Center for a New American Security

LTG Dave Barno, Matt Irvine and I have a new policy paper out at CNAS, which you can read here. This paper is in a lot of ways the logical follow-on to our Responsible Transition report from December of last year, which, looking back, still seems quite relevant. (Check it out if you have the time.)

LTG Barno and I sat down with about a dozen journalists this morning and went over the particulars of new report. Our primary concern -- and the reason why we felt the need to write this report -- is that U.S. and allied commanders in Afghanistan have not yet made the mental leap that, whether they like it or not, the United States and the rest of the NATO coalition are transitioning in Afghanistan. In 2008, the situation in Afghanistan may have required large-scale counterinsurgency operations to buy time and space to build up Afghan security forces. (And I argued, in 2009, that it did.) Some would argue the situation still demands such large-scale operations, but with the transition already under way, the time to make the switch from counterinsurgency to security force assistance is sooner -- while you still have the relevant enablers in the country -- rather than in 2014. If those Afghan units you have been building are lemons, you also want to know that sooner rather than later.

Some U.S. and allied officers might argue the United States and the rest of the coalition are already working by, with and through the Afghans, but the reality on the ground suggests that is the exception, not the rule. In 2009, the NATO/ISAF command in Afghanistan stood up NTM-A to train Afghan soldiers and police, and that effort, while flawed, has been a lot more successful than what came before it. But the old training-and-advisory component of the mission was folded into the combat command in Afghanistan, and that work has since been uneven. "Partnering" -- which Gen. Stan McChrystal felt would allow Afghan units to fight alongside U.S. and allied units and thereby increase the development of the former -- never really materialized. U.S. combat units have been more proficient at finding and killing the Taliban and the Haqqani Network, so they have done the jobs themselves.

But developing security forces is like any other development work. What matters most is not whether or not the school or dam gets built but rather the process through which you take the host nation government to build a school or dam. U.S. commanders in Afghanistan now need to take short-term security risks in order to get Afghan units into the lead. The time to do this is now, not in 2014. Among the forcing mechanisms available to a president are to change the mission, change his commander, or change the resources. President Obama has already done the second and third this year. He should now do the first as well.

Anyway, read the whole report here and sound off in the comments section. 

I had dinner last night with several Levant specialists, including Aram Nerguizian of the CSIS. Tony Cordesman speaks highly of Aram, and their paper on the Lebanese Armed Forces is probably the best thing you can read on the subject. Aram has a book coming out this summer on the Lebanese Armed Forces, and yes, he has already agreed to do a "Six Questions" interview for the blog when the book is published.

In the meantime, I want to link to a fascinating discussion between Aram and David Schenker at the Middle East Institute. I can't think of two people I would rather listen to on the subject of U.S. military assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces. I "tweeted" this event the week it was held but was not able to be there myself. So many thanks to Aram for alerting me that their discussion is on the internets. I'll link to the first part of the discussion below, but anyone who is screaming for the U.S. to provide Lebanon with fixed-wing attack aircraft and other prestige weaponry should listen to Part 3.

Dr. iRack has been writing a lot about the ongoing U.S.-Iraq negotiations over the SOFA and the related but separate Strategic Framework Agreement (outlining long-term military, economic, and political ties) in the last week. (For good summaries of the agreements, see here and here). In recent days there have been a lot of important developments on this front.

Maliki just returned from Iran, where Iranian leaders (including Ayatollah Ali Khamenei) complained about an impending U.S.-Iraqi security pact and, as usual, blamed all the violence in Iraq on the U.S. "occupation." (Perhaps to mollify Tehran's concerns, Iraq and Iran agreed to increase their own defense cooperation.)

On the Iraqi side of the equation, the growing number of complaints against the SOFA negotiations include the number of bases (58 by one count), U.S. control of Iraqi airspace, contractor immunities, and the right of U.S. forces to detain Iraqi combatants. Iraqi leaders are also concerned that the U.S. would be able to define external "aggression" against Iraq in any way they wanted, perhaps dragging Iraq into a war with Iran. Lawmakers and officials in the ruling coalition (yes ISCI/Dawa, not just the Sadrists) are now loudly criticizing the draft SOFA:

"The points that were put forth by the Americans were more abominable than the occupation," said Jalal al Din al Saghir, a leading lawmaker from the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. "We were occupied by order of the Security Council," he said, referring to the 2004 Resolution mandating a U.S. military occupation in Iraq at the head of an international coalition. "But now we are being asked to sign for our own occupation. That is why we have absolutely refused all that we have seen so far." . . .

"It would impair Iraqi sovereignty," said Ali al Adeeb a leading member of Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki's Dawa party of the proposed accord. "The Americans insist so far that is they who define what is an aggression on Iraq and what is democracy inside Iraq... if we come under aggression we should define it and ask for help."

Maybe this is all for show to appease the growing nationalist backlash and Sadrist-led protests, or gain bargaining leverage to get a better deal. (And the latter may be working since the agreement is reportedly being tweaked to address some of these concerns.) Nevertheless, although the administration still aims to complete a strategic framework this year (including the SOFA), they now admit that the uproar may prevent them from finalizing a deal this year and may force them to support an extension of the UNSCR instead.

If this happens, it would effectively kick the negotiations down the road to the next administration. Dr. iRack is on record that this would be a good thing, since that would allow the negotiations to occur within the context of a credible commitment for a phased U.S. redeployment--something that would lead to a better deal with less nationalist backlash.