Center for a New American Security

Get some! It would have cooler had they sunk the mother ship. Or at least told France where they could sink it. Those French, man, hate themselves some pirates.

MOGADISHU, Somalia (Reuters) — Dutch commandos freed 20 Yemeni hostages on Saturday and briefly detained seven pirates who had forced the Yemenis to join them in attacking vessels in the Gulf of Aden, NATO officials said.

The Dutch forces, operating under a NATO antipiracy mission, then released the pirates, a NATO commander said, because NATO has no “detainment policy.”

Meanwhile, gunmen from Somalia seized a Belgian-registered ship and its 10 crew members farther south in the Indian Ocean. A pirate spokesman said the vessel, the Pompei, would be taken to the coast.

Somali sea gangs have captured dozens of ships, taken hundreds of sailors prisoner and made off with millions of dollars in ransoms despite the presence of foreign warships in waters off the Horn of Africa.

Lt. Cmdr. Alexandre Fernandes of NATO said the 20 Yemeni fishermen were rescued after a Dutch Navy frigate on a NATO patrol responded to an assault on a Greek-owned tanker. The tanker had been attacked by pirates firing assault rifles and grenades.

Commandos from the Dutch ship chased the pirates, who were on a small skiff, back to their mother ship, a hijacked Yemeni fishing dhow.

“We have freed the hostages, we have freed the dhow and we have seized the weapons,” Commander Fernandes said, speaking on board the Portuguese warship Corte-Real. “The pirates did not fight, and no gunfire was exchanged.” The Corte-Real is also on a NATO antipiracy mission.

To: ahoymatey@hotmail.so

From: secdef@osd.mil

Subject: Thanks!

http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0409/21293.html

Those Navy snipers off the coast of Somalia might have done more than simply rescue an American ship captain.

They’re also giving Defense Secretary Robert Gates a new argument for his plan to steer Pentagon spending toward small-scale fights and dial back the Pentagon’s focus on multibillion-dollar weapons.

"As we saw last week, you don't necessarily need a billion-dollar ship to chase down a bunch of teenage pirates," Gates said at the Air Force War College, The Associated Press reported.

The Somali scenario fit perfectly into the narrative Gates has hammered away at for the past year. Gates’ budget proposal alters more than 50 Pentagon programs, and this week, he’s fanned out to military colleges to make his case.

Like roadside bombs that crush the Army’s armored vehicles, pirates armed with automatic weapons have rendered the Navy’s massive destroyers impotent. And so, while the nation will still need high-tech fighter jets and ships that can shoot down ballistic missiles, Gates argues that the Pentagon should pump more money into large quantities of more affordable equipment, as well as intelligence and surveillance capabilities, and training special forces

Ninja Fred has ideas.

God bless Sean Lee, who has figured out a way to allow me to talk about pirates and Lebanon. If anyone figures out a way to bring military innovation theory into this conversation, let me know. (I suspect it will not be hard, actually.)

We need to deal with this problem from the beach side, in concert with the ocean side, but we don’t have an embassy in Somalia and limited, ineffective intelligence operations. We need to work in Somalia and in Lebanon, where a lot of the ransom money has changed hands. But our operations in Lebanon are a joke, and we have no presence at all in Somalia.

Here I am, with Bob Kaplan, King of Historical Analogies, on the Charlie Rose Show last night talking about piracy.

My friend Noah Schachtman, meanwhile, has come up with a list of all the ways we can counter piracy off the Horn of Africa. None of them are particularly appealing.

...from a long-time friend of the blog.

Resistance Daddy,

First, on Saturday, I thought firing three shots from a rolling platform and getting three kills on another rolling platform was about as likely as shooting missiles out of the sky with a laser on a 747. I mean, come on, that's frigging awesome-about as much justification as is needed for the "executive assassination ring" aka JSOC.

Anyway, now that the chest thumping will be over by the end of the 24 hour news cycle, the real questions should begin. I'd offer your readership a framework and look forward to their thoughts.

First, as bad ass as that tactical action was, simply doing it again will not necessarily be possible nor would it be sufficient. A tactical problem was solved involving one hostage, three pirates, a US destroyer, and a disabled lifeboat. Already the pirates are musing on lessons learned in the media. Are we inside the pirates OODA loop? Are they so static and unchanging that we can kill our way out of the problem? That piracy has actually increased in spite of similar actions by the French and Indians suggests otherwise.

The area off of Somalia where this piracy is taking place is about the size of Spain and offers coastline about the length of the Eastern seaboard. Intelligence driven operations in this area seem to be just about impossible--an area of interest of this size seems to offer little in the way of enabling us to determine where and when pirates will strike.

Given the state of the state in Somalia, piracy is essentially a fungible "commodity." Deterrence against one group at one moment makes it unlikely that others will stop. Nor does it appear that there are so few possible ports that a punitive action against one would be effective against all--particularly as it would be hard to discriminate between legitimate pirate targets and fishermen, etc. I imagine the outcry against such action in the West would preclude its continuation for long enough to be of much use. Nor do tactical successes like today's seem to offer much of a deterrent--after all, earlier this week, French commandos did much the same thing and pirates have continued at their normal pace. I imagine that the pirates' after action report would focus on the wisdom of sending four men after a ship and how to ensure the crew is unable to disable it (or what to do to crew members themselves if they take such actions)--maybe they'll just tug the thing next time. Certainly, getting to shore, as they knew, would have been a game changer (think hostages in Lebanon in the 1980s, except with less government, if that's possible)--and they had at least eight hours according to news reports in which to do so. I also imagine that collective punishment against the Somali population on the sea coast would enable Al Qaeda's influence in the country to a greater degree.

The New York Times reports today on a current push to essentially arm merchant boats. Others have pushed for arming US merchants regardless of what other nations do. Is this really a practical solution? What percentage of US trade that passes through the area passes on US flagged ships? How much of what passes through the area is tied to the globalized commodity market? If grand amounts of oil are held up in the area, it makes little difference to the US economy whether they were bound for the US or anywhere else or what flag the ship bears--it would drive up US oil prices at a particularly inconvenient time. If more ships are armed in response to the pirates, is the problem of determining a legitimate ship vise a pirate ship even more difficult (I'm not sure they will all do us the favor of hoisting the Jolly Roger)?

Before we talk about how to defeat pirates, I think it would also be useful to discuss how piracy in this area affects our national interest. If piracy were to be allowed to go on unfettered, how much would US trade and the US economy be affected? How much would our image be affected? How much would the world trade regime upon which our hegemony is (at least partially) built be affected? Ground pounders like myself tend to forget that the US' dominant position is built in a large way on its naval force that enables trade and allows us to move our ground forces and goods where we wish.

It is within the context of defining our national interest that we can discuss what exactly we wish to do to pirates and piracy in these waters and how we wish to do it. The range of options certainly seems significant. Can we, for instance, simply have shippers avoid the areas where piracy is taking place? Ransom payment seems a major issue--are ransom payers essentially funding piracy, and can there ships and cargo subsequently be taken or destroyed as the illegal fruits of the trade? This certainly would change the cost-benefit calculation of those who consider ransom payments. On the other hand, could we kill two birds with one stone through some sort of naval unconventional warfare--arming, equipping, and training (and paying) some of the clans to go after pirates (you know, like Anbar, except in the sea)? You can't believe in saints if you are to take this approach. Are there legitimate grievances (definitely) that can be addressed cost-effectively (no idea) that would prevent pirates from being launched from these shores against international shipping? Can merchant convoys be organized and armed to move more effectively with less risk at less cost?

Obviously second- and third-order effects are of prime importance given AQ's presence in Somalia. If the costs of the status quo are very high, or if the low cost solutions will enable AQ and present significant threats to US security, the perhaps nation building of some sort in Somalia, extremely expensive in blood and money for sure, will be a necessary or unavoidable decision.

So the questions we need to be considering right now boil down to this: the cost of action versus the status quo (and perhaps by extension the cost in dollars and opportunity of the current task force), which ships count as "US" ships (as a majority of US-bound and US-derived cargo is not sailed on US-flagged ships) in terms of our national interest, the relationships between our decisions and the war against AQ, the additional difficulties in identifying legal commerce over piracy if more ships are armed, and other strategic options which might be available to us.

So what does your erudite and brilliant readership believe that actions against the pirates should look like, toward what ends, at what costs, and with what risks? I look forward to their thoughts...

When I don't check my blog for a while and come back to a throw-away post I wrote on the Bekaa that somehow has 99 comments on it, that means that my readers have gone off on one another again. Care to sift through the comments? No? ("I got 99 comments but a ***** ain't one.")

Then watch Bob Kaplan and I talk about piracy on the Charlie Rose Show tonight. I'll link to it tomorrow, but if you're up anyway, busy yourself with the Abu Muqawama Drinking Game.

One of the great things about this blog's readership is the readiness it displays to challenge me when topics drift into things about which I know less than a true subject matter expert. If I were to start holding forth with strong opinions about, say, Canadian politics, I have no doubt my readership would keep me as honest as it has when we talk about economics, health care policy, and insurgencies in regions of the Earth I do not know as well as the Middle East.

By the same token, if you're a blogger who has -- in the past week -- written things such as "Andrew Exum’s idea to dispatch SEAL teams is absurd" and "Exum’s idea to dispatch Navy SEALS is simply silly" then you better have either a) some direct professional experience in direct-action special operations or b) be prepared to explain why that's not a good idea in response to my (what I thought was fairly obvious) suggestion that Navy SEAL teams might be exactly the right answer to a hostage situation on the high seas. If, by contrast, you have no idea about what you are writing and no relevant experience or knowledge but nonetheless have strong opinions, you should keep those opinions to yourself lest the following news emerge 72 hours later:

The operation to rescue Capt. Richard Phillips involved dozens of Navy SEALs, who parachuted from an aircraft into the scene near dark Saturday, landing in the ocean. The SEALs were part of a larger group of Special Operations Forces involved in the effort, according to military officials.

U.S. military observers believed that Phillips was about to be shot. SEAL snipers, who were positioned on a deck at the stern of the Bainbridge, an area known as the fantail, had the three pirates in their sights. The on-scene commander gave the SEAL snipers authority to fire.

"As soon as the snipers had a clear shot at the guy who had the rifle, they shot him and the other two in the hatches," said the senior military official.

A member of the Special Operations team slid down the tow line into the water and climbed aboard the lifeboat. Phillips was then put in a small craft and taken to the Bainbridge.

I do not have the time to explain the training, missions, and capabilities of our nation's special operations forces. To even those without a security clearance or any relevant military or policy background, the value of these forces should be gobsmackingly obvious. And anyone who has closely read what I have written knows that I -- far from being "obsessed" with special operations forces -- have been quite critical about their employment in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This criticism is based on both personal experience and a careful study of policies and operations.

No, an average platoon of Marines or Army light infantry does not have the capabilities or the training to carry out the missions executed by Army Rangers, Navy SEALs, and other SOF (to include the SMUs). That's okay. Because in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the so-called "general purpose" forces are the ones responsible for carrying out the main effort. But parachuting into the middle of the Indian Ocean, swimming to the USS Bainbridge and then shooting three pirates from a boat that is rocking up and down and side to side is pretty effing difficult. If this operation to rescue Richard Phillips isn't the damn poster child for why we need special operations forces -- and why it's important that those forces are able to work in tandem with normal U.S. Navy and U.S. Army forces -- I don't know what is.

Sorry. I usually don't go off like that. But I have been holding my tongue for three days. And I don't get angry when genuine subject matter experts respectfully criticize me on issues about which they know more than I -- think Josh Foust on Afghanistan -- but do when others attack me in a know-it-all fashion about things they don't have any experience in or knowledge of.

For the rest of you, meanwhile, this short, fun essay by John Collins at Small Wars Journal should be required reading for all of those who don't know much about special operations but want to know more.

P.S. Hahaha. Great quote from a member of the readership, in an earlier thread: "Well, I think this puts an end to the pirates vs. ninjas debate."

Happy Easter indeed! (More to follow...)

MOMBASA, Kenya (AP) -- An American ship captain was freed unharmed Sunday in a swift firefight that killed three of the four Somali pirates who had been holding him for days in a lifeboat off the coast of Africa, the ship's owner said.

A senior U.S. intelligence official said a pirate who had been involved in negotiations to free Capt. Richard Phillips but who was not on the lifeboat was in custody.

Phillips, 53, of Underhill, Vermont, was safely transported to a Navy warship nearby.

Maersk Line Limited President and CEO John Reinhart said in a news release that the U.S. government informed the company around 1:30 p.m. EDT Sunday that Phillips had been rescued. Reinhart said the company called Phillips' wife, Andrea, to tell her the news.

The U.S. official was not authorized to discuss the matter publicly and spoke on condition of anonymity. A Pentagon spokesman had no immediate comment.

When Phillips' crew heard the news aboard their ship in the port of Mombasa, they placed an American flag over the rail of the top of the Maersk Alabama and whistled and pumped their fists in the air. Crew fired a bright red flare into the sky from the ship.

My CNAS colleague Bob Kaplan has an op-ed in the New York Times today on -- what else? Aargh! -- pirates. Bob thinks this running fiasco off the Horn of Africa doesn't reflect well on U.S. naval power.

That a relatively small number of pirates from a semi-starving nation can constitute enough of a menace to disrupt major sea routes is another sign of the anarchy that will be characteristic of a multipolar world, in which a great navy like America’s — with a falling number of overall ships — will be in relative, elegant decline, while others will either lack the stomach or the capacity to adequately guard the seas.

I guess there is an argument to be made there. After all, navies are responsible for basically four missions.

1. Protect seaborne commerce.
2. Protect movement of armies and their supplies.
3. Deny enemy trade and commerce.
4. Deny movement of enemy armies and supplies.

If our navy can't do #1 and #2, then we might need to re-think what we're doing. I would defer, though, to what Old Boy Galrahn has to say about this, as well as to the thoughts of Martin Murphy, pretty much among the world's leading piracy experts. This may present a tactical problem to the U.S. Navy that does not demand a complete re-set of the force structure.

Another invaluable resource these days is the Naval Institute's blog. These nerds are to the high seas what we are to population. Only more nerdish. If that is possible.