Center for a New American Security

"I think that Vogue is always on the lookout for good-looking first ladies because they're a combination of power and beauty and elegance. That's what Vogue is about. And here was this woman who had never given an interview, who was extremely thin and very well-dressed and therefore, qualified to be in Vogue." -- Joan Juliet Buck

I have an op-ed on Bloomberg View on the way in which the profusion of camera phones and other new-ish technology has caught the U.S. military off-guard. 

The proliferation of camera phones and social-media networks has caused problems for the U.S. military as an institution. Much of this has to do with the generational divide in understanding technology. Most of the men and women serving in the lower enlisted and company-grade officer ranks are what the defense expert Thomas Rid identifies as digital natives. They grew up with e-mail, Facebook and the Internet playing as much a part in their childhoods as Saturday morning cartoons did.

 

The senior ranks of the military, on the other hand, are populated by digital immigrants. E-mail is something they can remember using for the first time. As late as 2008, at a conference at the U.S. Army War College, Rid asked a collection of senior officers and civilian defense officials how many of them had a Facebook profile. Only four of about 50 people in the room raised their hands.

 

He then asked how many people had heard of Twitter, and only two people raised their hands. Today, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff himself has a lively Twitter feed -- but the generational divide remains.

Read the rest here. With respect to this latest incident in Afghanistan, I continue to think this represents a failure of leadership on the part of whichever officers and noncommissioned officers were supposed to be supervising these soldiers. But there is a bigger issue surrounding new technologies that the U.S. military hasn't quite wrapped its head around, and in part I blame the fact that the people setting policy are often those least likely to understand the technology itself.

I have written about the difference between capability and intent before, but in my World Politics Review column this week, I tackle the intelligence problems related to intent, which are normally much more difficult than those related to capability. Specifically, I tackle the (understandable) failure of U.S. intelligence agencies to determine whether or not Israel will attack Iran -- a failure that matches my own inability to do so.

My column was inspired by both a book I read and a conversation I had last week. On the way to and from my incredible, kick-ass hometown for a short trip, I read Bob Jervis's Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War. Jervis provided me with much of the framework through which I examined the problem. I then followed that book up with a lengthy lunch conversation with Jeffrey Goldberg, who has written extensively about what might be going through the heads of Israel's leaders regarding Iran's nuclear weapons program. I first fleshed out the thesis of my column over lunch and was grateful for the pointed questions he asked.

(Goldberg noted, though, that it is problematic to call Israel, as I do, "by far the largest recipient of U.S. aid since the end of World War II." I referenced and hyperlinked a report by the Congressional Research Service (.pdf) that itself noted Israel is "the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since World War II." But Goldberg noted that South Korea or Germany have received a lot more overall aid when you count U.S. military posture, and he has a good point. My sense is that most U.S. Congressmen and Americans do not count this as aid. But maybe they should. Also, we have never actually gone to war for Israel -- no matter what some loons say -- but we have gone to war for South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and others. That surely counts for something too, yes?)

1. I do not know why we continue to be surprised that initial reporting and statements on the raid to kill Osama bin Laden were innacurate. It will be a long time -- maybe even decades -- before the facts of the raid fully see the light of day. As far as journalistic accounts are concerned, I have no reason to doubt the reporting of my friend Nick Schmidle and others, but bear in mind Mark Bowden wrote his original award-winning articles on "Blackhawk Down" four years after the event. And in the case of Abbottabad, we're talking about a highly sensitive special operation that was and necessarily remains cloaked in secrecy. So caveat lector, as always.

2. I spent yesterday with the students at Girls Preparatory School in Chattanooga, Tennessee, where my mother has taught for over two decades. I was really impressed by the intelligence and intellectual curiosity of the girls, which served as a nice antidote to the Tennessee state legislature's war on science. My family farm is about five miles from where John Scopes went on trial in 1925, and I would have thought we Tennesseans had come a long way since then. Most folks in my hometown with whom I spoke, to be fair, seemed depressed about the fact that we are the country's laughing stock again and spoke of their desire for the legislature to focus on issues that matter. Personally, I am just happy that Henry Mencken is dead and can't weigh in on the matter.  

If it's any consolation, though, the sponsor of the so-called Monkey Bill is an alumnus and former member of the Board of Trustees of the Baylor School. My alma mater, the McCallie School, taught me that intellectual life can live in harmony with a strong faith in Christ. McCallie has accordingly produced statesmen, captains of industry, war heroes, and some of our nation's leading public intellectuals. Our bitter rivals, meanwhile, can take now take pride in the war its alumni wage against ... the scientific method.*

3. Speaking of intellectuals, my old friend and professor Peter Stallybrass recently sent me an old article of his titled "The Mystery of Walking" from the Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies. I recommend this article to all literary-minded infantrymen out there. It is delightful. 

*Problematically, Pat Robertson also went to my alma mater, but in deference to our rivals, I am not allowing trivia like "facts" or "exculpatory evidence" to get in the way of my arguments today. 

Anne Barnard -- whose husband wrote a very solid book on Hizballah last year -- has herself written a very solid article on Hizballah and Syria in today's New York Times:

Deprived of Hamas’s political cover, Hezbollah has been accused of sectarian hatred, and has been its target as well. Syrian rebels have burned the Hezbollah flag, claimed that its snipers are killing civilians in Syria, and named their brigades after historic warriors who defeated Shiites in Islam’s early schismatic battles. Early on, some analysts thought that if a Sunni government would arise in Damascus it might support Hezbollah against Israel. But now, says Michael Wahid Hanna of the Century Foundation, Hezbollah may have missed a chance to hedge its bets. ...

 

Hezbollah seems in no danger of losing its most hard-core supporters. But some of its loyalists have questions.

 

In the Sidon cafe, the health worker declared that Syrians, with free education and medical care, had no reason to rebel. Her friend, a Shiite from Hezbollah’s heartland in southern Lebanon, disagreed. “They have things,” she said, “but they are fighting for their rights.” ...

 

A Hezbollah party member said that government shelling had killed many civilians, but it was justified because the victims had let the rebels use their houses “as bunkers.” Israel used a similar argument, which Hezbollah condemned, to defend its bombing of Hezbollah neighborhoods in 2006.

In addition to this article, those with access to scholarly journals will want to read Bilal Saab's review of Nick Blanford's excellent book in this issue of Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. (No link, alas.) 

The U.S. occupation of Australia has begun. U.S. officials claim the occupation has nothing to do with the behavior of China, leading defense analysts to conclude this has more to do with helping Australia counter the well-publicized scourge of baby-stealing dingos down under. The problem with this kind of dingo-centric "strategy" -- can you even call it that, or is it just a collection of tactics? -- is that it's hard to see how the U.S. Marine Corps will maintain its core competencies while in Australia. I have made a careful study of the U.S. Marine Corps from 1942 to 1945, and based on that study, I have concluded that amphibious landings are really the heart and soul of the Corps. The history of the U.S. Marine Corps from 1775-1941 and from 1946-present is also quite interesting and may well have included some other stuff, to include counter-dingo operations, but it is largely irrelevant as far as Marine culture and doctrine are concerned. No, amphibious operations are the only thing that really matters, which is why I am also concerned the costly deployment of Marines to Australia will endanger the long-term health of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, without which the U.S. Marine Corps would surely decide to turn in their uniforms and weapons, grow out their hair and take up hemp farming in Idaho.

There are other things that trouble me about this deployment. How many cultural advisors, for example, have these Marines deployed with? How many Marines in each platoon speak the local language or have any training in the tribes and customs of the Australians? How many Marines know that an "Australian" is what you call a native, whereas an "Australiani" is the local unit of currency? (I predict that ten years from now, it will still be possible for esteemed professors of international relations at Harvard to get these two terms confused in the pages of the New York Times.) I understand that U.S. Marines believe "Fosters" is the Australian word for beer, but I worry that few of them know that it is also the Australian word for "cat urine." 

Finally, it may make sense today to limit the U.S. mission in Australia to a struggle to disrupt, dismantle and defeat the dingo menace. But inevitably, U.S. Marines will be drawn into adjudicating the petty internal rivalries of Australia. Without a proper understanding of Australia's culture or troubled history, U.S. Marines will create winners and losers among the population, which will eventually tire of our heavy-handedness. Equally inevitably, well-meaning U.S. Marines will offend Australians by asking awkward questions, like, "Why are all your rugby players from Fiji?"    

Australia is a land populated by criminals, which is why Alexander the Great stopped well short of there. (Alexander the Great understood defense in depth.) The British Empire has been humiliated in Australia time and time again, and there is no reason to imagine that we Americans will have any more luck. I fear we are embarking on another fool's errand.