Center for a New American Security

The ASEAN Summit in Bangkok has been shut down with mass protests and clashes between pro-government groups, supporters of the previous government, and the military/police forces. How should the government respond?

(Carlos won't suggest SEALs, and ninjas are closer to being culturally appropriate than pirates here, but what about cowboys? The leader of the Redshirts--seen above--would fit...I mean, if the cowboys were the ones from the village people....)

Carlos was looking for a scorecard for the various players for the readership rather than trying to type it all up himself. The most concise one he found was here. More in-depth profiles can be found on the BBC site.

There's no real irony, despite the reportage, that the "Red Shirt" supporters of former PM Thaksin Shinawatra are using the same tactics that were used against Thaksin when he was in office. Good tactics is good tactics. Enlisting the aid of taxi drivers to block roads, pushing mass amounts of people to clog the airport, all great protest tactics. State of emergency has been declared, and the military is out firing weapons in the air. Tensions are, needless to say, very high, and a little slip could really push the situation over the top. The declaration is probably necessary (the Royal Thai Police do not have the manpower to deal with this size of protests), and more importantly, the Thai Police have had even *less* training on quelling riots than the military (though this has been shifting).

The regional and international implications are big here. Beyond the actual meetings, the ASEAN Summits have always been (attempted) showcases for the host country. With the turmoil in Thailand the last three years, this was going to be a big deal. This meeting was also meant to take advantage of the relatively good press of the G-20 summit The heads of government of 10+ countries (not just ASEAN members, but major dialogue partners Japan, China, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand)getting run out of town isn't the best tourism/commerce campaign.

Whether Thaksin himself is orchestrating the Redshirt protests to destabilize the current government is interesting, but in the end is not critical. Thailand's internal stability holds larger ramifications and while the Abhisit government currently has the military's support, increasing chaos could see that change.

Carlos cannot say this "obscures" the problem of tensions in the South, but the Pattani movement over the last 4-5 years has been showing increasing levels of violence. Many in Thailand (government officials and others) had blamed Thaksin while he as PM for stirring tensions in the South for political purposes. True or not (the Pattani movement obviously predates Thaksin), he hasn't been the only player. Regional groups like Jemaah Islamiyah have long wanted a tie-in to the Southern Thailand issue, and their influence may be growing there (see the International Crisis Group reports on Southern Thailand--the website is currently down or flooded with requests (Carlos suspects the latter)--I'll re-edit later with links). With the Thai government having to deal with the protests, efforts to deal with the South will inevitably be on the backburner. The long-term impacts of this unfortunate fact could (will) be troubling.

EDIT: ICG site is still down, but the links are in a previous post here. I suspect that a more current ICG report will be hitting their site very soon.

The three convicted Bali Bombers were executed late last night by firing squad. Indonesian security forces await violent gatherings and events today. The three bombers were unrepentant to the end, glorifying in their celebrity all through their trial.

One of the convicted was Imran Samudra, and his jailhouse autobiography, Saya Melawan Teroris" (Me Against Terrorists) had sold over 10,000 copies over three print runs. (Plans to translate the book into other languages, including English, have been on hold since late 2005. The Indonesian Government has said it would be reviewing the book to evaluate banning its continued publication).

Counter-Radical publications have been less popular in terms of sales, though this may be more about notoriety than agreement.

This goes to the heart of the problem regarding de-radicalization programs and movements. In many ways, they require what could be euphemistically termed "Passionate Moderation", and that is an incredibly difficult emotion to stir.

There are, of course, the structural obstacles first. See this still-relevant report by the International Crisis Group on de-radicalisation programs in Indonesia. The ICG notes that the success of the programs are undermined by the problems within the prison system. Many critics have suggested that the Indonesian Government's failure to close off the Bali Bombers from the media heightened their celebrity and continued to fan the flames of the radical movement. On this score, the government cannot win, as if they had closed the prisoners off, they would have likely been subject to criticisms from simple mistreatment to torture.

But even if prison reform magically occurs, the energy needed to keep these programs going, and to make them relevant to the ones that need to be reached, will remain difficult. Simply put, MODERATION IS BORING. Regardless of how one ties recruitment into ANY group/movement to the need for young (men, especially) to find excitement, note that NONE of the "recruiting" movements stress even-handedness and balance.

So, how to counter the militant, the true believer? Arguably with someone who's been there, as the Indonesia program attempts to do. The experiences of those like Ed Husain are also interesting. (Husain's book is a wonderful read. It is available via Amazon.co.uk, but not in the US directly. Carlos bought it when the dollar was much stronger, interested readers in the US now have to deal with a tougher exchange rate).

Alternatively, there are those who have the same experience but not the same result. In this light, Carlos recommends the blog by Noor Huda Ismail. Ismail was for six years a student at the Al Mukmin Ngruki, the boarding school founded by Abu Bakkar Baasyir (spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah. Ismail is a contemporary to the Bali Bombers and many of their supporters.

Passionate Moderation is so hard to come by. On one level it may manifest in perceived hypocrisy. Carlos remembers fondly his time in Kosovo, drinking beer and smoking cigarettes (though Carlos does not partake of the tobacco)with large groups of Albanian Muslims. One of them referred to Kosovo as home to "Rock and Roll Muslims," and that is either the hope or the danger of such presentation. R'n'R Muslims certainly don't play in Southeast Asia. Well, if they do, they aren't as blatant:

(Carlos remembers being in grocery stores in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, one of his favorite cities. Next to the beer and wine, there are frequently prominent signs in Malay, English, and sometimes Arabic. The signs state "Muslims Cannot Buy Alcohol." Carlos wonders which Muslim needed to be told that).

But that is of course the symptom of the problem. "Integrated" believers either allow for others to "sin," or (more problematically for the believer) allow for a certain amount of secular hypocrisy. It's not hard to see why the militant voice has such play in comparison to that. Carlos cheers for the Rock and Roll Muslims (and Christians, and Buddhists, etc,) but he recognizes the problem with such "movements" toward secularization and moderation. They in fact increase the threat to those who feel both disenfranchised from the "society to come" and view the "society that was" (even if only in mind) being erased and degraded.

Carlos has long wondered about the differences in the virulence of two different insurgencies in Southeast Asia. One in the Southern Philippines, the other in Southern Thailand. Not being one for monocausal arguments, there are many factors that have been raised to explain the differences.

1. Buddhism vs. Catholicism as a major religion and its associated tensions with Islam.

2. The role of a King who is above politics, but has moral authority and a true bully pulpit. (The King of Thailand isn't necessarily respected in the South, where part of the claims for separation rest on separate kingdoms, but could the King's position in the rest of Thai society be a factor in societal relations in the South?)

3. Income differentials for the regions, as well as connection between the "haves" and whatever particular section of society.

4. Role of the Afghanistan experience? Many Filipinos fought against the Soviets, and I cannot say there were no Thais in that fight, I cannot on the other hand think of any off the top of my head. (This, though, isn't really an explanation, but simply an expression of the same phenomenon--why the Southern Philippines fighters have transnational connections and less so with the Southern Thais).

So there continue to be differences, but there may be unfortunate inroads (so far, only tactical) from transnational influences into Southern Thailand. Recent bomb attacks show a shift in targeting (not to mention the simple tactic of the car bomb itself) towards first responders and increasing casualty counts. This is certainly a troubling development, given the recent reports by the International Crisis Group (Carlos' favorite place for current SE Asia information and analysis, incidentally) that there have been advances for the government in the South.

The ICG report also notes that these advances due to shifts in the application of military power will not (statement of the obvious to follow) address the more fundamental grievances of the insurgents.

The Thai government is currently distracted from this issue due to more pressing concerns closer to home, as the current PM is facing (literally outside his door) a massive popular protest. (Again in some contradistinction to the Philippines, there is something about "revolutions" in Thailand that are different).

ASIDE: To add on to Rivers' post above, Carlos remembers a quick stopover in Bangkok, during which there was a massive protest over (I think) government salaries being cut. The mass of people made the terrible traffic in Bangkok even worse, but it cleared out when the protesters left for the weekend. They would be coming back Monday.

ASIDE 2: The food vendors in SE Asia are the creators of some of the greatest cuisine known to humanity, and one should always partake whenever possible. They are also some of the best HUMINT in the region. When they are not in an area that they usually populate, be wary; when they arrive in even greater numbers than one usually sees, this is either: (1) a Festival (which you can confirm with a calendar and newspaper) or (2)a massive protest is coming.

Samak Sundaravej, the current Thai PM is under fire for being a proxy of the previous one, the billionaire Thaksin Shinawatra. Thaksin was under investigation for multiple corruption charges when he fled the country. Thaksin and Samak remain quite popular in the outskirts of the country, but definitely have their share of enemies among the urban population and "traditional elite" in and around the capital.

Yeah, I don't know of any other country that has a situation like that (/sarcasm)

While the protesters generally agree Samak should go, asking who will or should replace him is to open up a whole host of questions. Many anti-Thaksin folks believed he stirred up the problems in the South for political advantage (fat lot of good that did him), but with this ongoing turmoil, any advances that might be made in the South are almost sure to be lost.

So here I am, on AM, as the resident “Asia Pundit,” if you will. I’ve spent most of my intellectual life and a great deal of my physical one in and near <?xml:namespace prefix = st1 />Asia, and for anyone who studies political violence, it isn’t as if there isn’t enough to talk about in that region. Operation Enduring Freedom is, after all, more than Afghanistan, and OEF-P (for Philippines) is at the heart of what has been called the “second front” in the war against terror. The threat that groups in the Southern Philippines pose not just within the country but as part of a regional threat is understandable. How one responds to that threat, ah, now there’s the point.

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Many things are problematic with the imagery of a “second front.” On the purely sensible military note that opening up another front isn’t often the smartest of moves, on the whole war analogy in the first place, “second fronts” aren’t usually good things. (Gershman’s article focuses not on whether we should be concerned with Al-Qaeda type radicalism inserting themselves into Southeast Asia, but whether the military instrument—how one responds to another “front”—is the best way to address such a concern in SE Asia).

News on OEF-P frequently is articulated as the “good stuff the military is doing in the war on terror.” There has been great validity to that, but that’s not the big story. At least, it shouldn’t be. The thing that is more important to know and understand is how not only the US military, but other aspects of both American and Philippine power are being applied to handle tensions in the southern Philippines. One of those things has been the establishment of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), an effort to give to folks in Mindanao some political buy-in to the central government in Manila by opening up some political space and internal self-rule on some issues. The ARMM, however, isn’t a very large part of Mindanao writ large, so the sense of meaningful representation is, shall we say, a little questionable. August 12 2008 saw the most recent ARMM elections, and while there were some instances of violence, the Philippine government is viewing the elections (so far) as a success. And with an estimated 84 percent turnout (of 1.7 million potential voters), there’s good reason to be optimistic, but not complacent. That same day reports discussed about 130,000 displaced persons in the southern Philippines.

A great deal of the work for the Philippine government and the effectiveness of their programs to bring the people of the south into the national fold will be seen not in the potential increase of the territory covered by the ARMM, but more in the movement by the population either for or against a larger ARMM territory. Economically, the Southern Philippines is the poorest region, and overlaying gap that is the religious difference (a majority Muslim population in the south, but still a minority to the overall Catholic population in the Philippines total). That’s an easy recipe for discontent. What is critical is whether this domestic grievance can be tied to a larger regional or even global one. On that score, the worst thing for the situation in the Philippines (or SE Asia more generally) is to be any front in the “Global War on Terror.”