Center for a New American Security

I received a note last week from a former USAID administrator lamenting the fact that while the U.S. Department of Defense annual budget remains comfortably north of $700 billion, the U.S. Department of State struggles to keep its measly $58 billion per year. There are a lot of reasons why it's easier to pass a mammoth defense budget than to protect money reserved for foreign aid and diplomatic operations. If U.S. foreign service officers were constructed in as many congressional districts as the F-22, for example, I suspect we would have a lot more congressmen fighting to increase their ranks.

But in their excellent book Buying National Security: How America Plans and Pays for Its Global Role and Safety at Home, Gordon Adams and Cindy Williams offer another explanation:

The State Department's dominant culture -- the Foreign Service -- takes pride in [the department's] traditional role as the home of US diplomacy. Diplomats represent the United States overseas, negotiate with foreign countries, and report on events and developments. Diplomats, from this perspective, are not foreign assistance providers, program developers, or managers. As a result, State did not organize itself internally to plan, budget, manage, or implement the broader range of US global engagement ... State department culture focuses on diplomacy, not planning, program development and implementation.

They go on to lament that "Foreign Service Officers increasingly have responsibility for program planning, budgeting, and implementation, tasks for which they receive minimal training."

There are a number of ways in which military organizational culture changes, and the literature on the subject is extensive. (For an introduction, you can hardly do better than Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff's The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology.*) Strong leadership and emulation of other organizations are two ways in which change comes about, and external shock is another. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have, to a large degree, functioned as external shocks that have changed elements of the U.S. military's organization culture. I could be wrong, but I do not think those wars have had a similar effect on the Foreign Service.

*There is, of course, a much larger body of "rationalist" explanations for military change and innovation, starting with this book and this book. I am pretty well read in the corpus, but the best guy to explain the various explanations dispassionately is my buddy Mike, who is wicked smaht and who I am meeting for beers in about half an hour. (Yes, I know what time it is in the afternoon, but give me a break: I have just returned from Saudi freaking Arabia, and happy hour will begin this week when I want it to.)

We all know Christopher Hill is a smart and talented diplomat. But has he ever served in the Middle East? And has he ever worked hand-in-hand with the U.S. military? Lindsey Graham and John McCain have some reservations about putting him in Iraq:

"We have real concerns with the President’s decision to nominate Assistant Secretary Christopher Hill as the next U.S. Ambassador to Iraq," said Senators Graham and McCain. "While Mr. Hill is a talented diplomat who has served our country for many years, his selection for this post concerns us.

"The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad is the world’s largest, and our next ambassador will take the helm at a particularly critical time in our efforts in Iraq," Graham and McCain continued. "The next ambassador should have experience in the Middle East and in working closely with the U.S. military in counterinsurgency or counterterrorism operations. Mr. Hill has neither. Given these considerations, together with the controversial legacy Mr. Hill left in his North Korea diplomacy, we believe that the President should reconsider this nomination."

I noted my own reservations about this appointment a few weeks back when it was announced, and for the same reasons (aside from that bit about North Korea). My objections were tempered by the fact that Robert Ford -- an ambassador with a tremendous amount of Iraq experience -- had agreed to serve as Hill's deputy. But behind the Hill appointment is something else. I get the sense that the Department of State is anxious to start treating Iraq like any other state. The lack of enthusiasm for PRTs, for example, suggests that while the military still views the Iraqi state as a work in progress, the Department of State would rather get back to processing visas and strengthening commercial ties. With a few exceptions -- mainly the brave young foreign service officers and senior diplomats who have served in Iraq -- I get the sense that the Department of State has never really switched on to the Iraq War. And I worry about a fundamental difference between the way the military and policy-makers in Washington see Iraq and the way the Department of State sees it. Why on Earth would they think Chris Hill is a suitable replacement for Ryan freaking Crocker? Yes, I know the Obama Administration ultimately nominated him -- not State. And yes, I know Hill is a darling of Richard Holbrooke. But I really just don't understand this pick and wonder if a broader disconnect is in play. (h/t Intrepid Spencer)

Update: The comments section is filled with some good justifications for Hill's selection. What about the bigger question, though?

Lots of folks in the broader foreign policy and defense communities have noticed, at one time or another, that the State and DoD regional bureaus don't exactly align. State has bureaus for Near Eastern Affairs, South and Central Asia, and East Asia and Pacific; DoD has Centcom, Pacom, and now Africom. It's not pretty.

So where exactly is the Gulf and Southwest Asia?

Maybe the State Dept briefer can explain.

Laura Rozen apparently has wiretaps over at the NSC, too.  Check out her ridiculous account of General Zinni's almost-ambassadorship-to-Iraq.  General Jim Jones offered Zinni the Baghdad post.  But a week later, Zinni was still twisting in the wind.  We now know he was passed over in favor of Christopher Hill, leading the New Republic to describe the final exchange thusly:

...it must be true? Reports are out that Hillary Clinton will accept Barack Obama's offer to be Secretary of State. So far, no additional stateside sourcing.

Let Charlie channel AM's skepticism of what the British generously call "reporting." (No offense, Londonstani.) Stay tuned.

Charlie apologizes for her absence...she's only recently returned from The Flatlands and has just begun to unbury herself. But the last week has brought two Bill Caldwell related notes that she just *had* to share with her loyal readers. (It should be said that we here at Abu M are officially in the bag for LTG Caldwell.)

First, while the good general is well known as an advocate of increased (and improved) blogging by soldiers, it turns out he's turned this into a graduation requirement for the majors attending CGSC at Ft. Leavenworth. At least, that's what he told Charlie. If she can figure out a way for you fine field grade officers to get credit for blogging here, she'll be sure to let you know.

Second, one deep bit of inside baseball from the world of professional-military education (affectionately known as PME) is the difficulty in recruiting foreign services officers as students in the intermediate courses (like CGSC or its Marine equivalent at Quantico). While these schools are geared toward military officers, there is a noticable interagency presence as well. FSO's, however, are more commonly found only at the "top-level schools" like the National War College). Now, astute readers of this blog will know that's because State is miserably under-staffed. (Insert military band comparison here.)

So, LTG Caldwell has once again put his money where his mouth is: he's offered to cough up one officer for each FSO the State Dept. sends to CGSC. (Charlie's guessing these officers take up slack at Main State, not in the Embassies, but she's willing to be corrected on this score.) This is exactly the kind of wealth transfer Secretary Gates has been calling for: using the vast resources of DoD to enable more flexibility at State.

Bill Caldwell: our favorite three star.

John Nagl has often quipped that it is difficult for the State Department to do its job when there are more members of military bands than there are Foreign Service officers.

Kip isn't sure that this is exactly how Herr Nagl wished the equation addressed:



Fortunately, the soldiers will be all right...

A WaPo op-ed on the future of the State Department has been making the rounds the last couple days and has generated some interesting traffic in Charlie's inbox. It gets at two pretty basic questions:

1) Should State go all-in in Iraq (and to a lesser extent Afghanistan) with its newly "transformed" diplomats or should it keep its eye on longer term relationships and concerns elsewhere in the globe?

2) What, exactly, do we want from a 21st Century State Department?

We've discussed State's staffing problem before. Charlie has yet to hear a good reason why we shouldn't double the number of FSOs (there's currently a significant shortage of officers at a myriad of posts as a result of staffing shortages and the behemoth Embassy Baghdad). But while Charlie spends a fair amount of time explaining FSO culture to her students (and has a fair degree of sympathy for them and their work), State doesn't exactly get a free pass around here.

Unlike the Pentagon, currently benefiting from rare, gifted leadership by Secretary Gates, State suffers under Secretary Rice (to the point that Gates is a much better advocate for State than she is). They are adrift, and major changes are required as we move forward in the Long War (like how not to alienate the entire WaPo readership by bitching about assignments to Iraq). But there has also been little in the way of the kind of strategic thought that might give them any sort of guidance. A little strategy goes a long way. (And oh, btw, don't forget that most of the things we want "civilians" to do in Iraq and Afghanistan aren't core competancies of the Foreign Service either. If you want a Colonial Office, you're gonna have to build a Colonial Office.)

State needs to sack up and do the job in Iraq (and Afghanistan) if only because it won't be the last time they're asked to work closely with the military or in a conflict environment. But we absolutely need State's core diplomatic skills, something that doesn't exist anywhere else in the government (except for the rare 4-star like Gen Zinni). Diplomacy isn't appeasement; it's the process by which we convince others of the correctness (or at least utility) of the American position. Surely we could use a little more of that right now.

From TNR's, The Plank:

You probably haven't heard of James McGee. He's our Ambassador in Harare, Zimbabwe. He's also a black man, which frustrates the sick worldview of Robert Mugabe. Here's an excerpt from a news story earlier this week that made me smile:

The diplomats involved in the incident at a roadblock on the edge of the capital, Harare, had just completed a tour of hospitals and an alleged torture camp when police demanded they prove they had official permission to visit the sites. At one point, a police officer threatened to beat one of Mr. McGee’s senior aides. The officer got into his car and lurched toward Mr. McGee after he had demanded the officer’s name. The car made contact with Mr. McGee’s shins, but he was not injured.

Mr. McGee climbed onto the hood of the car while his aide snatched the keys from the ignition, then the diplomats used their mobile phone cameras to take photographs of the officer. Mr. McGee insisted the convoy be allowed through and the 11 vehicles passed through after about an hour.

The men and women of the foreign service put themselves through great sacrifice, but rarely do we hear of stories like this in which an actual Ambassador would put his own life on the line to send a message to a totalitarian, murderous regime: America is watching you.

Indeed. There's a pretty standard line offered by foreign service officers recounting the number of ambassadors killed in the line of duty vs. the number of general officers. (Charlie can't remember the former, but the latter is something approximating "zero since WWII.") Not all ambassadors spend their time at cocktail parties, and not all of America's influence comes from the barrel of a gun (but check out Jamie's novel suggestion for an Africom mission at the end of his post).

After finally filling its required posts in Iraq an Afghanistan the State Department has been forced to make cuts in 10% of its staffing jobs elsewhere:

Diplomatic posts at the State Department and U.S. embassies worldwide will be cut by 10 percent next year because of heavy staffing demands in Iraq and Afghanistan, Director General Harry Thomas informed the foreign service yesterday.

The decision to eliminate the positions reflects the reality that State does not have enough people to fill them. Nearly one-quarter of all diplomatic posts are vacant after hundreds of foreign service officers were sent to embassies in Baghdad and Kabul, and Congress has not provided funding for new hires. Many of the unfilled jobs will no longer be listed as vacancies.

Citing "severe staffing shortfalls," Thomas asked each assistant secretary of state to prioritize jobs in his or her bureau and identify the least critical 10 percent by next Monday. "If we cannot realistically fill all of the positions currently vacant," he wrote in a cable sent throughout the department, "good management dictates that we . . . focus on the most essential."

So we've done directed assignments to the mammoth embassy in Baghdad and now we're short elsewhere. Charlie wonders how many of those folks sent post-haste to Iraq would be more useful in Indonesia, Senegal, China, Brazil, Ethiopia, or the UK? It's true that State would prefer the cuts to come from Foggy Bottom--but that still means you're literally decimating the individual country desks. Which is all well and good until Bangladesh goes to sh*t and no one is covering the account at Main State.

But here's what really caught Charlie's eye:

While the Baghdad and Kabul embassies are the immediate cause of the vacancies elsewhere, the State Department suffers from a deeper problem of flat hiring budgets. The size of the foreign service, about 6,500 diplomats, increased by approximately 300 positions a year between 2001 and 2004, but since then Congress has rejected requests for additional hiring for all but consular and security positions.

"We believe that . . . we had a justified need for those additional positions in those years," Patrick F. Kennedy, undersecretary of state for management, said in an interview. "On the other hand, Congress has to make choices, and they made them. I'm not going to say they are the wrong choices."

You're not gonna say it? Well hell, I'll say it. In fact, Secretary Kennedy, you know who did say it? The no sh*t Secretary of Defense, that's who.

“Making robust civilian capabilities available in the first place could make it less likely that military force will be needed, as local problems can be dealt with before they become a crisis,” Gates said in a Landon Lecture before about 1,600 at Kansas State University.

Now why is it the SecDef is a better advocate for diplomatic staffing and resourcing than the SecState? And can you imagine Air Force or Marine funding levels remaining static for 3 years and the Chiefs saying, well, I'm not going to say that was the wrong choice?!? They'd be running around with their hair on fire. Which is one reason why the Army and Marines are getting a huge plus-up and the Foreign Service is stuck 10% cuts. (The Air Force is actually facing massive reductions in personnel, but that's essentially a deal with the devil to get airframes instead of people.)

State has always had problems with resourcing. There's no domestic constituency for foreign aid and diplomacy, no iron triangle jobs program like with weapons procurement. But that doesn't mean you just take it lying down. Come on State, sack up, get some magic spray, and get back in the game. This is no way to run a war; and certainly no way to prevent one.