Center for a New American Security

Uh oh, Meghan O'Sullivan has something to say about Iraq...

While visiting Iraq this month, Biden spoke of a need to broker a grand bargain between Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds, and to resolve disputes between "the different confessional groups." He made clear that he -- and, presumably, the United States -- saw Iraq's challenges and solutions largely in terms of sectarian or ethnic groups. Discussing Iraq's problems in such terms pushes Iraqis back toward the boxes they have been trying to leave behind -- and undermines incipient movement away from the dominance of sectarian political identities toward issues-based politics.

To many Iraqis, such language is familiar. The failure in security from 2004 well into 2007 crystallized sectarian and ethnic identities; Sunni extremists and Shiite militias identified both their targets and those they protected on sectarian grounds. But this language is also increasingly outdated. Security improvements over the past two years have created space for Iraqis to begin moving away from seeing themselves and their problems in such terms. Indeed, in the provincial elections held in January, issues seemed to matter to voters at least as much as identities...

The current tensions between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government are frequently presented simplistically as manifestations of historical animosities between Arabs and Kurds. Certainly, cultural factors do matter, and Iraq's long history -- including, of course, Saddam Hussein's brutal efforts to eradicate the Kurds -- shapes the nature of the problems and the lens through which they are viewed.

But the reality is that Iraq's most difficult problems are primarily about substantive issues. Iraqis and their leaders are divided on fundamental questions about the nature of the state -- specifically, whether the locus of power should be in Baghdad or in the provinces. Should Iraq be a more traditional Arab state, where power is centralized in the capital? Or should the regions and the provinces -- i.e., the KRG -- have substantial authorities and autonomy?

Now, I don't think this is bad advice--I've also questioned Biden's "appointment" as the de facto special envoy to Iraq.  In a lot of ways his--and, more broadly, America's--conception of power-sharing and national reconciliation in Iraq seems trapped in the Bosnia paradigm of divvying up territory along ethnic lines and calling it peace.  I don't think that's particularly helpful for Iraq.  We have to avoid policies that reinforce the country's ethno-sectarian divisions (which, to be honest, O'Sullivan and some of those she advised played a role, even if inadvertently, in exacerbating in the early years of the war).

But do you really think the average Kurd or Arab in the street, let alone their respective leadership in Erbil and Baghdad, is thinking about this in terms of abstract federalism?  I think it's likely that the identity issue is salient.  There's a long history there that predates Saddam, and nobody's forgotten it.  That doesn't mean that Kurds and Arabs are destined to fight for eternity, but it does make the situation much more dangerous and harder to solve than a federalism dispute between Washington and Sacramento.

_____

I've also been keeping track of the apparent controversy over Iraq's (gasp) tough enforcement of the SOFA terms to limit U.S. operations.  Is this really that much of a surprise?  It shouldn't be--I'm not sure what else we were expecting.  It was clear from the beginning of the SOFA negotiations that the Iraqis were deadly serious about it.  They want to run the show, and we have to respect that.  They might not be as "ready" or effective as U.S. forces, but it seems like we really have to learn to let go a bit on the security front.  Let's wait a bit and see how this shakes out before pronouncing it a disaster.

One of our regular blog readers requested some discussion of the recent spate of bombings in Iraq and the implications for the U.S. pullout from Iraqi cities set for June 30 (this Tuesday--mark it on your calendar).  This wave of attacks has prompted a good amount of hand-wringing about the coming “unraveling” of the country.  Here’s my two-cent analysis.

Obviously we don't want to underestimate how dangerous and violent Iraq is.  Even with the dramatic improvements in security over the past two years, it's not exactly a choice vacation destination and probably won't be for the foreseeable future.  From the remnants of AQI to the underground members of the JAM and “special groups,” there’s no shortage of bad guys out there who would like to undermine the Iraqi government.  With U.S. forces pulling back, they have some opportunity to reemerge, probe the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces, and spark a new round of communal strife.

So it’s not like the current series of bombings is unexpected.  Certainly it’s not a good thing, but it’s also important not to overreact:

Despite all these bombings, we have yet to see signs that the death spiral of sectarian retaliation has returned or is about to return.  This is a point that General Odierno has made with some regularity.  The attacks in and of themselves are terrible, but not necessarily strategically significant unless they trigger waves of reprisals that Iraqi forces cannot control.  If there are signs of this occurring, it doesn’t seem like they’re being noticed.  Instead we get statements from al-Sadr after the recent attacks calling for restraint.  Obviously we can’t take that restraint for granted, but that still seems qualitatively better than the days of 2006.

In any case, even if we’re concerned about some degradation of security, what are we supposed to do?  A number of folks, including Stephen Biddle, have counseled slowing the pace of withdrawal, but to exactly what end?  Iraq’s forces may not be the best in the world and Maliki may be overconfident, but it seems to me that what the Iraqis need is more assistance in resolving some underlying conflicts that can drive violence (Sunni integration into government, Kurdish territorial and oil disputes) and developing the governmental and economic institutions necessary to sustain the state.  It’s not clear to me that continuing our troop presence in Iraq at its current level and disposition is still required to advance those goals.

Of course, I could be completely wrong.  But if Iraq is about to go off the rails, I will predict that it will not be because of the Sunni-Shi’ite divide that still gets a lot of the U.S. media focus.  It will either be a flaring-up of the simmering Kurdish-Arab conflict, or something else we haven’t thought of yet.

 

According to Reuters, the 2011 date for a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces was a compromise. Looks like Bush wanted a longer stay, asking for authorization until 2015. The Iraqis countered with 2010, and the compromise was 2011. The date is not finalized, and it not clear what if any U.S. presence there might be after 2011 (since, even under Maliki's recent formulation, the Iraqis could ask us to stay longer in a support role after that.) But if you want to know why our leverage has gone down, you now know. Because Bush was begging to let us stay longer than the Iraqis wanted, we had to give the Iraqis concessions instead of vice versa to let us do so. This whole thing should have been crafted to get the Iraqis to convince us we shouldn't leave sooner and convince us we should provide them with residual support (counter-terrorism assistance, training and advising, deterrence against external foes, etc.)--but instead we begged to stay longer. Totally backasswards. It also points to the significant downsides of any presidential candidate signaling that he would like to stay for a long, long time (a decades-long "Korea-style" presence, for example). If the next president tells the Iraqis this is what he wants, the Iraqis will be extracting concessions from us when it should be the other way around.

The NYT reports that Prime Minister Maliki is calling for a fixed timetable for the removal of all U.S. forces by the end of 2011.

Days after top Iraqi and American officials suggested that a draft of the security pact between the countries was close, Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki toughened his language, reiterating earlier Iraqi demands for a fixed date for the withdrawal of American troops.

“It is not possible for any agreement to conclude unless it is on the basis of full sovereignty and the national interest, and that no foreign soldiers remain in Iraqi soil after a defined time ceiling,” Mr. Maliki said in a speech to Shiite tribal leaders in Baghdad’s Green Zone.

What is going on? The straight forward explanation is that Maliki is asserting Iraqi sovereignty and demanding the full withdrawal of the occupier. But Dr. iRack thinks the answer may be a bit more complicated than that.

A fuller explanation should start with the recognition that Maliki's current position is simultaneously strong and weak. He is increasingly (over)confident as a result of successful ISF operations in Basra, Sadr City, Mosul, and Amara, and is attempting to fashion himself into a strongman figure.

At the same time, the prime minister is in a weak position over the long-term. His Dawa party has little grassroots support, the once united Shia front is fractured, and escalating Arab-Kurd tensions mean the Kurds are no longer reliable coalition partners. The Sadrists long ago left his coalition, and the rest of his coalition is fraying. This weakness makes him vulnerable in upcoming elections.

This combination of near-term strength and long-term vulnerability is causing him to rush to consolidate power now before it is too late. This is manifesting itself in several ways:

1. Maliki's efforts to undermine the Sadrists (not just militarily, but dismantling their political apparatus in the south).

2. Maliki's efforts to stall the integration of the Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi Security Forces, and
detain and harass the Awakening Groups/SOIs in Diyala, Abu Ghraib, and Baghdad.

3. Maliki's continued efforts to consolidate command over various elements of the ISF (including Iraqi SOF and Emergency Response Units) and intelligence services, and the use of various "Operations Centers" in Baghdad, Basra, Ninewa, and Diyala to directly command the Iraqi Army (and supersede local police).

And last, but not least:

4. Maliki's domestic political positioning vis-a-vis the SOFA which attempts to enhance his nationalist credentials by demanding a timeline for a U.S. departure.

So, does Maliki want the Americans completely out? Not yet. If he did, he could get us to leave immediately. All he has to do is not agree to any SOFA or UNSCR re-up or bridge agreement and we will have to leave. Period. The fact that Maliki wants some agreement (any agreement) suggests that even Maliki recognizes he needs us -- at least for a while longer.

Does Maliki really want all forces out by the end of 2011? Maybe, but Dr. iRack remains dubious. Dr. iRack suspects that Maliki wants all combat forces out, but not all support troops. Indeed, as the NYT notes:

Though Mr. Maliki seemed to be referring to all foreign troops in his statements, Iraqi negotiators have said recently that an agreed-upon 2011 date is for combat forces only, and that “training and support” forces could remain after that if invited by the Iraqi government. On Monday, a senior Iraqi official said he understood that even a departure date for combat troops would be “conditions driven.”

The Iraqi consensus--both civilian and military--is that Iraq's Army won't be able to defend their country from external aggression for a decade. That is why Maliki and other Iraqi leaders have pushed for an external security assurance within the context of the Strategic Framework Agreement. It therefore seems unlikely that even Maliki would risk having zero U.S. support assets in Iraq post-2011.

So why talk about all troops out by the end of 2011? Here an aide to Maliki provides some insight to the WaPo:

"The agreement will be met with significant public discomfort," said an aide to Maliki. "So Iraqi officials will resort to using the dates mentioned in the agreement to sell it to the public, even though they might be intended to be used in a guidance way."

The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to talk to the media, added: "If you ask the prime minister, 'What happens if the situation on the ground changes before 2011?' then he would obviously say that the dates might need to be changed."

Reports suggest that U.S. and Iraqi negotiators have agreed on a text for a SOFA (now called a "Memorandum of Understanding," or MOU), which will be attached to a broader Strategic Framework Agreement. The agreement still has to get approved by Maliki and then the Iraqi parliament, so it's a long way from being finalized--and maybe it won't happen at all. But when reading the leaked details of the agreement, Dr. iRack took note of a key date: June 2009

Apparently, the SOFA/MOU will call for U.S. combat forces to be out of Iraqi cities by the end of June 2009. Dr. iRack does not think this means that U.S. forces will actually be completely out of Iraqi cities by that date. Rather, he suspects it means that U.S. combat outposts and joint security stations will be handed over to Iraqi security forces by that date, at which point U.S. forces will go back to "commuting to work" from outlying FOBs. U.S. forces are likely to continue to partner, mentor, and advise the ISF, but their visibility on the streets--and their ability to monitor the ISF and influence events--will be greatly reduced. The SOFA/MOU also seems likely to call for the removal of remaining U.S. combat forces by the end of 2011, although this is an "aspirational" timeline. The exact details regarding the kinds of forces that might remain after 2011 remain fuzzy, but it appears that the agreement envisions the possibility of some U.S. troops in a support role past that date.

But let's stick with the June 2009 date for a moment. This date is important. You see, Dr. iRack has also heard from his contacts that this is the key date for transitioning the remaining Sons of Iraq contracts to the Iraqi government. There are currently 102,000 SoIs. The U.S. goal is to integrate about 16,000 into the ISF by the end of 2008, and provide another 26,000 civilian jobs -- a total of 40 percent of the SoIs would then be off the American rolls. The goal is then to transition the remaining 60 percent of the contracts to the Iraqi government to manage. Dr. iRack was under the impression that this was to occur on January 1, 2009 -- but he's now heard that it will happen in June 2009. Yes, that's right, the same June.

If true, this cannot be a coincidence. Instead, it likely represents a demand from the Iraqi government made during the SOFA negotiations. It makes sense that if the ISF will officially be "in the lead" in Iraqi cities in the summer of 2009, the Iraqi government would also want full control of the SoI program at that time. This means the Maliki government will be free to employ them if they so desire or, more likely, fire them, detain them, or use all that biometric and biographical information we've collected to do whatever else they see fit with them. Given the fact that Maliki and his allies hate these guys and, according to a recent interview with General Petraeus, the Iraqi government is purposefully slowing down the integration process, it is unlikely that Maliki and his buddies will be generous once they are in complete control of the program. And if recent behavior in Diyala and the newly reported crack down on SoIs in Abu Ghraib are any indication, things could get ugly.

So, if you're looking for a D-Day in Iraq, it just might just be June 2009, when U.S. forces are pulling back, no longer supervising the SoIs on a daily basis, and handing the whole shebang over the Iraqi government. Fireworks normally happen on July 4th in the United States. They may happen a bit earlier in Iraq.

As I’m sure most readers noticed, President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki agreed to include a “time horizon” for withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraq as part of the bilateral strategic framework currently under negotiation. . . or did they?

This is what the written statement from Bush's Press Secretary said:

In the context of these improving political, economic, and security conditions, the President and the Prime Minister discussed the ongoing negotiations to establish a normalized bilateral relationship between Iraq and the United States. The leaders agreed on a common way forward to conclude these negotiations as soon as possible, and noted in particular the progress made toward completing a broad strategic framework agreement that will build on the Declaration of Principles signed last November, and include areas of cooperation across many fields, including economics, diplomacy, health, culture, education, and security.

In the area of security cooperation, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that improving conditions should allow for the agreements now under negotiation to include a general time horizon for meeting aspirational goals -- such as the resumption of Iraqi security control in their cities and provinces and the further reduction of U.S. combat forces from Iraq. The President and Prime Minister agreed that the goals would be based on continued improving conditions on the ground and not an arbitrary date for withdrawal. The two leaders welcomed in this regard the return of the final surge brigade to the United States this month, and the ongoing transition from a primary combat role for U.S. forces to an overwatch role, which focuses on training and advising Iraqi forces, and conducting counter-terror operations in support of those forces.

This transition and the subsequent reduction in U.S. forces from Iraq is a testament to the improving capacity of Iraq's Security Forces and the success of joint operations that were initiated under the new strategy put in place by the President and the Prime Minister in January 2007.

“A general time horizon for meeting aspirational goals." Seriously? That’s the best they could do. That phraseology ranks right up there with "WMD-related program activities."

No, seriously, what does the time horizon actually mean? The administration is adamant that it does not imply a fixed timetable . . . or even necessarily a withdrawal. According the NYT:

The White House offered no specifics about how far off any “time horizon” would be, with officials saying details remained to be negotiated. Any dates cited in an agreement would be cast as goals for handing responsibility to Iraqis, and not specifically for reducing American troops, said a White House spokesman, Gordon D. Johndroe. . . .

On the prospect of dates for American withdrawals, Mr. Johndroe, the White House spokesman, said that the agreement would not prescribe American troop levels over time, but rather reflect a transition to Iraqi command. “The agreement will look at goal dates for transition of responsibilities and missions,” Mr. Johndroe said in an e-mail message. “The focus is on the Iraqi assumption of missions, not on what troop levels will be.”

The Iraqi government, however, described the agreement in somewhat different terms. The NYT continues:

Under pressure from political parties wanting a diminishing American role, Mr. Maliki began demanding something in the agreement that would make it clear that American troops were on the way out. Iraq’s statement on Friday, reflecting those internal sensitivities, referred more specifically than the American version to “a time frame for the complete transfer of the security responsibilities to the hands of the Iraqi security as preface to decrease the number of the American forces and withdraw them later from Iraq.”

In Baghdad, a member of Mr. Maliki’s Dawa Party, Ali al-Adeeb, said the withdrawal of American and other foreign forces was fundamental to an accord. “The Iraqi government considers the determination of a specific date for the withdrawal of foreign forces an important issue to deal with,” he said. “I don’t know what the American side thinks, but we consider it the core of the subject.”

Similarly, the Washington Post reported:

Iraqi government spokesman Ali Dabbagh confirmed in a statement that Iraq and the United States had agreed "to specify a time horizon to achieve a full handover of security responsibility to the Iraqi forces in order to decrease American forces and allow for its withdrawal from Iraq."

But Sadiq Rikabi, a senior political adviser to Maliki, said in an interview that negotiators were still hashing out the details of troop cuts. The Iraqi government, he said, wants specific timelines governing different stages of what will eventually become a full U.S. withdrawal of combat forces.

"There are two principles that determine the military relationship: no permanent bases and no permanent existence," Rikabi said. "In such a way, there should be a timetable for withdrawal."

So what explains the different interpretations? And if the Maliki government appears set on establishing some timetable, why did they sign on to a more ambiguous time horizon? Two possibilities suggest themselves:

1. The Iraqi leadership deep down wants a fixed timetable for a complete withdrawal, despite contradictory statements suggesting otherwise, but they were forced to agree to more ambiguous language by the Bush administration.

2. The Iraqi leadership actually wants the U.S. to transition to a support role and reduce its military footprint sooner rather than later, but it is not in favor of a fixed timetable or a complete withdrawal in the near to intermediate term. Nevertheless, to appease rising nationalist sentiment and sovereignty concerns in an Iraqi election year, the Maliki government wants to appear to be demanding some kind of schedule for U.S. withdrawal.

Explanation #2 seems much more likely given the recognition among many in Maliki’s coalition that they will require some residual military presence and support from the United States for several years to come.

If it is true, however, that the Iraqi leadership wants this kind of residual support, and this accounts for the nature of the agreement, Dr. iRack wants to know what the Bush administration demanded from Maliki in exchange for this commitment? Apparently zip, nada, nothing, zilch. So, yet again, the administration failed to exploit our rapidly diminishing leverage to extract concessions from the Maliki government on the political front that might actually help produce lasting stability in Iraq.

Why would the Bush administration pass up this opportunity? Because, to play this game right, the administration would have to be willing to pull U.S. support from the Iraqi government and leave if Iraqi leaders didn’t meet our conditions—something Bush has never been willing to do. Even worse, because the Bush administration is ideologically inclined to desire a long-term military presence (albeit at reduced levels) in Iraq, this sets up a negotiating situation in which the administration is basically begging the Iraqis to let us stay instead of trying to get them to convince us we shouldn’t leave. In short, the Bush administration’s entire approach appears tailor made to not only piss away our leverage, but to make sure that the Iraqis have leverage over us!

Update: Reuters reports that Maliki told a German magazine that he backs a 16-month timetable: "U.S. presidential candidate Barack Obama talks about 16 months. That, we think, would be the right timeframe for a withdrawal, with the possibility of slight changes." When asked if this meant he was siding with Obama over McCain, Maliki said it was not his place to tell people who to vote for, but "Whoever is thinking about the shorter term is closer to reality. Artificially extending the stay of U.S. troops would cause problems." Again, the key to interpreting comments like this is: what does the American presence, in Maliki's view, look like at the "end" of the 16 months? Is it zero? Maybe, but Dr. iRack doesn't think so. Regardless, Maliki is at the very least signaling that he would like to see most troops out in 2010, and the time horizon may be closer than we think. So, how will the next president, Obama or McCain, manage our inevitable draw down to get the most out of the Iraqis on the way out?

Update II: Based on a recent trip to Iraq, a new piece by Kim Kagan in the Weekly Standard concludes with this:

But even the most extreme of these hubristic Shia advisers [to Maliki] strongly favor a partnership with the United States. "Iraq is flying west," one of them told me over a dinner of rice, kabobs, and masghouf (a fish dish). The debate over the details of the military arrangements for 2009 has overshadowed a much more important point, he said, echoing the comments of the young people at the party headquarters we visited: Iraq wants American help of every kind. The security arrangements must be seen within the context of this larger partnership, he added. Like American politicians, of course, he and the rest of Iraq's leaders have to figure out how to sell any specific agreement to the parliament--and to the voters. That makes negotiations difficult, but it is also the strongest possible sign of hope in Iraq.

The whole purpose of the surge was to transform the conflict over power in Iraq from a military to a political struggle. We and the Iraqis have accomplished that goal--for now. But the most critical period in the birth of a new Iraq lies ahead. America can stand beside this fractious and sometimes violent young state whose people are now passionate about democracy. Or we can abandon them to their enemies, to their own fears and insecurities, and to the fragility of their months-old efforts at real reconciliation. It is a weighty choice, but not a hard one for anyone who has seen the vision of a possible future Iraq.

Yet by simplistically framing the issue as a choice between unconditional partnership and total abandonment, Kagan never asks herself: "OK, the Iraqis want us, they need us, so what should we get from them in return for this support?" That is the key political question for the next administration . . . and it is vital if the United States is to push Maliki et al. to make the difficult compromises necessary to lock-in the gains from the surge. The Kagans of the world don't (ever) see that. Instead, they simply use everything and its opposite to make the case that we should stay, forever, no strings attached.

The BBC had an interesting story a few days ago about what Maliki "really" said regarding the need to set a timetables for withdrawal within the context of ongoing SOFA/SFA talks:

In an audio recording of his remarks, heard by the BBC, the prime minister did not use the word "withdrawal".

What he actually said was: "The direction is towards either a memorandum of understanding on their evacuation, or a memorandum of understanding on programming their presence."

Mr Maliki's own office had inserted the word "withdrawal" in the written version, replacing the word "presence".

Contacted by the BBC, the prime minister's office had no explanation for the apparent contradiction. An official suggested the written version remained the authoritative one, although it is not what Mr Maliki said.

The impression of a hardening Iraqi government line was reinforced the following day by comments from the National Security Adviser, Muwaffaq al-Rubaie.

He was quoted as saying that Iraq would not accept any agreement which did not specify a deadline for a full withdrawal of US troops.

Significantly, Mr Rubaie was speaking immediately after a meeting with the senior Shiite clerical eminence, Ayatollah Ali Sistani.

But in subsequent remarks, Mr Rubaie rode back from a straightforward demand for a withdrawal deadline.

He said the talks were focused on agreeing on "timeline horizons, not specific dates", and said that withdrawal timings would depend on the readiness of the Iraqi security forces.

Militant elements

The confusion reflects the dilemma facing Iraqi government leaders.

On the one hand, many of them - particularly among the Shia factions - face a public which regards the US presence as a problem rather than a solution.

With provincial elections coming up soon, they could be outflanked by more militant elements such as the supporters of cleric Moqtada Sadr, who wants American forces out now and opposes negotiations that would cover their continued presence.

Yet the government knows that its own forces are not yet in a position to stand on their own against the two major challenges they face - the Sunni radicals of al-Qaeda and related groups, and the militant Shia militias which were partly suppressed in fierce battles this spring in Basra and Baghdad.

Both groups could simply bide their time awaiting the American withdrawal before making a comeback drive.

Violence has fallen off considerably from the horrendous levels of 2006 and the first half of 2007, but hundreds of people are still dying violent deaths every month.

Hence the ambiguity in statements by Iraqi leaders, who know that their own survival depends on US support continuing until Iraqi forces are genuinely able to stand alone.

All of this seems to validate a number of points Dr. iRack has been making for some time now:

1. The Iraqi leadership knows that the Iraqi public continues to dislike the U.S. presence, and in an election year those concerns have to be accounted for.

2. The Iraqi leadership--Maliki in particular--is much more confident in the capabilities of the ISF, making them willing to bargain harder during negotiations.

3. Whether or not they want a timetable for withdrawal, they want a "time horizon" that establishes some parameters for the draw down of U.S. forces and the transition from a lead-U.S. role to a U.S. support role.

But . . .

4. Most Iraqi leaders recognize, deep down, that they will still need the U.S. to provide support and critical enablers to the ISF for a while to come even as the U.S. moves out of the lead in combat operations.

So, to repeat something Dr. iRack has long argued, we should be negotiating a security framework within the context of setting a time horizon for our draw down and transition to a support role while also conditioning residual support (including, critically, support to the ISF) on political accommodation. The administration may or may not be doing the former, but they are most definitely not doing the latter. They don't believe in strategic conditionality. And, as a consequence, we are giving up what little leverage we have left to push the Iraqis toward the kind of political compromises--on SoI integration, fair elections to co-opt moderate Sadrists and avoid alienating Sunni tribes, etc.--that are necessary to lock-in security gains from the surge.

The SOFA is dead. Long live the SOFA!

According to U.S. and Iraqi officials, no agreement on a long-term bilateral security framework will be possible before Bush leaves office. In the absence of a long-term SOFA/SFA, the administration has no intention of re-upping the UNSCR. Instead, they hope to sign a "bridge" document--called a "temporary operating protocol" in Washington and a "memorandum of understanding" in Baghdad--that will allow U.S. operations through the end of 2009. The interim document will also likely include a "time horizon" with specific goals for U.S. troops to withdraw from Iraqi cities, as well as some installations and Saddam-era palaces. It will not be a fixed timetable or even a time horizon for a complete withdrawal.

So the long-term SOFA/SFA will be kicked down the road to the next administration.

Why did the SOFA/SFA talks fail? The standard explanation will be that U.S. negotiators overreached and the combination of Iraqi sovereignty concerns, upcoming provincial elections, and growing (over)confidence among Maliki's crowd in the capabilities of the ISF meant the Iraqis were not willing to meet the Americans even half-way. The is partially right. The bigger problem, however, was how the entire negotiations were framed on the American side.

Because talks were not occurring against the backdrop of negotiating a U.S. withdrawal and a clear signal that we did not want to have the rights and prerogatives to stay in Iraq indefinitely, two things happened:

1. Iraqi sovereignty and nationalist anxieties were exacerbated by the perception that we were negotiating a permanent occupation (regardless of how many times the administration asserted it wasn't seeking permanent bases). This made it difficult for Iraqi officials--including those that wanted a long-term agreement negotiated under Bush--to sign on to anything.

2. U.S. negotiators framed the whole thing to the Iraqis as us wanting to negotiate a way to stay in Iraq. This reversed the leverage in negotiations, making us appear increasingly desperate to give the Iraqis concessions so we could stick around indefinitely. This made it look like we needed them more than they needed us, which is completely back-ass-ward.

If, instead, U.S. negotiators had framed the talks around setting a timeline for a U.S. withdrawal and then sought to establish the conditions for the Iraqi government to receive the residual U.S. support it desperately needs (especially support to the ISF which, despite Maliki's rhetoric, the Iraqis will need for years), then the sovereignty/nationalism issues would have been at least partially addressed and the leverage would have worked in our favor. But because this administration doesn't believe in negotiating a withdrawal and because they have never been willing to impose strategic conditionality on our support to Maliki, they didn't adopt this approach. And they failed.

Let's hope the next administration figures this out and doesn't give the Iraqi government or the Iraqi public the impression that we are hoping to negotiate a deal that lets us stick around for 100 years. Let's also hope that the next administration decides to use our diminishing leverage over the Iraqi government at the strategic level, instead of frittering it away as this administration has.

Talks over the SOFA, and the strategic framework agreement (SFA) that will be bundled along with it, remain contentious. Lets be clear on one thing: the current Iraqi leadership wants some kind of long-term partnership with the United States, including assurances that we will protect them against foreign invasion, continue to conduct counterterrorism operations, continue to train and support the ISF, continue to help them re-negotiate their debt obligations, etc. All of this is in the November 2007 "Declaration of Principles," signed by Bush and Maliki, which the SFA is meant to codify. What they bristle at--or at least see as a "marketing problem" with the Iraqi people--are the various immunities in the SOFA (for our troops and contractors--the latter of which has apparently been addressed) and prerogatives in the SOFA (such as control of Iraqi airspace, the right for U.S. troops to detain Iraqis, the right to conduct independent U.S. operations, basing rights, etc.). So think of this as a "sovereignty game." The Maliki government wants us to continue to help them with residual support--on their terms.

In this light, there have been some interesting recent developments:

• Iraqi foreign minister Zebari suggested that a long-term security deal may not be possible this year and American officials have suggested the same thing (Dr. iRack is hearing this from his sources too). But instead of re-upping the UNSCR, the Iraqi and U.S. governments may sign an "interim" bilateral pact that will expire after a year or two. Good idea. This would allow the next administration to (re)negotiatiate the agreement(s) instead of having a lame duck administration lock us into commitments:

• Maliki now suggests that the security deal(s) may include a timetable for U.S. withdrawal, either in the pact or as a separate memorandum of understanding. This reflects Maliki's newfound (over)confidence in the ISF as well as the growing Iraqi public sentiment against a long-term U.S.-Iraqi pact occurring outside the context of a time horizon for withdrawal.

So the Bush administration has an opportunity. They can put a time horizon into the pact and condition the residual support the Iraqi government dearly wants on continued political progress to lock-in recent security gains. Sounds like a viable "exit strategy" and a pathway to a reasonable, realistic definition of success. Doesn't mean the administration will seize this opportunity, of course.

In a recent LAT op-ed, Max Boot attempts to diagnose some of the reasons the SOFA talks aren't going so well, and then he concludes with:

[I]n order to reach an accord, the U.S. will need to do a better job of diplomacy -- never a strong suit of this administration. The Iraqis, for their part, will have to overcome the intoxication produced by recent victories and come to a realistic appraisal that they will need substantial American support for years to come. [Hat tip to American Footprints for tagging this op-ed, and giving Dr. iRack a shout-out.]

That's it. Just "better" diplomacy. To be fair, Boot argues that U.S. negotiators should offer a few small face-saving concessions at the tactical level (e.g., joint procedures for processing detainees), but he offers no strategy that would improve the prospects of a bilateral deal that would benefit both countries.

Why not? It's not because Boot isn't smart enough--it is the ideological position he subscribes to, and the associated analytical blinders this position creates. Boot is basically perplexed: "[W]hy are Iraqi leaders trying to hinder the very military operations that have been making their country safer and thus strengthening their own authority?" Those silly Iraqis, they're trying to grab defeat from the jaws of victory by forcing us to leave!

This sentiment tracks with an emerging narrative among Boot's buddies, like the Kagans and Charles Krauthammer, who now claim that we're so close to "winning" that and the only way we can lose is if we start to withdraw. Consider this from the WSJ editorial page:

[A] permanent U.S. military presence – albeit one reduced over time – would give Iraqis the confidence to continue their political maturation. Another Iraq national election is scheduled for next year, and it is an opportunity for democracy to put down even deeper roots. It's crucial for Americans to understand that, apart from the Sadrists, all factions of Iraqi politics now support some kind of U.S.-Iraq status of forces agreement to succeed the U.N. mandate that expires later this year.

We are winning in Iraq. Indeed, we can now say with certainty that we will win, as long as we don't repeat our earlier mistakes and seek to draw down too soon [emphasis added].

So, in the context of near-victory, this crowd simply can't fathom why the Iraqis would try to screw things up by thwarting a SOFA that is required to authorize the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq in 2009 and beyond.

But the truth of the matter is that it is difficult to see a way forward in current negotiations if one starts from the premise that the entire goal of the talks is to allow the United States the maximum amount of "freedom of action" in Iraq and the largest possible troop presence for as long as we want.

As Dr. iRack wrote yesterday, even the Maliki government--which probably, deep down, wants a long-term bilateral security relationship--is uncomfortable with this position, because it is a blow to Iraqi sovereignty--creating, at the very least, a political "marketing" problem in the face of rising national sentiment and impending provincial elections. According to the WaPo:

The Bush administration's Iraq policy suffered two major setbacks Friday when Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki publicly rejected key U.S. terms for an ongoing military presence and anti-American Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr called for a new militia offensive against U.S. forces. . . .

The moves by two of Iraq's most powerful Shiite leaders underscore how the presence of U.S. troops has become a central issue for Iraqi politicians as they position themselves for provincial elections later this year. Iraqis across the political spectrum have grown intolerant of the U.S. presence, but the dominant Shiite parties -- including Maliki's Dawa party -- are especially fearful of an electoral challenge from new, grass-roots groups.

"All the politicians are trying to prove that they care more about Iraqis than they do about Americans -- otherwise they know the people and the voters will not support them," said Ala Maaki, a senior lawmaker with Iraqi's largest Sunni political party. "I think we could see al-Maliki and Moqtada Sadr trying to one-up the other today and see who can take the strongest stand against the Americans."

Moreover, because Maliki et al. are increasingly overconfident that they can police Iraq all by themselves, and the Bush administration has done a great job of convincing the Iraqi government that we need them more than they need us (because our support to Maliki, at the strategic level, is effectively unconditional), the current Iraqi ruling coalition believes they have all the leverage. This shouldn't be the case. After all, Boot is right when he corrects the false impression that the ISF is ready to go it alone:

In reality, while Iraqi troops are becoming much more capable, they still rely on U.S. assistance for key "enablers" such as logistics, surveillance, communications and air support. Without that help, which is coordinated by U.S. advisors embedded with Iraqi units, Iraqi security forces -- no matter how brave and dedicated -- would be hard put to operate successfully against such hardened terrorists as Al Qaeda and the extremist Shiite factions known as "special groups." American troops also serve a vital function as a buffer between sectarian groups still suspicious of one another.

It's true that fewer American combat troops are needed. . . . But the contributions of U.S. logistics people, advisors, air crews, intelligence collectors and other specialists continue to be as important as ever. It will be years before the Iraqis are able to take over some of these functions.

So, how can we make diplomacy more effective?

1. Address the nationalist backlash. The negotiation of a new bilateral U.S.-Iraq security framework should be occurring within the context of negotiating a time horizon for the departure of U.S. forces from Iraq. Not immediately; not irresponsibly. But a clear signal that the trajectory is set for the U.S. leaving (combined with a firm commitment to not to have "permanent" or otherwise "enduring" bases in Iraq) would help alleviate some anxieties among the Iraqi public and lawmakers, and give the Iraqi leadership a stronger hand in deflecting criticism from the Sadrists and Iran. This is something Boot and his clan doesn't get (or aren't willing to admit). At the same time . . .

2. Convince the Iraqi government that they are not yet ready, militarily, to go it alone. This can be done by showing them (repeatedly) the facts regarding operations in Basra, Sadr City, and Mosul--that is, evidence that without U.S.-provided critical enablers, these operations would have failed. It could also be done at the tactical level by withholding or slow-rolling some U.S. support here or there and, if the ISF falls flat, using that as evidence to strengthen the argument. These steps will increase U.S. leverage in bargaining for some type of agreement by helping convince the Iraqi leadership that they still need us, but it will only work if we . . .

3. Make U.S. commitments to continue supporting the Iraqi government conditional. Promises of residual support to the Iraqi government--including leaving a robust residual U.S. presence, for a while, to deter external aggression, continue to target terrorists, and prevent a coup; training, advising, equipping, logistical, air, intelligence, and other forms of support to the ISF; continued support in building the governance capacity of Iraqi ministries; continued support in renegotiating external debt obligations and encouraging foreign investment; and continued efforts to gain more support from Iraq's neighbors--should be made conditional on the Iraqi government continuing to move toward political accommodation and improved governance. Deep down, these are all things the Iraqi government wants (if you don't believe Dr. iRack, look at the November 2007 "Declaration of Principles for a Long-term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America."), so we should be using them for leverage.

Look, Dr. iRack knows that these recommendations are not foolproof. Maliki's government could call our bluff and cave into the delusion that they don't need us. If so, it's not clear why we should be supporting the government anyway. They don't need us? Fine. They want us to leave? Fine, we'll leave. But Dr. iRack doubts it will go down like this. More likely, negotiations that included a timeline for a U.S. draw down would give the Iraqi government more than enough "face saving" material to ward off the nationalists, while giving them a path to secure a bilateral agreement with the United States that protects the long-term interests of the Iraqi state. They would still have to give us something (continued progress toward political accommodation), but if they won't do that, we shouldn't be supporting them anyway.

All this said, Dr. iRack doesn't think there's any prospect the Bush administration will wake up and follow his advice. They share all the ideological blinders that Boot, the Kagans, Krauthammer, and the WSJ exemplify. So, the best outcome would be stalled SOFA/SFA talks that lead to a reluctant renewal of the UNSCR. This would pass the negotiations along to the next administration so they could actually deploy a diplomatic approach that might work.