Center for a New American Security

Hospital sources are confirming Benazir Bhutto has, in fact, been killed in a massive suicide attack on a political rally. Most web sites are still saying she was wounded.

The folks on NBC, though, are making it sound as if Bhutto was some brave liberal alternative to the Musharraf regime, swallowing hook, line, and sinker this narrative that Benazir Bhutto was some kind of Pakistani Aung San Suu Kyi.

Okay, folks, we all know she was eloquent, went to Harvard and Oxford and was a darling of the English-language media. But she was arguably the most corrupt woman in the history of South Asia. She was removed from office not once but twice on corruption charges. And ruthless? She killed her own brother in 1996.

So by all means, mourn Benazir Bhutto, but those who live by the sword...

Update: The U.S. presidential candidates are weighing in on Bhutto and her assassination now. Everyone is emphasizing her bravery and the physical courage it took for her to return to Pakistan. And you can't take that away from her, that's for sure. She knew she was risking her life by returning. (And yes, commentors, Abu Muqawama would guess some folks in the ISI are up to their chin hairs in all of this.)

Abu Muqawama watched McCain's comments on Fox News with his grandmother and then changed the channel to CNN. At times like these, CNN proves its worth over Fox. On Fox, the best they can do is show a bunch of Americans in a studio talking about the events. CNN, for all its faults, actually has reporters on the ground filing reports via satellite phone. The BBC and Al-Jazeera English are even better for on-the-spot reporting, but we can't get those networks in East Tennessee. And ten bucks says Abu Muqawama's grandmother turned the channel back to Fox after he left.

Update II: The New York Times obituary pulls no punches.

Update III: Abu Muqawama is now throwing things at the television. Noted Pakistan expert Ann Curry just compared Bhutto to Mahatma bleeping Ghandi on MSNBC's Hardball. Meanwhile, Tom Ricks has a piece up on the Post's website on the military side of this mess.

Update IV: CNN is reporting that there are unverified claims of al Qaeda responsibility for the assassination. The FBI has issued a bulletin regarding the alleged claim, but apparently the usual AQ websites have been silent thus far. (The original report was filed by an Italian news agency, and sent to Charlie by intrepid reporter Spencer.) Also, SWJ Blog has an amazing collection of news stories and editorials. The situation seems to still be in flux, so stay tuned.

Update V: WaPo has two good pieces of analysis set for Friday's paper. First, a detailed discussion of the machinations behind Bhutto's return to Pakistan, including this gem: "He basically delivered a message to Musharraf that we would stand by him, but he needed a democratic facade on the government, and we thought Benazir was the right choice for that face," said Bruce Riedel of CSIS. Great game, indeed.

Next, further analysis from Tom Ricks (and Joby Warrick) on possible responsibility for the attack. Tony Zinni says AQ; Andrew Exum says ISI. But Charlie thinks Barnett Rubin may be closest to right when he argues that perception matters more than reality, "I know what many people in Pakistan and Afghanistan believe: They think that the Pakistani military killed her," he said. "I am not endorsing this belief -- or denying it -- but it is a political reality." (More on this in the NYT's lengthy analysis piece.)

Update VI: Abu Muqawama is pretty sure Andrew Exum did not mean the ISI "did it." The ISI is no monolith, and what Exum is arguing is that if AQ did it (and he thinks they did), then it was unlikely some members within the ISI had no prior knowledge. But Abu Muqawama, like Charlie, likes what Rubin had to say the most.

Abu Muqawama woke up early this morning, hit the gym with his cousin, drank a protein shake, and then packed all the guns into the back of the truck to hit the shooting range. "Nothing celebrates the birth of the Baby Jesus like firepower," Abu Muqawama's cousin remarked in between magazine changes. Indeed. And there's no better taste than a handful of beef jerky with the just faintest hint of gun oil. Yum.

It's just as well Abu Muqawama didn't stay at home and read the papers, because since he returned he's read nothing but bad news -- including that peach of a story Charlie linked to below this post.

First off, the PMC story gets worse and worse. (And those brave few souls who stick their necks out to defend PMCs -- you know who you are -- get quieter and quieter.) Check out this article from the Washington Post, which includes the counterinsurgency quote of the day, courtesy of T.X. Hammes:

I still think, from a pure counterinsurgency standpoint, armed contractors are an inherently bad idea, because you cannot control the quality, you cannot control the action on the ground, but you're held responsible for everything they do.

Amen.

And if that doesn't depress you enough for Christmas Eve, try this book review:

Upon hearing mention of people who have caused death and destruction in our world, such as Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin, most decent people will react negatively. While Dr. Abdul Qadeer (A.Q.) Khan may not elicit the same reaction, it's high time to include him on that list...

A who's-who of NYT South Asia reporters offers up a detailed look into US aid policies to Pakistan. They report something Charlie first heard a few months ago: that Pakistan is diverting the funds from COIN/CT efforts in NWFP to conventional units intended to confront/deter India.

In interviews in Islamabad and Washington, Bush administration and military officials said they believed that much of the American money was not making its
way to frontline Pakistani units. Money has been diverted to help finance weapons systems designed to counter India, not Al Qaeda or the Taliban, the officials said, adding that the United States has paid tens of millions of dollars in inflated Pakistani reimbursement claims for fuel, ammunition and other costs.

Musharraf, of course, denies such claims, causing an irritating he-said, she-said. And if that weren't galling enough, one American officer makes this comparison:

For years, how money from the Coalition Support Funds was disbursed to the Pakistani government was veiled in secrecy. The size and scope of the payments to Pakistan was held so closely that one senior American military officer in Afghanistan said that he did not know that the administration was spending $1 billion a year until he attended a meeting in Islamabad in 2006. “I was astounded,” said the officer, who would not speak for attribution because he now holds another senior military post. “On one side of the border we were paying a billion to get very little done. On the other side of the border — the Afghan side — we were scrambling to find the funds to train an army that actually wanted to get something done.”

Readers of this blog are well familiar with the travails of those training the Afghan National Army. One assumes that we'd all be ok with a little less money for the Pakistani armor corps facing New Delhi, and a little more for what could be a world-class training academy in Kabul.

Nate Fick sent this well-timed report along. Abu Muqawama imagines it will be much-referenced within the beltway in the coming weeks, as it breaks down U.S. strategy toward and aid to Pakistan since 9/11 and makes several points worth considering as the U.S. plots what should happen next. Worth looking through, even if you don't read all 141 pages.

Abu Muqawama is not entirely sure why this report warrants the coverage the New York Times is giving it:

WASHINGTON, Nov. 18 — A new and classified American military proposal outlines an intensified effort to enlist tribal leaders in the frontier areas of Pakistan in the fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, as part of a broader effort to bolster Pakistani forces against an expanding militancy, American military officials said.

If adopted, the proposal would join elements of a shift in strategy that would also be likely to expand the presence of American military trainers in Pakistan, directly finance a separate tribal paramilitary force that until now has proved largely ineffective and pay militias that agreed to fight Al Qaeda and foreign extremists, officials said. The United States now has only about 50 troops in Pakistan, a Pentagon spokesman said, a force that could grow by dozens under the new approach.

First off, it's just a proposal. Second, this whole training-foreign-security-forces thing should have ceased to be controversial a long time ago. Like, in 1958 or thereabouts. The fact that the U.S. advisor presence in Pakistan might grow by mere dozens -- goodness me, an invasion! -- doesn't seem like it should be Page 1 news. We've probably got more economic advisors in some countries. What should be Page 1 news, though, is an analysis of whether or not the Pakistanis are up for what looks to be a long-term counterinsurgency fight in their back yard. Just before Abu Muqawama went to bed last night, he read a report announcing the Pakistani government was mobilizing more forces in the northwest to stop Sunni-Shia fighting.

But mobilizing forces is comparatively easy. What's difficult is convincing those same forces they're going to participate in a years-long counterinsurgency campaign against their own people. Immediately prior to this latest political crisis in Pakistan, several Army units as much as openly rebelled and said they were sick of killing other Pakistanis in the northwest while watching their own soldiers captured and beheaded. It seems to Abu Muqawama that someone has to convince the Pakistani Army -- as an institution -- that a fight against the militants in the northwest is in their best interests and that striking some kind of separate peace isn't an option.* Because as it stands, more generals in the Pakistani Army care about this than they do fighting al-Qaeda.

*That someone is you, George Bush. The Washington Post was 100% right to call you out yesterday for not making a personal effort to capitalize on the military successes of the COIN campaign in Iraq, and they would be 100% correct in similarly demanding you take a hands-on approach in Pakistan. You make $400,000 a year. Earn your paycheck. (Is it just Abu Muqawama, or is George W. Bush the J.D. Drew of American politics? Going into his presidency -- love him or hate him -- he looked as if he had all the right tools to be a successful president. But just like J.D. Drew, he always looks like he would rather be doing something other than the job he's getting paid to do.)

In the end, after three days of fighting, the Taliban were not crushed in the jaws of a closing trap, as we had been led to expect. They executed a disciplined, fighting withdrawal -- one of the most difficult maneuvers on a battlefield. Even their retreat emphasized their message.

Although Abu Muqawama has taken issue with the analysis of Sarah Chayes in the past, her dispatch for today's Washington Post is must-read stuff for the readers of this blog. Her description of the way in which weak-kneed leaders in Kabul have worsened the situation in her neighborhood in Kandahar by preaching the need to negotiate with the Taliban is great, as is her description of the effect an attack by the Taliban has on its intended targets -- the population:

...I knew that the significance of this event could not be weighed in the usual quantitative metrics dear to journalists and military men. The number of bodies, the number of houses vacated, the inches of terrain occupied or retaken did not add up to the full reality of what had taken place. That reality was in the hearts of the people, the sinking sense of impending tragedy.

What had in fact transpired, in my view, was a deft, successful psychological operations action by the Taliban. Their attack on Arghandab was designed to communicate, and it did -- eloquently. It said that they are here. It said that, despite the likelihood that they would attack after the death of Mullah Naqib, no obstacle was thrown up to oppose them, and they were able to walk into the district. The targeting of the mullah's house was a deliberate affront. It said: "You see, o men of no honor? You can't even protect his house. You are nothing now." The sum of these messages was aimed at the ordinary people who are the prize in any insurgency: Our encroachment is inevitable, the Taliban said. You should align yourselves with the inevitable.

Bless. Sarah Chayes understands Clausewitz better than 90% of the officers in the U.S. Army. It's not about destroying the enemy -- it's about achieving your desired political aim, whether that means your act of violence kills 100 men or none. She also knows what it will take to "win" in Afghanistan:

The only reason Pakistan's invasion-by-proxy has morphed into something even vaguely resembling an insurgency is that the Afghan people are at the limit of their endurance with a government that pillages and brutalizes them and lies to them barefaced. Judges demand fortunes for positive verdicts. Customs agents expect kickbacks for every transaction. Police officers shake people down or kidnap them for ransom. Six years of depredations by the government have led to its rejection -- and to resentment of the international community that installed it and then refused to supervise it. From those feelings of anger have spread pools of collaboration with the Taliban. ... [P]roper conduct of government is the best antidote to the Taliban. Provided with accountable, responsive leadership, the Afghan people wouldn't give that lot a second glance.

The Washington Post today highlights what has been, for Abu Muqawama, the central paradox of this crisis in Pakistan: Pervez Musharraf has tried to sell this introduction of emergency law as necessary to bring fight insurgents in the northwest. But it has been difficult to see how this helps him at all if units in the army -- upon whom he now depends to stay in power -- are reluctant to fight a never-ending war against other Pakistanis. The only "crackdown" we have seen thus far has been against secular lawyers and activists in Islamabad, not Islamist insurgents in Swat.

For the past 10 days, some Pakistan-watchers (including Abu Muqawama's Pashtun flatmate*) have been saying the real story is in the north, not in Islamabad. That's partly why Abu Muqawama (and his flatmate) were so happy to see Martha Raddatz's brave reporting over the weekend from Swat. Here, in essence, is the problem Musharraf faces:

Throughout the northwest, the war against the insurgents is unpopular. Many Pakistanis consider it America's war, though on either side, it's Pakistani blood that is spilled.

Analysts say they fear that while emergency rule may give Musharraf more power to use the army to put down the insurgency, it will backfire when it comes to changing minds.

"The mullahs' main slogan is enforcing sharia, and that is popular with the populace," said Ghulam Cheema, a retired army colonel. "The army, in their heart of hearts, can't fight such a slogan."

Read the rest of this important article here.

*Abu Muqawama's flatmate likes to tell all the local jihadi wannabes that Abu Muqawama is a former Chechen guerrilla fighter. So now Abu Muqawama has to walk around his neighborhood like he's some tough religious fundamentalist one second away from erupting into violence ... which, actually, for a kid from East Tennessee, is second nature anyway, so he's not sure why he's complaining.

P.S. Abu Muqawama wouldn't mind Taliban-style Islamist insurgents as much if they shared the same sense of humor as our good-natured American anarchists:

Martha Raddatz of ABC News wins the Spirit Award this week. Her reports from the Swat Valley in Pakistan -- where the Taliban has officially taken over, even as the political tug-of-war plays out in Islamabad -- are priceless. Most Western journalists with her profile would have been like, "Nah, I think I might wait this one out and file my reports from the Hilton." Not Martha. What a tough lady.

You should be able to click here to see the video report.

Finally. The Washington Post has a piece today focusing on the way in which political turmoil in Pakistan is affecting the U.S.-supported counterinsurgency fight against Islamist militants.

The political turmoil in Pakistan is threatening to undermine a new long-term counterinsurgency plan by the U.S. military aimed at strengthening Pakistani forces fighting Islamic extremists in the country's tribal areas, according to senior military officials. The officials said the initiative involves expanding the presence of U.S. Special Forces and other troops to train and advise the Pakistanis, who have been largely ineffective in battling the hard-line militants.

...

Currently, U.S. Special Forces teams make occasional trips to Pakistan for about six weeks at a time to train different groups of Pakistani soldiers. Under the new plan, the 12-man teams would be stationed there for longer assignments, without gaps in between, and they would work consistently with the same set of local troops. The teams would step up their training of the Pakistani military's Special Services Group, a strike force for conducting raids against insurgent training camps and leaders.

Other trainers would teach basic skills to Pakistan's Frontier Corps, the tribally recruited paramilitary force that patrols the tribal regions. Training would include marksmanship as well as how to set up checkpoints and gather basic intelligence, while providing the force with helicopter support such as medical evacuation by the Pakistani army.

About 400 U.S. military personnel currently work in Pakistan, and the total is expected to grow by dozens under the new initiative.

... U.S. military officials said that [Ashfaq] Kiyani, Musharraf's possible replacement as head of the military, is supportive of the counterinsurgency plan in the tribal areas, which he visited within days of assuming his current post last month. Kiyani has also indicated an openness to having the Pakistani military focus on missions other than conventional operations aimed at the threat of India, which senior U.S. officers consider diminished. "He has a different view," said one senior military official. "I'd expect he will step up and be head of the army, and there will be some changes."

The idea for the plan to strengthen and increase the Frontier Corps, along with economic development in the tribal areas, was unexpectedly raised by Musharraf during his meeting with President Bush in March 2006.

Some initial funds for the efforts have been cobbled together -- relying in part on Pentagon counternarcotics funding -- but officials familiar with the plan say the goal is to redirect current military aid toward the counterinsurgency plan.

The COIN model the U.S. is using in Pakistan -- light footprint, heavy on advisory missions -- seems to be the same COIN/CT model the U.S. has been using in places like Algeria, where we have been very cautious about letting our military aid and activity become too overt. Abu Muqawama likes it. It's not aggressive enough for some presidential candidates, probably, but it makes more sense than sending a division of light infantry into the FATA.* The Pakistani Army would revolt if the U.S. took direct military action, but using Special Forces teams in advisory roles allows the U.S. to "fight" in the FATA without actually getting into any two-way live fires themselves.

In other Pakistan news, the IHT has two op-eds worth reading. The first is by the ever-sophisticated Pakistan observer Anatol Lieven, who explains what's been taking place in Pakistan from within a Pakistani context. The second is by the big-wigs at CrisisGroup, who say it's about time the West scrapped its Musharraf policy for a real Pakistan policy.

*FATA: Federally Administered Tribal Areas

Fred Kaplan at Slate is not a veteran Pakistan watcher by any stretch of the imagination. But he is a student (and critic) of the current American administration. So Charlie takes what he says with a few grains of salt, but his latest on the situation in Pakistan does strike a chord.

Now we've really got problems.

Strong start. Glad we go that out of the way.

The state of emergency in Pakistan signals yet another low point in President George W. Bush's foreign policy—a stark demonstration of his paltry influence and his bankrupt principles. More than that, the crackdown locks us in a crisis—a potentially dangerous dynamic—from which there appears to be no escape route.

No escape, huh? Paltry influence? Bankrupt principles? Come on, Fred, isn't Musharraf fighting Taliban and al Qaeda elements in the border areas?

Musharraf is portraying his suspension of the constitution as a necessary step to stabilize Pakistan and fend off Islamist terrorists. Yet the timing suggests it was, for the most part, a power grab. Pakistan's Supreme Court was about to rule that Musharraf's reign as both president and army chief of staff was unconstitutional. That meant the coming elections (which may or may not now be called off) would have ended his reign. And so he dissolved the court. He also arrested many democratic activists and shut down the nation's independent media.

It should now be clear, if it wasn't already, that Musharraf has been diddling Bush & Co. the past three years or longer.

Oh snap! (And did Kaplan just say "diddling"?) Ok, power grab, check. Crazy islamists are just a bogeyman.

The problem is that there's some truth to Musharraf's official reason for his crackdown. He has been going after al-Qaida jihadists, especially those inside his own country, though not so much Taliban fighters on the border of Afghanistan. And he is in a genuinely tight spot.

Sucks to his tight spot. Let's just cut him off and be done with it.

If the United States were to respond to this power grab by cutting off aid to the Pakistani army, the army would turn elsewhere—and the Islamist factions would be strengthened. If the United States were to cut its links to Musharraf … well, Musharraf is the face of the Pakistani army. If he goes, probably some other strongman would take his place, but the tenuous coalition he has assembled could fall apart in the process, with unpredictable—but almost certainly unpleasant—results.

Well goddammit, you're not making this easy, Fred! It's like the tail is wagging the dog here.

The fact is, the United States needs Musharraf more than Musharraf needs the United States. And the fact that he's rubbing our noses in it doesn't make it any less true.

Well, then, look. This was just the inevitable result of getting into bed with dictators. It's unavoidable.

We can't do much about this now, but we might have been able to do something about it two years ago or six months ago. The fact that we didn't is a grave indictment of Bush's foreign policy, both its practices and its principles.

But it's just an indictment of the Pakistan policy, right? Freedom is on the march!

The Bush foreign policy was neither shrewd enough to play self-interested power politics nor truly principled enough to enforce its ideals.

One consequence of this crisis is that Bush's "freedom agenda" is finally bankrupt. He will never again be able to invoke it, even as a rhetorical ploy, without evoking winces or laughter.

Fred, I hope you're buying the next round. I need a drink. Any parting words?

Musharraf's proclamation reveals that we are not the "sole superpower" that Bush and his associates thought we were; that sometimes the combination of vital interests and mediocre diplomacy put us all too desperately at the mercy of events.

Make that two.