that I forced Matt to answer some questions.

    1. I’m going to get right down to it: this is my favorite memoir to be published by a veteran of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. I wrote my own quickly-forgotten memoir, of course, and have read quite a few more because my friends keep writing them. So far, the two most popular memoirs written by junior officers have been those written by Nate Fick and Craig Mullaney. And in a lot of ways, their well-written memoirs are reflections of the writers themselves: thoughtful, earnest, accomplished … and almost too good to be true. One of the things that has always struck me about Craig and Nate – and I consider them both friends – is how damn earnest they are. Their memoirs reflect two hard-working, selfless platoon leaders who live and die by the welfare of their men. I read and greatly enjoyed both of their memoirs, but as I finished them, I thought to myself, “Damn, is that what I should have been like?” Sometimes I wonder, as I pin up a photoshopped GQ cover (with Nate’s face replacing that of Rachel Bilson) in our office kitchen, whether or not I should feel guilty for having as much fun as I did as a platoon leader in combat. Yes, the constant grind of missions was brutal, and bivouacs on 12,000-foot peaks in eastern Afghanistan in March are never fun, but what about all the hilarity that goes hand-in-hand with a tight-knit group of men at war? I mean, maybe I’m just a much bigger smart-ass than Craig or Nate (or E. B. Sledge or Tim O'Brien for that matter), but one of the things that I have always found to be missing from war memoirs has been the humor, the banter, and the absurdities of living with a group of young men of the Anchorman generation. Until now, that is. Man, you really nailed it. My first question is, how in the world did you so faithfully represent the back-and-forth, smart-assed dialogue that takes place within a combat arms platoon at war?

    It was important to me to capture that element of war because it was so vital to my platoon’s experience and my own personal experience. Humor is one of a soldier’s survival tools, and it has been for far longer than the GWOT wars. I remember reading Norman Mailer’s novel, The Naked and the Dead, the summer before I left for college and being shocked that the Greatest Generation joked so crudely. But of course they did. It helped remind them that they were alive, that their present wasn’t their eternity. And we of the “Anchorman” generation, as you put it, did the very same thing, albeit with the ironic quirkiness and sarcasm of our era.

    So, I made a point of scrawling down the more hilarious quips and events of our time in Iraq, both for the Kaboom blog (when it was still active) and for the sake of posterity. I’m paraphrasing the old adage about war – that it’s constant boredom interrupted by fleeting moments of terror. Well, what fills up that constant boredom? It’s not just pulling security or moving sandbags or cleaning weapons. There are a lot of dick jokes to be told. A lot.

    As for the natural comparisons to Nate Fick’s and Craig Mullaney’s books – I’ve read both and enjoyed both immensely. And they both seem like great guys and even greater platoon leaders. But their way isn’t the only way. They’re gladiators. That isn’t me. I found that the most important thing a platoon leader can do is to be authentic with his men, as soldiers can sniff out frauds and phonies like bloodhounds. So, I played to my leadership strengths, turned to my NCOs to help me out with my weaknesses, and that turned out to be a pretty simple recipe for success.

    So yeah, there’s a reason Craig Mullaney’s website has a video of him boxing a gigantic Robo-major to near-death with only one working shoulder, whereas mine has one of my soldiers teaching me the “Crank That” rap dance. Play to your strengths, future LTs, play to your strengths!

    Also, Ex, don’t sell yourself short. Your memoir is solid and a vital part of the junior officer memoir library. I’m pretty sure you were the trailblazer in our little slice of the literary world, so embrace that. I’m not kissing your ass, either, because I still own you at foosball.

    2. So true. I was half in the bag at that point in the evening, but usually my foosball gets better the more I drink.

    Your “voice” in this memoir is really unique. You go back and forth between stream-of-conscience reflection and hyper-realistic narrative and dialogue. What was your idea for this memoir when you first started writing it. What did you want it to be?

    In addition to enjoying writing in both of those styles, I think they both reflect the deployment experience, albeit in very different ways. While conducting ops, you're forced to take on a hyper-realistic mental state, in an effort to detach yourself from the severity of what you're actually doing and where you actually are. I'll still catch myself remembering moments in Iraq, and have to remind myself that "yeah, that actually happened and we actually did that." But in the moment, you can't get bogged down by that, so you rely on the mere momentum of action to carry you through. At the same time, there was a lot of time for reflection in Iraq - either during long, boring missions or back at the outpost, during recovery. That's when the stream of consciousness kicks in, and anyone who’s been deployed can attest to the dangers of thinking too much over there.

    My only goal for Kaboom ahead of time was for it to be an accurate portrayal of our experience in Iraq. I think I accomplished that, and hope it resonates with others who had similar experiences, and/or with people interested in learning more about what it means to send off our nation’s soldiers off to war.

    Now that I’ve completed the book, I’m shooting for something a little grander in scope. Counterinsurgency is a great buzz word now, and a sweeping strategic vision, but tactically speaking, it’s messy and not conducive to instantaneous fulfillment. I’ve read a lot of great books about COIN, but I didn’t find too many that described in detail the ground experience for junior officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers. I really hope “Kaboom” helps out some cheeky platoon leader twenty years from now who has no idea what counterinsurgency means to him or his guys, but does like to read. Even if this only happens once, I’ll consider this endeavor a success.

    3. To what degree was this memoir a logical extension of your much-loved, short-lived blog?

    I never intended to turn the blog into a book. It honestly – I swear to Allah - started out as a medium to communicate with family and friends, and as a way for me to chronicle our days and nights. Then it evolved into a personal catharsis. And then it evolved into a case study for how to get into trouble without ever really getting into trouble. Luck of the Irish, that, and all thanks to my strict observance of OPSEC.

    In terms of the finished product, I think readers of the blog will recognize style similarities and a few of the earlier stories. I’m obviously free to write more honestly and candidly than I did on the blog, though. And the benefit of an actual editing process, and its impact on the quality of the writing, cannot go unstated.

    4. You seem like the kind of guy that might never enjoy a job as much as you did leading the Gravediggers in combat. I know the feeling but have been pleasantly surprised to find out how much I enjoy life outside the U.S. Army. On the one hand, I miss it every day, but on the other hand, I never regret leaving. The opportunities I have received on “the outside” have just been awesome. (Plus, I never would have met Lady Muqawama.) What is next for you? Where do you see yourself in five years?

    I honestly have no idea, and frankly, I wouldn't have it any other way. I'm still young enough - or immature enough, depending on your take of such matters - that the thought of being permanently settled to a place or a job scares the hell out of me. I'm going to grad school next year for Middle Eastern history/Islamic studies, and if I end up doing something with that, great. But I'm going back simply because I enjoy learning about those subjects, and think that I have something to contribute because of my own experiences.

    You're right about the job thing, I miss being a platoon leader in combat greatly, and worry that I'll never get a thrill like that again. While civilian life has its perks (sleeping in past dawn! Beatles hair!), I don't think most veterans ever accept its banality. I certainly haven't. But I drifted into the military and into that job, so I'm hoping that I'll drift into something else just as invigorating and enlightening. I miss the people in the Army every day. I don't really miss the Army.

    Wherever I'm at mentally and physically in five years, I'll be writing. Fiction, non-fiction, Dear Abby columns - it's the only thing I enjoy as much as I did being a PL, albeit in a much different, introspective way. Leading the Gravediggers was straight social channeling, homie, and enough of an extrovert exercise to last me a decade.

    5. I was at church last Sunday and ended up striking up a conversation with a new congregant who happened to be from my hometown. For a while, we were talking about Chattanooga and churches there, but then we both realized we had served in Iraq and were then talking, after the service but still in our pew, about the war. This guy was telling me about his battalion commander, and – still in church, mind – said to me: “Do you know him? No? Yeah, he was a fucking douchebag … Wait, am I allowed to say that in church?” Needless to say, I was rolling with laughter. Sometimes – and it doesn’t matter where you are – the old U.S. Army vernacular slips out. What will you take from your Iraq experience with you into the brave new world of civilian life? Any quirks you have kept? Anything your girlfriend notices that just stands out?

    Well, my propensity to use the word fuck, in pretty much any form of speech, is still there, as well. That seems to be a universal gift from the military to its former soldiers and retirees. My family has accepted this, but it tends to shake up both strangers and the meek. Lady Kaboom (better known as City Girl to long-time readers of my blog) thinks I order around civilians too much, especially when they’re moving slowly and are in my way. And what’s with all the fat people out here? Don’t they have tape tests? Other than that, just the standard combat veteran dislikes for honking cabs and slamming dumpster lids.

    6. Guinness – specifically, pints and cans of it – occupies a privileged place in your narrative. The last question in these interviews always revolves around food and drink. Where can one get the best pint of Guinness in the United States? Name specific bars, please, as our readers demand it.

    Let me preface this by saying that Guinness outside of Ireland is dirt. Granted, this dirt still tastes better than all of the other beers in the world, but still, don’t be fooled into thinking that the Irish don’t horde the best for themselves. I studied near Dublin for a semester during college, and spent way too much time sampling the Black Stuff. So I have to include at least one genuine Irish pub. I’ll follow your United States restriction for the remaining recommendations.

    1) The Roost, Maynooth, Ireland

    2) White Horse Tavern, West Village, New York City – Crusty bartenders, cranky locals, and the place where Dylan Thomas drank himself to death. A little too touristy now to be a consistent watering hole, but you can still feel the ghosts in there. Especially after a few pints of Guinness. Some words of warning, though – don’t feed the yuppies! Or the hipsters. Damn, dirty hipsters …

    Yeah, this is one of my favorite bars, and they serve a mean pint. But if I'm in the Village, I usually walk over to Swift for Guinness. Anyway, #3...

    3) O’Toole’s Irish Pub, Honolulu – As a young lieutenant, I held the dubious honor of being thrown out of every Irish pub on the island of Oahu. This place was my favorite, due to being the most authentic “pub,” and thus its bouncers were the most familiar with my antics and appreciation for general mayhem.

    4) Durty Nelly’s Irish Pub, San Antonio

    5) Molly Malone’s Irish Pub, Louisville – I have fond memories of this place, from my time as a 2LT in the officer basic course, mainly for the atmosphere and the conversation. But isn’t that at least half the reason to go to a bar? This was the place my friends and I did our best to make sense of the wars, our futures, and military culture, in general. It’s also the last place I hung out with Mark Daily, a friend of mine who was killed in Mosul in January, 2007. I couldn’t not mention Molly Malone’s (double negatives be damned). I’ll always associate it with the Clancy Brothers’ version of “The Patriot Game” and Mark.

    Thanks, Matt, for both writing this book and taking the time to answer these questions. You, reader, can buy Kaboom here. And I'll raise a toast to Mark Daily the next time I sip from a pint of Guinness.

  • Most everyone agrees the Presidential Management Fellowship is one of the federal government's best programs, as it allows smart young Americans fresh out of graduate school a pathway to service in the federal government. Many current or former Presidential Management Fellows read this blog, and they do great things for the tax-payer and the war-fighter on a daily basis. So this blog post is not intended to attack the program or its graduates. But the federal government selected 869 finalists for the PMF this year, and just ten (10) are engineers. Ten.

    The next time you wonder why our infrastructure is falling apart, or why we cannot effectively oversee defense contracts for large weapons systems, remember that fact.

    (By contrast, of course, my officemate has an organization chart on the wall depicting China's government. The president, premier and eight of the nine members of the Politburo Standing Committee are engineers. Just sayin'.)

    P.S. Are you a veteran? Are you looking for a solid career path and the ability to raise your family in the most beautiful area of the United States? Click here.

  • Not a joke. Issandr reports.

    Does this mean the blog should start selling lizard caps?

  • I had lunch with Amos Harel of Ha'aretz a few months ago in Tel Aviv, and he floated the idea of starting a blog on security issues in the Middle East that would reach a larger audience than his normal posts for Israel's newspaper of record. (Or is that Yedioth Ahronoth these days? I honestly don't know.) I normally enjoy the reporting Amos does with Avi Issacharoff, so I am enjoying their new blog, even if it reads less as a blog and more as just another section of Ha'aretz. Both guys are excellent journalists who would (and probably did) make the late Ze'ev Schiff proud. (Avi, in particular, earned kudos for physically protecting Palestinian families from crazy religious-nationalist settlers two years back.) The one thing that bothers me, though, aside from the format, is how isolated the discussion is. I mean, it's all about Israel and the Palestinian Territories. And that's fine, as that's the beat walked by Harel and Issacharoff. But it's less "the Middle East" and more "a slice of the eastern Mediterranean."

    On a serious note, you wonder whether or not Israel's isolation in the region has made the perspective of its reporters increasingly blinkered. If I were the editor of Ha'aretz, I would send talented guys like Amos and Avi off to report from Washington or London or Tokyo for a year to get a more global view of security before returning home to report on the IDF and the territories. Have them do a fellowship at CSIS or RUSI or something. One of the things I thought was cool about Schiff is how plugged in he was with the policy debates taking place in Washington and Europe.

    Another thing I would like to see -- and this is by no means the responsibility of any one journalist or newspaper -- is a good blog on Middle East security issues written by reporters from all around the region, with bloggers from Cairo, Baghdad, Beirut, Tel Aviv, the Palestinian Territories, Yemen, etc. all joining in. Is that too much to ask for? Some newspapers have tried to do this, but with budgets shrinking, what you end up getting is two or three English-speaking journalists trying to cover an entire region with little coordination and too few resources.

    That having been said, I think Amos and Avi have perhaps chanced upon the most appropriate name for a blog covering security in the Middle East. Middle East Security Survey. Or: MESS. I plan to be a regular reader and look forward to their future posts.

    P.S. Speaking of Israel, followers of my Twitter feed will know I saw none other than Tzipi Livni wandering around 7th Street NW in Chinatown yesterday. Lady Muqawama spotted her first and made me walk into the Anne Taylor store to confirm. I walked in, started scanning the store, and was like, "Not famous ... not famous ... not famous ... woah, hey, it's Tzipi Livni!" The AIPAC conference, of course, is going on right now, which you can follow here if it interests you. (I'm personally not that interested, honestly, for pretty much the exact reasons Jeffrey Goldberg C'87 lists here.) Now if any of you want to leave comments below, by all means do so, and feel free to tell me whether or not I should have either given Livni a big hug and kiss or arrested her for war crimes. But let's keep the discussion free of ugly anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim or anti-Arab slurs, okay? Because those are not cool.

  • Tyler Moselle, a smart and capable researcher based at Harvard's Carr Center, has a bizarre op-ed in today's Financial Times in which he warns that counterinsurgency not be considered "a panacea for American national security and foreign policy." Which is quite good advice save for the fact that I cannot name a single person arguing that counterinsurgency should be a panacea for American national security and foreign policy. (To be fair, Tyler calls this a "basic fact." Which is exactly what it is, in the sense that you cannot argue with facts.)

    If I am reading Tyler's op-ed correctly, though, one of the things that concerns him is that a lot of the aid and development work being done in Afghanistan is being effectively militarized by the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy. For this concern I have some sympathy. But not much.

    As I see it, the U.S. mission in Afghanistan is one of stablization. That's not the same thing as nation-building, which is what Andrew Bacevich claims -- not without justification -- the United States and its allies are doing.

    Moselle seems to want something more. He wants, in his words, "a mixture of nation-building, stability operations, long-term humanitarian and economic development, precision-based counter-terrorism strikes, political negotiations with the Taliban -- plus counter-insurgency to put down the Taliban."

    Goodness gracious, Tyler, is there anything you don't want?

    This is the kind of stuff that drives people like Bacevich nuts, because it's a prescription for a 30-year occupation of the country without any discussion of resources (hint: they're limited) or prioritization of effort.

    So what's the solution?

    I have been thinking a lot about this in advance of and since I returned from a conference on assessing the stablization effects of aid and development programs in Afghanistan. Some really good work is being done by folks like Eli Berman and Andrew Wilder to determine which aid and development projects are actually addressing drivers of conflict, which aid and development projects might be exacerbating the conflict, and which aid and development projects are quite nice when considered in and of themselves but which have no real effect on levels of violence.

    Considering the fact that the United States and its allies a) have decidedly limited resources and b) do not want to continue to occupy Afghanistan too far into the next decade, it is my humble opinion that we should focus what money and resources we are sending to Afghanistan overwhelmingly on those projects which can demonstrate they are having an effect on levels of violence. In Iraq, as Berman & Co. demonstrate (.pdf), that meant CERP funds -- especially when those CERP funds were used in conjunction with a PRT. In Afghanistan, that might mean whatever they are calling CERP these days (I forget), and programs like the NSP.

    It also means that we should be constantly assessing what programs are having an effect, even if that means folks like me have to swallow our pride and hand over our data to the quant geeks who specialize in analyzing it. Because, as Berman points out, if you tried to spend $30 billion on a domestic program in the United States without any pilot programs or means to assess its effectiveness, you would get laughed out of the Congress. The reforms initiated after the Great Society programs, in fact, made doing such a thing hard if not impossible. But we have spent well over $30 billion in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan, and as far as I can tell, no one really understands yet what programs are having a stablizing effect, what programs are either exacerbating the conflict or turning Afghanistan into a bona fide rentier state (it's already is, actually), and which programs are nice but ineffective.

    In conclusion, you may have never thought you would read a call for minimalist means on this blog, but I have come to believe that is more or less what we need in Afghanistan in terms of aid and development.

  • This blog long ago established a tradition of announcing the identities of its writers to mass yawns and mumblings of "yeah, so?"

    Today, it's Londonstani's turn.

    As many of you already know and a few have probably worked out with a little cross referencing via google, my name is Amil Khan.

    Me

    And that's me.

    After a few cameo appearances as AM's "violent Pashtun flatmate", I first wrote for this blog nearly two years ago after returning from a trip to Lebanon that was actually supposed to be a holiday. I used to work as a Middle East correspondent for Reuters. After six years abroad, I left to come back to London and work on documentaries. Since then, I've had the privilege of working for the likes of Channel 4 and the BBC on topical foreign and domestic projects. My speciality is looking into why people do bad stuff. Mostly, I looked at Islamist extremism but I've also spent time investigating the kinds of extremism we see more often, such as racism.

    Towards the end of 2009, I moved away from the world of day-to-day journalism and cast my net further a field. This blog had a lot to do with that decision. Some of the stuff I'm proudest of having written came about following conversations in Walthamstow with Abu Muqawama that started with the words, "OK, so I saw [insert strange occurrence]. Weird or what??." To which, AM's reply often was, "why don't you blog on it?"

    Presently, I am working on a project in Pakistan that aims to challenge the religious legitimacy claimed by extremists operating there. And since I am what a friend calls a "recovering journalist", I exorcise my demons on this blog whenever time permits. I usually restrict my writing to this blog, however, my latest thoughts ended up on the Guardian's Comment is Free site.

    I intend to continue writing for this blog. I haven't yet figured out why AM himself is on Twitter, but I might even give that a go some day. In the meantime, I'll be posting here whenever I get the chance. The intention will be, as always, to provide readers with the context behind the news rather than the news itself (this is done far better than we can manage by the likes of Reuters, BBC, AP and AFP). And as always, expect to find many references to things that have no broader intellectual interest whatsoever and are only there for amusement value.

    Hell, at the very least, everyone can rest assured that in keeping with the house style of this blog, Londonstani will not be referring to himself in the third person.

  • I am crashing on some writing assignments, so I do not have much time to blog. Or to read much, alas. But I figured I would share with you the books that I am currently reading and those that are on my shortlist, competing for my attention.

    Currently Reading:

    1. Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World; I have thus far really enjoyed this book and am almost done with it. Very readable financial history, much like Ferguson's The House of Rothschild.

    2. War and Punishment; Really impressive. Thus far, he has cited sources in three different languages and has a thorough understanding and incisive criticism of the literature he is challenging. No wonder people think highly of this dude.

    Competing For My Attention:

    1. Buying National Security: How America Plans and Pays for Its Global Role and Safety at Home; How sick am I that this is the book I am most excited about reading? A book on budgets! But there had been no good book on the subject prior to this one, and I think very highly of both co-authors.

    2. Our Army: Soldiers, Politics, and American Civil-Military Relations; I have heard great things about the research this active-duty officer has been doing on the values and political allegiances of the U.S. military's officer corps.

    3. Every Man in This Village is a Liar: An Education in War; Megan graciously hosted me for Christmas dinner at her apartment in Cairo in 2005. I look forward to reading this book, based on her experiences reporting the Middle East for the Los Angeles Times. An advance copy landed on my desk yesterday.

    4. The Iraq Effect: The Middle East After the Iraq War; I got a briefing from both co-authors yesterday. Had a few quibbles with some observations, but their analysis on stuff I know a little about, like Lebanon, largely matched my own. Solid, necessary work.

  • Ugh. This is a sad day for this blog. As many of you know, I am a bit of a fundamentalist when it comes to free speech. I have always supported an open comments policy on the grounds that it is better for ugly and offensive language to be exposed to the light of day than to employ some bound-to-be-arbitrary standard for moderating comments. And that policy worked for over three years. But some of my co-workers have recently complained, with justification, about the comments that were on this post, resulting in us deleting a few comments. Sadly, the comments threads on this blog have featured a lot of offensive, nonsensical language recently. What the heck is wrong with some of you people?

    I have come to the conclusion that tasking a few CNAS interns with moderating the comments on this blog will not be too great an offense to the marketplace of ideas. A policy regarding offensive language in the comments is being drafted and will soon be posted. If you want to be ugly and write offensive comments using racist, anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim and/or anti-gay language, that's fine -- just do it someplace else. From today on, you will no longer be allowed to write them on this website and expect them to remain published in the comments section.

    Again, this really makes me frustrated. We shouldn't have to do this, gang.

    Update: Okay, here it is. I hate having to do this.

    CNAS retains the right to delete comments that include words that incite violence; are predatory, hateful, or intended to intimidate or harass; or degrade people on the basis of gender, race, class, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or disability. In summary, don’t be a jerk.
  • I'm just back from a great conference at Wilton Park in the UK on how we can assess the effect of aid and development on counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. I'll have much more to say about this later. But depite my well-documented and mischevous antagonism toward those doing quantitative analysis in the field of security studies, allow me to once again highlight the work being done by Eli Berman, Jason Lyall, Jacob Shapiro, Joe Felter and Company. Eli's presentation on the effectiveness of CERP funding in Iraq was, for me, one of the highlights of the conference. And although the conference was governed by Chatham House rules, you can read the paper behind Eli's presentation here (.pdf). Again, I will have much more to say about this later.

    For now, though, one thing that caught my eye was this report by Mark Perry (prolific author, father of Cal) in Foreign Policy on the case CENTCOM is apparently making to bring Israel into its area of responsibility. Briefly, there has always been a good argument for keeping Israel a part of EUCOM: what is the optic we send when a senior commander of U.S. troops in the region makes a visit to Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt ... and then caps his trip off with a visit to Israel? Does that cause more suspicion among our allies -- Arab and Israeli alike -- than it is worth? And we can safely assume that EUCOM would resist such a move outright. With the establishment of AFRICOM, EUCOM's relevance has already been diminished. What would taking away Israel do?

    But putting Israel in CENTCOM probably makes sense. Issues relating to Israel and the Palestinians affect quite a lot of CENTCOM's activities already, and it doesn't make sense to decouple what's going on with respect to the Middle East Peace Process and the command in charge of the Middle East. I worked on a review of CENTCOM strategy last year, focusing on the Levant and Egypt, and I confess -- and I am only speaking for myself here -- to having been frustrated in reviewing U.S. strategy concerning Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon without looking comprehensively at U.S. strategy toward Israel and the Palestinians. It doesn't make sense, right? So moving Israel and the Palestinian Territories over to CENTCOM is probably a wise decision, but I confess to not having fully thought out what the second- and third-order political effects would be.

  • So a typical cycle for this blogger is to get annoyed by some criticism, write something snarky and mischievous, and then get all Presbyterian about it and feel guilty for having written something snarky and mischievous. I wrote something snarky and mischievous about Dan Drezner yesterday and now feel kinda bad about it because it's really not cricket to write such things. And since I don't really know the guy and can't apologize directly, allow me to both reference what I wrote and honor his particular field of research by recommending a brief reading list on the political economy of the Middle East. (I'm not sure if Drezner would define himself as a political economist, actually, but close enough.) When I was a graduate student at the American University of Beirut, the Department of Political Science there was briefly blessed with two of the finest political economists to have worked on the Middle East in recent memory. The first was then-president of AUB, John Waterbury, and the second was a mentor of mine named Yahya Sadowski. The key thing about both of these guys is that they are both first-class political scientists specializing in political economy who have also spent decades in the Middle East living and researching. This allows them to write with both rigor and intimacy with their subject matter. Accordingly, if you're looking to start some research on the subject, you could do a lot worse than:

    Waterbury's (with Richards) A Political Economy of the Middle East: Third Edition

    and

    Sadowski's Scuds or Butter?: The Political Economy of Arms Control in the Middle East

    Okay, I feel better now for having done that. I'll be gone for a week or so, so allow those books to tide you over. What will I be reading while I'm gone? Why, none other than my main man Hein Goemans! Drink some beer, Hein! The royalty check is in the mail!

  • "The Iliad is ever mindful that war is about men killing or men killed. In the entire epic, no warrior, whether hero or obscure man of the ranks, dies happily or well. No reward awaits the soldier's valor; no heaven will receive him. The Iliad's words and phrases for the process of death make clear that this is something baneful: dark night covers the dying warrior, hateful darkness claims him; he is robbed of sweet life, his soul goes down to Hades bewailing its fate. Again and again, relentlessly, the Iliad hammers this fact: the death of any warrior is tragic and full of horror. Even in war, death is regrettable."

    - Caroline Alexander, The War That Killed Achilles

  • Much to my amusement, this post on the utlity of quantitative analysis caused quite a stir in the international relations blogosphere. I don't know if folks in security studies just don't have a sense of humor or if it's true what Kissinger said about how university politics are vicious precisely because the stakes are so small. But what I think happened is that Stephen Walt read my post, chuckled, and his chuckling did two things: 1) it brought a lot of people to this site who were not aware that the posts on this blog are meant to be light and irreverent, and 2) it opened up an old fault line in security studies between traditionalists like Walt who aren't so impressed by quantitative analysis and the Young Turks and political economists who have pushed to make it ascendent in political science departments across the United States. I have about as much interest getting involved in these scholarly disputes as I do catching the Ebola virus. But I did find some of the reaction pretty amusing. Like the fact that Hein Goemans, a brilliant scholar at the University of Rochester, was writing comments on my blog at 5:17 on a Friday afternoon. (Hein, buddy, it's happy hour. Put down the TI-89, get off the internets and go drink a beer.) Or the fact that Cranky Dan Drezner was left in a cursing, sputtering rage over at his Foreign Policy blog. (I was particularly hurt that Drezner didn't see the humor in my post, as I have always found his willingness to hold forth on the peoples and politics of the Arabic-speaking world and Iran without any time spent in the region or training in its languages to be hilarious.)

    In the end, though, I commissioned one of this blog's regular readers, "Scott Wedman", to write a response to what I had written. What follows is good stuff. I am sorry that folks got their proverbial panties in a twist about a post that was meant to be funny, so hopefully this will make up for things. (Though curses to you all for making me publish something serious minded.)

    Plenty of people have already weighed in on AM’s “Quantitative Manifesto”, including Drezner, Walt, Farrell, and others (including but not limited to Drew Conway, Justin Logan, and Kindred Winecoff).

     

    Since others have covered many of the specifics in depth, I’ll limit myself to four broad points that I think those even vaguely interested in these issues should consider (and feel free to disagree with). Just so you know where I’m coming from, I’m an assistant professor of political science at a research university who primarily publishes on international conflict and security issues. I use both qualitative and quantitative research methods. I have also done some work that is better defined as policy relevant or even policy analysis.

     

    First, good research is good research, regardless of method. Just criticizing one method or another out of hand is short-sighted because the more important thing is encouraging good research methods overall. While that sounds trite, it’s true. Good work asks an interesting question, utilizes new evidence or methods to answer the question, and is appropriately modest in its conclusions. Good work can be qualitative, quantitative, or game theoretic. Frankly, lots of research isn’t good work, but there’s quite a bit of good stuff out there. And much good work follows a lot of AM’s manifesto, though not all of it. What’s important is that people from across the methodological spectrum be open to sources of evidence and argumentation that fall outside what they may utilize in their research, but that may shed light on a topic of interest. Of course, that’s easier to say in theory than in practice.

     

    Second, there is a difference between empirical social science research and policy analysis. Social science research, which lays out theories/hypotheses and then (mostly) uses evidence to test those theories/hypotheses, is potentially a useful input for those interested in specific policy recommendations. Good social science research suggests what is most likely to happen in a certain situation, based on what has happened before in similar situations. But that’s not a substitute for specific, in-depth information on the question of the day, whether it’s the consequences of implementing new sanctions on Iran, whether or not Obama’s surge in Afghanistan is likely to succeed, or something else. Social science research is one tool in the policy maker’s toolkit. And perhaps, as Drezner and others have argued, it should be used more often. But it’s not, and it shouldn’t be, the only tool.

     

    Third, there are important benefits to using quantitative methods in international relations/security studies. The simplest is just that there are often competing theories or arguments drawn from qualitative studies on topics like the effectiveness of economic sanctions or the link between different types of political regimes and success on the battlefield. Quantitative analysis helps scholars systematically evaluate those competing claims by seeing how they fare when tested on dozens or hundreds or thousands of cases instead of just a handful or fewer (quantitative scholars will argue among themselves as well, but you get the drift). Of course that doesn’t mean a political science professor knows more about how to take a hill or how to secure a village than someone in, you know, the military, but it does mean those scholars are (hopefully) producing valuable knowledge that is based on more than their (or any one person’s) personal experience.

     

    Fourth, international relations and security studies were traditionally very hostile to quantitative methods and formal models (the old security studies = realist = qualitative idea used to rule the day), but most of the best scholars these days use multiple methods, usually meaning qualitative analysis and either quantitative analysis or formal models. Sometimes they use all three. However, the move to multiple methods is generally not a crass ploy to get published or get tenure (and I don’t think AM meant to imply that it was). It’s a genuine recognition on the part of many scholars, and especially younger scholars, that the more tools you have in the box, or clubs in the bag, or whatever the analogy, the more evidence you can bring to bear to answer a question. And there’s no reason to exclude a type of evidence when it can help give you a new perspective on a question. There are also some questions better answered through qualitative analysis, some through quantitative analysis, and some through formal models. So the more methods you know and can use, the more interesting and varied questions you can answer. That’s just smart.

  • Today we have a special interview with NPR's Deborah Amos. Deb is a longtime reader of this blog and an even longer-time student and observer of the Arabic-speaking world. I asked her to discuss, for the benefit of the readership, her quite lovely new book on Iraqi refugees and some of the regional dynamics set in motion by the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.

    1. Let me start off by saying that I really enjoyed this book. For a journalist who has spent most of her time in radio and television, you are an exceptionally eloquent writer. But I want to talk about the tone with which you wrote your book as opposed to your diction. It strikes me that you can write a critical essay on the Arabic-speaking world with contempt, or you can write an equally critical essay on the Arabic-speaking world with compassion. I can't help but notice that at the same time Max Rodenbeck has been taking Lee Smith to task for apparently doing the former, you have done the latter.* But then, you have spent most of your professional life working in or on the Middle East, haven't you? Your love for the cultures and peoples of the region shines through your narrative, and even when you pass judgment, you pass it with a high degree of sympathy and self-awareness. Tell us a bit about how you first came to the Arabic-speaking world and how your long engagement with the region set the stage for this book.

    Thank you for recognizing that broadcast journalists can write complex sentences. In some ways, this book represents a long journey. I first arrived in the Arabic speaking world in 1982. I landed at the port of Jounieh to report on the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. My first image of a Middle East war zone was a woman water skiing off the waters of Christian east Beirut as Israeli jets were pounding Muslim West Beirut. It was my first lesson in sectarian fault lines. I also had the best meals of my life that summer; it is Beirut, after all. Over the next three decades I reported from almost every corner of the Middle East. Iraq had been off-limits in Saddam’s time. I could get a visa to travel there, but it was illegal for Iraqi’s to talk to foreigners. When I arrived in Baghdad in 2003 I could talk to everybody. They all had plenty to say and in some ways that opening conversation in this formerly closed country set the stage for this book.

    2. I want to ask you about the Iraqi refugee crisis in just a minute, but your book is about more than that. As eloquent as I found the prose inside the cover of your book, the title is a rather blunt, inelegant "Eclipse of the Sunnis". On the other hand, maybe that title says all that needs to be said. Is that the theme of this book? Are we seeing a seismic shift in power relations in the Arabic-speaking world? And how can that be so when Sunni Muslims still constitute such an overwhelming majority of the Arabic-speaking peoples?

    When I first started writing the book I had a different title in mind. I was interested in the experience of exile and I wanted to use the opening line from a poem by Dante that expressed the pain of political banishment. “You shall leave everything you love most,” wrote Dante and it seemed to capture the complicated emotions of Iraqis who hated Saddam but were deeply tied to their culture and community. The title changed as I understood that the sectarian cleansing in Iraq had a wider implication. The majority of exiles and refugees are Sunni Arabs. Baghdad has had a demographic shift that is historic and seismic. Baghdad is now a Shiite capital which has an impact on the way power relations work in the country. Iraq’s Shiites won the sectarian war, the Sunnis lost. However, Iraq is not an island. As you correctly point out, Sunni Muslims still constitute an overwhelming majority in the region. Iraq’s Sunni neighbors see the resolution of the exile crisis as an indicator of Iraqi’s identity. An eclipse implies a phase. There will be no stability in Iraq until there is political reconciliation and power sharing. To quote an Iraqi political analyst, “The Kurds are only 20% of the population without a friend in the region, and they’ve managed to destabilize Iraq for 80 years. The Sunnis have friends in almost every neighboring capital.”

    3. About a year ago, The Gamble by Tom Ricks came out and seemed to have as many detractors as admirers. I was one of the people who liked it, taking it for what it was, largely because I knew it was just one of many books that would be written about the events known as the "Surge" and that other books would soon be published telling the story of Iraq from the perspective of grunts, insurgents, and ordinary Iraqis. Tom Ricks has told me that he himself looks forward to reading those books. I think your book is, in some ways, a "Surge" book in that it speaks to the effects the war and especially the U.S.-led offensive of 2007 has had on ordinary Iraqis -- and especially those who came to be refugees. What do you think about the idea that your book -- meant to be a broader narrative of the region -- is in some ways also a book about the Iraq War and the Surge?

    While the “Surge” is not the major focus of the book, I write about the Iraq war and the events that surround the surge from an Iraqi point of view. I felt it was a view missing from the war literature. I couldn’t be on the ground in Baghdad in 2007, but I was in Damascus during the troop build up. There were more Iraqis fleeing the country in 2007 than had left in 2006. In Damascus, the UN refugee center was packed each day. By interviewing the newcomers I could document the explosion of sectarian cleansing that took place as additional U.S. moved into Baghdad neighborhoods. For many Iraqis, the price of the surge was quite high and some are still paying. Tactically, the surge contributed to the dramatic drop in violence, strategically, the surge failed to spark a political reconciliation in Iraq. Which means the refugee crisis could be with us for some time to come.

    4. You write, in your chapter on Lebanon, how the Palestinian refugee problem in that country is proof positive of what happens when refugee crises go unresolved. What do you see as the long-term effects of the Iraqi refugee crisis on the region?

    First, I want to talk about important indicators. I believe the March 7th parliamentary elections will play a role in the refugee crisis. The outcome will determine whether there are wide spread returns. The Iraqi election commission expects that more than 160 thousand Iraqis to vote in the voting centers across Syria. Arab League poll watchers are going to be dispatched to monitor the vote. The refugee neighborhoods are papered with campaign posters and Iraq’s Sunni politicians are courting the exile vote including Tarek al Hashimi, Iraq’s Vice President. This is an unprecedented event. The exiles are part of a ‘virtual’ Iraq that exists beyond the borders. The election outcome could determine whether Iraqis remain in exile, a destabilizing population in the region, or return home. They will be watching for the signals of power-sharing and what the vote reveals about the strength of the sectarian fault lines.

    5. What concrete steps should policy-makers -- U.S., international, regional, Iraqi -- take to address the refugee crisis?

    A few years ago, when I started interviewing refugees and NGO’s in the region, a U.N. official estimated there would be about 100 thousand Iraqis that would not go back. The number has probably grown larger since then, but the list reflects the legacy of the past few years: those too traumatized to return, religious minorities still threatened, female headed households, and Iraqis who worked for the U.S. military. While the U.S. resettlement program has made great strides, the specific program for military translators is a failure. The number of Iraqis granted special visas is dismally low. The program needs some serious attention. As for the larger picture, donor fatigue is hampering UN programs that support refugees. The International community still has a role to play in funding programs in Jordan and Syria. The latest U.S. government report portrays an Iraqi population that has no hope of employment or integration in exile; their children are largely outside the education system. This is not good news for Iraq’s future. The Iraqi government’s policy towards exiles and the internally displaced seems to be one of willful neglect. The Obama administration must use any remaining clout to get the next Iraqi government to focus attention on this population.

    6. I usually end these interviews with a booze-related question, asking my interviewees to name their five favorite bars in their far-flung corners of the globe. Your book, though, reflects your love affair with the cuisine of the Middle East. You're always writing about food, and although I think we've dined together a couple of times, I remember with especial fondness a big dinner we enjoyed at Abdul Wahab al-Inglizi in Beirut with Leena, Oliver and several others. What, then, are your five favorite restaurants in the Arabic-speaking world? And your answers don't have to be all haute cuisine experiences -- what are the best places, for example, for fuul or kabob?

    Thanks for letting me off the hook on the booze question. I’m not much of a bar girl, but I have done my share of sampling Arak around the region. However, the cuisines of the Middle East are my favorite topic. I would have to place Abdul Wahab al-Inglizi at the top of the list because I’ve spent many enjoyable evenings there, including the dinner you mention. Many of my favorite dinner memories include the company as much as the food. A meal at al-Mayass, an Armenian restaurant in Ashrafieh, a Beirut neighborhood, was all the more remarkable because Sami Zubaida, the “cuisine sociologist,“ was a guest. There is no better place to eat Ful than Abu Abdo’s in Aleppo, Syria. The restaurant is a “hole in the wall”, serving ful for more than 70 years. The dash of Aleppo pepper makes it all worthwhile. And while I’m on this great food city, I have to nominate a meal at Aleppo’s private food club located above Yasmeen d’Alep Hotel. You have to make friend with a member to get an invitation, but you have 600 people to choose from. And finally, the kabob. This is sure to get me in deep trouble, but I nominate the Iraqi kabob as the finest in the region. Iraqi refugees have opened more than a dozen restaurants in Damascus. My favorite is Qassim al Kassam Abdul Guss. You’ve pointed out a much better translation than the one I used in my book, “slave of grilled lamb,” which says all you need to know about the Iraqi obsession with grilled meat.

    Thanks, Deb! Interested readers can buy her book here.

    *I have not yet read Lee's book, I should say, so I cannot pass judgment on it. I plan on reading it, though, and will ask Lee to do a similar Q&A for the blog if the readership is interested and Lee is willing.

  • I just found this via Arabist. This is Anthony Shadid, the Pulitzer Prize-winning Middle East correspondent for the New York Times (and the Boston Globe and Washington Post before that), speaking at my alma mater.

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