Center for a New American Security

Today's Washington Post had an interesting op-ed from the former ambassador from Kyrgyzstan. Not normally the most reliable source, I know, but he has now left Kyrgyzstan and teaches in Utah -- at Utah Valley University (naturally) -- and this op-ed doesn't read like something written by a regime's mouthpiece. He frankly admits, for example, that the Russians were none too pleased about the massive U.S. airbase in their backyard. But that wasn't what irked the ambassador:

Every relationship has its peaks and valleys. But one thing has consistently troubled me about the relationship between the United States and my country. Once the base was set up, I saw a fairly radical change in American attitudes. Before, Washington had consistently juggled a series of priorities -- broadly speaking, they were security concerns, economic concerns, and advocacy of human rights and democracy. But once the base was established, it became clear that while other concerns might be voiced from time to time, only one thing really mattered: the air base. In the end, this shift served neither country's interests.

Does this strike anyone as implausible? I mean, doesn't this sound like all-too-typical great power behavior?

According to its auditor general, Canada is facing serious logistics shortages that will come to undermine its efforts in Afghanistan if not dealt with soon. (here, here, here)

"So far the military has been able to adapt and adjust so that operations have not been significantly affected," Fraser [the auditor general] reported Tuesday. "But unless the problems we found can be resolved, National Defence could have increasing difficulty supporting the mission."

The military has compensated by tripling support staff between May 2006 and July 2007 to more than 900 personnel. That also included a renewed reliance on civilian contractors, which also tripled between November 2006 and July 2007 to 266 from 95.

Logistical challenges are not limited to the Canadians in Afghanistan. Insufficient airlift, the limited military logistical personnel in country, and the poor roads contribute for all participating nations. The Afghan National Security Forces are logistically hindered by the same problems as the rest and also by a lack of capacity and corruption.

Logistics are often transported around the country on Afghan "jingle" trucks and, as in any guerrilla campaign, are often attacked en route to their final destination. More than other countries, the routes on which logistical convoys can travel are very limited, thus making them easier, more predictable targets than they would be in most parts of the world.

Even were they unhindered entirely, the long, difficult roads from Pakistani ports to Afghanistan would challenge any enthusiast and only get worse after entering Afghanistan (although the road from Spin Boldak to Kandahar is a relatively good one for supplies going directly to Canada's National Command in Kandahar).

Where logistics would be difficult anyway, they are further complicated by the command structure in Afghanistan which has each major national player responsible for its own logistics and separate logistics chains for ISAF, the advisor command, and the Special Forces command. For US advisors, a less-than-full-strength logistics battalion is responsible for logistic support for advisors throughout the country. Without centralized logistics planning, this often results in advisors who are unsupported and literally begging supplies off of ISAF and the Special Forces (this is not just theoretical--Kip's team was reduced to begging from a Special Forces team when we were issued only half the normal load of ammunition for our machine guns). For the Canadians, this means that they cannot both support and piggyback off of US logistics planning.

It is a system that will, for as long as it continues in its present form, leave soldiers of all nations in the Coalitions short of needed supplies when they need them.