Center for a New American Security

Understatement of the Year? Fouad Ajami on the United States after 9/11:

America ... wasn't brilliant at everything it attempted in Arab lands.

LTG (Ret.) David Barno, Matt Irvine and I have published a new report (.pdf) with the Center for a New American Security that attempts to identify the components of a successful U.S. strategy for Central and South Asia. Our research began in the fall of 2010 and included research trips to both Afghanistan and Pakistan. We also assembled several working groups comprised of both area specialists as well as functional area specialists to help us identify planning assumptions, U.S. interests, and policy options. In the end, we recommend the United States:

• Negotiate a Strategic Partnership Agreement with the government of Afghanistan.
• Develop a long-term but differentiated approach to Pakistan that strengthens its economy, civilian government and anti-extremist elements while pressuring factions that support terrorists.
• Reshape foreign and security assistance to Pakistan.
• Broker confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan quietly and as opportunities arise.
• Sustain and deepen a multidimensional U.S.-India relationship and encourage the peaceful rise of China.
• Promote open trade and transit across South and Central Asia to catalyze economic growth and enhance stability.
• Develop a strategic public engagement plan for the region to mitigate the effects of the intense anti-Americanism that preclude greater cooperation with the United States.

Read the whole report here (.pdf).

UPDATE: Joshuas Kucera and Foust have written thoughtful critiques of the report worth your time. I want to thank both for taking the time to read the report and offer their own analysis. Both analysts lament, in their own ways, how little priority we give to Central Asia in this report. Let me briefly respond by assuring our readers this was a deliberate decision made after much thought and discussion about limited U.S. resources available as well as other, competing priorities. Within Central and South Asia, the U.S. relationship with India dominates our long-term interests, and the U.S. relationship with Afghanistan dominates our near-term interests. Pakistan, meanwhile, the central focus of our report, has the potential to decisively affect both. (This much, I think, is somewhat obvious, yes?) So again, given limited resources and competing priorities, we made a deliberate decision to de-emphasize the importance of Central Asia for U.S. policy makers. Every region of the globe is important, of course, and the United States has at least some interests everywhere. But in deciding where the United States should allot its limited resources and focus the energies of its policy-makers, departments and agencies, we make the case the United States should spend the most time thinking through the problems of Pakistan. Again, I think our logic makes sense even if you disagree. Just starting from an assumptions-and-interests analysis, we did not conclude Central Asia to be as important to the United States and its interests going forward as the three states -- Afghanistan, India, Pakistan -- to which we devote the most time in our report.

Two recent articles made me think. The first, which is the most accesible (in more ways than one), is Richard Betts' review essay on Huntington, Fukuyama and Mearsheimer in the most recent Foreign Affairs. The second, which I am considering translating into English because it is both very good and very important, is the new article by Stathis Kalyvas and Laia Balcells in the much-maligned American Political Science Review. Grand strategist types should read the first essay, while students of counterinsurgency should plow their way through the second.

After about 600 words of apologetics and a bunch of stuff tangential to the core of the issue, Max Boot finally arrives at the point of his op-ed in today's Wall Street Journal, and it is, for me, the key take-away from this fiasco at sea -- and an excellent warning to we Americans as we consider our own campaigns against violent non-state actors and the problem of terrorism:

Israeli officials are right to say the operation was justified and that the blood was on the hands of the pro-Hamas activists. Right, but irrelevant.

 

As it does too often, Israel took a narrow military operational approach to what is a broader strategic problem. Hamas, Hezbollah and other terrorist groups are conducting a skillful "information war" that is making Israel a pariah state in the international community. Israel, like the United States and other democratic nations, is at a severe disadvantage trying to combat a ruthless foe willing to sacrifice its own people to score propoganda points.

 

There are no perfect counter-tactics available, but whenever Israel does use military force it needs to be more aware of the political ramifications. That awareness appeared to be lacking during the botched 2006 war against Hezbolla -- and in the boarding of the Gaza flotilla.

Max Boot's advice to Israel could be turned around and similarly offered to U.S. and allied policy-makers as they consider everything from direct-action SOF raids into Somalia to drone strikes into Pakistan. Military operations cannot substitute for a comprehensive strategy. Just because the military is willing and able, and just because direct-action raids appear to be quick and easy, does not mean that second- and third-order effects cannot bite you hard if not properly thought through and mitigated by effective information operations and other supporting operations.

Okay. Back to working on my dissertation, so go elsewhere for your hot drone and Gaza commentary for a while.

The Cable has posted the new National Security Strategy, due to be released today at Brookings. My initial impression, which I shared with my colleagues at CNAS, is posted below:

"Considering the financial crisis from which our country is still emerging, I am surprised there is not more in the National Security Strategy about the environment of scarcity in which the United States now operates. Strategy is, in part, about setting goals, prioritizing those goals, and matching resources to each goal. Aside from the section about spending tax-payer money wisely -- which seems more about reducing fraud, waste and abuse than anything else -- there seems to be little acknowledgment that the United States might not be able to pursue all of our national security goals as vigorously as we might like in part due to spending constraints. I'm still trying to understand how the acknowledgment that the United States must address its deficit to ensure our future security squares with a bold statement like 'the United States of America will continue to underwrite global security'. That is an especially bold claim considering the fact that this document seems to consider security to include not just physical security but economic security, food security, medical security and addressing problems of governance and reducing poverty outside America's borders. This document is much like the recently released Quadrennial Defense Review in that I liked a lot of what it had to say but was left unsure of what the administration's true priorities are heading into the rest of its term in office."

In summary, I would have liked to have seen a more ruthless prioritization of efforts. If I were a reporter working the national security beat and could ask Sec. Clinton just one question today, my question would be, "Madam Secretary, this strategy lays out some very ambitious goals for the United States. But if we could only do three of the things on the list of activities, what would they be? What, in other words, are this nation's top priorities in national security -- whereby if we get other stuff wrong but get these specific things right, we can sleep soundly at night?"

UPDATE: A couple of my friends have written some good dissenting opinions in reply to my comments. The first objection (written by my officemate, the GZA aka The Genius, and soon-to-be-posted in full on Tom's blog) is basically, "Exum, as usual, you're complaining too much. The NSS is not meant to match ends, ways and means. It is intended to outline the broader way in which the administration thinks about the contemporary security environment. The NSS can't allot resources because we have this thing called the legislative branch -- you may have heard of it? -- which does that. The QDR and QDDR are the documents that should then identify ends, ways and means."

My response to that is, uh, first off, the QDR preceded the NSS. Which, we can all agree, is as f***ed up as a football bat. Also, the QDR also punted on setting priorities, something that has frustrated both allies with whom I have spoken as well as key legislators. (See, Abe! I am aware of the Congress!) I will note my major complaint about all of this, though, after I cover the second objection.

The second objection is that these kinds of "strategies" are really just long political speeches focused on national security. There is a little in there for everyone, and everyone's activities and opinions are at least acknowledged if not promoted. The document is, at the end of the day, intended more for external consumption than for internal use.

The problem with this is the internal leadership vacuum that results. Like it or not, people in the Departments of Defense, National Intelligence and State -- not to mention USAID and the combatant commands -- will refer back to this document to justify their programs and budget requests before both the administration and the Congress. And who can blame them? It's an official document signed off on by POTUS himself. All of those good progressive voices who fret the military has too much power and is dictating strategy from below need to take note here: when you produce something-for-everyone documents like this NSS and the QDR which do not set firm priorities, you're essentially asking departments and commanders below you in the food chain to set their own priorities. Or, at best, you are forcing them to constantly be seeking guidance as to what your true priorities are.

I may be asking for too much -- I don't know. But both the QDR and this NSS strike me as thoughtful, intelligent, comprehensive and ... kinda empty. Because these documents do not establish clear priorities or recommendations, I am left studying the budget like everyone else for clues as to what the U.S. government's real priorities are for national security.

Patrick Porter, meanwhile, has an intelligent take on his blog, which doesn't feature comments so Patrick isn't bothered by hoi polloi like you.

Below is a picture of my office door. Nate rues the day I discovered the template for our office name plates on the CNAS share drive...

In keeping with my abstinence from daily blogging, I will not have any in-depth comments on the president's speech tonight or tomorrow morning, but I was struck by President Obama's reference to Eisenhower. His words:

As President, I refuse to set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means, our or interests. And I must weigh all of the challenges that our nation faces. I do not have the luxury of committing to just one. Indeed, I am mindful of the words of President Eisenhower, who – in discussing our national security – said, "Each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs."

I was riding back from an event today with a retired Marine Corps officer friend of mine when we started discussing Eisenhower's guidance to Project Solarium:

1. I will not accept any strategy which undermines the economic foundation of this country.
2. I will not accept any strategy which assumes we will emerge from a war better off than when we entered.
3. I will not accept any strategy which must go forward without the consent and support of our key allies.

I do not know if President Eisenhower would have agreed with the current president's direction on Afghanistan, but I think he would have certainly recognized the considerations behind his decision-making process.

If any of us were to corner Barack Obama on his trip to Asia and ask him what he was going to decide on Afghanistan, I do not think he would yet have an answer. Like Fred Kaplan, whose latest in Slate is worth reading, I don't think that is a bad thing. Not as long as when does make a decision, that decision sticks. Fred is also right that the troop levels matter less than what we decide to do with those troops.

I rarely go to middle-of-the-day think tank events, but I made an exception this afternoon for an excellent panel discussion Caroline Wadhams and the Center for American Progress set up involving Afghanistan experts Gilles Dorronsoro, Michael Semple and Joanna Nathan. The topic was the prospects of reconciliation in Afghanistan, and as I had just finished Michael's new book on the subject, I arrived with plenty of questions to ask. [You should be able to watch the event yourself -- as well as the question I eventually did ask -- here.] Reconciliation, as all of the panelists agreed, is no substitute for a strategy -- though it should certainly be an integral part of one.

I suspect, though, that if we asked all three of the panelists what we -- the United States and its allies -- should do in Afghanistan, we would get a variety of opinions. I am going to lend some space to three strategic alternatives to the one advanced by Gen. McChrystal. I obviously have my own preferences, but having said that, I have been greatly impressed by the three arguments advanced below. The first, written by a Special Forces officer, makes the case for foreign internal defense and has been highlighted on Steven Pressfield's blog. The second, which I found the most thought-provoking, offers a kind of counterinsurgency strategy with a much smaller footprint than the "Go Big" plan advised by the current ISAF command. And the third is an older paper written by Dorronsoro, an honest-to-goodness Afghanistan expert, explaining why reducing the Western troop presence in Afghanistan is smarter than increasing it.

Okay, enjoy. You can find these documents and more, by the way, by following me via scribd.

One Tribe

go-deep-_14-oct-09_

Afghan War Strategy

My readers are geniuses. They would have this debate sorted in no time, even if it took the Thunderdome:

Maybe we could handle it another way, taking a clue from classic Greek warfare and playing to the President's interests. We get the best COIN basketball player and match them against the best CT dude and winner gets to make the call on CT or COIN for the rest of this Presidential term. We get a quick and final decision and the WP can have a twofer writing Afghanistan and the President's latest basketball team(s) in the same story. We have Ex, Col Gentile and Charles Barkley do the TV color. Pay per view bonanza.

Meanwhile, staying on the same subject, I read this yesterday and thought it pretty smart.

Not to be outdone by AM on the traveling front, Londonstani has spent the best part of 24 hours on planes flying around the Middle East. And, the one good thing about travelling economy class on Emirates air are all the free English and Arabic newspapers.

The Taliban attacks on ISAF forces in Nuristan made for the top story in every single title. The story seems like a pretty straight forward affair, but hidden in its coverage is clue to how the Afghan conflict is being seen within the Muslim world.

Wire stories are a nuts and bolts write-by-numbers affair with strict rules on news judgement, impartiality and grammar which aim to ensure the finished written product adheres to the ethos of the organisation and varies little from individual writer to writer. Newspapers then later reprint these stories. Often the only changes they make are to cut out the final paragraphs of background or re-write the headline.

With that in mind, the original Reuters story on the Nuristan attack has the title; Eight U.S. soldiers killed in east Afghan battle. The same story in the Gulf News is; US troops beaten back. AFP's original story has the headline; Eight US troops die in one of worst Afghan battles. The Gulf news runs with; US suffers heavy losses in Taliban's daring attack.

Gulf News is a Dubai-based paper with a fairly neutral line towards the United States. Sitting in the middle of the central section of seats on the Emirates airbus squashed between a large Punjabi man and a nose picking spoilt Pakistani teenager visiting home after a stint working in the family business in Saudi, Londonstani was not in a position to conduct a media study, but the Arabic newspapers had similar headlines. It would been instructive to look at other newspapers from across the region and monitor the op-eds which will appear in the next couple of days. (This is something embassies do, right?)

The public in ISAF contributing nations are exposed to media stories that highlight the sacrifices of their own country's troops and the general evilness of the enemy. But what we don't see is how the conflict is being viewed abroad. But it is vital strategists are aware of perception in the region when they consider the implications of future strategy decisions.

There is little point denying that the Taliban (whether in Afghanistan or Pakistan) get much popularity for just fighting toe to toe against Western, and particularly American and British, troops. One of the new realities on the ground engendered by the last eight years of conflict is that local militias in the Muslim world attract respect and therefore support just by taking on Western forces. This respect, particularly when it comes from people who live far away from the theatre of conflict, translates into financial support. Many of these groups now have a strong motivation to turn "internationalist" where once they would have been local. Most readers here are aware of the talks between US and Taliban officials held in the US before 9/11. Once, it seemed the Taliban might develop a Saudi-like US client state. Not any more.

In Londonstani's own opinion, the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan was misguided. But now it's done, it needs to be done right. "Leaving them to it" is morally dubious after a botched occupation that returned a bunch of gangsters to power. Not to mention the years of bloody service Afghanistan provided to the West in its cold war struggle against the Warsaw pact countries. But also, in the same way the Palestinians' use of suicide attacks sanctified their adoption by al Qaeda, what happens in Afghanistan will have an effect in the future. It's only the exact form of that impact that's not clear.