Abu Muqawama: July 2010

Abu Muqawama retains its autonomy and the views and beliefs expressed within the blog do not reflect those of CNAS. Abu Muqawama retains the right to delete comments that include words that incite violence; are predatory, hateful, or intended to intimidate or harass; or degrade people on the basis of gender, race, class, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or disability. In summary, don't be a jerk.

  • "[Assange] insisted that any risk to informants' lives was outweighed by the overall importance of publishing the information." -- The Times of London

    As it turns out, I have one more thing to say about Wikileaks. In the past, I have chastised some on the American Right for their apparent belief that what we -- the United States and its allies -- do or fail to do in Afghanistan is of paramount importance in this conflict. My view, as I think I have made clear, is that ultimately the fate of Afghanistan is in the hands of the Afghans. External actors -- the United States and its allies, Iran, Pakistan, etc. -- are important. But our counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan is dependent for its success on the actions of local Afghan actors. I may be misguided to think this and be prejudiced by my admittedly limited experiences, but based upon 10 years spent either fighting or studying conflict in Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon, I have arrived at the conclusion that in general the actions of local actors matter more than those of external forces. Thus one thing that a critic like Andrew Bacevich and I share in common is a degree of humility about what we can expect from the exercise of American power abroad.

    There is a corollary to the above criticism of the Right, though. On the Left, you can often observe a similar phenomenon -- perhaps as the result of a post-colonial education that often preaches the evils of Western interventions through the years -- in that examining a conflict like Afghanistan, or Iraq, things like agency, responsibility and vulnerability are all disproportionately assigned to the (Western) external actor at the expense of local actors. There is a sign near my home in Washington, for example, in the Mount Pleasant neighborhood, which reads: "End the War in Afghanistan." The assumption behind such a sign is that the war is for U.S. and other western policy-makers to end. You saw similar signs in 2005 and 2007 exhorting President Bush to "end" the war in Iraq. As if once the United States and its allies ceased combat operations, the war would somehow end and the grievances of local actors be forgotten. 

    In the same way, the political target for Wikileaks and Julian Assange is most certainly U.S. and allied decision-makers. Why else collaborate with Western media outlets such as the New York Times, the Guardian and Der Spiegel and not al-Jazeera or Xinhua? The assumption, again, is that this is an American and Western war in Afghanistan, and thus we should reserve responsibility for what does and does not happen for Western policy-makers. The agency is stripped from Afghan and other local actors. So too is any claim of vulnerability.

    I have said before that those western media outlets I mentioned above often labor to protect the lives of U.S. and allied servicemen and intelligence officers when reporting on sensitive stories. I appreciate that, even if Julian Assange, referring to last week's series of articles on the U.S. intelligence community in the Washington Post, considers this kind of stuff "craven". But it does seem as if measures have been taken by Wikileaks to protect U.S. and allied personnel whose lives might be endangered by the leaks. The same cannot be said for the Afghans. A cursory search of the Wikileaks documents by the consistently excellent Afghanistan-based journalist Tom Coughlan revealed hundreds of Afghan lives to have been put at risk by these leaked documents. The mentions of Afghans -- either because they have confounding, non-Western names or because they simply are not considered of importance -- do not seem to have been considered by Mr. Assange and Wikileaks when they decided to dump these documents into the public sphere.

    I don't know whether Mr. Assange simply did not understand enough about Afghanistan to realize what he was doing when he leaked these documents or just doesn't care, so myopic is his focus on the governments of the United States and Europe. But when I stop and think about this, I think of one of the good guys in U.S. foreign and defense policy through recent decades, Richard Armitage, and the stories of how in the last days of U.S. involvement in the war in Vietnam, he returned to save hundreds of Vietnamese who had worked with the United States. Long after the U.S. public had moved on -- remember, the iconic image of the fall of Saigon was that picture of our embassy, proving how hard it is for us to focus on anything other than ourselves -- the men and women who had actually fought and bled alongside their Vietnamese counterparts still gave a shit about their well-being. I suspect that's the way it's going to be in Afghanistan, too. For the U.S. and allied soldiers, diplomats and aid workers who have worked alongside Afghans, they matter. They are our peers. For Mr. Assange and others, they're little more than local color. Certainly not lives worth protecting.

    Welcome to the world of collateral murder, Wikileaks.

    Update: Josh Foust, whose tweets on this deserve credit for getting me so fired up in the first place, has a post up on Registan.

    Update II: Glenn Greenwald counters.

    As was painfully predictable and predicted, the bulk of political discussion in the wake of the WikiLeaks disclosures focuses not on our failing, sagging, pointless, civilian-massacring, soon-to-be-decade-old war, but rather on the Treasonous Evil of WikiLeaks for informing the American people about what their war entails.  While it's true that WikiLeaks should have been much more careful in redacting the names of Afghan sources, watching Endless War Supporters prance around with righteous concern for Afghan lives being endangered by the leak is really too absurd to bear.   You know what endangers innocent Afghan lives?  Ten years of bombings, checkpoint shootings, due-process-free hit squads, air attacks, drones, night raids on homes, etc. etc.

    I don't know if he realizes it, but Mr. Greenwald actually provides a darn good example of the tendencies on the American Left that I described above. No, Mr. Greenwald, the Afghans have not suffered through ten years of war. The conflict to which we have been a party for the past nine-plus years did not start on 12 September 2001. The Marxist coup that shattered the peace enjoyed by most Afghans for the bulk of the 20th Century began in 1978. The Afghan people have thus suffered through 32 years of near continuous conflict. Were the United States and its allies to withdraw from Afghanistan tomorrow, the war would surely continue.

    Again, the American Left is as often as bad as the American Right: its pundits reserve all the agency for Western actors and assume history stops and starts when we the United States do something or stop doing something. Afghans and their actions, in this example, are rendered meaningless without Western attention to validate them. But we can no sooner "end" this conflict by pulling everyone out than we can "win" it by snapping our fingers and sending more troops. I have a lot more sympathy for a hard-core neo-isolationist who thinks the United States should just abandon most foreign interventions, consequences be damned, because those guys are usually at least realistic about the way the world works. They understand that life, death, famine and conflict will continue in our absence. For too many others, the history of Afghanistan begins in 2001 (when we the United States started caring about it again) and will end the moment we leave. Were the United States and its allies to leave Afghanistan, though, the conflict would go on: the only thing that would depart that country with our troops would be the short-lived attention of America's self-absorbed punditry.

  • I don't have that much more to add to the conversation about the Wikileaks docu-dump on Afghanistan beyond what I wrote in the New York Times this morning. Let me just say that my op-ed followed on the heels of some very good commentary yesterday by Fred Kaplan, Joshua Foust and others. (Fred laughed when I assured him I had filed for the Times before reading his piece in Slate.) My violent Pashtun ex-flatmate has written some good commentary for this blog from Pakistan along with Mosharraf Zaidi, who wrote some good commentary contra, uh, me. I hyperlinked the heck out of the first draft of the op-ed I submitted to the Times, by the way, full-on Frank Rich-style, with links to all kinds of good reporting, and also called out, by name, Erica Gaston, a researcher for the Open Society Institute who did much of CIVIC's best work on civilian casualties in Afghanistan. Erica is one of the good guys, a Harvard-trained human rights lawyer based in Kabul who makes the best Cajun food in Afghanistan and knows what's in a French 75. Our families know each other back in Louisiana, so I might catch hell if I don't mention the great work she continues to do as well as her take on the Wikileaks documents in the Huffington Post.

    That's all. I just felt the need to pop my head out of the Dissertation Cave to give credit where it's due.  

    UPDATE: Our friend Noah "Danger" Shachtman got caught in a pretty vicious firefight in the Helmand Valley last year while embedded with Marines. So what did he do when the Wikileaks documents were released? He looked for reports on the events he witnessed, of course. What he found exposes the limits of relying on these documents for a full picture of the war. Great op-ed, Noah.

  • In Pakistan, news of Wikileaks's Afghan cache is officially being seen as an affront to Pakistan's dignity/more lies/a general anti-Pakistan conspiracy etc etc. My favourite reaction is from an ISI man who tells the Guardian's Declan Walsh:

    "It's very strange such a huge cache of information can be leaked to the media so conveniently," he said. "Is it something deliberate? What is its purpose? We'll be looking into that."

    It would have been really interesting to find out how the ISI would "look into that". But, unfortunately, he doesn't go into it.

    But Pakistan is much complex in it's opinions than you might gather from the odd official one-line riposte. For a more nuanced view, and one - that in my experience of speaking to people from various walks of life - is much more reflective of the everyday conversations that people have away from a TV camera or reporters' notebook, read Mosharraf Zaidi's op-ed in the Daily News.

    "Wikileaks' purpose in releasing these files has nothing to do with Pakistan, or India, or Afghanistan. Its purpose is to expose the incompetence, myopia and failure of the US-led war in Afghanistan. Wikileaks is an anti-war organisation. This means that the expose is not a part of any kind of campaign against Pakistan. If Pakistan looks bad in the crossfire of domestic American politics surrounding the Afghan war, that's Pakistan's bad.

    "Over time, the space provided by an ineffective Pakistani state has helped the ISI occupy in western minds, what the Mossad and CIA represent in the Muslim world: a convenient red-herring to explain the complexities, difficulties and unpleasantness of war and diplomacy in a post-9/11 world."

    And my favourite part:

    "Western conspiracy theories about Pakistan's evil double-cross in Afghanistan don't need to be rooted in absolute truth, just a scant kernel of the truth will often do. In that way, it is once again eminently clear that talk of a "clash of civilisations" is garbage. It turns out that human beings are the same everywhere."

    But don't rely on my pull-out quotes; read the whole thing.

    UPDATE: OK, i might be ruining Mosharraf's subtlety here by explicitly drawing attention to it, but I think it's too good a point to risk being lost on a quick-scan read: Pakistan's obsession with conspiracy theories are a comfort blanket used to avoid thinking about uncomfortable realities. In the same way, the US and its allies concentration on blaming the ISI also provides a comfort blanket.

    "There is much comfort in finding Pakistan and the ISI under every rock and IED in Afghanistan. The small kernels of truth that enable ISI conspiracy theories are a matter for Pakistanis to take seriously and address. But they also help the US and its allies in Afghanistan avoid the uncomfortable reality of Obama's Afghan war. This is a war that does not have a happy ending for anyone. This is a war that has made America, Pakistan, India, Iran and Afghanistan less safe."

  • I've noticed on my Twitter account that opinion on the information contained in the leaked Afghanistan documents obtained and released by Wikileaks varies between "yeah, we knew that. So?" to "Oh my God!".

    I think there is much more to this whole episode than whether or not you knew civilians were being killed in Afghanistan and former ISI officials were giving advice to insurgents in Afghanistan. This is about public opinion. Measuring what the public thinks and predicting how it might react to events is an imprecise science (much like the related fields of economics and sociology). But it's still very real. You might not know how it works but you can feel its effects when governments start clamping down on banks, launch military campaigns or pull troops out and come home.

    And when it comes to public opinion, lots of vagaries start making a huge difference - like how you found out. When George Galloway suggested that British MPs were greedy, people rolled their eyes, nodded or smiled. The general thought was, "yeah. But they are politicians, what do you expect?" However, once the British MPs expenses scandal hit the headlines with details of taxpayers coughing up for duckhouses and flatscreen televisions, the result was a national political crisis.

    For Western news organisations, unsustainable losses over the past decade or two have meant the degredation of the kind of infrastructure that allows the media to act as a check on executive power. At the same time, the medium that caused the decline in traditional news ogranisations - the Internet - is also picking up the slack. The Telegraph's coverage of the expenses scandal was built on extensive groundwork done by independent journalists who write extensively on the web. Most conflict coverage since 9/11 has been done through embeds with Western military forces. (the stand-out exceptions here are people like Nir Rosen, Ghaith Abdul-Ahad and Mitch Prothero) While this is great in the short term for those prosecuting the war, after a while, militaries start to believe their own hype, which actually does longer term damage as it makes PR disasters such as prisoner abuse and the Nisour square incident more likely. 

    I'm not into offering "big thoughts" or indulging in grand "blue sky thinking" but there does seem to be a growing trend internationally away from control and direction by organisations and governments towards impetus for action coming from groups of individuals who are somehow harnessing technology. Organisations like Wikileaks leave grand old names like Reuters, BBC and the New York Times rewriting news they didn't break. (That said, the NYT is one of a few organisations investing heavily in original reporting, which shows in their output.) At the same time, a leaked video of a girl getting beaten by the Taliban in Swat  presented the Pakistani government with the political cover it needed to launch a campaign against the Pakistani Taliban last year.

    What makes any difference here is whether any of this changes anything. Does public opinion get swayed? Do politicians feel the need to react? Do insurgents find a sense of justification for their actions (or fall in support when they screw up)? The answer to all of these questions is yes.

    So the response here isn't, "yeah, whatever, we know this" or "OMG! why did no one tell me?!". The question to ask is how the information is being digested. That was the question I wish I had asked more thoroughly on the night of September 11, 2001, when I went out and about in Cairo to ask people what they thought.

  • Here are the things I have learned thus far from the documents released via Wikileaks:

    1. Elements within Pakistan's Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) support the Taliban.
    2. The United States integrates direct action special operations into its counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan, targeting insurgent leaders through capture/kill missions.
    3. Civilians have died in Afghanistan, often as the result of coalition combat operations.

    I'm going to bed, but if I were to stay up late reading more, here is what I suspect I would discover:

    1. "Afghanistan" has four syllables.
    2. LeBron is going to the Heat.
    3. D'Angelo Barksdale didn't actually commit suicide in prison. Stringer Bell had him killed.
    4. Although a document dated 17 October 2004 claims the Red Sox were down 3-0 in a seven-game series with the Yankees, they actually went on to win 4-3.
    5. Liberace was gay.
    6. The Pathan remains wily.
    7. Julian Assange is a clown.
  • "Meanwhile, the names of intel sources, which were classified to protect them from violent retribution, are now public. Fuck you, Wikileaks." - J.

    I think the time it took Julian Assange to weigh the moral choices involved with publishing these documents was roughly equivalent to the time it took the make-up artist to powder Assange's face for his latest television interview.

  • Greg Carlstrom noticed that the AFC managed to squeeze Iran, Iraq and North Korea into the same group in January's Asia Cup. (Plus the UAE, which is surely wondering what it did to deserve getting lumped in with the original Axis of Evil.) My prediction is the Pentagon will deploy Landon Donovan & Co. to Abu Dhabi to take care of these jokers once and for all ... but, true to form, it will only plan for the first ten minutes of each game, abandon the field for 70 minutes and then rush everyone back into the stadium with ten minutes left in order to secure a hard-fought draw and spare the United States and its allies blushes. Bob Bradley will play a 4-3-3 in the final ten minutes of the game, which Andrew Bacevich will say is unsustainable in the long term (and demand to know how long stoppage time will be) and which Gian Gentile will say is exactly the same as the 4-4-2 we were using in 2006 and, besides, probably won't work anyway. The U.S. public (too busy eating Cheeze-Its, whining about their taxes and playing FIFA Soccer 10 on their X-Boxes to pay much attention to the actual game being played in the Middle East) will wonder whether or not the soccer game was worth it in the first place, but that won't prevent Team USA from having to endure round after tedious round of Lee effing Greenwood on its return stateside.

  • David Ucko, as careful a student as anyone of the learning process through which the U.S. military has gone since 2001, has written a must-read blog post on Kings of War concerning the enduring utility of counterinsurgency theory and practice in the face of its critics.

    To me, counterinsurgency retains value because it:
    1. reaffirms the need to understand the social, cultural and political dimensions of the operating environment;
    2. reaffirms the significant requirements of effective intervention in foreign polities;
    3. emphasises the political essence of armed conflict;
    4. recognises the local population as a significant player, rather than as an obstacle to circumvent;
    5. recommends a more-than-military approach to the problem of political violence.

    What counterinsurgency does not do is:

    1. suggest the facility of foreign intervention so long as you’ve read Galula;
    2. provide a formula or scientific model to the problem of political violence;
    3. provide an answer to ‘the War on Terror’, or al-Qaeda writ large;
    4. provide an answer to what the US should do in Afghanistan;
    5. suggest that the use of force is irrelevant in modern conflicts.

    It is on this basis that I would regret the disappearance, once more, of counterinsurgency. The one good reason to get rid of the term is precisely because of its divisive and distorting connotations; the aim then would be to talk more plainly about the requirements of war-to-peace transitions. But this presumes that the lessons of counterinsurgency have been sufficiently internalised that the concept has lost its utility as an important antithesis. And I fear that we are not quite there yet.

  • Regular readers of this blog wont be surprised to hear that I've been banging on about ways to do something useful in Pakistan. Just for a change, this time, I've been at it over at Foreign Policy's afpakchannel. There are some quotes in there that haven't seen the light of day before. Such as:

    "Of all the terrorist attacks carried out so far, no American culprit has been caught, no one from Britain and no Israeli. All those who have been apprehended belong here. And with great sorrow, I say that they have been men with beards (religious men)," said one speaker, who holds a high-profile position within Pakistan's religious education establishment."


    And:

    One of Pakistan's highest-ranking religious officials said of extremists; "In religious garb they organised hatred into a force. Now it is an organised force. These people are in society... The attacks on army installations were done by their followers who are in the army."

    As well as:

    In a madrassa in the rural hinterland of Punjab, an elderly former Barelvi leader with still considerable influence within the community's nationwide network said Barelvis should arm and organise a militia to take on the Taliban. "Our ideology is lying in its grave. And before long, if we do nothing, our lifeless bodies will be joining it," he said in Punjabi.

    Read the whole thing here.

    A few months ago, I read Hilary Synnott's International Institute for Strategic Studies report Transforming Pakistan. I thought at the time that Sir Hilary's suggestion that the international community basically take it on itself to transform Pakistan was unrealistic and an even bigger disaster waiting to happen. However, I'm beginning to think that a major game change is needed and the only question remains who the real domestic partners should be. The best option, and the most willing potential allies, are the general public. The question is how to approach them and how to tool the options avaiable to the international community so that they actually work effectively.

    To see someone else expertly demonstrate what kind of mess we are talking about here, read (and watch) this great bit of reporting from Sabrina Tavernise of the New York Times.

    "..in Pakistan, the lack of a workable tax system feeds something more menacing: a festering inequality in Pakistani society, where the wealth of its most powerful members is never redistributed or put to use for public good. That is creating conditions that have helped spread an insurgency that is tormenting the country and complicating American policy in the region"

  • I'll be attending a conference for the next week outside the United States. Don't expect any posts unless they're by Londonstani, though you can always check @abumuqawama on Twitter for updates.

  • If you read the press reports (here, and here), it would appear that my hometown senator, Bob Corker, was on a roll in yesterday's hearings on Afghanistan. Good for him. There is no reason why a guy whose last job was mayor of the mighty metropolis of Chattanooga should develop into a first-class inquisitor on matters related to national security and foreign affairs ... other than the possibility that he simply takes his job seriously and does his homework. The people of Tennessee -- me included -- appreciate that kind of thing.

    Update: And most unlike another member of his party, Corker is apparently taking a non-crazy position on New START.

  • I was reading an article in the Financial Times this morning about ties between BP and Libya and how they have attracted the attention of U.S. congressmen. Seeing as how my mother's family hails from Louisiana, I don't have a problem with a lot of the current BP-bashing taking place. This business about Libya seems a bit excessive, though, and strikes me as if congressmen are searching for reasons above and beyond BP's safety record to demonize a transnational corporation.

    The problem for BP is that the Congress will not have to look far before they get enough dirt on BP and Libya to make for some compelling hearings. Shortly after he left Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service, Sir Mark Allen, who got the honorific at the front of his name for bringing Gaddafi in from the cold, went to work as a senior advisor to BP. Now working in the private sector -- and, as far as I know, still working for BP -- Sir Mark is rumored to have been at the center of last year's negotiations which led to the release of the terrorist Abdelbaset al-Megrahi.

    You guys can see where the problems are, right? I myself have met and very much admire Sir Mark. He is the author of this book on Arab culture and is an urbane connoisseur of jahili poetry and falconry. But congressmen are going to ask in whose interests he was working when he helped negotiate Megrahi's release: BP's or HMG's? All of this attention will come as most unwelcome to Sir Mark, a true gentleman who served his country selflessly for several decades and was rumored to have once been a candidate to lead the SIS. But the questions the Congress will ask are fair game if unrelated to deepwater operations -- and more unwelcome attention for BP.

  • I am hardly the pro's pro on Yemen, but I want to call two things to your attention. The first is this excellent reported essay from yesterday's New York Times Magazine by Bobby Worth, who I can say has done some solid reporting from Yemen for the past year at some personal cost. It's great to read a talented reporter -- and all-around good guy -- like Bobby in long form. Second, I cannot find anything about this on the Washington Institute's website, but April Alley and Chris Boucek are supposed to be speaking there at an event tomorrow on Yemen which I would most definitely attend if I did not have other business. Those two would be at the top of my list on people to consult on matters relating to Yemen (residing in or around the 202 area code), and I am sick to miss the event. So if you have the chance, work in DC and can find the details, do attend.

  • Check out CNAS adviser David Barno's piece in the Financial Times.

    "In the region, clocks are set to July 2011, a date widely believed to be the start of a rapid US withdrawal, and the subsequent resumption of a new internecine Afghan war - one in which all the important actors are already manoeuvring for advantage. Gen Petraeus must find ways to both put time back on the clock through battlefield success, improved governance and more effective civil-military integration. To do this, he must convince the wary protagonists that the US is staying, and that America's interests trump any temptation to replay the precipitate American disengagement after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989."

    Pakistani journalists, government people, military people, well-to-do professionals, guys who sit in blankets in road side stops smoking and drinking tea.. everyone thinks that the US will be getting out of Afghanistan no matter what. Even if they don't have any real solid reason for thinking so, the fact that they do creates its own dynamic.

    I'm told something similar is true in Afghanistan

    So the challange for the US, and Gen. Petraeus in particular, how to square domestic pressure to end America's longest war while not giving the impression in the region that the US is about to leave.

    i was at a conference about communications in conflict recently, one of the speakers said that you can't give conflicting messages to different audiences. I can see why.

    So spare a thought for Gen Petraeus. He seriously has his work cut out for him.

  • I just got back to Pakistan after a two month stay back in London that was initially only supposed to last two weeks.

    I've been catching up on the stack of newspapers that greeted me on my return. Not to mention the dust, cockroaches and dodgy plumbing. With me is Ms. Londonstani, also known as Ms Henley-on-Thames, who is whipping things into shape with fearsome efficiency.

    The two biggest events while I've been away have been the attacks in Lahore and Mohmand. The Lahore attack did receive substantial coverage in the Western press, however Mohmand, in most hardcopy newspapers, was buried around page eight. And mostly consisted of reprinted wire copy. I suspect the issue in editorial meetings across the world is how to "refresh" the Pakistan story. How to take it beyond a list of attacks on places with funny names, where the only thing that seems to differ is the number of dead.

    I'll be doing some more in-depth analysis of events over the coming weeks. In the meantime, during my reading-in this morning a couple of things caught my eye.

    From a very interesting NYT article about US military training Pakistani army people: "The scouts face a battle-hardened enemy that has lived in the mountains around here for decades. "We've been here one-and-a-half years," said Col. Ahsan Raza, the training center's commandant. "They have been preparing for the last 20 years.

    I might be wrong about this.. rather, Wikipedia might be wrong about this.. but haven't the Frontier Corps been hanging out in the mountains since 1907?

    NYT has had a brilliant series of articles getting to the bottom of the conundrum facing Pakistan-Western relations - namely Pakistani mistrust of US intentions. And yes, Pakistani-Western relations rather than Pakistani-US relations, since the view of the US transfers to the West in general. Which is great...if you are al-Qaeda. I met a former Pakistani law maker from the opposition party. As a young man he had worked in the UK, gotten married there, lived there a good number of years. He was convinced the US wanted to see the break up of Pakistan and was probably sponsoring the Taliban. Did he think the UK was working for the same goal? "The UK is working to America's plan. It's not their aim to break-up Pakistan, but it is their aim to further their relationship with the United States," he said.

    Going back to the NYT article, this last one by Jane Perlez and Eric Schmitt shows what such views translate to when the two "allies" try to work together.

    "Pakistan also restricts the number of American trainers throughout the country to no more than about 120 Special Operations personnel, fearful of being identified too closely with the unpopular United States - even though the Americans reimburse Pakistan more than $1 billion a year for its military operations in the border areas."

    "...the American-led war in Afghanistan and its continuing campaign of drone strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas have made the United States suspect at all levels of the military, and among the Pakistani population, as anti-Americanism has hit new heights."

    It seems to me that without addressing the image problem, all other Western efforts in Pakistan are in trouble. The drone strikes are no more than a convenient tool when all your other options have been blunted. But in the final analysis, they only serve to stuff the future for the sake of "doing something" in the present.

  • 1. A CNN editor trying to express her admiration for Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah on Twitter is just silly. (The name and title alone are 42 characters!) One should not try and explain what seems to have been a nuanced opinion in a text message. Firing her for it, though, also seems silly. Also silly, though, is continuing to describe Fadlallah as Hizballah's spiritual mentor. That may have been kind of true in the 1980s but has probably not been the case since then. My guess is that the young and relatively undistinguished religious scholars who formed Hizballah's leadership in the early 1980s -- Musawi, Tufaili, Nasrallah, etc. -- needed someone of high religious stature like Fadlallah to beef up their Islamic bona fides.* Fadlallah, in turn, benefited from his relationship with Hizballah within civil war-era Lebanon. By the 1990s, though, both groups more or less outgrew one another. Fadlallah no longer needed Hizballah's support, and Hizballah no longer needed his blessing. Both Fadlallah and Hizballah had enough stature to stand on their own. Even Martin Kramer, who once wrote a long monograph on the man titled "Oracle of Hizballah", is highly sensitive to the way in which Fadlallah's stature and relationship with Hizballah has changed over time. Personally, I think Hizballah and Fadlallah are best understood as separate if overlapping phenomena within Shia Lebanon. Fadlallah's ministry and activities, for example, long precede those of Hizballah.

    2. This Andrew Bacevich blog post is off. Bacevich wants us to consider foreign policy decisions black-and-white moral affairs. Bush, he argues, reliably chose the wrong option out of two available but was at least guided by a flawed moral compass. Obama, Bacevich argues, is amoral. This is absurd. In matters of war, leaders at all levels make hard moral choices involving sin and virtue. One could describe this as the hard moral economics of war, and it applies from platoon leaders to presidents. Invading Iraq, for example, delivered difficult-to-calculate moral benefits (overthrowing a brutal dictator, responsible for the death or torture of hundreds of thousands) and similarly-difficult-to-calculate moral costs (horrific violence affecting the lives of millions and costing the lives of many thousands more). By invading and occupying Iraq in such an incompetent manner, we Americans changed the margins, indesputably raising the moral costs further. I disagreed with the initial decision to invade Iraq on both strategic and moral grounds but understood the moral calculus involved. (I have never understood the strategic calculus.) In the same way, just because you disagree with the Obama Administration on Afghanistan does not mean that the administration lacks a moral compass. They probably just did a strategic and moral cost-benefit analysis and arrived at a different conclusion than Bacevich did. I understand that Andrew Bacevich is upset about our policy in Afghanistan. But concluding as he does -- without any evidence to suggest that moral considerations, such as an obligation to the Afghan people, were not weighed in the president's decision-making process -- that the president lacks a moral compass is ugly, unnecessarily ad hominem, and beneath a man of Bacevich's intelligence and humanity. If Bacevich was serious, he would consider not just the strategic risks to a complete withdrawal from Afghanistan -- which is what he is apparently advocating -- but also the moral costs to be paid by the Afghan people we leave behind. In that light, the moral economics of war are no more black and white than the strategic economics of war. We're left with hard choices and trade-offs, and the public discourse is very poorly served by those who pretend they are easy.

    *I should add here that I am hardly the only person who has come to this conclusion. I do not have any citations handy, but I do not want to be accused of plagiarizing someone else's research either. So let me just say, again, that my take on this is not unique.

  • Having just finished a fantastic lunch of fried chicken and sweet tea at Champy's, I am now preparing to leave Chattanooga for Washington. Before I leave, though, I want to highlight this fantastic op-ed in today's Financial Times by LTG (Ret.) Dave Barno, now my colleague at CNAS. Gen. Barno has been a breath of fresh air around the offices at 1301 Pennsylvania, largely due to the kind of sober analysis he brings to this op-ed. (Yes, I know, the pesky firewall at the FT is preventing you from reading the op-ed. But jump it somehow and read the op-ed. Or do like I do and subscribe to the FT -- my favorite paper, by the way, which has replaced my subscription to the Wall Street Journal -- on your Kindle or something.)

    Gen. Barno highlights the very real difficulties Gen. Petraeus is going to face in Afghanistan and warns that failing in just one of four critical areas might lead to policy failure. But he also does something else: he defines near-term success, in an oblique kind of way, writing that "success in moving to an enduring (if limited) military presence is achievable."

    This is really important: those who fret about American imperial overreach will argue a limited, long-term military presence in Afghanistan amounts to "garrisoning Central Asia". But despite all the anger and emotion in current debates over U.S. and allied Afghanistan strategy, few are arguing for a complete and rapid withdrawal. Michael Cohen, one of the current strategy's critics, linked to several alternate strategies for Afghanistan on his blog the other day, and none argue for a complete withdrawal. The real debate, in other words, revolves around how quickly we can transition to a lighter footprint.

    On the one side you have people who argue that something looking like a comprehensive, resource-intensive counterinsurgency strategy gives you the best chance to build up key Afghan institutions in the next 12 months to allow you to begin the transition to a lighter footprint counterterrorism and security force assistance mission. On the other hand, you have those who feel the president should have adopted that kind of lighter footprint last spring and that we are needlessly wasting U.S. resources on the current strategy. Despite all the hot air you wil read on blogs like this one (or hear coming out of the mouth of the chairman of the GOP), the real debate about Afghanistan revolves around the best way to spend the next 12 months paving the way for a long-term, limited presence. Those who really think a complete withdrawal from Afghanistan is on the table are dreaming. They will not like to hear it, but speaking as a student of the various positions on Afghanistan articulated by U.S. politicians, it is excedingly difficult to see either this president or a Republican presidential candidate arguing for a total withdrawal. It's also hard to see this president or any pretender to the throne arguing for the Cadillac option: a time- and resource-intensive counterinsurgency campaign that would truly garrison Afghanistan ad infinitum.

    Economists would shrug and argue that this is how people make decisions: rational people, in the words of Greg Mankiw, think at the margin. They rarely decide to simply do something or to not do something. More often, they decide how much of something they are going to do. They weigh marginal costs against marginal benefits and make a decision based on that calculation.

    In summary, you might get the impression based upon things you read in the newspapers and on the interwebs that the debate on U.S. policy in Afghanistan spans the spectrum from those isolationists who think we should simply pack up and leave to those who would have us devote all our national treasure to U.S. and allied success. But those are not the real parameters of the debate: the real debate is at the margins, and the real question facing policy-makers is how best to reduce the U.S. and allied presence in Afghanistan over the near term while protecting U.S. and allied interests and weighing the costs and risks involved with each choice.

  • Issandr sent me this picture, taken with his camera phone, from Librairie Antoine on Hamra Street in Beirut, figuring it would crack me up. It did.

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

  • The BBC is reporting 42 people died at the attack on Data Durbar shrine in Lahore last night.

    During the last few months, everyone in Lahore would tell you it's just a matter of time before the place was bombed. The sufi Brehlvis who revere the place have been targeted before. And the Taliban spares no effort making the point that it doesn't approve of "shrine worship". The Taliban have hit shrines before. But they were smaller and in the northern Pashtun areas. Data Durbar on the other hand is a huge complex right in the middle of Lahore. It's a national icon. It is also difficult to police a place thronging with that many people at all hours of the day and night.

    The attack comes less than a month after the Taliban attacked mosques in Lahore belonging to minority community that is seen as non-Muslim by he vast majority of Pakistanis. The attack on Data Durbar is a big step up the scale. This is a big, big deal. I would agree with the various respected analysts I have spoken to while in Pakistan who would say that the Taliban is trying to provoke sectarian warfare in Pakistan and then set themselves up as the protectors of the Sunnis.

    But I wonder, if the Taliban are being prevented from realising their aims by the same thing that normally works for them; the Pakistani rumour mill. I have watched some Pakistani news channels on line. The line of questioning by the presenters seems to suggest, predictably, that the Indians/Israelis/CIA/Blackwater are being touted as the puppet masters as "obviously" they want to break up the country and that's what this kind of attack threatens to achieve. If the "real" perpetrators aren't Muslims, then that lessens the potential for communities turning on each other. But that's no reason to feel complacent. The communities being attacked have expressed anger that the section of Pakistan's religio political community sympathetic to the Taliban turn a blind eye when their people die. And I have heard leaders of these communities, in private conversation, talk about arming for "self defence".

    I went to a very interesting conference earlier this week called Information Operations Europe. More than one speaker reminded the audience that al Qaeda's genius in part has been the placement of information and communication considerations at the heart of its activities. This is something other extremist outfits are learning too. No one has yet claimed responsibility for the attack. My feeling is that the Taliban will hold back from doing so until they know whether confirmation will serve or damage their overall aims.

    This would be a good time for the Pakistani state, or someone, to press home the point that this attack killed and maimed over a hundred Muslims, was carried out by people who claim to serve Islam and are Pakistanis (ie not Indians, Israelis etc) and targeted a site of worship, a national icon and somewhere that draws positive international attention to Pakistan. Unfortunately, the TV news I've seen has officials still repeating the "hidden hand" insinuation, which feeds into a sense of hostility, victimisation and tacit support for extremism.

     

    UPDATE: It killed and maimed over a hundred people rather than hundreds of people.

    Data Durbar:

     

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