Center for a New American Security

US Special Forces have conducted multiple raids into Pakistani territory, local daily The Nation reported today in a front-page article that was basically just quoting an earlier Guardian story. 

One previous US raid that occurred in 2008 was already known about. And when it happened, there was serious concern as to whether such actions by the Americans might lead to the breakdown of the Pakistani army. One respected London-based Pakistan academic said if American troops kept crossing into Pakistani territory he could envisage a situation where Pakistani commanders would lose control over soldiers who would want to fight the incursions.

That might explain this comment:

"The Pakistanis were kept entirely in the dark about it. It was one of those things we wouldn't confirm officially with them," said the source, who had detailed knowledge of the operations."

Read the original Guardian story here.

 

There was a great deal of response and debate on my short piece in the New York Times on whether the IDF might be more effective if it used tactics that "place a higher emphasis on the prevention of civilian casualties at the expense of lethality and force protection."

Between Clancy Chassay's video reports from Gaza for the Guardian, the reports of "interesting" t-shirts popular with IDF units, and the continuing stream of less-than-flattering testimonies from soldiers who fought in Gaza, this has turned out to be a horrible week for the IDF and Israel more generally. (More on the IDF and teh internets here.) But does the IDF have an image problem? Is this just bad information operations and public affairs work? Or is it something else?

Jeffrey Goldberg, who I do not know but who links to this blog on occasion, had this to say:

The Times reported that the Israeli government believes it must spend more money on "hasbara," a Hebrew word that falls somewhere between propaganda and information. It is true that the world media, generally speaking, doesn't like Israel very much, and stacks the deck against it, but good hasbara starts with not allowing soldiers to vandalize Palestinian homes and shoot Palestinian women.

Now why do I mention this? Because I'm sticking to my guns -- how you behave tactically has strategic effects on the modern battlefield. My central thesis, I believe, is correct -- whether you're talking about the U.S. military, the IDF, or any other Western military:

In modern conflict against violent nonstate actors like Hamas, Hezbollah or guerrilla groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, it may be in the best interests of the dominant military actor to adhere to rules of engagement that go beyond the laws of land warfare and international conventions. As the United States military has discovered in both Iraq and Afghanistan, civilian casualties have a direct effect on the effectiveness of operations in the strategic sense.

I was exchanging emails with Michael Totten about his blog post on Commentary, and he correctly noted that I did not have much space in the Times piece to talk about how Iraq differs from the Palestinian Territories or how American priorities in Iraq differ from Israeli priorities. But leaving Israel aside, can we agree that -- in the age of television and the new media -- decisions made by corporals and sergeants have strategic effect? Is this really controversial?

Londonstani wonders what readers make of this NYT article about al-Qaeda's possibly changing attitude towards suicide attacks. The wackiest part of this example of AQ bluesky thinking is the comment about unleashing the dogs of war, literally.

"Abu Abdullah al-Qurashi suggested training dogs to recognize American troops’ uniforms, then releasing other dogs carrying improvised explosive devices toward American soldiers so the bombs can be detonated from a safe distance. The author begins with the following words: “I.E.D. operations, but this time, with dogs. Yes, dogs! Brothers, some may find my words fantastic. But, believe me, we should better let a dog die, than let a Lion of Islam die!”

It all sounds like the British WWII "suggestions box" Londonstani learnt about many years ago at school. The idea was to encourage the general public to pass the ideas that flashed into their minds during the long hours in bomb shelters to the war office. One idea involved stringing a net over London to catch German bombs. Another, would have the Royal Navy make submarines out of ice to avoid detection by radar. One even, if memory serves, was to strap mines to dolphins and use them to sink ships.

Obviously, in this day and age, animal rights organisations are going to be barking mad at the idea of exploding dogs. But Londonstani thinks they have little to worry about since it's probably no more than a few spotty jihad geeks gnawing over an old bone. (couldn't resist)

Suicide attacks are elemental to the AQ brand. They form a key part of their operational effectiveness and the follow-up PR effort. And as anyone who's worked in Iraq or Afghanistan might tell you, suicidal recruits are in abundance.

Londonstani isn't sure it's a good idea investing too much attention into a lot of the stuff on the jihadi forums. You have no idea how much of it is written by armchair jihadis in Croydon and how much reflects the thinking of key decision makers. Although, when key decision makers comment, it is often clearly flagged up and pre-announced - which wasn't the case with the comments this article is based on.

And, it's definitely worth keeping in mind that monitoring and translating jihadi sites is a growth industry. Many of these firms try to leak the odd non-story to friendly faces in the media to justify their generous contracts.

However, it would be interesting to see what others make of it.

So Abu Muqawama got into a semi-public argument with one of the world's leading al-Qaeda experts today about a subject he wants you guys to weigh in on. Basically, Abu Muqawama advanced what he did not think a controversial proposition: that the internet is used by terror groups and guerrilla groups to spread TTPs -- tactics, techniques, and procedures.

The world-famous al-Qaeda expert, meanwhile, rubbished this claim. He said that while the internet was certainly central to the radicalization process, you need an actual physical space to spread tactics and know-how. He then challenged Abu Muqawama to come up with an example where a terror group had either used the internet to plan an attack or had used the internet to spread tactics.

Okay, so Abu Muqawama's RFI (Request For Information) is two-fold. One, who out there smart on diffusion theories -- that would be you, Mike, and you, Erin -- can either support or dispute the claim that the internet has been used to spread tactics? All the diffusion literature Abu Muqawama has read is a little dated in its case studies and examples. The best example Abu Muqawama can come up with is the way in which different terror/guerrilla groups have all begun to use Google Earth to target sites from Israel to Iraq. But did the internet drive that diffusion?

Two, who do you think is right here? Abu Muqawama or the famous (and very intelligent) al-Qaeda expert? Because Abu Muqawama trotted out Thomas Rid's line about digital natives versus digital immigrants and how younger U.S. Army officers have used sites like platoonleader.org to go around the traditional top-down lessons learned process. And let Abu Muqawama tell you: this esteemed expert did not like being called a digital immigrant -- with all the you're-too-old-and-I'm-young-and-hip connotations that go along with it. But Abu Muqawama thinks he's right. Folks over a certain age are much less likely to intuitively understand the way in which younger people -- digital natives -- share information and use the internet.

Thoughts?