Center for a New American Security

The NYT reports that Prime Minister Maliki is calling for a fixed timetable for the removal of all U.S. forces by the end of 2011.

Days after top Iraqi and American officials suggested that a draft of the security pact between the countries was close, Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki toughened his language, reiterating earlier Iraqi demands for a fixed date for the withdrawal of American troops.

“It is not possible for any agreement to conclude unless it is on the basis of full sovereignty and the national interest, and that no foreign soldiers remain in Iraqi soil after a defined time ceiling,” Mr. Maliki said in a speech to Shiite tribal leaders in Baghdad’s Green Zone.

What is going on? The straight forward explanation is that Maliki is asserting Iraqi sovereignty and demanding the full withdrawal of the occupier. But Dr. iRack thinks the answer may be a bit more complicated than that.

A fuller explanation should start with the recognition that Maliki's current position is simultaneously strong and weak. He is increasingly (over)confident as a result of successful ISF operations in Basra, Sadr City, Mosul, and Amara, and is attempting to fashion himself into a strongman figure.

At the same time, the prime minister is in a weak position over the long-term. His Dawa party has little grassroots support, the once united Shia front is fractured, and escalating Arab-Kurd tensions mean the Kurds are no longer reliable coalition partners. The Sadrists long ago left his coalition, and the rest of his coalition is fraying. This weakness makes him vulnerable in upcoming elections.

This combination of near-term strength and long-term vulnerability is causing him to rush to consolidate power now before it is too late. This is manifesting itself in several ways:

1. Maliki's efforts to undermine the Sadrists (not just militarily, but dismantling their political apparatus in the south).

2. Maliki's efforts to stall the integration of the Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi Security Forces, and
detain and harass the Awakening Groups/SOIs in Diyala, Abu Ghraib, and Baghdad.

3. Maliki's continued efforts to consolidate command over various elements of the ISF (including Iraqi SOF and Emergency Response Units) and intelligence services, and the use of various "Operations Centers" in Baghdad, Basra, Ninewa, and Diyala to directly command the Iraqi Army (and supersede local police).

And last, but not least:

4. Maliki's domestic political positioning vis-a-vis the SOFA which attempts to enhance his nationalist credentials by demanding a timeline for a U.S. departure.

So, does Maliki want the Americans completely out? Not yet. If he did, he could get us to leave immediately. All he has to do is not agree to any SOFA or UNSCR re-up or bridge agreement and we will have to leave. Period. The fact that Maliki wants some agreement (any agreement) suggests that even Maliki recognizes he needs us -- at least for a while longer.

Does Maliki really want all forces out by the end of 2011? Maybe, but Dr. iRack remains dubious. Dr. iRack suspects that Maliki wants all combat forces out, but not all support troops. Indeed, as the NYT notes:

Though Mr. Maliki seemed to be referring to all foreign troops in his statements, Iraqi negotiators have said recently that an agreed-upon 2011 date is for combat forces only, and that “training and support” forces could remain after that if invited by the Iraqi government. On Monday, a senior Iraqi official said he understood that even a departure date for combat troops would be “conditions driven.”

The Iraqi consensus--both civilian and military--is that Iraq's Army won't be able to defend their country from external aggression for a decade. That is why Maliki and other Iraqi leaders have pushed for an external security assurance within the context of the Strategic Framework Agreement. It therefore seems unlikely that even Maliki would risk having zero U.S. support assets in Iraq post-2011.

So why talk about all troops out by the end of 2011? Here an aide to Maliki provides some insight to the WaPo:

"The agreement will be met with significant public discomfort," said an aide to Maliki. "So Iraqi officials will resort to using the dates mentioned in the agreement to sell it to the public, even though they might be intended to be used in a guidance way."

The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to talk to the media, added: "If you ask the prime minister, 'What happens if the situation on the ground changes before 2011?' then he would obviously say that the dates might need to be changed."

Maliki plans to travel to Iran next week. Word is that he will confront the Iranian leadership over their lethal assistance to Shia militants in Iraq in an attempt to get them to stop.

Hmmmm. Direct, high-level diplomacy with Tehran by the leader of a democratic country! Sounds like appeasement! After all, as Bush told the Knesset:

Some seem to believe that we should negotiate with the terrorists and radicals, as if some ingenious argument will persuade them they have been wrong all along. We have heard this foolish delusion before. As Nazi tanks crossed into Poland in 1939, an American senator declared: "Lord, if I could only have talked to Hitler, all this might have been avoided." We have an obligation to call this what it is -- the false comfort of appeasement, which has been repeatedly discredited by history.

Well, if it is appeasement, the U.S. military seems to think it's a great idea for Maliki to move in this direction.

And SecDef Gates thinks we should do some high-level chatting with Iran too:

I think that the one area where the Iraq Study Group recommendations have not been followed up is in terms of reaching out [to] the Iranians. . . . We need to figure out a way to develop some leverage and then sit down and talk with them. If there’s going to be a discussion, then they need something, too. We can't go to a discussion and be completely the demander, with them not feeling that they need anything from us.

Oh, and so does Petraeus.

Seriously, the political debate in this country over Iran is nonsensical. Of course we have to talk to Iran about their activities in Iraq (indeed, we already do through back channels and at the working level). And, no, it isn't appeasement to talk. Appeasement is giving in to an aggressor. Tough diplomacy, on the other hand, is trying to get them to give in to you. Now Dr. iRack knows that there is a legitimate debate about the requirements for effective, tough, diplomacy . . . so let's have the debate about that rather than whether we should talk to Iran at all.

All that said, now that the two presidential nominees are set, expect silly season on Iran to kick in to a whole new gear.