Center for a New American Security

LTG (Ret.) David Barno, Matt Irvine and I have published a new report (.pdf) with the Center for a New American Security that attempts to identify the components of a successful U.S. strategy for Central and South Asia. Our research began in the fall of 2010 and included research trips to both Afghanistan and Pakistan. We also assembled several working groups comprised of both area specialists as well as functional area specialists to help us identify planning assumptions, U.S. interests, and policy options. In the end, we recommend the United States:

• Negotiate a Strategic Partnership Agreement with the government of Afghanistan.
• Develop a long-term but differentiated approach to Pakistan that strengthens its economy, civilian government and anti-extremist elements while pressuring factions that support terrorists.
• Reshape foreign and security assistance to Pakistan.
• Broker confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan quietly and as opportunities arise.
• Sustain and deepen a multidimensional U.S.-India relationship and encourage the peaceful rise of China.
• Promote open trade and transit across South and Central Asia to catalyze economic growth and enhance stability.
• Develop a strategic public engagement plan for the region to mitigate the effects of the intense anti-Americanism that preclude greater cooperation with the United States.

Read the whole report here (.pdf).

UPDATE: Joshuas Kucera and Foust have written thoughtful critiques of the report worth your time. I want to thank both for taking the time to read the report and offer their own analysis. Both analysts lament, in their own ways, how little priority we give to Central Asia in this report. Let me briefly respond by assuring our readers this was a deliberate decision made after much thought and discussion about limited U.S. resources available as well as other, competing priorities. Within Central and South Asia, the U.S. relationship with India dominates our long-term interests, and the U.S. relationship with Afghanistan dominates our near-term interests. Pakistan, meanwhile, the central focus of our report, has the potential to decisively affect both. (This much, I think, is somewhat obvious, yes?) So again, given limited resources and competing priorities, we made a deliberate decision to de-emphasize the importance of Central Asia for U.S. policy makers. Every region of the globe is important, of course, and the United States has at least some interests everywhere. But in deciding where the United States should allot its limited resources and focus the energies of its policy-makers, departments and agencies, we make the case the United States should spend the most time thinking through the problems of Pakistan. Again, I think our logic makes sense even if you disagree. Just starting from an assumptions-and-interests analysis, we did not conclude Central Asia to be as important to the United States and its interests going forward as the three states -- Afghanistan, India, Pakistan -- to which we devote the most time in our report.

A couple of people have made the point that I skipped over India in my overview of Pakistan-US relations. It's a fair point. India is a post by itself (hence the new post). India does of course come into the equation in any discussions about Pakistan and the US, and that's likely to increase in the future. I don't mean to downplay the India angle, but from the point of view of US-Pak relations, it still boils down to the issue of Pakistan's political and economic independence, which itself comes down to building a stable political system internally.

But yes, there's more to Pakistan's relationship with India than just that... India is special because it is intrinsically linked to Pakistan's self image.

A Pakistani diplomat I met in Jordan once asked me, "You've worked in the Middle East. Tell me, how is it that the Arabs are so much better at building a long-term relationship with the US than us."

The question troubled me on a number of levels. I know the diplomat is thinking about the aid Egypt has received since 1982, and continual political and diplomatic support that has allowed the Egyptian state to become a disfigured behemoth. Jordan is propped up by military aid and free trade agreements while Saudi Arabia (and other Gulf states) find excuses to push their cash towards America so they get the big-power umbrella they need to survive. The main threat to these countries is that the ruling family will be deposed by their own people. I'd never worked in Pakistan at that point, and I found it worrying that from what I knew about the place. The fact that Pakistan isn't a centralised one-party/family state is a strength. Did the Pakistani establishment really think becoming Egypt or Jordan was the best direction for their country?

Whereas Arab countries are fearful for their ruling families (probably rightly so), Pakistan's fear is India. And whereas America's relationship - individually - with each of those states is more important to the smaller country than to America, as a whole it represents the foreign policy strategy that America uses to maintain its economy and position in the world.

For the Arab states mentioned above (apart from Egypt) their present form is largely based around a ruling family. So their narrow ruling classes are right in seeing a threat to the rulers as a threat to the country as a whole. Pakistan is based on an idea rather than a ruling family. That idea is a vague political conceptualisation of Islam. The threat to that idea is personified by India. An India that includes a peaceful Muslim-majority Kashmir knocks the most basic sense of the idea behind Pakistan; that Muslims would risk being wiped out physically and culturally while also removed from the history books if they were subsumed by the Hindu masses. An India at war with itself (in Kashmir and other non-Muslim provinces) proves the idea that Pakistan's founders were right to push for self determination and escape the "clutches of the conceited Hindu rulers of India" (as they would have put it).

This doesn't mean India is totally blameless. Historical evidence suggests that Pakistan's founders didn't expect to have the kind of relationship with India the country has today. It's speculated that Pakistan's founding father, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, left some of his family and property in India at the time of partition because he thought he'd be able to travel between the two new Commonwealth states that both retained the Queen as their head of state and senior British Army officers heading their armed forces. In the early days Pakistan and India briefly talked about common defence agreements even while Kashmir lay unresolved.

In reality, Pakistan's founders, Jinnah in particular, probably saw Pakistan as a largely secular Muslim state with cultural and economic ties to both the UK and India. The point of Pakistan, in his mind, was not that every South Asian Muslim should live under Muslim rule, but that Muslims of the subcontinent would again be able to chart their political and economic destiny on their own terms as they did before the Indian Mutiny (First War of Independence) of 1857. India, he thought, would behave better to its Muslim minority when its regional power was checked by a Muslim neighbour. Also, it's worth remembering that Pakistan's squaring up to India hasn't always seemed like total folly. For many years, Pakistan had higher (but more volatile) economic growth rates and its industrial base and infrastructure was superior. Although Pakistan had the smaller army, it modelled itself on the numerically inferior Western forces designed to face a larger Warsaw Pact opponent. An approach the Israelis have used successfully against their Arab foes. India has surged ahead in the past 15 years, while Pakistan has really struggled in the last five.

The only future for Pakistan is a truly independent one. Relying on China as its patron is not wise. If India and China make common cause, Pakistan will again be out in the cold. China also has a Muslim minority that it doesn't always treat well. The potential for linkages to develop between Pakistan-backed elements working with or influencing Chinese Muslim discontent is high.

The only real future for Pakistan (or any country) is a truly independent one so that it has the confidence to engage the wider world on the basis of mutual interest. Pakistan will need peace with India if it is to stand on its own feet. But peace with India means building some sort of national consensus around Pakistan's identity, which is going to be a seriously tough prospect. There are infinite parallel universes of competing interests and visions. The easier option (which India indirectly encouraged) has been to build an identity around the idea of anti-Indianess and finding a big power patron to support Pakistan enough to avoid having to do any real meaningful country building. The only sort of government that will be able to start that process will be one with popular legitimacy. ie a democratic government that is seen as competent and sincere. That in itself is a huge challenge.

But perhaps this is where US policy can come in useful. By pushing the two countries together and pressuring them to make a real and lasting peace with a solution to Kashmir could kickstart Pakistan's inner conversation about itself. Right now, the only people with a compelling line of argument are extremists.

Maoist insurgency remains alive and well in India.  Clearly the solution is to send surplus copies of FM 3-24 to New Delhi.  Who wants to organize the book drive?

The Indian military is experimenting with chili grenades for "riot control and counter-insurgency situations."  And to scare away elephants.

Charlie has, like, a million tabs open in her fancy Google Chrome browser.  Here's a snapshot of what she's reading.

Carlos will start this post with a whinge-that's-really-not-one. He was all set to enjoy the Thanksgiving tradition of American college football (and being an Oklahoma alum, the weekend's games all had great implications for him). But sometime Friday night, while checking on sports scores, he saw "Mumbai shootings" and right then and there knew that this would not be a football weekend.

So no, Carlos did not see the games. He's been reading the websites. He just saw the Oklahoma/Oklahoma State highlights about an hour ago for the first time. And yes, he's resentful.

But no, this isn't really a "poor Carlos, he missed a game because of a horrific tragedy." It's the chronic problem, he'll assert, of anyone who has an interest, be it academic, policy/politic, or whatever, in issues of political violence. The problem is twofold: the first is obvious, life doesn't stop. The bad guys keep moving. The second one is harder to see at times, and for Carlos the most frustrating of issues. It's the tendency of "others" (we'll call them the laity for lack of a better term) to assume that one enjoys when tragedy strikes, that "staying in business" is what this is all about.

ASIDE: Two days after 9/11, Carlos went back to work. A "well-meaning" colleague came upon Carlos and patted him on the shoulder. "Guess you'll be working now for the next twenty years, pal." (Carlos is generally thankful there were no witnesses to what followed, and that no charges were pressed).

Okay, out of third person here. I would gladly get out of the business and go teach "Realism vs. Idealism" and "How a Bill Becomes a Law" to uninterested undergraduates who have no idea how this matters to them. I'd love to be able to do that because the other issues have gone away, but they haven't, and won't, not for a while, if ever. So if I've still got some things to teach to people that have to stand the watch for the rest of us, then I'll be here. I want to be watching the game because I'm out of business, but I want to be out of business because we all got it right.

When Charlie first asked me to post, one of the first things she said was, "watch the comments. Try not to get caught up." Still, to see AM get accused of making light of the deaths at Mumbai, to have the blog accused of "sympathy" for terrorists (quick note: Understanding is NOT sympathy. Getting inside the head of the adversary isn't always Stockholm), yeah, I read too many comments this weekend.

And I've gone on long and only barely mentioned Mumbai, so here are some other notes (putting the nom de guerre back on):

Carlos has liked the BBC's coverage found here. And especially their timeline of events. He respectfully disagrees with the Namesake that Tennessee would have done much better on these 10 (the BBC report suggests 15 individuals now). Carlos would argue that would more likely have upped the casualty count. The attackers were generally systematic in their carnage. They could have killed a lot more, much faster. This suggests that they were either (1) actually planning some type of escape (as one report suggests evidence of); or (2) the plan was carried out as intended--a days+ long campaign rather than a spree killing.

For obvious reasons to readers here, India's priorities with CT have always been with the military, but their police functions have been much weaker. The police are of course, the real front line for events like this. For Americans, think Columbine. Think Viriginia Tech. For Australians, think Port Arthur. Militaries don't respond to these events. Even with a "lot" of people with (legal) concealed weapons, once you get to either a school or a luxury hotel like the Taj, first thing sensible management would probably do is have you check weapons at the door (or metal detectors, though Carlos doubts that's the image a hotel wants to have). And it is clear the attackers knew the hotel, most especially the back passageways and service areas (Carlos used to work in the hotel industry, the things patrons don't see....). It will be interesting to see how that information got passed, whether one of the attackers used to work in the hotels, or whether the information was passed from an employee. The open secret of India's economy is of course the large number of Pakistanis, Nepalis, and Bangladeshis who come in for employment. (Border security beyond J&K for India is not the highest of priorities, and the potential threat of some illegal migrants is generally seen as offset by the economic benefit that the majority of these workers provide. *Insert obligatory US-Mexico parallel here*).

India is now discussing a national security body for these kinds of events, but it's really about (all together now) Interagency Cooperation.

The attackers came in from the sea after taking over a fishing trawler that had left a little under two weeks earlier. Indian Coast Guard is unlikely to have been able to stop/search every ship coming in, especially since the attackers came in to the beach on small boats.

What security forces/police might have interdicted may have been the weapons stockpiles (though Carlos expects ironically that the American Second-Amendment-ers might have protested a preemptive takedown based solely on the gun stockpile). (NOTE: Carlos does not know offhand the gun control laws in India).

UPDATE: It seems gun control is quite tight in India as written, so a preemptive takedown of the stockpiles, had they been found, could have happened. The report on how the weapons got in and from where, etc, will be interesting to see, but again, border security in India is incredibly difficult (understatement off).

The knee-jerk Indian reaction is to blame Pakistan, of course (and hell, those reactions happen because they've generally worked well in the past). Carlos doubts "official" connections between the attackers and Pakistan/ISI, though "rogue" elements are certainly possible. If the reports that the attackers were members of Lashkar-e-Toiba pan out, then there are very likely personal ties between LeT members and individuals with government connections. Very interestingly, a report discusses the possibility that westerners were targeted specifically. Confirmation of that allegation will definitely change the profile. The attack may have been in India, but the attackers may have been going for a larger goal than simply the Subcontinent.

Look, if just 10 dudes rolled into my hometown and started shooting people, they would have been killed within the hour. I'm not kidding. (People still try to take their guns aboard planes in my hometown.) India's police has been caught out by these 10 gunmen as badly as U.S. intelligence services (and airport security) were caught out by the 9/11 hi-jackers. In both cases, there was no reason so many people were killed by so few. Unlike 9/11, though, heads are rolling in India. In case anyone is wondering, I have been regularly checking the Guardian and the Hindu (which gives Jethro Tull their proper respect). The Washington Post has this good story, and the Wall Street Journal has been good as well, often covering the story from the Mumbai-as-financial-capital angle.

(By the way, one commenter accused me of being a terrorist sympathizer for daring to criticize India's CT teams. Another, however, accused me of being a neoconservative. So I must be doing something right, eh? Anyway, as Jay-Hova teaches us...)

Update: A reader sent in this thoughtful piece from the BBC.

...then Mumbai could represent something rather different in the history of terrorism, and possibly something far more disturbing even than global jihad.

Perhaps we have come to the point where casually self-radicalised, sociopathic individuals can form a loose organisation, acquire sufficient weapons and equipment for a few thousand dollars, make a basic plan of action and indulge in a violent expression of their generalised disaffection and anomie.

These individuals indulge in terrorism simply because they can, while their audience concocts a rationale on their behalf.

Welcome to the age of celebrity terrorism.

With this kind of skilled weapons handling, I have no idea why it's taken so long to kill the last terrorists in Mumbai. My buddy swears to me that India's CT/SOF is good, but...

Ajai Sahni:

I think India is extremely vulnerable. And the fundamental reason for that is that this is a state that has neglected security for decades. Investment in policing was considered a nondevelopmental—and consequently wasteful—expenditure. We are one of the most under-policed societies in the world. We have a ratio of 126 police per 100,000, whereas the Western ratio is 250-500 plus per 100,000.

Also, our police are under-equipped and under-resourced across the board. There is no really hard counterterrorism core to policing in India, despite our decades of experience as a target of terrorism. Consequently there is absolutely no doubt that India is vulnerable to terrorism and will remain so in the coming years.

I think this government as well as its predecessor has been equally inept and equally neglectful on the issue of terrorism …The principle task of law enforcement and law-and-order management and counterterrorism is the state's under the Indian constitution. It is the responsibility of the state governments that are run by various parties in the country. All major parties have some states under their control. With very rare exceptions, the quality of counterterrorism has been abysmal.

Picking up on Charlie’s post from yesterday, Troy would like to add a few quick thoughts about India and Pakistan in Afghanistan.

One can make an argument that an attack on the Indian presence in Afghanistan is a means for the Taliban to weaken the central government. Delhi supported Masoud the Northern Alliance during his years of confrontation with the Pakistan-backed Taliban. When the Northerners (Tajik, Uzbek and Hazarah) came to dominate the new government in the wake of OEF, India was a natural partner for the new Afghan government, becoming very involved in aid and reconstruction work as well as efforts to strengthen the capacity of the Afghan Government. In particular, the development of transportation infrastructure, which India is heavily involved in, could go a long way to assisting the economic situation in Afghanistan. On this level, India could certainly be viewed as a strategic target. They are necessarily hostile to the Taliban since they are the friend of their enemy (Karzi government). However, for their part, the people at the Taliban HQ in Quetta have denied involvement in the attack. The big question is, would the Taliban target India of its own accord?

Afghan officials (and others) have previously made the allegation that the Pakistan military retains close links with the Taliban militants, and they have accused the ISI of backing the assassination attempt on Karzi that took place in April. According to the AP, the Afghan Interior Ministry is claiming that yesterday’s attack was carried out “in coordination and consultation with an active intelligence service in the region.” In this regard, it is worth pointing out, that Pakistan has constantly criticized the sizeable Indian presence in Afghanistan, even raising the issue with the US/NATO. At the domestic level, several of the religious parties in Pakistan have also been very critical of the Karzai Government for its close relations with India.

Pakistan, particularly the Army, has traditionally viewed Afghanistan as part of their “strategic depth” vis-à-vis India, and they certainly would not want to see Delhi’s influence in Kabul grow. One could certainly argue that the ISI has a motive to target Indian interests in Afghanistan through its surrogates.

Without making apologies for the Pakistan military, it is worth noting that their continuing sense of insecurity is something that needs to be recognized and taken into account. For example, continued support for/links to the Taliban does have a strategic logic, which is predicated on the following beliefs:

1) The US and NATO are not going to stay in Afghanistan for the long-term
2) The Karzi government and/or its successors will not last
3) Pakistan will need to have a proxy ready to reimpose some degree of stability when Afghanistan returns to chaos.

Similarly, Pakistani visions of Indian dominance in Afghanistan, though overblown in Troy’s opinion, are nevertheless real to them.

Charlie was reading through this morning's coverage of the massive suicide bombing at the Indian Embassy in Kabul, when she came across this in the NYT:

The fact that the Indian Embassy was attacked raised suspicions among Afghan officials that Pakistani operatives allied with the Taliban had used the bombing to pursue Pakistan’s decades-long power struggle with India.

India said it would send a delegation to Pakistan to investigate what the Indian Foreign Ministry called “this cowardly terrorist attack.”

Our usual Afghan watchers (the estimable Kip and Troy) are out of pocket today, so Charlie thought she would throw this one open to our loyal readership.

How should we think of this attack? Is it one event of a campaign to oust NATO from Afghanistan and undermine the Karzai government? Or is it part of a larger, regional context that includes Indo-Pakistani rivarly (and rogue intelligence agencies)? More broadly, how do tensions on the subcontinent affect the long-term prospects for stability in Afghanistan?