Center for a New American Security

Carlos has long wondered about the differences in the virulence of two different insurgencies in Southeast Asia. One in the Southern Philippines, the other in Southern Thailand. Not being one for monocausal arguments, there are many factors that have been raised to explain the differences.

1. Buddhism vs. Catholicism as a major religion and its associated tensions with Islam.

2. The role of a King who is above politics, but has moral authority and a true bully pulpit. (The King of Thailand isn't necessarily respected in the South, where part of the claims for separation rest on separate kingdoms, but could the King's position in the rest of Thai society be a factor in societal relations in the South?)

3. Income differentials for the regions, as well as connection between the "haves" and whatever particular section of society.

4. Role of the Afghanistan experience? Many Filipinos fought against the Soviets, and I cannot say there were no Thais in that fight, I cannot on the other hand think of any off the top of my head. (This, though, isn't really an explanation, but simply an expression of the same phenomenon--why the Southern Philippines fighters have transnational connections and less so with the Southern Thais).

So there continue to be differences, but there may be unfortunate inroads (so far, only tactical) from transnational influences into Southern Thailand. Recent bomb attacks show a shift in targeting (not to mention the simple tactic of the car bomb itself) towards first responders and increasing casualty counts. This is certainly a troubling development, given the recent reports by the International Crisis Group (Carlos' favorite place for current SE Asia information and analysis, incidentally) that there have been advances for the government in the South.

The ICG report also notes that these advances due to shifts in the application of military power will not (statement of the obvious to follow) address the more fundamental grievances of the insurgents.

The Thai government is currently distracted from this issue due to more pressing concerns closer to home, as the current PM is facing (literally outside his door) a massive popular protest. (Again in some contradistinction to the Philippines, there is something about "revolutions" in Thailand that are different).

ASIDE: To add on to Rivers' post above, Carlos remembers a quick stopover in Bangkok, during which there was a massive protest over (I think) government salaries being cut. The mass of people made the terrible traffic in Bangkok even worse, but it cleared out when the protesters left for the weekend. They would be coming back Monday.

ASIDE 2: The food vendors in SE Asia are the creators of some of the greatest cuisine known to humanity, and one should always partake whenever possible. They are also some of the best HUMINT in the region. When they are not in an area that they usually populate, be wary; when they arrive in even greater numbers than one usually sees, this is either: (1) a Festival (which you can confirm with a calendar and newspaper) or (2)a massive protest is coming.

Samak Sundaravej, the current Thai PM is under fire for being a proxy of the previous one, the billionaire Thaksin Shinawatra. Thaksin was under investigation for multiple corruption charges when he fled the country. Thaksin and Samak remain quite popular in the outskirts of the country, but definitely have their share of enemies among the urban population and "traditional elite" in and around the capital.

Yeah, I don't know of any other country that has a situation like that (/sarcasm)

While the protesters generally agree Samak should go, asking who will or should replace him is to open up a whole host of questions. Many anti-Thaksin folks believed he stirred up the problems in the South for political advantage (fat lot of good that did him), but with this ongoing turmoil, any advances that might be made in the South are almost sure to be lost.

So here I am, on AM, as the resident “Asia Pundit,” if you will. I’ve spent most of my intellectual life and a great deal of my physical one in and near <?xml:namespace prefix = st1 />Asia, and for anyone who studies political violence, it isn’t as if there isn’t enough to talk about in that region. Operation Enduring Freedom is, after all, more than Afghanistan, and OEF-P (for Philippines) is at the heart of what has been called the “second front” in the war against terror. The threat that groups in the Southern Philippines pose not just within the country but as part of a regional threat is understandable. How one responds to that threat, ah, now there’s the point.

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Many things are problematic with the imagery of a “second front.” On the purely sensible military note that opening up another front isn’t often the smartest of moves, on the whole war analogy in the first place, “second fronts” aren’t usually good things. (Gershman’s article focuses not on whether we should be concerned with Al-Qaeda type radicalism inserting themselves into Southeast Asia, but whether the military instrument—how one responds to another “front”—is the best way to address such a concern in SE Asia).

News on OEF-P frequently is articulated as the “good stuff the military is doing in the war on terror.” There has been great validity to that, but that’s not the big story. At least, it shouldn’t be. The thing that is more important to know and understand is how not only the US military, but other aspects of both American and Philippine power are being applied to handle tensions in the southern Philippines. One of those things has been the establishment of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), an effort to give to folks in Mindanao some political buy-in to the central government in Manila by opening up some political space and internal self-rule on some issues. The ARMM, however, isn’t a very large part of Mindanao writ large, so the sense of meaningful representation is, shall we say, a little questionable. August 12 2008 saw the most recent ARMM elections, and while there were some instances of violence, the Philippine government is viewing the elections (so far) as a success. And with an estimated 84 percent turnout (of 1.7 million potential voters), there’s good reason to be optimistic, but not complacent. That same day reports discussed about 130,000 displaced persons in the southern Philippines.

A great deal of the work for the Philippine government and the effectiveness of their programs to bring the people of the south into the national fold will be seen not in the potential increase of the territory covered by the ARMM, but more in the movement by the population either for or against a larger ARMM territory. Economically, the Southern Philippines is the poorest region, and overlaying gap that is the religious difference (a majority Muslim population in the south, but still a minority to the overall Catholic population in the Philippines total). That’s an easy recipe for discontent. What is critical is whether this domestic grievance can be tied to a larger regional or even global one. On that score, the worst thing for the situation in the Philippines (or SE Asia more generally) is to be any front in the “Global War on Terror.”