Center for a New American Security

Bing West, of course, described it the most eloquently:

For a man to charge into fire once requires grit that is instinctive in few men; to do so a second time, now knowing what awaits you, requires inner resolve beyond instinct; to repeat a third time is courage above and beyond any call of duty; to go in a fourth time is to know you will die; to go in a fifth time is beyond comprehension. 

 

Meyer's performance was the greatest act of courage in the war, because he repeated it, and repeated it, and repeated it.

From an otherwise great dispatch from Afghanistan by -- who else? -- Bing West:

Marine tactics, like Ohio State football, have the subtle inevitability of a steamroller.

I'm not sure what Bing is getting at here in comparing the Marine Corps to the Ohio State football team. Does he mean Marines pawn their valor awards?

I was on a plane to the Middle East on Sunday evening when I spotted these lines from Leon Panetta's op-ed in the Washington Post:

The main lesson from this attack is that, like our military, CIA officers are on the front lines against al-Qaeda and its violent allies. They take risks to confront the enemy, gathering information to destroy its networks and disrupt its operations. This is a vicious foe, one that has struck our country before and is determined to do so again.

As an agency, we have found consolation in the strength and heroism of our fallen colleagues and their families.

We have found no consolation, however, in public commentary suggesting that those who gave their lives somehow brought it upon themselves because of "poor tradecraft." That's like saying Marines who die in a firefight brought it upon themselves because they have poor war-fighting skills.

The op-ed was, written, I believe, in response to commentary like this op-ed by Reuel Marc Gerecht arguing that poor tradcraft was, in fact, at least in part to blame for the deaths of seven U.S. operatives and one Jordian agent. I myself do not know much of anything about the tradecraft of an intelligence officer at the CIA, so I am not going to pass judgment on what happened in eastern Afghanistan. What Panetta wrote above, though, sure does trouble me.

Panetta assumes that is beyond the pale to say that Marines or U.S. soldiers died in a firefight due to poor war-fighting skills, but that in fact has happened quite regularly over the course of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Every single firefight U.S. soldiers and Marines engage in is subject to an admirably honest after action review (AAR). Readers of this blog no doubt count themselves as veterans of many an AAR held everywhere from Fort Polk, Louisiana to Bagram Airbase, Afghanistan. In some military mini-disasters -- like the hapless convoy that was ambushed during the Battle of Nasiriyah and resulted in the capture of Jessica Lynch -- an extensive AAR process reveals that soldiers died because they did, in fact, possess poor war-fighting skills. (After Nasiriyah, that particular finding led many within the U.S. Army to stress the importance of basic rifle marksmanship and maintenance for even so-called "support" soldiers.)

The military is, by now, used to engaging in a pretty frightful AAR process that, when successful, lays bare the weaknesses of fighting organizations tested by realistic training or combat. When aggressive national security journalists don't think the U.S. Army or Marine Corps is being honest enough, they do not hesistate to say so. (Exhibit A.) So in conclusion, it is not, in fact, taboo to say that Marines died because they have poor war-fighting skills. Marines do sometimes die because they have poor war-fighting skills. And when that happens, the U.S. Marine Corps relies, like the U.S. Army, on a vigorous AAR process to identify faults in training, leadership and equipment.

One can only hope that the CIA is engaged in a similar process today. But when the director pre-emptively says that the "main lesson" of this loss is that "CIA officers are on the front lines against al-Qaeda and its violent allies", it makes me think the director, at least, is on the defensive. Because that's a pretty anodyne main lesson to draw from this. A visit to any tactical U.S. military unit in Iraq or Afghanistan -- where successes and failings are analyzed and provoke reforms on a daily basis -- tells you it doesn't have to be that way.

The CIA is, of course, conducting an investigation. But an investigation can be a lot different in tone and scope than an AAR. An investigation has a prosecutorial air about it and can focus on factors outside an organization. An AAR, by contrast, should focus on dynamics inside an organization. It should also be conductd in such a way as to encourage honesty from subordinate leaders and participants -- no one should fear for their career. A how-to guide can be found here. Tips and techniques from readers on how to conduct an effective AAR are encouraged in the comments section.

In related news, the report on the failings of U.S. military intelligence in Afghanistan -- and the accompanying recommendations for a way forward -- has been downloaded 9,864 times as of yesterday. That's a new record for a CNAS report. I heard the director of one of the civilian intelligence agencies thought the Flynn report was in part directed toward his agency. It wasn't, but his alleged knee-jerk response -- angry and defensive -- was revealing.

Nick Francona -- U.S. Marine, Penn graduate and all-around American Hero -- emailed me to wish me a Merry Christmas and to say he gave me a shout out on ESPN.com. Nick's story is a pretty incredible one, and I for one am really resisting the urge to make a comment about the patriotism of Red Sox fans as compared with fans of another club (that will go unnamed lest I draw the wrath of the Jeter-loving Lady Muqawama). But if you happen to be a fan of baseball, read this article. Go Red Sox, and Semper Fi.

Lt. Col. Jeffrey "Jay" Goodes just led the CNAS celebration of the Marine Corps Birthday, and Abu Muqawama salutes all the leathernecks celebrating downrange in Iraq and Afghanistan. In honor of the Marine Corps, we now present Gunny Highway versus the Swede. In Italian. Which somehow makes Heartbreak Ridge even more awesome.

More Pulitzer-worthy reporting from C.J. Chivers:

On the ground, far from the generals in Kabul and the policy makers in Washington, the hour-by-hour conduct of the war rests in part in the deeds of men this young, who have been given latitude to lead as their training and instincts guide them.

One of the Marines profiled, though, takes a not-so-subtle jab at my former service:

In all, Corporal Conroy said, in five months here, he and Lance Corporal Murray have been attacked more than 70 times. He said he respected the insurgents’ courage, but was grateful that most of them lacked an essential skill.

“They are experienced and understand the principles of the ambush,” he said. “But they are not very good shots. If these guys knew how to shoot like even the U.S. Army, we would be taking 50 percent casualties on all of our patrols.”

What a little twerp! Chivers no doubt included this line because he, too, is a Marine. I know a certain U.S. Army regiment at Fort Benning that would relish wiping that cocky smirk off Corporal Conroy's face. But fair is fair. These Marines are national treasures as far as I am concerned, and as an Army buddy of mine wrote when he sent along this article...

This is the modern equivalent of the Vietnam advisory mission, only done by Lance Corporals and Corporals, not Captains and Majors. It almost makes this Army Captain want to say "Ooo-rah," not "Huah." Almost. ;-)

P.S. A reader reminded me to mention the great photographs which accompany the article.

And for the WTFO Picture of the Day, we have the U.S. Marines marching through Beirut in 1958 with ... a Confederate flag.


Sean and I are trying to figure out the meaning of this. I guess this would make sense if this was an old state flag, but a) I don't think it is and b) the USMC doesn't have National Guard units, so it doesn't make sense why they would be marching with a state flag anyway. Nope, this is the Confederate Battle Flag, alright. Anyway, this is just ... weird.

Boy, here's the most depressing video you will see all week. On the ground with Marine trainers in Afghanistan. (Thanks, B.D.)

Okay, I will admit that I had never even heard of the Continuity IRA until yesterday. (So many forms of the IRA: the IRA, the PIRA, the RIRA, the OIRA, the anti-treaty IRA ...) One of the things I have noticed while reading these reports on the events in Northern Ireland -- besides how unified the peoples of Northern Ireland seem to be at the moment against violence -- is the way in which these splinter groups are dangerous because of the way they attract young men looking for a purpose. While some revolutionary movements have broad appeal and legitimacy, many of the world's militant groups we see are mostly collections of young men looking for meaning to their lives. In this way, of course, terrorist groups are a lot like the United State Marine Corps. But whereas the latter applies disciplined violence in the service of both the status quo and a democratic process, the former apply more or less indisciplined violence against the status quo and often with few checks or controls over behavior. I realize this is one of the more obvious observations this blog has ever made. But as I read these stories out of Northern Ireland, I find myself wondering whether or not the key issue in combating terror is combating the "disaffected young men" problem. I suspect this problem will get worse, not better, with unemployment rising throughout the developed world.

By the way, Edward Gorman has it right.

Easily the most eerie aspect of the last couple of days for me has been the sound on my car radio of Martin McGuinness, allegedly once a senior IRA commander, sounding just like a Northern Ireland Secretary of State from the Eighties.

I think this is because McGuinness knows these attacks are as much a challenge to Sinn Féin as they are to British rule.

Holy $&!%, where have I been?  A shoe shopping safari?  A christmas fudge induced coma? Maybe I took Ex too seriously when he said we had nothing more to write about now that Tom Ricks was on the scene.  (Btw, does Laura Rozen have the phones at Foggy Bottom wiretapped?  Jaysus.)