Center for a New American Security

And speaking of the Daily Show, we here at Abu Muqawama thought they only interviewed over-exposed lieutenant colonels. But no! LTG William Caldwell was on the show last night talking about the new boring-as-hell-but-really-important field manual, FM 3-0, Operations. (LTG Caldwell explains FM 3-0 to the more specialized audience in Military Review.) Name us one other network or show that has given the U.S. Army more time and space to explain its new doctrine than the Daily Show, which occupies a slot on a network called Comedy Central. This is why young Americans would rather get their news from Jon Stewart than CNN or Fox. And kudos to LTG Caldwell as well. He comes off a little awkward in the interview, but credit him for not being afraid to go on the show and actually engage with the media. This is the same guy who forces U.S. Army majors to write blog entries as practice for engaging with the new media. Hard to imagine the same Army that produced Caldwell produced Tommy Franks.

As our regular readers know, Charlie likes to spend her spare time looking for a pike on which to place the Marine Commandant's head. But it's time to share the love a bit.

On the one hand, we have LTG Bill Caldwell doing a full court press on the Army's new FM 3-0, Operations.

The Army yesterday rolled out the first revision of its operations manual since the Sept. 11 terror attacks, putting stability operations - nation-building - on par with combat. Army officials said the revision reflects a focus on fighting terrorism.

"The field manual is our Army's blueprint for an uncertain future," said Lieutenant General William Caldwell IV, commander of Fort Leavenworth, where the document was produced. "It does provide the blueprint for how we, as an Army, will operate over the next 10 to 15 years." The new manual reflects Army experiences over the past six years of fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and insurgents in Iraq, as well as with relief efforts after hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

[...]

Caldwell said he and Wallace also have been discussing the operations manual with Army "graybeards." They recognize that the United States has few military peers that would challenge it in conventional combat, the signature threat of the Cold War era. "The environment has changed, and we need to alter our view as to how we organize, train, and prepare ourselves to operate in the 21st century," Caldwell said.

On the other: GEN Casey. Now presumably the Chief of Staff of the Army has met LTG Caldwell. But you wouldn't be able to tell from Yochi Dreazen's searing account of the current advisor training mission:

"I'm just not convinced that anytime in the near future we're going to decide to build someone else's army from the ground up," said the Army's chief of staff, Gen. George Casey. "And to me, the 'advisory corps' is our Army Special Forces -- that's what they do."

Actually, sir, that used to be what they do. Now they're treated as just another direct action unit (albeit one with fancy language skills). And besides, last Charlie checked, there weren't that many of them...in fact, there are so few that the Marines are standing up new Security Cooperation MAGTFs to backfill the SF traditional advising mission. So maybe some folks in the Chief's office could page through FM 3-0 over the weekend, look into that "uncertain future" and changed environment hullaballoo, and see about helping out the advisors and training teams?

Also, for the record, Charlie isn't convinced that we're going to roll tanks across the Korean DMZ or the North European Plain "in the near future," but she isn't, like, totally opposed to an armor division or two. You know?

Come on George, get on board for the big win.

A Michael Gordon article in the NY Times today discusses the Army's new FM 3-0 Operations.

Supposedly the manual gives equal weight to maneuver operations and stability operations.

However:

Even as they welcomed it, other Army officers said there were inconsistencies between the newly minted doctrine on how to wage war and current practice. Army brigades in Iraq have too few combat engineers to support civil programs, they said. Also, they added, the Army does not promote officers who advise the Iraqi and Afghan security forces as readily as battalion staff officers and needs to improve their training.

This is a severe understatement. The Army as a whole remains woefully unprepared psychologically and structurally for COIN. Structurally we remain unprepared for intelligence and reconstruction efforts in particular. Our information operations, psychological operations, and civil affairs continue to be under-utilized and staffed with the wrong people. Moreover, I have yet to work with a competent PAO (public affairs officer) in either Afghanistan or Iraq, ensuring that the fight at home remains at least as difficult as the fight abroad--I apologize if you are a competent PAO reading this...I look forward to meeting you one day. Bottom line, in the field of dominating perception, we remain woefully behind our enemies.

Psychologically, commanders, particularly from the rank of colonel on up, still don't understand that a comprehensive approach to defeating insurgency and unrest is not a fad that will pass with time. In Afghanistan in particular, the focus remains force protection rather than population protection (sometimes commanders look to killing the enemy too, but it depends where and on how their national command is feeling that day). In terms of information operations, nothing can be released at the battalion level or below in Afghanistan without explicit authorization from higher.

And, let's follow the money...how much money are we spending on patrolling skills, language training, IO training, psychological operations, and human intelligence skills development, and how much money are we spending on new capabilities re-branded as "COIN necessary?"

And while LT General Caldwell (who I deeply respect, by the way) does see the new focus on stability and COIN operations as the “blueprint to operate over the next 10 to 15 years” then maybe he could begin by getting stabilization and COIN weighted equally and explicitly in the ILE curriculum for our field grade officers.