Center for a New American Security

"On NBC and in other public forums, General McCaffrey has consistently advocated wartime policies and spending priorities that are in line with his corporate interests. But those interests are not described to NBC’s viewers. He is held out as a dispassionate expert, not someone who helps companies win contracts related to the wars he discusses on television."

Great reporting or unfair smear? Read the rest here and debate in the comments.

LTC Bob "The" Bateman has a new piece in Armed Forces Journal based on one simple observation:

In one area, however, the current conflict is anomalous. We have retained nearly all our generals (and admirals) throughout the fight. Only a single brigadier general has been relieved for the performance of duty in a combat zone. Historically speaking, that is a curious fact.

The Bateman is a walking encyclopedia of military history (and former USMA History professor), so Charlie is inclined to listen.

Let us be clear here: Not a single general, not a brigadier, a major general, a lieutenant general or a full general, nor any naval officers of the same grades, has suffered any serious adverse consequences for failure upon the field of battle since World War II. At worst, as was the case with Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, some might merely have not been promoted. Others, such as Gen. William Westmoreland, were promoted to chief of staff of the Army after failing to win year after year in Vietnam. So what is the difference and how have things changed over time since the end of World War II?

[...]

Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has engaged in three sustained conflicts. Korea lasted 36 months of active combat; Vietnam, if measured only from the summer of 1965, was 96 months long; and we have been fighting the war on terrorism since October 2001, 78 months as I write this — a total of 210 months, nearly twice as long as the three earlier wars [US Civil War, WWI, WWII]. In all three of those first three wars, we sacked dozens upon dozens of generals, probably more than 100. We also won all three of those fights. Since then, we have removed from combat only eight of the hundreds upon hundreds, perhaps as many as a thousand, of generals involved. We fought the Korean War to a draw, we lost the Vietnam War, and we are in a toss-up right now. There is obviously correlation, but is there causation in effect, as well? In other words, is one the result of the other? Even in part? Or are there too many other variables in play for the correlation to be relevant?

Bateman reviews the historical circumstances of the US Civil War, WWI, and WWII to suggest that the political costs associated with firing generals goes along way toward explaining how many may come to face the music and be fired. And while FDR (and George C. Marshall) famously relieved vast swaths of general officers, subsequent presidents would instead take their cue from Harry Truman and the searing price he paid for firing Douglas MacArthur.

Since that time, two truisms seem to have been in place with regard to the political calculations that go into presidential decisions regarding the relief of generals.

The first seems to be that a succession of presidents believed they did not have sufficient personal expertise to override their military subordinates and demand the relief of a nonperforming or underperforming commander in combat....At best, the presidents who fall under this heading may shuffle an officer aside, although they also might promote them up and out of the way, as happened with Westmoreland and others. Call this the “professionalization effect.”

The second apparent truth is that at least some presidents believed that the political costs the electorate (and the opposition party) would impose on them or their party for the relief of a combatant general would be excessive....In this situation, the president is more likely to endorse a course of action that promotes the offending general out of the combat theater, as happened repeatedly under Johnson.

Charlie has before that one of the biggest legacies from these current wars is this a profound fissure in civil-military relations. The Bateman likely agrees. Finding a way to review, reward, and punish the combat performance of general officers is critical to "battlefield" success. Though that might require civilians who are more interested in winning wars than winning elections.

Aviation Week & Space Technology (sorry, Kip can't link to this one) reported today that Ike Skelton is seeking to get the US a three-star command in Afghanistan.

The chairman of the House Armed Services Committee wants Defense Secretary Robert Gates to expand the scope of the U.S. military headquarters in Afghanistan. Rep. Ike Skelton (D-Mo.) is urging Gates to bump up the headquarters’ status to a three-star command—headed by a lieutenant general or vice admiral. Based in Kabul, the upgraded command would improve coordination between U.S. forces and NATO’s International Security Assistance Force on military, political and economic assistance, Skelton says. “The situation in Afghanistan,” he writes in a letter to Gates “is not purely or even primarily a military problem.” Currently, the U.S. headquarters, a 90-min. drive outside Kabul, rates a two-star commander and is focused only on one region of the country—Regional Command East—according to Skelton.

This is a terrible idea. CSTC-A, the command already in Kabul has a two-star general (and 10 percent of its officers are in the rank of colonel or general) as does the US command at Bagram. The campaign doesn't need more chiefs, it needs more Indians. A three-star would just add to the already glaring problems of unity of effort while not assisting with providing more boots on the ground.