Topic “IEDs”
Terror Dogs of War?!
September 10, 2008 | Posted by Londonstani - 6:26am | 4 Comments
Londonstani wonders what readers make of this NYT article about al-Qaeda's possibly changing attitude towards suicide attacks. The wackiest part of this example of AQ bluesky thinking is the comment about unleashing the dogs of war, literally.
"Abu Abdullah al-Qurashi suggested training dogs to recognize American troops’ uniforms, then releasing other dogs carrying improvised explosive devices toward American soldiers so the bombs can be detonated from a safe distance. The author begins with the following words: “I.E.D. operations, but this time, with dogs. Yes, dogs! Brothers, some may find my words fantastic. But, believe me, we should better let a dog die, than let a Lion of Islam die!”
It all sounds like the British WWII "suggestions box" Londonstani learnt about many years ago at school. The idea was to encourage the general public to pass the ideas that flashed into their minds during the long hours in bomb shelters to the war office. One idea involved stringing a net over London to catch German bombs. Another, would have the Royal Navy make submarines out of ice to avoid detection by radar. One even, if memory serves, was to strap mines to dolphins and use them to sink ships.
Obviously, in this day and age, animal rights organisations are going to be barking mad at the idea of exploding dogs. But Londonstani thinks they have little to worry about since it's probably no more than a few spotty jihad geeks gnawing over an old bone. (couldn't resist)
Suicide attacks are elemental to the AQ brand. They form a key part of their operational effectiveness and the follow-up PR effort. And as anyone who's worked in Iraq or Afghanistan might tell you, suicidal recruits are in abundance.
Londonstani isn't sure it's a good idea investing too much attention into a lot of the stuff on the jihadi forums. You have no idea how much of it is written by armchair jihadis in Croydon and how much reflects the thinking of key decision makers. Although, when key decision makers comment, it is often clearly flagged up and pre-announced - which wasn't the case with the comments this article is based on.
And, it's definitely worth keeping in mind that monitoring and translating jihadi sites is a growth industry. Many of these firms try to leak the odd non-story to friendly faces in the media to justify their generous contracts.
However, it would be interesting to see what others make of it.
"Abu Abdullah al-Qurashi suggested training dogs to recognize American troops’ uniforms, then releasing other dogs carrying improvised explosive devices toward American soldiers so the bombs can be detonated from a safe distance. The author begins with the following words: “I.E.D. operations, but this time, with dogs. Yes, dogs! Brothers, some may find my words fantastic. But, believe me, we should better let a dog die, than let a Lion of Islam die!”
It all sounds like the British WWII "suggestions box" Londonstani learnt about many years ago at school. The idea was to encourage the general public to pass the ideas that flashed into their minds during the long hours in bomb shelters to the war office. One idea involved stringing a net over London to catch German bombs. Another, would have the Royal Navy make submarines out of ice to avoid detection by radar. One even, if memory serves, was to strap mines to dolphins and use them to sink ships.
Obviously, in this day and age, animal rights organisations are going to be barking mad at the idea of exploding dogs. But Londonstani thinks they have little to worry about since it's probably no more than a few spotty jihad geeks gnawing over an old bone. (couldn't resist)
Suicide attacks are elemental to the AQ brand. They form a key part of their operational effectiveness and the follow-up PR effort. And as anyone who's worked in Iraq or Afghanistan might tell you, suicidal recruits are in abundance.
Londonstani isn't sure it's a good idea investing too much attention into a lot of the stuff on the jihadi forums. You have no idea how much of it is written by armchair jihadis in Croydon and how much reflects the thinking of key decision makers. Although, when key decision makers comment, it is often clearly flagged up and pre-announced - which wasn't the case with the comments this article is based on.
And, it's definitely worth keeping in mind that monitoring and translating jihadi sites is a growth industry. Many of these firms try to leak the odd non-story to friendly faces in the media to justify their generous contracts.
However, it would be interesting to see what others make of it.
JIEDDO Chaos
August 8, 2008 | Posted by Kip - 6:00pm | 23 Comments
It has become common knowledge that the most deadly enemy in both Afghanistan and Iraq is the "Improvised Explosive Device," IED, which we once used to simply call a "mine" or "homemade bomb," but apparently needed a three letter, three syllable acronym to describe instead.
The US government has spent great money and great effort in defeating the IED, including funding the massive Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) in order to prevent IEDs from killing soldiers.
JIEDDO has developed a great amount of tactical expertise on IEDs. The problem is, however, that the enemy has at the tactical level provided adept at adapting far faster than JIEDDO can provide new Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures to the force. Soldiers in the field have in-turn proven quicker at adapting to the enemy than a large bureaucracy in the US, despite herculean efforts on the part of many inside.
An August 7 report in Aerospace Daily & Defense Report details continued strife between the organization and Congress after several highly critical GAO reports and the provision of $10 billion. Soldiers are, after all, still being killed by IEDs.
Kip thinks the real problem is conceptual. Certain tactical measures can defeat an IED, but insurgents will adapt. To get inside the insurgents' decision cycles and prevent soldiers from being killed by an IED, one has to attack the network of support among the human population that sets the IED. Destroy the insurgents, develop intelligence from the populace on where he's placed bombs, shrivel the funding, kill his bomb makers, then he never gets the IED. This requires protecting the populace, convincing information and psychological operations, and organization for intelligence. It doesn't require an organization like JIEDDO (although many of JIEDDO's capabilities should be re-organized into other parts of the DOD).
The US government has spent great money and great effort in defeating the IED, including funding the massive Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) in order to prevent IEDs from killing soldiers.
JIEDDO has developed a great amount of tactical expertise on IEDs. The problem is, however, that the enemy has at the tactical level provided adept at adapting far faster than JIEDDO can provide new Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures to the force. Soldiers in the field have in-turn proven quicker at adapting to the enemy than a large bureaucracy in the US, despite herculean efforts on the part of many inside.
An August 7 report in Aerospace Daily & Defense Report details continued strife between the organization and Congress after several highly critical GAO reports and the provision of $10 billion. Soldiers are, after all, still being killed by IEDs.
Kip thinks the real problem is conceptual. Certain tactical measures can defeat an IED, but insurgents will adapt. To get inside the insurgents' decision cycles and prevent soldiers from being killed by an IED, one has to attack the network of support among the human population that sets the IED. Destroy the insurgents, develop intelligence from the populace on where he's placed bombs, shrivel the funding, kill his bomb makers, then he never gets the IED. This requires protecting the populace, convincing information and psychological operations, and organization for intelligence. It doesn't require an organization like JIEDDO (although many of JIEDDO's capabilities should be re-organized into other parts of the DOD).
