Abu Muqawama: December 2011

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  • Matthew Kroenig, Steven Walt and others have given us a real Christmas treat in the form of the debate over Matt's recent article in Foreign Affairs. Walt responded to Matt's article, as did Dan Drezner and Paul Pillar. Although I was inclined to agree with Walt when the debate began, I was put off by the condescension -- as I perceived it -- in his original response, so I was especially pleased to see him then allow Matt a chance to reply before posting one final time himself. Students of international relations and Middle East policy should take the time to read through the informative back-and-forth, and I thank both scholars for getting their ideas out there in the public sphere.

    I have a few problems of my own with Matt's original article. Those problems all concern second and third-order effects.

    If Iran gets the bomb, I have heard all kinds of worries about what would then happen in terms of regional security. But in conversations with leaders around the region, I have heard very few specifics. Why, exactly, would a nuclear Iran be so much worse than a non-nuclear Iran? Bear with me here: Let's say Iran gets a nuclear weapon. What happens next? Would other states bandwagon? What would that bandwagoning behavior look like in real terms? (For the record, I have never heard any compelling answer to this question in travels around the region.)

    Would other states seek nuclear weapons? How, exactly? Let's pick one example: Saudi Arabia. Why, first off, has Saudi Arabia not already begun a nuclear energy program? (And don't say "oil," because there is an opportunity cost to Gulf states using oil for their own energy rather than selling it on the open market for $100 a barrel.) Does Saudi Arabia have the technical expertise to start a nuclear program? If so, how long would it take them? Would Saudi Arabia instead buy a bomb? From where? From Pakistan, perhaps? Why would the Pakistanis sell one to them? Why might the Pakistanis not sell one to them? You can see where I am going here: once you start trying examine the second and third order effects and their various branches, it's tough to explain how, exactly, a nuclear Iran would be that much more dangerous than a non-nuclear Iran. I am not saying it would not be more dangerous -- I am saying it is very hard to explain how, exactly, a nuclear Iran would be more dangerous. And I think those arguing for war with Iran have an obligation to sketch out those specifics to both policy makers and to the public.

    On the flip side of the equation, what might be the adverse second and third order effects of a U.S. strike on Iran? I agree with Matt's critics that he gives us the best-case scenario. But how does the situation look if we work through the effects of a U.S. strike on Iran country-by-country? How might another war affect U.S. security and economic interests elsewhere in the region? How might such a war affect U.S. interests outside the region? How might Iran respond?

    I like Matt as both a person and a scholar. I think he owes us more analysis, though, than he has thus far given us.

    Update: On the other hand, I can think of few people less qualified to answer the questions I have asked in the above paragraphs than this freaking guy. I mean, why in the world would any responsible analyst or policy maker listen to what John Yoo, J.D., has to say about the regional security architecture of the Persian Gulf? Or military operations? It's not as if the Republican Party does not have plenty of smart people who can speak about each. I have no idea what the editors at the National Review were thinking.

  • National security analysts will immediately note the ways in which the massive U.S. arms sale to Saudi Arabia is part of the administration's strategy to reassure Gulf allies of a continued U.S. commitment to the region as the nation shifts its focus to Asia while dealing with the Iranian nuclear weapons program. This is also, though, about U.S. jobs. Boeing* had been manufacturing F-15s on its St. Louis assembly line for the past few years without a firm assurance those aircraft would ever be sold. Cancelling the deal with Saudi Arabia would have been a tremendous blow to both Boeing and the people of St. Louis. I am not among those who argue we should keep U.S. defense spending high in order to support the U.S. economy, but in this case, I think it is naive to assume U.S. domestic politics did not play at least a small role in this sale. I'm sure the congressional delegation of Missouri, for example, is enjoying a late Christmas present today.

    Note: the president barely lost Missouri in 2008.

    *Continuing a tradition of transparency on the blog and at CNAS in general, I should note that Boeing was a corporate sponsor of CNAS in 2011. A full list of CNAS donors can be found here. (I do not understand why all think tanks do not similarly publish a list of their donors so that consumers of their products can make more informed judgments.)

  • Today's news from Egypt, where the offices of the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute were raided along with several other civil society organizations*, should prompt swift action from the U.S. Congress when it returns from the holidays.

    Unlike many other regional analysts, I am not terribly upset by U.S. military aid to regimes in the Middle East: this aid, in theory, gives the United States influence over the behavior of regimes and institutions in the region -- and also professionalizes Arab military organizations. But the United States has an opportunity to support the promotion of democracy in the region by linking military aid to the development of civil society. Egypt receives approximately $1.3 billion in annual military aid from the United States. The Congress should include a clause to the effect that regimes will not be eligible for U.S. military aid if organizations funded by the National Endowment for Democracy (such as the NDI and the IRI) cannot operate free from host government harassment. The Egyptian military claims organizations like the NDI and the IRI "meddle" in the affairs of Egypt. Well, $1.3 billion in military aid also "meddles" in the affairs of Egypt. If you want the latter, you should be prepared to accept the former as well.**

    I have written about the sources of U.S. leverage in the Middle East. I do not think the problem is that the United States does not have leverage but that it has been incompetent in using it. The United States now has an opportunity to use it in Egypt. And even if the Egyptian military declines U.S. military aid (unlikely), the United States will have sent a strong signal that democracy promotion is a strategic goal of the United States in the region and that allied regimes should adjust their behavior. I might not have recommended such a gambit in 2010, but I think the events of 2011 mean the United States has to play by new rules in the region.

    *Reports from Cairo indicate the other organizations were the Arab Center for Independence of Justice and Legal Professions (ACIJP), The Budgetary and Human Rights Observatory, Freedom House and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

    **Military aid comes from a different pool of money than does other aid. One of the problems the United States has using its leverage is that the right hand often does not know what the left hand is doing. So the Dept. of Defense might be doing one thing while U.S. AID is doing another. Foreign governments know all about the fault lines and divisions in the U.S. government and exploit them. They bet (correctly) the U.S. government will not be able to come up with a whole-of-government approach. The U.S. Congress, though, can step in here and tie one set of activities to another by federal law.

  • A favorite Republican pastime is comparing Democratic presidents and presidential wannabes with Jimmy Carter, who, fairly or not, is remembered by many as having been both hapless in terms of foreign policy and weak toward the enemies of the United States.

    Theoretically, that should be really difficult to do with President Obama. Most Americans have a tough time taking seriously those who would call "weak" the guy who a) gave the order to thwack Osama bin Laden, b) surged in Afghanistan, and c) successfully directed the air campaign that removed Qadhdhafi from power.

    But now those Jimmy Carter comparisons are a lot easier to make in practice. In an eerie echo of Carter's decision to allow the embattled Shah of Iran to travel to the United States to undergo medical treatment, hastening the Islamic Revolution, President Obama has allowed the equally embattled leader of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, to do the same.

    That sound you subsequently heard this evening was America's Yemen experts (all three of them!) banging their heads on their desks in frustration. What kind of message does it send to the people of Yemen and the greater region when the United States allows an abusive autocrat to take refuge in a New York hospital while his people demonstrate in support of democracy in the face of bullets from his security forces? Just whose side is the United States on in the Arab Spring? If Bashar al-Asad gets pancreatic cancer, should we expect for him to be treated at Johns Hopkins?

    How, you might ask, did this golf foxtrot come to pass? An aforementioned strength of this administration -- its ruthless and successful campaign to decimate al-Qaeda and its affiliates -- is also a weakness in that it overshadows everything else and causes the administration to see entire regions of the globe through a CT-shaped soda straw. The United States does not have a Middle East policy or even a Yemen policy. It has a counterterrorism policy, and all things Yemen are viewed through that prism. It is telling that the lead administration official responsible for the decision to admit Saleh to the United States was not the Secretary of State but rather the president's chief counterterrorism advisor, John Brennan.

    The Obama Administration is making the same mistakes many Gulf regimes are making: thinking, to paraphrase Toby Jones, that it can continue into 2012 with 2010's assumptions -- as if 2011 never happened. Does the Arab Spring matter or does it not? If it does not, the United States can continue its relationships with Gulf states dominated solely by issues related to counterterrorism and oil. If it does, though, the United States has to think more broadly -- both in terms of its bilateral relationships in the region as well as how what it does in one country will be seen elsewhere in the region.

    I know the administration will say they have a plan to use this time Saleh is out of the country to shepherd him from power, to which I say the administration is being too clever by half. As Gregory Johnsen noted, the Saudis did not manage to keep Saleh in Saudi Arabia, so what hope do we have to keep Saleh here? And will any clever backroom negotiations to end Saleh's rule matter to millions who will not see beyond the United States offering refuge to a brutal dictator? The administration will also argue that it understands the comparison with the Shah and the attending risks -- but I think knowing and then ignoring the lessons of history is even worse than being ignorant of them to begin with.

    I'll just conclude by noting that the administration has yet to name a successor to Colin Kahl at the Department of Defense, so as all of this takes place, the United States does not have anyone behind the wheel of U.S. defense policy in the region. Merry Christmas!

  • Small Wars Journal has a thought-provoking post by Michael Cummings that takes issue with something I have often argued: 

    [W]hen it comes to counter-insurgency, military theorists continue to ignore humanity’s underlying irrationality. Consider Andrew Exum’s article in the Daily Beast:

     

    “Populations, in civil wars, make cold-blooded calculations about their self-interest. If forced to choose sides in a civil war—and they will resist making that choice for as long as possible, for understandable reasons—they will side with the faction they assess to be the one most likely to win.”


    I dub this the “Chicago School of Counter-Insurgency”, the idea that in warfare--with death and subjugation on the line--mankind’s rationality trumps his unconscious thoughts and emotions. ...

     

    We cannot pretend that killing people won’t cause emotional reactions. We cannot pretend that in a war zone people always act rationally, because people don’t. As a counter-insurgent, we must balance our views of insurgents and the population as both rational and emotional actors.

    Cummings has a point, of course. But what Cummings calls the Chicago School would better be described as the New Haven School. For a long time, the scholarly literature on civil wars discussed political allegiance in civil wars as primarily exogenous. In 2006, though, a scholar at Yale named Stathis Kalyvas published a book called The Logic of Violence in Civil War that argued the precise opposite. Anyone who knows my own work knows that I find the argument advanced by Kalyvas to be compelling. And a large-N analysis of population behavior in civil war environments would, I believe, lead to similar conclusions. But as many people know, I did my own graduate work in and on southern Lebanon, where all kinds of "irrational" factors like religion motivated the population. So what gives?

    I heard Steve Biddle describe the state of civil wars scholarship well last summer when he said that what Kalyvas and his work did was to effectively swing the literature from the all the way from the exogenous end of the spectrum to all the way over to the endogenous end. As more work is done, Steve said (and I agree with him), the literature would likely end up somewhere in the middle. Or right back where it started, when Thucydides noted man is motivated to go to war by fear, honor, and interest -- only one of which is covered in most economics textbooks. For now, I have yet to read a good corrective to Kalyvas that would lead me to radically change my own views about popular behavior in civil wars in general.

    (Cummings, alas, goes on to argue that "foreign occupation triggers suicide attacks." Let's all agree not to tell Daveed Gartenstein-Ross.)

    ***

    The subtitle given to the Cummings article on the Small Wars Journal webpage was "It's time to stop listening to CNAS." So ... no Christmas card from Small Wars Journal this year?

    Update: the original Michael Cummings post was here.

  • I woke up this morning to the terrible news that John Redwine had died while climbing in Lebanon. Missing since the weekend, his body was found this morning. I first met John in 2004, in a bank in Beirut. We were both new graduate students at the American University of Beirut and were trying to set up bank accounts in order to pay our tuition -- me in English, and he, hilariously, in the classical Arabic he had perfected over years of study in Fez. When John had made the journey from Morocco to Lebanon a few days earlier, he had done so in romantic fashion: overland, in a beat up, wheezing Renault he finally abandoned at the border with Syria.

    John met his wife Irina while they were both graduate students at AUB. Their marriage was a source of delight for their many friends. The most fun I have ever had at a party was surely at their wedding celebration, which took place in the hills overlooking Tangier. The party itself, which would have made Rabelais blush, lasted three days. On the last evening, the 30 or so of us who remained standing danced to Thriller at four in the morning. (Which would not have been remarkable were it not for the fact that a) we were all in a pool at the time and b) we were all still fully clothed.)

    I will remember those times, and many quieter nights spent sipping beers and trading stories. Many Americans moved to the Middle East after the September 11th attacks, but John embodied the best values of his native country and his home state of Iowa. John was unfailingly polite and generous toward others. He spoke softly and with humility. He had real intellectual curiosity about the peoples of the Middle East. He was quick to laugh at jokes -- especially those told at his expense. He was a fine student of the Arabic language and had mastered it in both its classical and Levantine forms. He would have made a fine ambassador one day.

    John and Irina were recently blessed with a son. My thoughts and prayers are with them this morning.

    Update: John's family has released the following obituary.

    John Newland Redwine, II, age 33, of Beirut, Lebanon, formerly from Sioux City, IA died Sunday, December 18 doing what he loved, alpine climbing in the Lebanon Mountains.

    John was born on June 13, 1978 in Kansas City, MO to Dr. John and Barbara Redwine when his father was in his senior year of medical school. The family moved to Sioux City, IA where his father completed a residency in family medicine and established a family practice in Morningside. John attended Clark Grade School, Hoover Middle School, and he graduated from Sioux City North High School in 1996. Between earning two bachelor’s degrees at the University of Montana and a masters degree at the American University of Beirut, he studied for two years at the Arabic Language Institute in Fez, Morocco and was fluent in both spoken and written Arabic.

    John served in many capacities as an independent public relations and communications professional. At the time of his death, he was the communications officer and editor on a regional cooperation project on water issues for the United Nations Regional Economic and Social Development Commission in Western Asia and the German Federal Institute for Geo-Science and Natural Resources in Beirut. He also had served as a freelance producer and journalist at Fox News, project director at Albany Associates, managing editor at Executive Magazine, Analyst and Copy Editor at The Middle East Reporter, and desk editor at ABC News. He recently helped organize the very successful Banff Mountain Film Festival Beirut.

    John had many publications in political, governmental, and professional journals and was well respected by his peers. In their leisure time, John and his wife, Irina enjoyed mountain climbing, motorcycling, camping, and entertaining their many friends across the Middle East and the world. He was a skilled alpinist and big-wall climber. He climbed extensively in Yosemite and Zion National Parks, climbed the nose on El Capitan, 6 of the 7 Grand Tetons in one day, on-sited classic routes in Stanage, Mont Blanc and Wadi Rum and established new routes in Morocco, Lebanon and many other countries. John took great pride in introducing others to climbing and worked at building the capacity of the climbing community in Lebanon.

    Two months ago, John and Irina welcomed their first child into the world, Winston Prentice Redwine. Irina and he survive, as do John’s parents, Dr. John and Barbara Redwine of Rogers, AR, his two brothers William Redwine and his wife Brooke of Sioux City, IA, and Adam Redwine and his close friend Aliya Gordon of Augusta, GA, and many aunts, uncles, cousins, nieces and nephews.

    Services will be in held Beirut, Lebanon on Friday, December 23 and in Sioux City, IA on Tuesday, December 27. Burial will be at Memorial Park Cemetery in Sioux City.

    RIP
  • For the past several months, I've been working on a big project related to U.S. policy toward the Middle East at the Center for a New American Security. (My research partner is Duke's Bruce Jentleson, whose research I have long admired.) During that time, I've had the opportunity to interact with a wide array of former and current U.S. policy makers as well as the kinds of na'er-do-well academic specialists on the region whose work I have always found to be thought-provoking. One thing virtually everyone can agree on is the dilemma in which U.S. policy makers find themselves: in a region that is rapidly democratizing, the United States is over-invested in the least democratic institutions and regimes in the region.

    Where things get tricky is when one tries to decide what to do about that. The principle problem is one that has been in my head watching more violent crackdowns in Bahrain and Egypt: the very source of U.S. leverage against the regimes in Bahrain and Egypt is that which links the United States to the abuses of the regime in the first place. So if you want to take a "moral" stand against the abuses of the regime in Bahrain and remove the Fifth Fleet, congratulations! You can feel good about yourself for about 24 hours -- or until the time you realize that you have just lost the ability to schedule a same-day meeting with the Crown Prince to press him on the behavior of Bahrain's security forces. Your leverage, such as it was, has just evaporated. The same is true in Egypt. It would feel good, amidst these violent clashes between the Army and protesters, to cut aid to the Egyptian Army. But in doing so, you also reduce your own leverage over the behavior of the Army itself.

    At some point, of course, the United States has no choice to cut all ties to a regime or institution. We are not, I feel strongly, quite there in either Egypt or Bahrain. But as I hear of more and more of my friends in the region beaten with crowbars and pelted with rubber bullets by the forces charged with protecting the citizenry, it's fair to wonder whether or not the United States is using the leverage it has to its greatest effect.

  • Distinguished scholar and strategist Steve Metz complained earlier today on his Twitter account that he had cancelled a presentation he was scheduled to give at the British International Studies Association conference in Edinburgh, Scotland because EUCOM regulations stipulate he must first ... wait for it ... go through SERE training before traveling to western Europe. (Now, I know some of you possibly think it prudent that civilian scholars at U.S. military colleges go through Survival Evasion Resistance Escape training before wandering into some neighborhoods in Glasgow, but this is Edinburgh we're talking about.) 

    Although the SERE training in question is not the hellish full two-week course but rather the one-day course, this is absurd nonetheless. Just yesterday, I met with a collection of junior U.S. Army officers, and we all agreed that U.S. military personnel -- and officers in particular, because they are often de facto ambassadors for the United States -- were better at their jobs if they had traveled widely or, even better, had lived abroad. But it can be a nightmare for U.S. military personnel to travel internationally, such have we elevated force protection to ridiculous importance. (One U.S. Navy officer related that six of his fellow officers were traveling on a trip to India with a U.S. university and needed signatures from four separate flag officers to do so!)

    The bottom line here is that if we are willing to send young men and women to fight and die in Helmand Province, we should go out of our way to be accomodating when U.S. military personnel want to broaden their experiences by traveling to countries with which we are not at war. Stupid regulations designed to cover someone's fourth point of contact do not serve the broader interests of the United States.

  • According to the Correlates of War dataset, roughly 83% of the conflicts fought since the end of the Napoleonic Era have been civil wars or insurgencies. And while scholarship (.pdf) suggets more recent civil wars are less "irregular" than those fought during the Cold War, it's safe to assume irregular wars will continue to be phenomena military organizations will wrestle with. That's why David Ignatius largely gets it right in his recent op-ed on the "COIN bubble." As the United States draws down in Iraq and Afghanistan, you can cut some of those ground forces -- as my colleagues recently argued -- that you need for large-scale, resource-instensive counterinsurgency. (Because if you have to assume risk somewhere, it's easier to build new combat brigades on the fly than it is to research and design a new weapons system.) But it is a mistake to assume the U.S. military will never fight these wars again. We've done that before, with disastrous results. Ignatius:

    There’s a consensus in the country that the big expeditionary ground wars of the past decade should end, and Panetta has his budget priorities right. But it would be wrong to repeat the mistake that followed the Vietnam War, when hard-learned counterinsurgency tactics were jettisoned in favor of conventional weapons for fighting quick “winnable” wars.

     

    During the COIN years, the Army and Marines learned how to adapt and fight in the most difficult environments. What a waste if those skills, acquired at such cost, were discarded and lost.

    Exactly. 

  • LTG Dave Barno, Matt Irvine and I have a new policy paper out at CNAS, which you can read here. This paper is in a lot of ways the logical follow-on to our Responsible Transition report from December of last year, which, looking back, still seems quite relevant. (Check it out if you have the time.)

    LTG Barno and I sat down with about a dozen journalists this morning and went over the particulars of new report. Our primary concern -- and the reason why we felt the need to write this report -- is that U.S. and allied commanders in Afghanistan have not yet made the mental leap that, whether they like it or not, the United States and the rest of the NATO coalition are transitioning in Afghanistan. In 2008, the situation in Afghanistan may have required large-scale counterinsurgency operations to buy time and space to build up Afghan security forces. (And I argued, in 2009, that it did.) Some would argue the situation still demands such large-scale operations, but with the transition already under way, the time to make the switch from counterinsurgency to security force assistance is sooner -- while you still have the relevant enablers in the country -- rather than in 2014. If those Afghan units you have been building are lemons, you also want to know that sooner rather than later.

    Some U.S. and allied officers might argue the United States and the rest of the coalition are already working by, with and through the Afghans, but the reality on the ground suggests that is the exception, not the rule. In 2009, the NATO/ISAF command in Afghanistan stood up NTM-A to train Afghan soldiers and police, and that effort, while flawed, has been a lot more successful than what came before it. But the old training-and-advisory component of the mission was folded into the combat command in Afghanistan, and that work has since been uneven. "Partnering" -- which Gen. Stan McChrystal felt would allow Afghan units to fight alongside U.S. and allied units and thereby increase the development of the former -- never really materialized. U.S. combat units have been more proficient at finding and killing the Taliban and the Haqqani Network, so they have done the jobs themselves.

    But developing security forces is like any other development work. What matters most is not whether or not the school or dam gets built but rather the process through which you take the host nation government to build a school or dam. U.S. commanders in Afghanistan now need to take short-term security risks in order to get Afghan units into the lead. The time to do this is now, not in 2014. Among the forcing mechanisms available to a president are to change the mission, change his commander, or change the resources. President Obama has already done the second and third this year. He should now do the first as well.

    Anyway, read the whole report here and sound off in the comments section. 

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