Center for a New American Security

If you are like me, you mostly avoided the television and the op-ed pages today. I am not sure it is entirely healthy that we force ourselves, as a society, to grieve anew ten full years after a traumatic event like the September 11th attacks. Surely the best rebuke to an organization like al-Qaida would have been to have simply gone about our business as a nation, worshipping with our neighbors in the morning, watching football in the afternoon at the local bar, and in the evening preparing for a new workweek. Although my own path in life was in part set in motion by the attacks in 2001, I believe the best American response to the anniversary would have been to have simply enjoyed one another while hoping and planning toward tomorrow rather than mourning anew those lost in yesteryear.

But the tenth anniversary of the September 11th attacks does, I must say, give us a moment to pause and reflect on what lessons, if any, we have learned over the past decade. So while dining with Norwegian expert-on-all-things-jihadi Thomas Hegghammer in Oslo last week, I came up with the idea of asking him to participate in a special interview with the blog for the anniversary.

How much do I respect Thomas and his scholarship? I even changed the way I normally spell al-Qaeda al-Qaida for this post because honestly, who the heck am I to tell Thomas what's what?

A few years ago, you wrote a great essay in the Times Literary Supplement arguing that the trauma of the September 11th attacks retarded the development of dispassionate scholarship on jihadi movements. 10 years after the attacks, how are we doing? Has the field of study evolved in the United States? (While you’re at it, explain to us why it seems as if every tenth Norwegian has published peer-reviewed scholarship on al-Qaida.)

First of all, thank you for inviting me to contribute to your blog on this special day. Allow me also to take off my “dispassionate scholar hat” and extend my sympathy to the families of those killed on 9/11 and of the many who fell in the wars that ensued.

Ten years after 9/11, I am sorry to report that the academic study of jihadi movements is still underdeveloped. Things have improved a little bit since I wrote the TLS piece in 2008. There is a core of specialists who continue to do fantastic work, and we see some new recruitment to the field. But the community is still very small and populated mostly by people who are on the fringes of the academy, institutionally speaking (and that includes myself).

The fundamental problem is still the same, namely that the incentive structure in the universities, especially in America, is set against people specialising in the study of jihadi gorups. Studying al-Qaida usually involves qualitative methods and requires high-level skills in Arabic or some other oriental language. Graduate students with an interest in jihadism thus work against two strong biases: the quantitative methods hegemony in the social sciences and the skepticism in American Middle East Studies toward the study of hard security issues. These biases affect hiring decisions and have some striking aggregate effects: for example, there are virtually no tenured faculty specialising in terrorism (let alone jihadism) in any Ivy League school or in any Middle East Studies department in America. Rational graduate students with academic ambitions see this and wisely stay clear of the topic.

A related problem is that jihadism studies in the US lack an institutional home. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point has partly filled this role, but even the CTC has rarely had more than one or two Arabic-speaking al-Qaida specialists based at West Point at any one time; several of the CTC’s best reports were written by off-site contractors. Another potential hub for al-Qaida studies was the Centre on Law and Security at New York University, but it recently scaled down its activities and looks set to close down. How America – with its huge academic workforce and enormous counterterrorism budget – in ten years has failed to produce a research institution with more than two permanent jihadism specialists is beyond me. As far as Norway is concerned, we actually only have around five scholars focusing on al-Qaida, but we have put them all in one place – the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) – and given them stable working conditions. By having 3-4 academics working on closely related subjects and interacting every day you get tremendous synergy.

Our friend Will McCants has been arguing that the Arab Spring is a disaster for al-Qaida. Do you agree?

The Arab spring is certainly bad for al-Qaida, but I would not call it a disaster, because the uprisings have so far only affected parts of the Muslim world. Important countries like Pakistan remain largely unaffected, as do the conflicts in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and elsewhere. In some places such as Yemen and Libya, jihadi groups arguably have more opportunities now than before the Arab spring. The short and mid-term security implications of the Arab spring are highly unpredictable. At the moment we see a decline of al-Qaida central, but it is difficult to disentangle the effect of the Arab spring from the effect of the concurrent tactical breakthroughs, such as the killing of top al-Qaida commanders and the capture of internal AQ documents. That said, I do think the overall net effect of the Arab spring is negative for the jihadi movement in the long term.

The United States has enjoyed some stunning successes against al-Qaida’s senior leadership in 2011. In Oslo, we discussed the possibility that al-Qaida Central might in fact collapse with a speed that could surprise us all. Sketch out a scenario by which that might happen. What does the rapid collapse of al-Qaida Central look like, and under what conditions might we expect it?

It is difficult for me to say, because academics like myself know precious little about the current inner workings of al-Qaida Central. The only people who have a chance of knowing what is going on are in the intelligence community, and whatever I say about the subject is sure to make someone in that community laugh. My overall impression, though, is that al-Qaida central has been severely weakened over the past six months.

Your award-winning book on al-Qaida and Islamism in Saudi Arabia has been justly praised. Tell us about your thesis, and also why al-Qaida’s insurgency was such a failure in Saudi Arabia in 2004 and 2005.

The book is basically a history of violent Islamism in Saudi Arabia after 1979. It tries to explain the ebbs and flows of militant activism in the Kingdom, focusing on the 2003-2006 terrorism campaign by al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula. I show that the campaign was not an organically developed domestic rebellion, but rather the work of an foreign-trained network of militants who had returned to Saudi Arabia after al-Qaida’s eviction from Afghanistan in late 2001. The rebels never enjoyed much popular support and failed to recruit outside a closed network of jihad veterans and their acquaintances. This made them an easy prey for the Western-supported security services.

A key argument in the book is that we have tended to overestimate the level of political opposition to the Saudi regime, because we have equated Islamism with anti-government activism. Observers have assumed that because Saudi Arabia has many Islamists, anti-regime sentiment must run very deep. But there are different types of Islamism and not all have regime change as their priority. The Kingdom has produced a lot of jihadists over the years, but most have been what I call extreme pan-Islamists rather than revolutionaries; that is, they preferred to fight non-Muslims rather than fellow Muslims. In fact, the normative barriers to revolutionary violence appear to be higher in Saudi Arabia than in the Arab republics. The non-revolution in Saudi Arabia earlier this year seems to bolster this hypothesis.

One of the more horrifying things I have seen recently was at your house: a DVD of jihadi propaganda and music sitting alongside a Norwegian children’s DVD. Tell us about your latest project examining jihadi culture. And please, also assure my readership (and your wife) that you do not sometimes get your DVDs confused and show your children jihadi propaganda.

Well, the two worlds are closer than you think. Some children’s entertainment is so bad it must be the work of al-Qaida. I have reason to suspect that Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri created the Teletubbies to destroy Western society from within.

The project you are referring to is about jihad culture, or “the things jihadis do when they don’t fight.” It is inspired by the observation that militants in the underground spend a lot of time doing things that appear to serve no immediate military purpose, like singing songs, reciting poetry, or discussing dreams. They also do unexpected things like weep on a regular basis, notably when reciting the Qur’an. The infamous Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, for example, was known among fellow militants as both “the butcher” (al-dhabbah) and “a weeper” (baki). All this “soft matter” of jihadism remains virtually unstudied; one reason, I think, is that it has been considered less consequential than the hard stuff of terror, such as attacks, resources, organizational structures and the like. My hypothesis is that jihad culture is not inconsequential at all; instead I think it may shed important new light on the processes by which jihadi groups recruit, exercise organizational control and make tactical decisions. I am sure that the military men and women reading this blog will find all this rather intuitive, because they have experienced the important role of music and rituals in their own organization.

As a first step in the inquiry, I am currently working with a great team of scholars on an edited volume that will explore various dimensions of jihad culture. I have recruited subject specialists – including a musicologist, an Arabic poetry expert, and an anthropologist of dreams – to help document and decipher al-Qaida’s internal culture. We are only scraping the surface of this vast topic but hopefully it will inspire others to dig deeper. Eventually I hope to write a monograph on some aspect of this topic, but that’s a few years down the line.

I usually end these Q&A’s with a list of the interviewee’s favorite drinking holes. And I imagine it must be depressing to be such a leader in your field of study yet still be only the second-brightest scholar in your own home. This, perhaps, explains your excellent taste in spirits. Tell us the best places to sip a gin-and-tonic from Princeton to Oslo to, er, Riyadh.

Princeton: The Triumph Brewing Company – a decent microbrewery and the least bad place in town for a drink.

Cambridge: The Conservatory in the Harvard Faculty Club – extremely preppy, but that is the whole point.

Oslo: For beer, I prefer Olympen, a 120-year old beer hall on the city’s east side. For G&Ts, I guess I would go for the deep leather couches of the Bristol Bar.

Riyadh: If I could sneak in a bottle of gin, I would drink it in either on the bridge of the Mamlaka Tower or in the golden ball of the Faysaliyya Center.

Takk! I knew there was a reason I went to school in Philadelphia (with its excellent bars and pubs) rather than New Jersey! (Or Riyadh -- not entirely sure which would be worse, honestly.) As for the rest of you, go buy the man's book here.

This isn't the quote itself, but a friend of mine wrote to me after reading my complaint in this New York Times Magazine article:

Exum emphasized that he is not outraged by Medal of Honor or any other military shooter. But he can’t help, he says, being a little bit bothered by these games. “This is the thing,” he told me. “Point 5 percent of this country actually fights in these conflicts.” Nearly 80,000 Americans are deployed in Afghanistan, Exum said, while 2.2 million played Modern Warfare 2 on Xbox Live during a single day last fall. “There’s something annoying that most of America experiences the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are actually taking place, through a video game,” he said.

My friend put it better than me:

These will be the first wars in which the civilians always remember where they were on 9-11 but never wondered where a bunch of tough-ass 19 year olds spent the next decade.

 

About an hour ago, Londonstani made a dramatic return to the Abu Muqawama blog. Unfortunately, due to technical issues (ie. his inability to work out the ways of the new website set up) no one seems to have seen it.

So here's a second, less dramatic, attempt.

While we remember the forces of death and destruction unleashed on the world with the attacks of 9/11, a protest in London today has graphically illustrated that the consequences of what happened eight years ago, will continue to rumble on in ways no one can really predict.

"Eight people have been arrested during a demonstration outside a mosque in north-west London where an anti-Islamic protest was planned."

A group with connections to the UK's far right spent weeks organising a demonstration to coincide with 9/11. They hide behind the flimsy subtifuge that its Islam they don't like, not people of a different race - which keeps them on the right side of UK law.

At the last minute, it seems the demo was cancelled, while hundreds of young Muslims who had decided to get into a fist fight in the name of God turned up and ended up clashing with the police.

Result -

Racists 1 - Duped angry young Muslims 0

If I was a racist strategist, I'd be pretty happy with this.

Eight years ago at this time in the morning, I was in the middle of a long run with my understrength platoon of infantry at Fort Drum. An hour later, I would be sitting in the parking lot, trying to rehydrate for a urinalysis, when I would hear the news that a plane had crashed into the World Trade Center. Three years after that, I would be descending into Beirut's international airport for the first of three years spent living and studying the Arabic-speaking world -- an enterprise more sparked by my experiences in Iraq than by the events eight years ago. Today, meanwhile, I am off to the Middle East for another month or so of research. I will be blogging while traveling, but not at the rate that I do while stateside.

Wherever you are today, though, take a moment to remember all those killed in the attacks of 11 September 2001 and in the wars that followed them. If you're looking for something to read, meanwhile, try this New Yorker profile of Rick Rescorla.

Carlos wanted to share a couple of moments from his Florida touch-and-go trip/talk. He shared the day with a journalist (a sort of internet/media day). It coincided with one hell of a Super Bowl. Carlos spent a year in Pittsburgh at Carnegie Mellon (a brief flirtation with chemistry; it didn't work out), but had to cheer for the Cards (one year does not fandom make. The five points I got didn't hurt either). But kudos to both teams.

The talk went well, but with a majority of developing countries, there is frequently the talk over "who runs/controls the internet" and how to shut it down. One attendee asked if Bill Gates ran the internet (he wishes).

The journo followed, and if there's one thing that Carlos has noted in his time in PME, it's that no matter what national disagreements one has, one thing military folks from around the world agree on is that they all hate the media. This audience was no different, with everything from "you lie" to "bias" -- you all know the drill.

Which brings me to the quote in the subject line. That's from AMB Jeanne Kirkpatrick in the late 1980's. She was on a debate on Firing Line (her and Buckley on one side, Paul Nitze and I-don't-remember on the other). The subject was US foreign policy and it was a whole "realism vs. idealism" debate for you polisci types. Near the end of the talk, Nitze began with a series of facts, and AMB Kirkpatrick cut in with that line. I've never forgotten that quote, obviously.

So when are facts not facts? When they're not, apparently. Carlos said that these international audiences bond on their belief that the media lies/is biased. Then they disagree on what the bias or lie is (those facts are not facts). The case in point was the discussion over Pakistan (two Pakistan officers in the crowd). On the question over "what to do about Pakistan", the journo opined that some sort of Islamabad control needed to be extended to the FATA. She's interrupted by one of the officers with the spiel of "you have to understand, these are old cultures, yada, yada." She responded with "Well, is it Pakistan or not?" "Yes, it is, but we don't control it." (Well, that would be the definition of NOT a state or part of one (lack of monopoly of legitimate violence over a given territory).

So, okay, moving on...the audience is still on the "media bias" kick, and the US Army CPT in the class pops up with the "you know, the biggest problem with what went on in Iraq was the media lying about the lack of connection between Iraq and 9/11."

Yeah...um, WTF?? We still have folks going after that chestnut?

Carlos stresses to his students that despite the fact that we talk about Strategic Communications and how to do it well, the most vital point of the equation is the one we do not control--how the message is received. And if the audience thinks the speaker is not credible, then how it is said (even in the language of the listener) is not going to help. (Though it is the philosophical conundrum. You know, the one where the speaker says "Everything I say is a Lie." Is that a lie?)

Finally, Carlos had what he has to call a "Gian Gentile" moment (and he hopes the good Colonel will take that as a compliment): In the middle of his lecture, Carlos called FM 3-24 the "Counterinsurgency Novel." :)

Okay, Carlos is going back to slacking off. He's gone until the end of February. He's going to Hawaii and has no plans to find connectivity. Aloha 'til March, all.

Thanks to Ken for pointing out this Reuters story on who the world thinks was behind the 9/11 attacks.

Londonstani thinks the whole idea of 9/11 conspiracy theories is idiotic since AQ has admitted its responsibility. Even if we assume Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's confession to US interrogators was a result of torture, we still have his comments to Al Jazeera. Along with endless Zawahiri comments alluding to knowing the attackers. There's also testimony from former jihadis who left the AQ world because they did not believe killing civilians was sanctioned by Islam.

But the real surprise here is the numbers. According to the WorldPublicOpinion.org statistics, 44 percent of Brits and Italians DIDNT think it was AQ.

The story says; "Respondents in the Middle East were especially likely to name a perpetrator other than al Qaeda, the poll found," but Londonstani was surprised that "only" 43 percent of those polled in Egypt thought it was Isreal.

Londonstani was in Cairo on 9/11 and went around interviewing many, many people for his story on the public response. Only one guy said Israel probably had nothing to do with it.

And only 19 percent in the Palestinian Territories blamed Israel??

How many in these places actually blamed AQ? Through some extrapolating, 46 percent of people in the Palestinian Territories blamed Israel and the US government. Does that mean 50-something percent of Palestinians and Brits blame AQ?

Probably not.. if you think that is a little too much amateur statistical analysis, look at the last line.

Many more Nigerians than British citizens blame AQ for 9/11.