Abu Muqawama: June 2011

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  • I would be remiss if I did not say anything about Sec. Gates today. I have never met the man but greatly appreciated the way in which he brought greater accountability to the Department of Defense and provided leadership in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan while caring deeply for the men and women serving in our armed forces. The love he feels for the average sailor, soldier, airman, Marine and special operator is reciprocated. So let me just say thank you to the secretary and also to his wife -- for allowing such a great public servant to spend a few more years with us in Washington. Although Sec. Panetta seems well placed to steer the department into an era of greater austerity, the greater defense policy community will be poorer in the absence of his predecessor.

  • I just finished Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann's essay on drone strikes in Foreign Affairs and recommend it. I especially agreed with the concluding recommendations, which address the two things that bother me most about the drone program thus far: perceptions and accountability.

    Few in the U.S. government -- because the drone program has been, in the words of our new secretary of defense, "the only game in town" when it comes to targeting militants in Pakistan* -- have been willing to admit that the program could have second- and third-order effects that might off-set tactical gains. There is some evidence to suggest the drone strikes are not unpopular within the tribal areas themselves, but they are highly unpopular in Pakistan as a whole and in, one suspects, the Pakistani diaspora community. If we kill bad guys in the tribal areas, great. But if killing bad guys in the tribal areas makes people in Walthamstow or Connecticut want to blow themselves up**, not great. It seems to me that we have been willfully ignorant of the ways in which the program might be radicalizing militants outside the places where we can kill them and that what is a great CT platform is, in the absence of a broader strategy, a crappy CVE platform.

    Bergen and Tiedemann suggest ways to make the program more transparent, which might address popular grievances. Bergen and Tiedemann also recommend transferring control of the program over from the intelligence community to the Department of Defense. Again, I think this makes a lot of sense because it would make the program both more transparent and also subject to more robust chains of accountability. Bergen and Tiedemann argue such a transfer of control would have other advantages, and they make a strong case.

    Not that I think this will ever happen. The drone program has been, if nothing else, a great way for the intelligence community to justify its budget since 9/11, and various agencies will be reluctant to surrender control for both substantive reasons and budgetary reasons.

    Contrary to popular belief, I have never been an anti-drone fundamentalist. But I do think the drone program has been a tactic executed in the absence of a strategy and without proper transparency and oversight. Bergen and Tiedemann's recommendations would go a long way toward addressing some of my main concerns.

    *Aside from, apparently, Seal Team 6.

    **Or lead someone to plant a bomb in Times Square, which is a total hypothetical, of course, and would never happen in real life.

  • As the names of those indicted by the special tribunal for Lebanon begin to leak out, please go to Qifa Nabki for invaluable background reading on the tribunal itself.

  • There are two items of note I want to highlight to which I was not able to draw attention while traveling. The first is this post by my friend Steve Negus on Issandr's blog on how Libyan rebels are learning to fight by ... playing video games. Alternately fascinating and hilarious.

    The second item to which I want to draw your attention is this paper by Doug Ollivant* for the New America Foundation challenging the "new orthodoxy" about what led to the dramatic drop in ethno-sectarian violence in Iraq in 2007. This is an excellent paper. Doug knows enough to know that we cannot definitively determine what caused the 2007 drop in violence, but he advances what he calls "an alternative, counter-narrative" to those offered by Tom Ricks, Bob Woodward, Kim Kagan, Linda Robinson and others.** (Which is in itself interesting in part because Doug is one of the heroes of these other narratives -- most especially that of Robinson.)

    Doug is one of the smartest thinkers on counterinsurgency I know***, and his piece is littered with interesting observations, though again, it is as tough to prove Doug's narrative is any more valid, given the lack of evidence, than that of Tom Ricks or, say, Peter Feaver. There are just too many variables out there, and as I have argued ad nauseum, the best we can hope to do in the absence of causality is to establish correlation among all the things that happened.

    Some of the more interesting observations, though, concern Afghanistan, from where Doug recently returned after a year spent as John Campbell's counterinsurgency advisor. Here are a few choice excerpts. This first one echos a point I made yesterday:

    The President’s statements have been ambiguous, ever since his West Point speech of 2009, during which he both authorized an increase in troop strength, and gave a July 2011 date for the beginning of their withdrawal, recently confirmed in an address on the future of the war. This mixed message from the President (which continues to resonate despite post-Lisbon Conference messaging about 2014, and not 2011, being the key date) has been echoed by his administration. This ambiguity is almost certainly driven by the desire to reconcile the largely incompatible goals of permanently and decisively denying al Qaeda safe havens and Taliban establishment in Afghanistan, while simultaneously avoiding long-term intervention and nation building at astronomical cost. So in short, while the troops have arrived in Afghanistan, the unambiguous message of support and presence that accompanied the 2007 Iraq surge has not. We should not be surprised when politicians in both Afghanistan and Pakistan react accordingly.

    This second bit is more sobering:

    ...it is unlikely that a push of more forces, better tactical counterinsurgency, and the arrival of a highly talented commander can compensate for a lack of political commitment and absence of shared goals between the host nation and the intervening power.

    Read the whole paper here, watch Doug run his yap here, and many kudos to the New America Foundation for giving such a smart scholar-practitioner a home.

    *Hahahaha, I love Doug like a brother, but he needs to change his profile picture. "Oui, c'est moi. Je suis au musée du Louvre parce que je suis un homme de culture. Regardez l'angoisse sur mon visage parce que je ne peux pas se permettre une coupe de cheveux."

    **Carl Prine dings me for citing Robinson and Ricks in my recent IFRI paper (in his otherwise very touching, thought-provoking post), but I did write that this was an incomplete sample and not a full review of the literature. At least I did in the initial draft I turned in.

    ***It struck me as so weird and stupid that Doug is set up as some kind of anti-COIN rival to my boss (and his longtime friend) John Nagl in this snarky, argumentative National Journal piece. Doug is as much a card-carrying COINdinista as anyone, and those who understand the continued scholarly and policy development of counterinsurgency know there are genuine operational and strategic differences of opinion concerning COIN and how it should be applied in Afghanistan. (Big footprint with lots of general purpose forces? Small footprint with more special operations trainers? Some combination of both? All of that is counterinsurgency -- it's just different ways of doing it.) More to follow on this...

  • Let's give Gov. Tim Pawlenty some credit for wading into the Middle East in a serious policy speech yesterday. I'm going to pick through it in this post, taking major issue with some things he said and commenting in a more neutral manner on others. Ready? Okay...

    I want to speak plainly this morning about the opportunities and the dangers we face today in the Middle East.  The revolutions now roiling that region offer the promise of a more democratic, more open, and a more prosperous Arab world.  From Morocco to the Arabian Gulf, the escape from the dead hand of oppression is now a real possibility.  

    Agreed.

    Now is not the time to retreat from freedom’s rise.

    Agreed. Though it was right here that I started to think about how the United States can effectively respond to what is taking place in the Middle East with limited and reduced resources.

    Yet at the same time, we know these revolutions can bring to power forces that are neither democratic nor forward-looking.  Just as the people of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria and elsewhere see a chance for a better life of genuine freedom, the leaders of radical Islam see a chance to ride political turmoil into power. 

    Probably true. Thought not chief among my own concerns about the revolutions in the Arabic-speaking world.

    The United States has a vital stake in the future of this region.  We have been presented with a challenge as great as any we have faced in recent decades.  And we must get it right.  The question is, are we up to the challenge?  

    Probably not, actually. Gov. Pawlenty's teammates in the Congress aim to slash the International Affairs budget.

    My answer is, of course we are.  

    Oh.

    If we are clear about our interests and guided by our principles, we can help steer events in the right direction.  Our nation has done this in the past -- at the end of World War II, in the last decade of the Cold War, and in the more recent war on terror … and we can do it again.

    Sometimes, though, as we have seen in the Middle East, our interests do not match up with our principles.

    But President Obama has failed to formulate and carry out an effective and coherent strategy in response to these events.  

    This is certainly true. But I have a little sympathy for the president here. It's tough to formulate a coherent regional strategy when our interests vary to such a high degree from country to country.

    He has been timid, slow, and too often without a clear understanding of our interests or a clear commitment to our principles.

    Meh. I actually see the guy's advisors trying to balance our interests against our principles, which is not the easiest thing to do in a region with Saudi Arabia in it.

    And parts of the Republican Party now seem to be trying to out-bid the Democrats in appealing to isolationist sentiments.  This is no time for uncertain leadership in either party.  The stakes are simply too high, and the opportunity is simply too great. 

    Well! At this point in the speech, I started to wonder whether or not we were about to get a taste of the full-throated freedom agenda stuff that kind of died in the maelstrom of Iraq and Israel's debacle in Lebanon in 2006.

    No one in this Administration predicted the events of the Arab spring - but the freedom deficit in the Arab world was no secret.  

    True.

    For 60 years, Western nations excused and accommodated the lack of freedom in the Middle East.

    True.

    That could not last.  The days of comfortable private deals with dictators were coming to an end in the age of Twitter, You Tube, and Facebook.

    True.

    And history teaches there is no such thing as stable oppression.

    True.

    President Obama has ignored that lesson of history.  Instead of promoting democracy – whose fruit we see now ripening across the region – he adopted a murky policy he called “engagement.”  

    Not sure how one is the opposite of the other, though I'm now sensing where this is going...

    “Engagement” meant that in 2009, when the Iranian ayatollahs stole an election, and the people of that country rose up in protest, President Obama held his tongue.  His silence validated the mullahs, despite the blood on their hands and the nuclear centrifuges in their tunnels.  

     

    While protesters were killed and tortured, Secretary Clinton said the Administration was “waiting to see the outcome of the internal Iranian processes.”  She and the president waited long enough to see the Green Movement crushed.  

    I'm sure the administration has some good reasons for not wanting to openly side with the protesters in 2009 in Iran, but that decision has made the administration an easy target for the other party.

    “Engagement” meant that in his first year in office, President Obama cut democracy funding for Egyptian civil society by 74 percent.  As one American democracy organization noted, this was “perceived by Egyptian democracy activists as signaling a lack of support.”  They perceived correctly.  It was a lack of support.  

    Interesting. I had not heard this. It would, of course, be interesting for Gov. Pawlenty to point out here that his own party now controls the purse strings. Should the Congress now spend more on these kinds of democracy promotion programs abroad?

    “Engagement” meant that when crisis erupted in Cairo this year, as tens of thousands of protesters gathered in Tahrir Square, Secretary Clinton declared, “the Egyptian Government is stable.”  Two weeks later, Mubarak was gone.  When Secretary Clinton visited Cairo after Mubarak’s fall, democratic activist groups refused to meet with her.  And who can blame them?

    Plenty of activists met with Sec. Clinton, actually, though Gov. Pawlenty is correct that the United States was on the wrong side of history on Egypt.

    The forces we now need to succeed in Egypt -- the pro-democracy, secular political parties -- these are the very people President Obama cut off, and Secretary Clinton dismissed.  

    This is weak sauce. You can't blame the U.S. government for the fact that secular political parties are not stronger than they are.

    The Obama “engagement” policy in Syria led the Administration to call Bashar al Assad a “reformer.”  Even as Assad’s regime was shooting hundreds of protesters dead in the street, President Obama announced his plan to give Assad “an alternative vision of himself.”  Does anyone outside a therapist’s office have any idea what that means?  This is what passes for moral clarity in the Obama Administration.  

    I'm with Gov. Pawlenty on this one, but there is a contradiction coming up later. Wait for it.

    By contrast, I called for Assad’s departure on March 29; I call for it again today.  We should recall our ambassador from Damascus; and I call for that again today.  The leader of the United States should never leave those willing to sacrifice their lives in the cause of freedom wondering where America stands.  As President, I will not.

    Cool.

    We need a president who fully understands that America never “leads from behind.”  

    Oh, man. Whichever advisor uttered those infamous words in front of a reporter from the New Yorker needs to be flogged.

    We cannot underestimate how pivotal this moment is in Middle Eastern history.  We need decisive, clear-eyed leadership that is responsive to this historical moment of change in ways that are consistent with our deepest principles and safeguards our vital interests.

     

    Opportunity still exists amid the turmoil of the Arab Spring -- and we should seize it.

    Hahaha, Tim Pawlenty sounds like Brad Pitt's Achilles from that horrible Troy movie. I'm fired up, Tim! Let's storm the beach!

    As I see it, the governments of the Middle East fall into four broad categories, and each requires a different strategic approach. 

    Just four?

    The first category consists of three countries now at various stages of transition toward democracy – the formerly fake republics in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya.  Iraq is also in this category, but is further along on its journey toward democracy.  

     

    For these countries, our goal should be to help promote freedom and democracy.  

    Okay, I'll buy that.

    Elections that produce anti-democratic regimes undermine both freedom and stability.  We must do more than monitor polling places.  We must redirect foreign aid away from efforts to merely build good will, and toward efforts to build good allies -- genuine democracies governed by free people according to the rule of law.  And we must insist that our international partners get off the sidelines and do the same.  

    Okay, but now I'm starting to ask those questions about where the money for this will come from.

    We should have no illusions about the difficulty of the transitions faced by Libya, Tunisia, and especially Egypt.  Whereas Libya is rich in oil, and Tunisia is small, Egypt is large, populous, and poor.  Among the region’s emerging democracies, it remains the biggest opportunity and the biggest danger for American interests.  

    True.

    Having ejected the Mubarak regime, too many Egyptians are now rejecting the beginnings of the economic opening engineered in the last decade.  

    True. But that liberalization allowed Egypt's economy to grow but only benefitted a small percentage of the richest Egyptians. Sounds a lot like another country I know, actually.

    We act out of friendship when we tell Egyptians, and every new democracy, that economic growth and prosperity are the result of free markets and free trade—not subsidies and foreign aid.  If we want these countries to succeed, we must afford them the respect of telling them the truth.  

    Nothing controversial there. A lot of truth, in fact. Read the Economist's special briefing on the Egyptian economy for more.

    In Libya, the best help America can provide to these new friends is to stop leading from behind and commit America’s strength to removing Ghadafi, recognizing the TNC as the government of Libya, and unfreezing assets so the TNC can afford security and essential services as it marches toward Tripoli.  

    I'm with this. The United States either needs to focus on a) removing Qadhdhafi or b) supporting the TNC militarily and politicially. One or the other. If Gov. Pawlenty wants to do that latter, I'm down with that. By the way, there's that "leading from behind" phrase again. Expect to hear a lot more of that in 2011 and 2012.

    Beyond Libya, America should always promote the universal principles that undergird freedom.  We should press new friends to end discrimination against women, to establish independent courts, and freedom of speech and the press.  We must insist on religious freedoms for all, including the region’s minorities—whether Christian, Shia, Sunni, or Bahai.  

    Outstanding.

    The second category of states is the Arab monarchies.  Some – like Jordan and Morocco – are engaging now in what looks like genuine reform.  This should earn our praise and our assistance.  These kings have understood they must forge a partnership with their own people, leading step by step toward more democratic societies.  These monarchies can smooth the path to constitutional reform and freedom and thereby deepen their own legitimacy.  If they choose this route, they, too, deserve our help.  

    I'm skeptical of how far Jordan is going to promote reform, actually. They still have one of the more brutal secret police in the region. But okay, I'll go along with this.

    But others are resisting reform. While President Obama spoke well about Bahrain in his recent speech, he neglected to utter two important words:  Saudi Arabia.  

    Yup.

    US-Saudi relations are at an all-time low—and not primarily because of the Arab Spring.  They were going downhill fast, long before the uprisings began.  The Saudis saw an American Administration yearning to engage Iran—just at the time they saw Iran, correctly, as a mortal enemy.  

    Oh boy, where are we going with this, Gov. Pawlenty?

    We need to tell the Saudis what we think, which will only be effective if we have a position of trust with them.

    Relationships of trust with the Saudis are built over decades, by the way.

    We will develop that trust by demonstrating that we share their great concern about Iran and that we are committed to doing all that is necessary to defend the region from Iranian aggression.

    Maybe. But I have spoken with a lot of high-ranking Saudi officials and princes, and all of them agree on two things: a) the United States must attack Iran because an Iranian bomb would destabilize the region and b) the United States must not attack Iran because a U.S. strike would destabilize the region. I wish Gov. Pawlenty the best in trying to reconcile this mixed message.

    At the same time, we need to be frank about what the Saudis must do to insure stability in their own country.  Above all, they need to reform and open their society.  Their treatment of Christians and other minorities, and their treatment of women, is indefensible and must change.

    Amen. But this is not the way to build up a position of trust with Saudi Arabia.

    We know that reform will come to Saudi Arabia—sooner and more smoothly if the royal family accepts and designs it.  It will come later and with turbulence and even violence if they resist.  The vast wealth of their country should be used to support reforms that fit Saudi history and culture—but not to buy off the people as a substitute for lasting reform.

    #realtalk

    The third category consists of states that are directly hostile to America.  They include Iran and Syria.  The Arab Spring has already vastly undermined the appeal of Al Qaeda and the killing of Osama Bin Laden has significantly weakened it.

    True. I might have myself argued much the same thing.

    The success of peaceful protests in several Arab countries has shown the world that terror is not only evil, but will eventually be overcome by good.  Peaceful protests may soon bring down the Assad regime in Syria.

    Peaceful protests? Probably not. Civil war? Maybe.

    The 2009 protests in Iran inspired Arabs to seek their freedom.  Similarly, the Arab protests of this year, and the fall of regime after broken regime, can inspire Iranians to seek their freedom once again.  

    Let's hope.

    We have a clear interest in seeing an end to Assad’s murderous regime.  By sticking to Bashar al Assad so long, the Obama Administration has not only frustrated Syrians who are fighting for freedom—it has demonstrated strategic blindness.  The governments of Iran and Syria are enemies of the United States.  They are not reformers and never will be.  They support each other.  To weaken or replace one, is to weaken or replace the other.

     

    The fall of the Assad mafia in Damascus would weaken Hamas, which is headquartered there.  It would weaken Hezbollah, which gets its arms from Iran, through Syria.  And it would weaken the Iranian regime itself.    

    I'm going to give Gov. Pawlenty a pass on this for the moment. You'll understand why later.

    To take advantage of this moment, we should press every diplomatic and economic channel to bring the Assad reign of terror to an end.  We need more forceful sanctions to persuade Syria’s Sunni business elite that Assad is too expensive to keep backing.  We need to work with Turkey and the Arab nations and the Europeans, to further isolate the regime.  And we need to encourage opponents of the regime by making our own position very clear, right now:  Bashar al-Assad must go.  

     

    When he does, the mullahs of Iran will find themselves isolated and vulnerable.  Syria is Iran’s only Arab ally.  If we peel that away, I believe it will hasten the fall of the mullahs.  And that is the ultimate goal we must pursue.  It’s the singular opportunity offered to the world by the brave men and women of the Arab Spring.

    I'm with the governor here.

    The march of freedom in the Middle East cuts across the region’s diversity of religious, ethnic, and political groups.  But it is born of a particular unity.  It is a united front against stolen elections and stolen liberty, secret police, corruption, and the state-sanctioned violence that is the essence of the Iranian regime’s tyranny.  

     

    So this is a moment to ratchet up pressure and speak with clarity.  More sanctions.  More and better broadcasting into Iran.  More assistance to Iranians to access the Internet and satellite TV and the knowledge and freedom that comes with it.  More efforts to expose the vicious repression inside that country and expose Teheran’s regime for the pariah it is.  

    Okay.

    And, very critically, we must have more clarity when it comes to Iran’s nuclear program.  In 2008, candidate Barack Obama told AIPAC that he would “always keep the threat of military action on the table to defend our security and our ally Israel.”  This year, he told AIPAC “we remain committed to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.”  So I have to ask: are all the options still on the table or not?  If he’s not clear with us, it’s no wonder that even our closest allies are confused.    

    Gov. Pawlenty, I have a question: would you launch military strikes against Iran to prevent the Iranians from acquiring nuclear weapons? (y/n)

    The Administration should enforce all sanctions for which legal authority already exits.  We should enact and then enforce new pending legislation which strengthens sanctions particularly against the Iranian Revolutionary Guards who control much of the Iranian economy. 

    Again, what about strikes?

    And in the middle of all this, is Israel. 

    Actually, to the left and upper right of all this.

    Israel is unique in the region because of what it stands for and what it has accomplished.  And it is unique in the threat it faces—the threat of annihilation.  It has long been a bastion of democracy in a region of tyranny and violence.  And it is by far our closest ally in that part of the world.  

     

    Despite wars and terrorists attacks, Israel offers all its citizens, men and women, Jews, Christians, Muslims and, others including 1.5 million Arabs, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, the right to vote, access to independent courts and all other democratic rights.  

    [Lips bitten. I suspect Arab Israelis and Palestinians living under occupation might have a few words to say, though.]

    Nowhere has President Obama’s lack of judgment been more stunning than in his dealings with Israel.

     

    It breaks my heart that President Obama treats Israel, our great friend, as a problem, rather than as an ally.

    This is complete B.S. And Americans do not buy it.

    The President seems to genuinely believe the Israeli-Palestinian conflict lies at the heart of every problem in the Middle East.  He said it Cairo in 2009 and again this year.   

    This is also complete B.S. But you know who does care about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? All those Arab democrats you've been talking about for the past 10 minutes.

    President Obama could not be more wrong.  

     

    The uprisings in Tunis, Cairo, Tripoli and elsewhere are not about Israelis and Palestinians.

    This is actually true. But just because the uprisings were not about Israel does not mean our secular, Arab democratic heroes do not care about the Palestinians.

    They’re about oppressed people yearning for freedom and prosperity.  Whether those countries become prosperous and free is not about how many apartments Israel builds in Jerusalem.

    See previous.

    Today the president doesn’t really have a policy toward the peace process.  He has an attitude.  And let’s be frank about what that attitude is:  he thinks Israel is the problem.  And he thinks the answer is always more pressure on Israel.  

    Okay, this is nonsense, and most Americans do not buy this. Most Jewish American voters do not buy this either and are not animated by this nonsense. But I suspect that most of this is not directed at Jewish voters but rather at conservative Evangelical Christian voters -- the kind who vote in Republican primary elections.

    I reject that anti-Israel attitude.  I reject it because Israel is a close and reliable democratic ally.  And I reject it because I know the people of Israel want peace. 

    They most certainly do. Here's a question I have for Gov. Pawlenty, though: he realizes that many Israelis are scared to death about what will follow the al-Asad regime in Syria, right? I ask this because he seems to argue that we should a) support Israel on everything but b) work toward the overthrow of the al-Asad regime. What will Gov. Pawlenty do when our Israeli friends voice their concerns about post-Asad Syria?

    Israeli – Palestinian peace is further away now than the day Barack Obama came to office.  But that does not have to be a permanent situation. 

    Correlation =/= causation. Domestic Israeli and Palestinian politics might have more to do with this situation than the occupant of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.

    We must recognize that peace will only come if everyone in the region perceives clearly that America stands strongly with Israel.  

    I would love to hear Gov. Pawlenty prove why this statement is true.

    I would take a new approach.

     

    First, I would never undermine Israel’s negotiating position, nor pressure it to accept borders which jeopardize security and its ability to defend itself.

     

    Second, I would not pressure Israel to negotiate with Hamas or a Palestinian government that includes Hamas, unless Hamas renounces terror, accepts Israel’s right to exist, and honors the previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements. In short, Hamas needs to cease being a terrorist group in both word and deed as a first step towards global legitimacy.

     

    Third, I would ensure our assistance to the Palestinians immediately ends if the teaching of hatred in Palestinian classrooms and airwaves continues. That incitement must end now. 

     

    Fourth, I would recommend cultivating and empowering moderate forces in Palestinian society.

    This is a new approach, actually. The first, second, and fourth points sound a lot like the approach taken by the Bush Administration between 2000 and 2006. But even the Bush Administration continued support for Palestinian security forces in the face of anti-Israeli sentiment among Palestinians. So this is actually more hardline than even the George W. Bush administration. And how the hell do you do #3 and #4 simultaneously? Also, good luck doing what you have just described in the above while at the same time engaging with Arab civil society and the new governments of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya as described earlier.

    When the Palestinians have leaders who are honest and capable, who appreciate the rule of law, who understand that war against Israel has doomed generations of Palestinians to lives of bitterness, violence, and poverty – then peace will come.

    Demonstrably false, actually. See Fayyad, Salam.

    The Middle East is changing before our eyes—but our government has not kept up.  It abandoned the promotion of democracy just as Arabs were about to seize it.  

    True.

    It sought to cozy up to dictators just as their own people rose against them.  It downplayed our principles and distanced us from key allies.

    Like Hosni Mubarak? Oh, wait, you mean Israel.

    All this was wrong, and these policies have failed.  The Administration has abandoned them, and at the price of American leadership.  A region that since World War II has looked to us for security and progress now wonders where we are and what we’re up to.

    That's probably true. But I think U.S. influence in the region is on the wane anyway, and I am not sure this is entirely bad.

    The next president must do better. Today, in our own Republican Party, some look back and conclude our projection of strength and defense of freedom was a product of different times and different challenges.  While times have changed, the nature of the challenge has not.  

    Well, let's give Gov. Pawlenty credit for making it clear where he stands on the primacy/restraint divide within the G.O.P.

    In the 1980s, we were up against a violent, totalitarian ideology bent on subjugating the people and principles of the West.  While others sought to co-exist, President Reagan instead sought victory.

    Aaaaaand also withdrew from Lebanon in the face of violent Islamist extremism.

    So must we, today.  For America is exceptional, and we have the moral clarity to lead the world.

     

    It is not wrong for Republicans to question the conduct of President Obama’s military leadership in Libya.  There is much to question.

    True.

    And it is not wrong for Republicans to debate the timing of our military drawdown in Afghanistan— though my belief is that General Petraeus’ voice ought to carry the most weight on that question.

    Half true. The president's voice should carry the most weight on that question, though I wish he trusted his field commanders more than he apparently does. 

    What is wrong, is for the Republican Party to shrink from the challenges of American leadership in the world.  History repeatedly warns us that in the long run, weakness in foreign policy costs us and our children much more than we’ll save in a budget line item.  

    Again, bold words for his own party.

    America already has one political party devoted to decline, retrenchment, and withdrawal.  It does not need a second one.

    Wow. I suspect we're going to see this "Democrats = Isolationism" meme more in 2011 and 2012.

    Our enemies in the War on Terror, just like our opponents in the Cold War, respect and respond to strength.

    Oh, goodness, has he been reading this?

    Sometimes strength means military intervention.  Sometimes it means diplomatic pressure.  It always means moral clarity in word and deed.  

     

    That is the legacy of Republican foreign policy at its best, and the banner our next Republican President must carry around the world.   

     

    Our ideals of economic and political freedom, of equality and opportunity for all citizens, remain the dream of people in the Middle East and throughout the world.  As America stands for these principles, and stands with our friends and allies, we will help the Middle East transform this moment of turbulence into a firmer, more lasting opportunity for freedom, peace, and progress.  

     

    Thank you.

    Thank you.

  • Any and all scholars of the contemporary Arabic-speaking world need to read Greg Gause's nostra culpa in the latest Foreign Affairs, "Why Middle Eastern Studies Missed the Arab Spring."

    Scholars did not predict or appreciate the variable ways in which Arab armies would react to the massive, peaceful protests this year. This oversight occurred because, as a group, Middle East experts had largely lost interest in studying the role of the military in Arab politics.

    I am proud to have completed my own studies under the supervision of one of the few scholars still both inclined and equipped to carefully study the role of the military in Arab politics. But as Harb and Leenders point out (.pdf) with regards to Hizballah, few contemporary area studies scholars have either the training or inclination to carefully study the role of military organizations and their activities.

  • I was unable to hear the president give his speech on Afghanistan, but it does not seem to have pleased many people. Reading it a few days later, I had a similar reaction of dissapointment to the one I had to the 2009 speech at West Point

    In that earlier speech, the president blunted a lot of any possible advantage he might have drawn from a renewed commitment to Afghanistan by simultaneously announcing we were going to begin a withdrawal in July 2011. On the one hand, that promised withdrawal provided reassurance to the peoples of the United States and other troop-contributing nations, who obviously wanted their men and women home from Afghanistan as soon as possible. But it was a terrible blunder in terms of the way it played in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It offered no reason to the people of Afghanistan to choose to support the institutions of the government of Afghanistan -- such as the security forces -- if the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan was temporary. It convinced the Taliban that their strategy of waiting us out was the correct one, and it also did nothing to persuade the Pakistani security services that their hedging strategy of continuing to arm and train insurgent groups in order to safeguard Pakistani interests after a U.S. and allied withdrawal was anything but wise. So the Surge of troops into Afghanistan was consigned to have less of an effect than it otherwise might have had.

    In this speech, meanwhile, I thought the president was well within reason to withdraw all the Surge troops by the end of 2012, and I myself co-wrote a paper on the mechanics of transition. But forcing commanders to remove all the Surge troops by the end of the summer just made no sense to me. No sense at all. Why not give commanders an extra 60 days until the end of the "fighting season"? As it turns out, administration officials confessed they think this whole "fighting season" thing is a bit of a false construct -- which it is, to a degree. Anyone who says the conflict in Afghanistan is like the baseball season, starting in the spring and ending in the fall, is simplifying things a bit too far. But there is an annual rhythm to the conflict -- if you measure the conflict by violent acts against either NATO and Afghan security forces or against Afghan civilians. The conflict is at its strongest in terms of violence in the summer and at its weakest in the winter. So why demand commanders withdraw so many forces right when things are getting most violent? Why? Why not give commanders a 180-day window or a target at the end of the year? One can only conclude the administration simply does not trust its generals in the field. But like Hew Strachan and for the same reasons, I think the administration itself is largely to blame for the disconnect between civilian leaders and field commanders.

    I have a tremendous amount of respect for many of the national security professionals in this administration but have been frustrated with the way the administration has handled both the conflicts in Afghanistan and Libya. In both conflicts, the administration has failed to provide clear strategic guidance to military commanders, and in Afghanistan, it has concentrated its message on voters at home at the expense of hearts and minds abroad.* That's hardly a recipe for success in this kind of conflict. I would give the Obama Administration higher marks on overall defense policy and on counter-terrorism operations than on waging wars, which demand the kind of resolve and strategic clarity from above that the president and his advisors do not seem very comfortable giving.

    *There is a tremendous amount of confusion, both within and outside the U.S. military, about what "hearts and minds" means. For more on this, read my latest essay in the French journal Politique étrangère. (It's in both English and French.)

  • First off, let me apologize for the lack of spam moderation in the comments while I was away. I checked the blog a few days ago and was appalled. So please accept my apologies -- except for all of you who are enjoying a bargain basement NFL replica jersey you bought through the comments thread on this blog.

    Second, some of you know I waged a long but ultimately successful insurgency to get CNAS to change its coffee machine, which could credibly claim until earlier this year to be the worst in Washington. And since this blog's readership is in part populated by highly caffeinated graduate students, let me report back from the United Kingdom and Italy on the State of Coffee abroad:

    The 1942 Instructions for American Servicemen in Britain note that British people cannot make a proper pot of coffee and that Americans cannot make a proper pot of tea and that we should consider it an even trade. But the Australians and New Zealanders who live in London are turning the old rules on their head. In Italy, I probably had seven cappuccinos and a dozen or so espressos. They were all very good -- especially the espressos. But as unbelievable as this might sound, the best cups of coffee I had in Europe were in London at Grind in Putney, where we stayed with some South African friends. The cappuccino was very good, but the flat white was simply amazing. If I still lived in Walthamstow, I would travel all the way to the SW15 for this coffee.

    In terms of food, meanwhile, my top three eating experiences (apart from the two wedding receptions and some tasty homemade sandwiches in the Alps) were:

    1. Lunch at Peck in Milan. (The maître d'hôtel steered me toward a steak tartare that was not on the menu but blew my mind.)
    2. Dinner at a cozy pizzeria, Da Martino, in Champoluc in the Italian Alps. (Again, the owner-waiter took tremendous care of us and paired our pizza with a lightly sparkling Barbera.)
    3. Lunch at The Market Tavern in Mayfair. (Eating alongside Londonstani, I paired my rather fancy "bangers and mash" with a murky cider that was really great.)

    Update: Speaking of coffee...

  • As some of you know, I have been traveling for the past 10 days in Europe. My wife and I celebrated two weddings, one in London and one in Milan. The London wedding celebrated the marriage of longtime blog contributor Amil "Londonstani" Khan and his lovely wife, so be sure to leave your best wishes in the comments section. My wife and I then spent a few days trekking in the Val d'Ayas, but not before I defended my doctoral dissertation in London. Since the subject of the doctoral dissertation might be of interest to the kind of people who read this blog, I will copy and paste the abstract below:

    The way in which the existing social science literature measures military capability does not explain how Hizballah, a small Lebanese militant group, has managed to defeat the Israel Defense Forces and its allies throughout the 1990s and in 2006. Conventional approaches measuring numerical preponderance, technological advantages or the way in which actors employ force cannot explain conflicts in 1993, 1996 and 2006 – in which a smaller, technologically inferior adversary using only basic light infantry tactics managed to deny victory to the most powerful military actor in the region.

     

    This study, by contrast, demonstrates the way in which Hizballah has developed a ‘comprehensive’ approach to warfare incorporating both kinetic and non-kinetic lines of operation. Not only combat operations but also propaganda campaigns and the provision of social services have enabled Hizballah to consistently realize political objectives on the battlefield. Only by expanding the definition of what constitutes military power and operations can victory and defeat in southern Lebanon be explained.

    As you might imagine, then, in light of my own research, I am very much looking forward to the publication of two books, one of which I have already read in draft form and one of which was waiting for me on my desk when I arrived back in Washington. The former is Nick Blanford's Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah's Thirty-Year Struggle Against Israel. The unedited, unabridged version of this book was both majesterial and fascinating, and I can only assume the finished product is also great. The latter book is Daniel Byman's A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism. I had known Byman was working on this book and now have high expectations about it after reading an excellent, glowing review in the Economist. I suspect that these two books are best read in tandem with one another, so order both and let me know how busy it keeps you through the fall. 

    Meanwhile, let me thank you the readers of this blog for often providing interesting articles and others sources that I incorporated into my dissertation. I should also thank, in addition to my long-suffering wife, my supervisor, Yezid Sayigh, who sets the standard for anyone writing on security issues in the Arabic-speaking world. I also got a nice grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation to carry out my field work, and my bosses at the Center for a New American Security gave me plenty of time off to tackle my dissertation while working at CNAS. There are many, many other people to thank, but they are, as you might imagine, all listed in the acknowledgements.

  • If today goes as planned, I will be sleeping in a refuge high in the Italian Alps when the president gives his address on Afghanistan tonight. So please go elsewhere, including my peers at CNAS, for comment. Thanks.
  • I'm no lawyer, I'll admit, but I do know thing or two about shooting wars, having been in a few and having studied others, and the conflict in which we have intervened in Libya is most certainly a war. The reason why the Obama Administration's legalistic determination that it is not a war is ridiculous is not because we've gotten to the point where we care most about which lawyers were smarter than other lawyers but because it does not pass the "common sense test" or "laugh test" of most Americans. I more or less approve of the way this administration has handled foreign and defense policy, but the way in which it has handled Libya, from the decision to intervene to this stupid determination that it is not a war, is a head-scratcher. And this latest episode, which to most Americans I suspect looks like a bunch of eggheads arguing about how many bombs you have to drop for it to be "hostilities" and, while they're at it, how many angels can dance on the head of a pin, is simply one of the stupidest things I've read in some time. It does not pass the laugh test, and the administration has handed an empty net to anyone looking to score points off of this. Just incredibly stupid.
  • I will be traveling for the next few weeks, attending weddings, climbing, and generally not spending much time working. Here's a question to keep you busy while I'm gone:

    Assumptions are necessary for strategic planning. One of the planning assumptions the U.S. government embraced while forming its strategy on Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2009 was that we would be able to build a partnership with the government of Pakistan that would allow us to degrade insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan. Obviously, this assumption needs to change*, and we might even be better off considering elements within the Pakistani military and security services the enemy of U.S. and allied interests. What, though, would the new planning assumption be, and how would changing our assumption then force us to change our strategy?

    *The assumption that we will be able to build a partnership with Pakistan's military and security services actually remains an assumption within the U.S. government, though of course many believe it should be amended.

  • I understand the nuances of the Obama Administration's position on Bahrain. I really do. But would you place bets on the stability of a regime so insecure it jails a woman one year for the crime of reciting a poem?

  • One down, one to go. The event this morning (.pdf) with Dave, Rangina, Wazhma and Elizabeth was great -- many thanks to the Institute for Inclusive Security for the invitation. I am now about to head to the U.S. Institute of Peace for a second event today on reconciliation and to discuss this paper (.pdf) by Hamish Nixon.

    National Journal asked a few of us how many troops President Obama should remove from Afghanistan this summer. My answer is, very few. Let me explain: If the president and his advisors decide to move a lot of troops out of Afghanistan in 2011, there are smart ways to do this and dumb ways to do this. A smart way would be to announce the withdrawal of troops in July but to actually physically remove them in the fall or winter, once the "fighting season" has begun to wind down. Removing more troops this summer rather than waiting 60-90 days makes absolutely no sense.

    That was the major point of disagreement I had with this short paper by Caroline Wadhams and Colin Cookman [see Update], but many kudos to them for raising the risks of civil war, which I do not think the U.S. and allied militaries have spent enough time worrying about and have certainly not thought about mitigating. Another thing that is worth worrying more about is the economy. Gunner "Kalev" Sepp told me a few weeks ago that when the United States ended the roughly $8.5 million we had been giving El Salvador in the 1980s during their civil war, the unemployment rate there sky-rocketed to over 50%. (!) What is going to happen when we start cutting aid to Afghanistan's similarly conflict-distorted economy, which I and others have been urging we do for some time? 

    Apologies for the random thoughts on Afghanistan, but these questions and others form the tableau on which any of us attempt to consider issues related to reconciliation.

    Update: I was just chatting back and forth with @colincookman on the Twitter, and they actually meant a drawdown to begin this summer. So there might not actually be that much daylight in between us. I think Colin went back into the text and clarified things. Anyway, my stance is the same: if you're going to draw down troop this year, you can announce it next month, but don't actually do it until the fall.

  • 1. I will be participating in two events tomorrow on reconciliation in Afghanistan. I am not really a specialist on the subject as it pertains to Afghanistan when compared with others, but I will discuss reconciliation efforts in terms of civil wars in general and will offer comment on how operations in Afghanistan may or may not be setting the conditions for what we have come to expect based on historical experience. The first event, hosted by the Institute for Inclusive Security, will be held at the National Press Club and will feature me along with David Kilcullen, Rangina Hamidi, and Wazhma Frogh Mohammad Yonus. The great Elizabeth Rubin will moderate. Details here (.pdf). (Also, the event will be televised on PBS at some point.)

    The second event will be at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Hamish Nixon and Andrew Wilder asked me to participate in an event with Ali Jalali, Michael Semple, Bill Taylor, Ashley Tellis and other smart people. Details here. (I suspect we'll spend much time talking about Hamish's new paper, which I read last week while attending a conference with both Andrew and Hamish.)

    2. There was an article in the Washington Post today about a new strategy in Afghanistan. Here are my two cents: The so-called "Biden CT option" for Afghanistan was a really bad idea in the fall of 2009 but may be a good option, as I and others have argued, once we have bought enough time and space to build up effective Afghan security forces that allow us to fight a counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan by, with and through the Afghans rather than with costly and large deployments of U.S. general purpose forces. The debate, as I see it, surround whether or not we have suffiently set the conditions to fight this kind of lower-cost counterinsurgency campaign. (And this debate, of course, only applies if no progress has been made on reconciliation.) The military, based on the remarks of Sec. Gates and LTG Rodriguez, among others, feels the Afghan security forces need more time and space to develop. In the end, I do not see a way to transition in Afghanistan much faster or much slower than the timeline LTG Barno and I came up with, but if you've got other ideas, knock yourself out.

    3. Chaning gears, if the Libyan rebels seize control of the road connecting Tripoli with Tunisia, that's a huge and strategically important victory. I really think the administration has been terribly sloppy in its own management of this conflict, but the rebel gains should be cheered nonetheless.

  • Sec. Gates apparently lit into our NATO allies in a closed-door meeting yesterday, calling out Spain, Turkey and the Netherlands but most especially Poland and Germany for not pulling their weight in Libya. (Gates also praised Canada, Belgium and most especially Denmark and Norway.) Today, broader concerns about the NATO alliance dominated a must-read public speech full of real-talking:

    The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress – and in the American body politic writ large – to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense.  Nations apparently willing and eager for American taxpayers to assume the growing security burden left by reductions in European defense budgets. 


    Indeed, if current trends in the decline of European defense capabilities are not halted and reversed,  Future U.S. political leaders– those for whom the Cold War was not the formative experience that it was for me – may not consider the return on America’s investment in NATO worth the cost. ...

     

    It is not too late for Europe to get its defense institutions and security relationships on track.  But it will take leadership from political leaders and policy makers on this continent.  It cannot be coaxed, demanded or imposed from across the Atlantic.

    Truth.

    From the perspective of many U.S. legislators and tax-payers, one of the reasons the states of Europe enjoy such nice social welfare programs is because the United States has effectively subsidized the continent's defense spending since 1989. A few weeks back, I was in a meeting with some representatives from one of our NATO allies, who warned me that if the United States moved troops out of Europe, European states would respond by only developing military organizations capable of operating in Europe and North Africa.

    I responded that would be a real improvement!

    Currently, the European states seem unable to carry out mid-sized military operations independently. In Libya, the United States is flying 75% of both in-flight refueling and reconnaissance missions -- because the European states have not invested in either in-flight refueling or ISR platforms. Some Europeans are also unhappy the United States has sent its A-10s and A/C-130s home, because European states also lack the kind of slow-flying, fixed-wing platforms ideal for close air support -- hence the recent deployment of British rotary-wing attack helicopters.

    This kind of reckoning between the United States and the states of Europe has been long overdue. Some European states have proven themselves serious about both the alliance and their own national defense. (I'm looking at you, Denmark.) Others have not. If Germans complain with justification that their workers subsidize Greek hair-dressers taking early retirements, it's perfectly fair for the United States to complain German workers enjoy comfy state benefits in part because U.S. tax-payers underwrite their national defense.

  • Today is the 67th anniversary of "Goddammit, Rangers, Lead the Way." If you are able, and especially if you are a youngish man thinking of trying your hand at Rangering, watch the first 25 minutes or so of Saving Private Ryan today. All of the rest of you should at least raise a glass for the Boys of Pointe-du-Hoc and all the other men who fought that day in Normandy. (And boy, think whatever you wish of Ronald Reagan, but the "Boys of Pointe-du-Hoc" speech is incredible.)

    ***

    As far as yesterday's fighting in the (occupied) Golan is considered, let me just say this, speaking as someone whose own research on the fighting in southern Lebanon is highly critical of the Israeli Defense Force and who has never been hesitant to criticize anyone's military forces (including my own) when they deserve it: You can have whatever opinions you wish to have about Israeli policy or the plight of the Palestinians, but if the IDF units did in fact employ escalation of force as is currently being described, starting with non-lethal means and then proceeding to lethal force, you can't ask any more of them tactically and operationally. That will infuriate some of you unable to divorce consideration of tactics and operations from the strategies and policies they serve, but there it is.

    (Considering both Israel's leaders and Syria's leaders might want Bashar al-Asad to stick around for a while longer, a friend in Beirut only half-jokingly suggested yesterday's events were staged on both sides to take the attention off the crimes of the al-Asad regime against its own people.)

    ***

    I'll be traveling internationally for the next few days and will likely not be blogging very much, if at all. On the flights, though, here's what I'll be reading:

    1. The manuscript for Daveed Gartenstein-Ross's new book.

    2. Kissinger's On China. People who actually know a lot about China and know better books about China might make fun of me for this, but I know next to nothing about China and figured it might be a good time to learn something.

    3. Bob Kaplan's forthcoming essay for the National Interest on John Stuart Mill and the Arab Spring. (Bob was kind enough to slip me a copy last week at the CNAS conference.)

    ***

    Speaking of the annual CNAS conference, if you did not attend, you can still watch a stellar conversation about Afghanistan and Pakistan moderated by Rajiv Chandrasekaran and featuring LTG (Ret.) Dave Barno, Amb. Anne Patterson, Steve Coll and Bing West on C-SPAN online. The five discuss, among other things, this report (.pdf) I co-authored.

    You can also watch, here, the panel on internet freedom and the Arabic-speaking world for which I served as the jester. Shadi Hamid and Richard Fontaine were both excellent, and Colin Kahl, as the panel went on and as he veered off the script, just starting owning it. Highly entertaining.

  • First off, many thanks to those of you who either attended yesterday's conference or followed proceedings on our website or via Twitter. I will be sure to post the conference videos when they are on-line, and C-SPAN covered the entire event, so when you have insomnia this weekend and are flipping through channels, do not be shocked to see me or Patrick Cronin talking at you.

    Second, I finally got around to reading Sarah Stillman's excellent and important article on the treatment of third-country nationals serving in support capacities for the U.S. military in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. The New Yorker has locked this article, which is silly, because this article has real policy relevance yet most of the people who need to read the article do not subscribe to the New Yorker.

    In summary: third-country nationals serving in support functions in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan often suffer horrific abuses. This will not surprise many of you, but it should make you angry, because your tax dollars are helping fund those carrying out the abuses.

    The United States has chosen to do two things in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that have led to a situation in which the U.S. military is obscenely dependent on labor from places like Fiji, Sri Lanka and the Philippines -- often not to do work directly related to combat but to instead support a bunch of stuff unrelated to killing the enemy or supporting the governments of Iraq and Afghanistan.

    On the one hand, we have decided that U.S. men and women serving on large forward operating bases and airfields should have as many of the comforts of home as possible, to include TGI Fridays, Burger effing Kings, etc. (Needless to say, the grunt walking point in Paktia gets none of this.)

    On the other hand, a lot of the regular support functions -- like, operating regular chow halls and laundry services -- are not carried out by U.S. servicemen but, again, by third-country nationals.

    The people who perform these functions and work at the Burger effing King are not from Kansas or California (or, importantly, Kandahar or Konar) bur rather from South and East Asia. Big contractors farm out contracts to sub-contractors, which in turn farm out contracts to smallish recruiters all over the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The potential for fraud, waste and abuse -- to say nothing of human trafficking -- is both obvious and immense. Many (most?) of these third-country nationals are lied to prior to their arrival about their jobs, the location of their work, their living conditions, and their compensation.

    Decisions made in defense policy and war-making have consequences and trade-offs. This is a truism, but an important one. When you buy a bunch of tanks, for example, that might mean you cannot afford to buy a new aircraft carrier. When you decide to turn an artillery battalion into light infantrymen for the sake of the war in Afghanistan, you accept their artillery skills will suffer.

    In the same way, if you're going to outsource so much of these wars, that's fine in theory. (Although, again, don't get me started on Burger effing King, or running convoys through an IED-littered road in order to deliver big-screen televisions to a FOB.) But you also need to be prepared to train a division's worth of contracting officers to oversee all of these contracts and subcontracts. Capitalism is amoral. Left to its own devices, the capitalist system will not just do the right thing. If you care about things like values -- to say nothing of spending tax-payer money wisely -- you need to invest in oversight. You can't just farm out all these contracts and assume people you've never met will behave in a moral, responsible manner toward their fellow human beings.

    Those who care about these things, meanwhile -- and I would hope those people include people in the executive and legislative branches of our government -- need to read this article.

  • On Thursday Today, CNAS hosts its fifth annual conference, which you can watch here. I'll be participating in a panel on internet freedom and the Middle East with Richard Fontaine, Colin Kahl and Shadi Hamid at 9:40, and readers of this blog in particular will then want to stick around for the all-star panel on Afghanistan and Pakistan at 11:50 featuring LTG (Ret.) Dave Barno, Bing West, Amb. Anne Patterson, and Steve Coll. The former panel will be moderated by Karen House, and the latter will be moderated by Rajiv Chandrasekaran. Once those panels are finished, I'll be wandering in and out, listening to smart people like Patrick Cronin and Zbigniew Brzezinski but otherwise just hanging out. So if you're one of the 8,000 or so planning on attending, find me and say hello. 

  • Also this morning, let me offer a hearty congratulations to SFC Leroy Arthur Petry of HHC, 75th Ranger Regiment. SFC Petry will receive the Medal of Honor for heroic actions in Afghanistan that resulted in the loss of a hand. Read the entire account here. SFC Petry makes all of us who have ever worn a scroll very proud. RLTW.

  • I beat up on the House yesterday, so let me give credit where it is due today:

    WASHINGTON (AP) — A House of Representatives panel presented on Tuesday a $649 billion defense spending bill for next year's Pentagon budget that would pay for wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and wade into the long-running fight over a multibillion-dollar next-generation jet fighter.

     

    The House Appropriations Committee bill would provide $119 billion for the two wars, $841 million more than President Barack Obama sought but $39 billion below the current amount. American combat forces are scheduled to leave Iraq at the end of the year and Obama is weighing the first round in the drawdown of the 100,000 troops in Afghanistan in July, with all combat forces scheduled to be out by 2014.

     

    The legislation would provide $13 billion to train and equip Afghan security forces and $1.1 billion for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, although 75 percent of the money would be withheld until the defense secretary reports to Congress on how the money would be spent in Pakistan.

    I would crow that folks on Capitol Hill must be reading our new report (.pdf), but honestly, thinking more critically about the money we give to Pakistan's military and security services is just common sense. Anyway, well done.

    Update: It has been called to my attention the language in this legislation borrows heavily from a very similar ammendment from the HASC.

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