Syndicate content
 

Abu Muqawama

Abu Muqawama retains its autonomy and the views and beliefs expressed within the blog do not reflect those of CNAS. Abu Muqawama retains the right to delete comments that include words that incite violence; are predatory, hateful, or intended to intimidate or harass; or degrade people on the basis of gender, race, class, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or disability. In summary, don't be a jerk.

  • Hospital sources are confirming Benazir Bhutto has, in fact, been killed in a massive suicide attack on a political rally. Most web sites are still saying she was wounded.

    The folks on NBC, though, are making it sound as if Bhutto was some brave liberal alternative to the Musharraf regime, swallowing hook, line, and sinker this narrative that Benazir Bhutto was some kind of Pakistani Aung San Suu Kyi.

    Okay, folks, we all know she was eloquent, went to Harvard and Oxford and was a darling of the English-language media. But she was arguably the most corrupt woman in the history of South Asia. She was removed from office not once but twice on corruption charges. And ruthless? She killed her own brother in 1996.

    So by all means, mourn Benazir Bhutto, but those who live by the sword...

    Update: The U.S. presidential candidates are weighing in on Bhutto and her assassination now. Everyone is emphasizing her bravery and the physical courage it took for her to return to Pakistan. And you can't take that away from her, that's for sure. She knew she was risking her life by returning. (And yes, commentors, Abu Muqawama would guess some folks in the ISI are up to their chin hairs in all of this.)

    Abu Muqawama watched McCain's comments on Fox News with his grandmother and then changed the channel to CNN. At times like these, CNN proves its worth over Fox. On Fox, the best they can do is show a bunch of Americans in a studio talking about the events. CNN, for all its faults, actually has reporters on the ground filing reports via satellite phone. The BBC and Al-Jazeera English are even better for on-the-spot reporting, but we can't get those networks in East Tennessee. And ten bucks says Abu Muqawama's grandmother turned the channel back to Fox after he left.

    Update II: The New York Times obituary pulls no punches.

    Update III: Abu Muqawama is now throwing things at the television. Noted Pakistan expert Ann Curry just compared Bhutto to Mahatma bleeping Ghandi on MSNBC's Hardball. Meanwhile, Tom Ricks has a piece up on the Post's website on the military side of this mess.

    Update IV: CNN is reporting that there are unverified claims of al Qaeda responsibility for the assassination. The FBI has issued a bulletin regarding the alleged claim, but apparently the usual AQ websites have been silent thus far. (The original report was filed by an Italian news agency, and sent to Charlie by intrepid reporter Spencer.) Also, SWJ Blog has an amazing collection of news stories and editorials. The situation seems to still be in flux, so stay tuned.

    Update V: WaPo has two good pieces of analysis set for Friday's paper. First, a detailed discussion of the machinations behind Bhutto's return to Pakistan, including this gem: "He basically delivered a message to Musharraf that we would stand by him, but he needed a democratic facade on the government, and we thought Benazir was the right choice for that face," said Bruce Riedel of CSIS. Great game, indeed.

    Next, further analysis from Tom Ricks (and Joby Warrick) on possible responsibility for the attack. Tony Zinni says AQ; Andrew Exum says ISI. But Charlie thinks Barnett Rubin may be closest to right when he argues that perception matters more than reality, "I know what many people in Pakistan and Afghanistan believe: They think that the Pakistani military killed her," he said. "I am not endorsing this belief -- or denying it -- but it is a political reality." (More on this in the NYT's lengthy analysis piece.)

    Update VI: Abu Muqawama is pretty sure Andrew Exum did not mean the ISI "did it." The ISI is no monolith, and what Exum is arguing is that if AQ did it (and he thinks they did), then it was unlikely some members within the ISI had no prior knowledge. But Abu Muqawama, like Charlie, likes what Rubin had to say the most.
  • From our partners in crime over at the Small Wars Journal Blog:
    We are checking it out now, but apparently the last of 86 unique items and over 140 total books and two movies were purchased today and sent off to the Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Academy in Kabul. Moreover, through this effort the Academy and my (Dave Dilegge) 'day job' organization (Wargaming Division of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab) were able to hook up resulting in 50 Small Wars manuals and COIN related DVDs and CDs sent as well. Thanks to all who helped us and Abu Muqawama with this effort.
    Let us second those thanks. We couldn't be more proud.
  • Abu Muqawama got some pretty sweet Christmas gifts yesterday, and he wanted to share a few of the titles with you all.

    1. Hugh Kennedy's The Great Arab Conquests: How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We Live In

    Abu Muqawama is pretty excited to read this military history of the Islamic conquests. In the one hundred years after the death of the Prophet Mohammed (PBUH), Islamic armies conquered a land mass greater than that of the Roman Empire. How?

    2. The Russian General Staff's The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost

    Translated and edited by Les Grau, Abu Muqawama flipped through this book a few weeks ago and thinks this book will be a valuable companion to The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan and The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet Afghan War.

    Right now, though, Abu Muqawama is reading No Country for Old Menbefore he sees the movie. So far, the book is fantastic. But then, Abu Muqawama has always liked Cormac McCarthy.

    (Abu Muqawama also received a great bottle of Scottish gin from one cousin and a nice bottle of single malt scotch from another. That has nothing to do with counterinsurgency, of course, but it does make an evening spent reading about Afghanistan a lot more enjoyable.)
  • ...it's not the Red Sox but it's close. Fire Joe Morgan* picked it up Friday; Charlie's former student over at the TNR blog linked to it over the weekend:

    A Flotsam data special: Tangiblizing the intangible

    After Tim McCarver’s month-long David Eckstein sploogefest that was October 2006, a serious investigation into 'grit' was long overdue. Despite the penchant of sportswriters and broadcasters to throw the term around willy-nilly, I was hard-pressed to locate a firm definition of grit in the baseball sense. Using lots of laptop science stuff, I think I’ve improved the definition, which isn’t really saying much, since there wasn’t one to begin with.

    [snip]

    Gritty players want to succeed. They just happen to not have the talent to actually do so. This results in inefficient baseball plays. For example, Jerry Hairston is gritty. He slides head-first into first base. A true sign of someone gritty enough to want to get to first base, but shitty enough to actually get there efficiently.
    Baseball + social science = magic!! For the most and least gritty players (along with a killer research design) click here.

    On a related note, Charlie's been playing her sister's Wii for the last several hours. She's not much for cow racing [insert Kansas joke here], but baseball? Oh man. Her splittah (low and away) is wicked pissah.

    PS If you like baseball (or sports journalism), and aren't reading Fire Joe Morgan, you simply must start now.
  • Charlie is taking advantage of this op-pause in her busy Christmas schedule to wish you all a very Merry Christmas. She has no tradition of Christmas shooting (though the idea has crossed her mind on more than one occasion), and doesn't share AM's rich East Tennessee heritage. But Kansas rednecks do a few things right, and in Charlie's family, Christmas Eve is one of them. The highlight of which is singing Christmas carols, which is every bit as hokey and white-bread as you imagine. It would be worse if one of Charlie's cousins wasn't a professional opera singer and another a country singer-songwriter (this side of the family are all tall, musical, and athletic...an amusing thought for any readers who've ever met your faithful blogger).

    After the usual renditions of Silent Night, Jingle Bell Rock, etc., we get around to Charlie's favorite: Christmas in the Trenches, John McCutcheon's classic telling of the 1914 Christmas truce (it's obviously not a Christmas carol, but neither is Let's Talk Dirty in Hawaiian, which is also an annual request). McCutcheon explains how he came to write the song in the video below; music starts at 2:00. Do yourself a favor and listen.

  • The blogging team at Abu Muqawama wishes you all a very Merry Christmas.


    Pictured: Abu Muqawama (blogging) and his violent Pashtun flatmate (eating kebab, non-violently) in their secret (Far) East London lair.
  • Abu Muqawama woke up early this morning, hit the gym with his cousin, drank a protein shake, and then packed all the guns into the back of the truck to hit the shooting range. "Nothing celebrates the birth of the Baby Jesus like firepower," Abu Muqawama's cousin remarked in between magazine changes. Indeed. And there's no better taste than a handful of beef jerky with the just faintest hint of gun oil. Yum.

    It's just as well Abu Muqawama didn't stay at home and read the papers, because since he returned he's read nothing but bad news -- including that peach of a story Charlie linked to below this post.

    First off, the PMC story gets worse and worse. (And those brave few souls who stick their necks out to defend PMCs -- you know who you are -- get quieter and quieter.) Check out this article from the Washington Post, which includes the counterinsurgency quote of the day, courtesy of T.X. Hammes:

    I still think, from a pure counterinsurgency standpoint, armed contractors are an inherently bad idea, because you cannot control the quality, you cannot control the action on the ground, but you're held responsible for everything they do.

    Amen.

    And if that doesn't depress you enough for Christmas Eve, try this book review:

    Upon hearing mention of people who have caused death and destruction in our world, such as Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin, most decent people will react negatively. While Dr. Abdul Qadeer (A.Q.) Khan may not elicit the same reaction, it's high time to include him on that list...
  • A who's-who of NYT South Asia reporters offers up a detailed look into US aid policies to Pakistan. They report something Charlie first heard a few months ago: that Pakistan is diverting the funds from COIN/CT efforts in NWFP to conventional units intended to confront/deter India.
    In interviews in Islamabad and Washington, Bush administration and military officials said they believed that much of the American money was not making its
    way to frontline Pakistani units. Money has been diverted to help finance weapons systems designed to counter India, not Al Qaeda or the Taliban, the officials said, adding that the United States has paid tens of millions of dollars in inflated Pakistani reimbursement claims for fuel, ammunition and other costs.
    Musharraf, of course, denies such claims, causing an irritating he-said, she-said. And if that weren't galling enough, one American officer makes this comparison:

    For years, how money from the Coalition Support Funds was disbursed to the Pakistani government was veiled in secrecy. The size and scope of the payments to Pakistan was held so closely that one senior American military officer in Afghanistan said that he did not know that the administration was spending $1 billion a year until he attended a meeting in Islamabad in 2006. “I was astounded,” said the officer, who would not speak for attribution because he now holds another senior military post. “On one side of the border we were paying a billion to get very little done. On the other side of the border — the Afghan side — we were scrambling to find the funds to train an army that actually wanted to get something done.”

    Readers of this blog are well familiar with the travails of those training the Afghan National Army. One assumes that we'd all be ok with a little less money for the Pakistani armor corps facing New Delhi, and a little more for what could be a world-class training academy in Kabul.

  • Charlie has been working on a post on Concerned Local Citizens groups (or Awakening Councils) in Iraq for the better part of two days. Several requests for information earlier this fall piqued her interest, and there's been a spate of writing on the subject. Alas, cookie baking, last minute shopping, and her grandparents version of the Spanish Inquisition have kept coherent thougths at bay.

    So until she can muster anything resembling cogent analysis, take a look at these articles and tell her what you think.

    Was this a target of opportunity? Classic counter-insurgency? A fit of wishful thinking by senior leaders in Baghdad? A deal with the devil? Or all of the above? Charlie promises her thoughts later this week.

  • Phil Carter, over at Intel-Dump, highlights an op-ed by Founding Brothers' historian Joseph Ellis.
    History professor Joseph Ellis writes in today's Washington Post about "what George Washington would do" with respect to the mess in Mesopotamia. It's a fascinating question, because Washington served both an insurgent (as commander of the Continental Army during the American Revolution) and a counterinsurgent (as an officer fighting Native Americans and the French during the Seven Years War). In fact, he probably ranks as one of history's most successful insurgents ever.
    But Phil (and Prof. Ellis) say it's Imperial Britain, not GW, that may have lessons for the US, as we both suffer from the same paradox:
    This is popularly as the "counterinsurgent's dilemma," perhaps best written about by David Galula in his classic Counterinsurgency Warfare — Theory and Practice. Setting aside those insurgencies which ripen into open warfare, like Mao's famous three-phase model, the goal of the insurgent is not to "win" in any conventional sense. Rather, the goal is to "win" by not losing. Either the insurgent bleeds the counterinsurgent to the point where his will to fight is gone, or the insurgent wins politically by earning the support of the people and alienating the people from the
    counterinsurgent.
    Read the rest and come back to offer your opinion on Dr. Phil's final question:
    So do we have the political will to be a counterinsurgent? To be an empire?
    And here's one more: do we need to be?

    PS Phil's been posting like a fiend this weekend. If you have time to kill, or in-laws to avoid, check out his recent posts.
  • Abu Muqawama watched Charlie Wilson's War with his grandmother yesterday and can recommend it to his readership, although Philip Seymour Hoffman's performance was the only thing about the film that was truly Oscar-worthy. Abu Muqawama personally enjoyed the dig at Admiral Stansfield Turner, who fired hundreds of CIA agents with native-level language skills because, as immigrants (some second-generation), their loyalty was questionable. We would never do that today. No, not us. We take full advantage of the skills within our immigrant population and never, ever alienate them.



    And be sure to read this profile from the Washington Post on the real Charlie Wilson.

    Update: AM has a nasty way of holding this Charlie's feet to the fire when she says she wants to post on something: he writes on it himself. The nerve!

    As a movie CWW is totally entertaining: as AM says, Philip Seymour Hoffman is great (he has many of the best lines in the movie), Julia Robert's Houston-socialite-earrings should have their own spot in the credits, and Aaron Sorkin still has it in him to write funny, pointed dialogue. (See AO Scott's review for more on that.)

    And somewhat surprisingly, CWW gets most of the politics--domestic and international--right too. It will surprise few readers that this Charlie is somewhat of a snob. She read Ghost Wars instead of Charlie Wilson's War, thinking the latter was unserious. Intrepid reporter Spencer set her straight: "They're like apples and oranges...but one is a schoolmarmish apple and the other is a chocolate orange smothered in whiskey and garnished with blow." So true. Ghost Wars is a tome; CWW is a romp. And while Ghost Wars surveys 20 years of American policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan (with a little bit of Saudi Arabia on the side), Charlie Wilson's War is primarily about the very narrow question of funding and delivering Stinger missiles to the mujahadeen.

    (The action montage once the Afghans finally receive the Stingers is unsettling, not unlike Mathieu's arrival in Algiers in "Battle of Algiers": emotionally you root for them, even though you know it's going to end badly. And the kill rates are just unbelievable: Charlie was asking herself how we'd do in Afghanistan or Iraq today with losses quarterly losses of 100+ helos and fixed wing aircraft. Holy god.)

    The movie also does a good job of highlighting the religious fervor motivating many of the players (watching a pasty, pudgy congressman shout Allahu Akbar from a refugee camp in Pakistan provides one of the movies more uncomfortable ironic moments). And while Hoffman's CIA agent is hostile to Julia Roberts and all her fellow Texas zealots, the complications only dawn on Charlie slowly, leading him to eventually realize that "sooner or later, God is going to be on both sides."

    Some have criticized the movie as too glib and one-dimensional. They're apparently not as smart as your blogger's 15 year-old brother who brilliantly passed the post-movie seminar (Charlie can't really turn off professor mode; be glad you don't have to suffer her brother's fate):

    Charlie: What was your favorite part of the movie?
    Brother: I liked the part at the end, how we changed the world but, uh, messed up the end game. [Charlie's brother won't swear, it's mind boggling.]
    Charlie: So what should we have done?
    Brother: Built those schools, sent more money. And used one of those missiles to take out Osama bin Laden.

    Go see the movie. And see if you can outsmart the 10th grader.

  • There has been some discussion in the comments over officer promotions about the requirement that all officers seeking promotion to general officer serve in a joint or "purple" billet first. Abu Muqawama got some clarification on this rule from an Army O-6 a few weeks ago: Yes, the law is in place, and yes, it has held up the promotions of some good officers, H.R. McMaster among them. But there is now a system in place whereby officers can apply for a waiver, and apparently, last year most of the officers who applied for waivers received them. So we'll see what happens in the next promotion board...

    Update: Charlie, here. The waivers actually aren't new (they've always been available); it's the ability to accumulate "joint points" throughout one's career without doing the 22 month purple billet that's new. As for COL McMaster, he shouldn't have to apply for a waiver as he's currently getting "joint-qualified" at IISS (unless he's still on GEN Petraeus' staff in Baghdad).

    Some weekend reading for all you counterinsurgents out there:

    1. Andrew Exum, on what military professionals can learn from Hizbollah. (Middle East Strategy at Harvard)

    Tactically, Hezbollah’s performance throughout the 1990s and in the 2006 war raises three red flags for U.S. military professionals. Unlike most other Arab armies since 1948, Hezbollah demonstrates a high proficiency in the maintenance and employment of its weapons systems, Hezbollah performs well in small-unit light infantry operations, and Hezbollah uses a decentralized command structure that allows its subordinate leaders to exercise a high degree of initiative on the battlefield.

    2. General Barry R McCaffrey, Iraq After Action Review. (Small Wars Journal) This has been up for a few days, but we have not yet linked to it. There are some good, no-nonsense observations here, and Abu Muqawama will leave it up to you the reader as to what you make of the recommendations at the end. Note you can access the entire .pdf file through a link at SWJ.

    3. The Washington Post on Veterans' Care.

    NOTHING WILL ever be able to absolve this country for the disgraceful way it has treated its returning war wounded. Congress, though, took a big step in making amends with final approval of legislation aimed at fixing and upgrading the military health-care system. Expected enactment of the measure, along with the installation of a new secretary of veterans affairs, are important developments in righting the wrongs against America's soldiers.
  • The Economist confirms what Abu Muqawama has been saying for quite some time: the U.S. military has learned the basic principles of counterinsurgency with frightening speed, and whatever supposed expertise the British Army possessed in COIN, the U.S. Army surpassed that expertise, accumulated over centuries, in the first five years after 9/11. Not that British officers have forgotten how to be condescending about it...

    Senior British officers, who until recently regarded themselves as experts in counter-insurgency, marvel at the speed with which the American army is learning imperial policing. “It is a case of the son surpassing the father,” says one British officer.

    Update: Charlie, here. David Kicullen, GEN Petraeus' former strategy advisor, offered some interesting thoughts on the British experience in Basra earlier this fall in a lecture sponsored by the USMC Small Wars Center of Excellence (briefing slides here). Kilcullen argues that the Brits, based on experience mostly in the Balkans and Northern Ireland, adopted a peacekeeping (vice COIN) mindset in Basra, to the detriment of the stated mission.

    What's the difference, you ask? Well in PKO your primary task is to keep people from shooting each other; little or no violence is the metric of success. But from a COIN perspective, that might only be the calm before the storm. You needn't be an expert on Mao to know that quiescent periods can serve as an operation pause for refitting and regrouping. But, far more perniciously, op-pauses facilitate political organizing--the backbone of any good insurgency. While the Brits were patrolling in soft caps, competing Shia factions were busy recruiting and securing the the political bases for their future confrontation.

    PKO is almost by definition apolitical; COIN is, of course, wholly political. And that's what the Brits got wrong in Basra: they mistook lack of violence for a lack of threat. Let's see how they do as they ramp up their presence in Aghanistan.
  • Abu Muqawama returned home to Tennessee for the holidays yesterday and apologizes for not blogging yesterday. Today, though, he's been watching Reading Rainbow with his niece and reading Andrew Tilghman's article in the Washington Monthly on the exodus of the brightest young officers from the ranks of the U.S. Army. Man, what a fantastic article. All Americans who care about national security in the least should read this article. Abu Muqawama is often asked for the reason why he left the Army, and he responds that trying to reduce the reasons why he left the Army down to one thing is like trying to reduce the reasons we went to war in Iraq to one thing. It was a lot of things, most of which Tilghman mentions in this article. (Abu Muqawama also has a few screws holding his knee together, which he suspects is not something all Army captains experience.)

    Tilghman notes two things driving the most talented Army officers out of the Army that aren't usually noted. (Once again, people often try to reduce the reasons for the exodus of talented junior officers down to the high op-tempo in Iraq and Afghanistan. That's a big reason, but it's not the only one.) One is geographical.

    A military career has always involved a rural lifestyle, since sparsely populated places provide more room to test artillery and simulate warfare. These locations appealed to baby boomers, who came of age when many American urban centers were in decay, and Army garrison towns like Fayetteville, North Carolina, evoked the feeling of the small towns in which many officers had grown up. Today, numerous coastal American cities have been revitalized, and they attract the most educated and ambitious young men and women, many of whom grew up in suburbs. Meanwhile, Army towns like Killeen, Texas, or Watertown, New York, have devolved into impoverished, isolated outposts economically dependent on their military installations and notable mostly for a seedy proliferation of chain restaurants, pawnshops, and strip clubs.

    When Abu Muqawama graduated from his fancy-pants Ivy League university, the majority of his classmates went off to live in the big urban centers -- Boston, New York, Washington, San Francisco -- that attract young and talented professionals. Abu Muqawama moved to ... Watertown. Let him tell you, he spent a lot of time reading and going for long bike rides -- not to mention visiting friends in New York and Boston. Guns and pick-up trucks are fine and all (He who is from East Tennessee shall not cast stones), but for a single young officer, these outposts can be pretty lonely. And if you're married? Well...

    Perhaps the most powerful new element affecting officers' willingness to stay in the Army is the shifting dynamic of marriage and the roles of men and women in the family. Even in the rather traditional realm of Army culture, fathers now expect to be more actively involved in raising their children, and women tend to be less deferential to their husband's career. Among baby boomers, officers' wives were usually homemakers. Today, however, many officers' wives are doctors or lawyers or have degrees in international affairs, and there are few opportunities for them in places like Kentucky or West Texas.

    Yeah, good luck meeting a nice girl who went to Stanford or Williams and has dreams of her own and then trying to convince her to follow you around the world to places where there is no way in hell she is ever getting a job more intellectually challenging than being the manager of the local Borders. Abu Muqawama's ex-girlfriend loved visiting him when he was stationed in Savannah (what a great town that is), but she's an international photojournalist. How the hell was she ever going to move there?

    Finally, here's something that didn't affect Abu Muqawama's own decision but might have had he stayed in the Army long enough to see this take place from the inside:

    Like many young officers I met, Kapinos and Morin were particularly disturbed by the experience of a colonel named H. R. McMaster. McMaster earned a Sliver Star in Operation Desert Storm. In 2005, he commanded a brigade of several thousand men in the northern Iraqi city of Tal Afar. He was lauded as the first upper-level commander to introduce progressive counterinsurgency strategies, rather than the traditional security-based mission that most other commanders were pursuing. He sought support from the entire population of Tal Afar. When his men released detainees, they asked them how they felt they had been treated (this was dubbed the "Ask the Customer Program"). The results were impressive. As the rest of Iraq deteriorated in 2006, Tal Afar was relatively calm, and President Bush touted it as a success. Despite these achievements, McMaster has been passed over twice for promotion to brigadier general. Kapinos concluded, "The junior officers see a guy who they worship—he's smart and successful—and they see him get the short end of the stick. If he doesn't make one star, if he doesn't go on to great things, if the cream stops rising at some point—then the good guys are going to say, 'What's the point?'"

    Indeed. There is so much that is absolutely %$#@ed in the way the U.S. Army is handling its young officers that it might take decades to fix this. On the bright side, Reading Rainbow is still the greatest show on television, even after all these years.

    Update: Instapundit has some extended commentary from readers--two emails from Army retirees and one from an active duty major. Great perpsective.

    Update II: Nir wrote in from Iraq to say that out of 18 first lieutenants of the unit in which he is embedded, 17 do not plan on re-enlisting. Iraq deployments are cited as the major factor.
  • Now it's Charlie's turn to travel, so things will be quiet here for a couple days. In the meantime, check out this long article from the Washington Monthly on the exodus of smart, experienced captains from the Army. It gets way beyond "why they're getting out" to highlight the long term problems of both the quantity and quality of those remain. (If AM finishes his Christmas shopping, he might post some thoughts over the weekend. Speaking of shopping, check out Danger Room's Gift Guide...no, I do not want a pink taser.).

    And, for the less highbrow amongst us, go see Charlie Wilson's War. Where else are you gonna find coke, hookers, Congressmen, and a covert Afghan appropriations bill? This Charlie is taking her brother on Friday and promises a review shortly there after.

    Update: Devil Dawg asks in the comments if the Marines are having the same problems with their Captains as the Army. The short answer is no: the Marines personnel system assumes/requires a massive turnover of its company grade officers. They count on their captains getting out, so their recruiting / promotion needs haven't really changed. Now, what is open to debate is whether different folks are leaving than before. (Is type of officer retained today systematically different from that retained 5 or 10 years ago?) Charlie would love to know the answer to that one.

    Update II: Charlie is stuck at National Airport due to snow in Boston. Glad to see some things never change. But some things do: why didn't any of you tell her that there's a 5 Guys in the US Air terminal now? And wireless!? Holy god, it's like a real airport instead of the ass-end of nowhere (those of you who've spent as many hours as Charlie waiting for shuttle flights pre-rennovation know what she's talking about).

    Also, Charlie's seen a dozen or so young Soldiers en route home. One with the cutest BCG's you've ever seen; one struggling with his boots at security (come on TSA, give the SPC a break, go harangue girl trying to sneak through with the giant snow globe). And of course, 7 or 8 in line at 5 Guys. Cheeseburger and large fries, hooah? Fly safe boys.
  • One of Charlie's advisors told her early in graduate school that a 50% of what one reads should be from outside their professed academic field. It's great advice, if only because reading about civil wars, torture, and genocide doesn't exactly make for good bedtime reading. And, of course, you'd be surprised what you can learn about your own discipline by discovering what constitutes unanswered questions and controversies in others.

    And frankly, it's easy to get bored reading the same dry, on-point analyses all the time. Sometimes you have to go outside the box...way outside the box. (Like thinking about what Moneyball tells you about strategic assessment.) Before her current incarnation as "COIN goddess" (AM's cousin's phrase, not hers), Charlie was rather more of a science nerd (a habit she's found hard to kick). It's rare that these two interests collide, so she leaves this as an exercise for the reader:

    How is counter-insurgency (or other forms of complex irregular warfare) like modern intensive-care medicine? Read Atul Gawande's incredible New Yorker piece to find out. (Thanks, Phil.) Leave your thoughts in the comments...
  • So Abu Muqawama has been staying with a friend for the past two nights, and this friend has the uncanny ability to sleep through his alarm clock radio for, like, 20 minutes while the volume is on full blast. Thus, Abu Muqawama was planning on sleeping in this morning until he was awakened by perhaps the worst Neil Diamond song he's ever heard, played at full volume. Neil Diamond has some great songs, we know. But Sweet Mary Mother of Jesus, this was not one of them. So now that your blogger is up, he's been flipping through the new journal put out by the Combating Terror Center at West Point. There is some good stuff in there, including articles by Bruce Hoffman and Bruce Riedel. Allow Abu Muqawama to point special attention toward his friend Gregory Johnsen's article on Yemen. Greg writes great stuff on Yemen, which is good news for the rest of us as no one else writes anything on Yemen. Check it out here.
  • Charlie has often argued that if we could figure out a COIN platform or weapons system that was manufactured in 435 Congressional districts like the F-22, we'd have a lot easier time fighting these wars. This, friends, is called the Iron Triangle: the occasionally corrupt but nearly always effective alliance between Congress, industry and one or more of the services.

    The example below isn't particularly pernicious; Charlie is a-0k with C-17s. But it's not like the Senators named below went through a detailed strategic analysis before determining that the production must (must!) continue. (Though the story does remind Charlie of Air Force base construction practices: build the housing and golf course first and then, when you run out of money for the runways, go ask for more. It's the Army that needs C-17s. So the USAF buys it's bombers and fighters, and then asks for more when it doesn't get the airlift the Army wants.)

    Aerospace Daily & Defense Report
    December 18, 2007

    Senators Pressure White House For More C-17s

    Nineteen senators are pressuring the White House and Pentagon to "rightly fund" C-17 production by including it in the forthcoming fiscal 2009 budget request due to Congress in February.

    Two letters, dated Dec. 13, were dispatched; one each went to White House Office of Management and Budget Director Jim Nussle and Defense Secretary Robert Gates. Both letters encourage the Bush administration to stop looking to Congress to plus-up funding for Boeing's strategic airlifter production line in Long Beach, Calif.

    "We encourage you to work with DOD leadership to have C-17 funding added to their budget," the senators say to Nussle. "While Congress has sustained C-17 production in recent years, it is unrealistic to presume that it will be able to continuously support needed production through congressional adds."

    Congress has provided funding to keep the production line open in the last two years; orders now stand at 190. The senators, however, tell Gates that the strategy of relying on congressional plus ups "is no longer viable."

    The production line would close in 2009 without additional money, and without a nod from the government, Boeing would be forced to close operations at its suppliers. The senators note that about 30,000 jobs around the country contribute to C-17 production. Suppliers are now being funded by Boeing in hopes that the U.S. government will buy more of the massive airlifters.

    The Pentagon's requirement for strategic airlift is about 300 aircraft. It has about 111 C-5s, which are in disrepair and subject to a $17 billion re-engining project before they can provide sufficient reliability. However, past requirements studies have not taken into account use of the C-17 as an intratheater airlifter, the increasing end strength of the ground forces, addition of an Africa Command and the demands of the war on terrorism. The Pentagon is planning to undertake a new Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study next year.

    Citing skepticism about the future of the C-5 modernization program, U.S. Air Force Gen. Norton Schwartz, chief of U.S. Transportation Command, has told Congress he needs at least 250 C-17s to handle his missions.

    Signatories of the two letters include nine Democrats and 11 Republicans, most of them from states in which Boeing has a significant business interest. They include Democrats Claire McCaskill (Mo.), Dianne Feinstein (Calif.), Christopher Dodd (Conn.), Maria Cantwell (Wash.), Barbara Boxer (Calif.), Joseph Lieberman (Conn.), Patty Murray (Wash.) and Ron Wyden (Wash.).

    Republican signatories are: Christopher Bond (Mo.), Kay Bailey Hutchison (Tex.), John Cornyn (Tex.), Susan Collins (Maine), George Voinovich (Ohio), Saxby Chambliss (Ga.), Johnny Isakson (Ga.), Olympia Snowe (Maine), Gordon Smith (Ore.), Larry Craig (Idaho) and Lindsay Graham (S.C.).

    Priceless. Now we just need to find a way to turn a COIN "weapons system" into a federally subsidized jobs program, too...
  • Abu Muqawama is sitting in Tryst on 18th Street NW in Washington, DC along with what must be the bulk of Washington's blogging community.* Aside from blogging, he is reviewing three papers -- two written by noted and established counterinsurgency experts and one by a particularly precocious Georgetown sophomore who got the idea to compare the British uses of concentration camps in counterinsurgency campaigns in Malaya and Kenya for her history class. Bless. This 19-year old girl is so freaking smart. If she doesn't get an A on this paper, Abu Muqawama will be out for Jesuit blood when he returns to DC in January.

    While Abu Muqawama was in the air on his way from London, Nick Blanford sent along his analysis for NOW Lebanon on the rumors that Hassan Nasrallah has been demoted by the authorities in Tehran. Nick rightly dismisses these rumors:

    If the kidnapping operation was deemed a mistake, it was one shared by Hezbollah and the leadership in Iran. That is hardly a compelling reason, from the Iranian perspective, to demote the one Hezbollah official who is revered by the party's cadres and who, during his 15-year tenure as secretary general, more than anyone else is responsible for molding Hezbollah’s military wing into the formidable fighting machine that it is today.

    *They're playing one of Abu Muqawama's favorite albums in Tryst: Amadou & Mariam's Dimanche a Bamako.
  • Abu Muqawama is traveling, again, so posting could be light until he's able to sit down properly by a computer on Tuesday or so. You are in Charlie's capable hands until then.

    Yesterday, though, Abu Muqawama got an email from a friend and mentor -- a noted counterinsurgency expert whose emails demand responses -- asking why Abu Muqawama did not tack on any analysis to yesterday's post on Afghanistan. He forwarded along this op-ed column from the Philadelphia Inquirer and specifically asked why we have developed a coherent counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq but not yet Afghanistan.

    Well, if everyone suddenly considers this blog's opinion worth something, here it is: in COIN, the senior leadership matters. If the senior leadership -- specifically, the senior commander on the ground -- understands counterinsurgency, units on the ground stand a much better chance of executing a coherent COIN strategy. The reason the U.S. military has been able to develop an effective COIN strategy in Iraq -- regardless of whether or not that strategy ends up being successful (it all depends on how the domestic Iraqi political process plays out) -- is simply because Petraeus "gets" it. In David Petraeus, George Bush has found the first capable field marshal of the War on Terror. And in Odierno, Petraeus has a subordinate commander who may not "get" it in the way he does but has faithfully and forcefully executed the will of the commander nonetheless.*

    In Afghanistan ... well, Abu Muqawama is very reluctant to armchair general in these cases, but it pains him to say that it does not appear as if the senior leadership on the ground in Afghanistan really understands counterinsurgency. It would be one thing if "Bomber" was Abu Muqawama's pet nickname for the NATO commander there on account of his love for air power. We could all laugh at that. But "Bomber" is what the allies call him.

    George Bush has discovered -- the hard way -- that not all generals are created alike. One four-star may or may not be the equal of another four-star. And as part of NATO's top-to-bottom review of operations in Afghanistan, policy-makers might want to spend a good deal of time on the "top" part of the spectrum. Yes, we have suffered in Afghanistan due to a lack of resources. We badly need the troops in Afghanistan who are busy in Iraq. But Iraq has also sucked up the intellectual and leadership resources of the U.S. military -- and not just its infantry battalions. Do we have a senior leadership team in Afghanistan that truly understands COIN, we have to ask? Or is it time to make a call to the bullpen?

    With that question asked, Abu Muqawama is off to Gatwick.

    *Abu Muqawama is slowly changing his opinion of Odierno -- an opinion which developed based on his personal experiences in Iraq, watching the 4th ID in action, and after reading Tom Ricks's devastating portrait of Odierno in Fiasco. Odierno may never be the second coming of David Galula, but he is certainly imposing his will on the way business is getting done in Iraq and forcefully executing the vision of Petraeus. Give credit where credit is due, we say.
  • The New York Times leads off this morning's newspaper with both a long article on the top-to-bottom review of the mission in Afghanistan (about time, says Abu Muqawama) and a lead editorial to go with it. At least someone's paying attention to events outside of Iowa.
  • Yeah, "Palestine" is always a good issue for Arab leaders to exploit when they need to unify their populations in the face of some domestic political threat, but funny how no one has been able to do anything about the atrocious conditions of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon since 1948. The only argument this blogger would make with Nir Rosen's otherwise-worthy piece in Sunday's Washington Post is that Arab autocrats and intellectuals -- for all the empty words issued from the mouths regarding their Palestinian "brothers" -- deserve some of the blame for the squalor and legal limbo in which the Palestinians of Lebanon have lived for almost 60 years now. It's not just Lebanon's shame.

    NOTE: This is not an invitation for Abu Muqawama's readership to fight out the Israel-Palestine conflict in the comments. We here at this blog studiously avoid that powder keg. But if you have a comment on the plight of the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon, go for it.
  • There is an article in the New York Times this morning suggesting poverty had something to do with the decision of Larbi Charef and others to blow themselves up in a suicide attack a few days ago in Algiers. This bothered Abu Muqawama, as the economist Alan B. Kreuger makes a pretty persuasive case that poverty has little to do with terror in his excellent book of lectures, What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism.

    You should all read that book, which is on the Counterinsurgency Reading List. And if you're looking for something smart to read on the Algeria attacks, you should also read this article -- forwarded along by Charlie -- on the way in which the attacks represent a maturing terrorist organization. Emily Hunt's long piece is also good, though now dated, and it goes without saying that the French-language press is going to get into the weeds on Algerian politics better than its English-language peers. Happy hunting.

  • Is everyone out there clear about how much Abu Muqawama admires many of the Guardian's far-flung reporters (and football coverage) yet hates the newspaper itself? When it's not sending its reporters to harass a perfectly nice, altruistic girl doing some good in the world, it publishes not-at-all-clever editorial cartoons portraying President Bush as a simian, sub-human creature. Abu Muqawama's granola-munching Guardianista friends chuckle at these cartoons, forgetting all that critical theory they read in university which taught them, among other things, how dehumanizing a subject means relieving yourself of the moral obligation to engage with it. Thus, we can slag off President Bush as some monkey-creature rather than throw ourselves into a more difficult task -- such as an intelligent debate of the issues. Cool. These are some of the same folks, remember, who righteously condemned the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) as hateful and despicable (even if they defended their publication on free-speech grounds).

    That said, reporter David Smith's reports from Iraq were really fantastic, and now he's back with video. Check it out. Good on him for humanizing the jack-booted imperial thugs of the U.S. Army.

    UPDATE: One other thing in London that pisses Abu Muqawama off is the guy in his gym -- you know who you are, buddy -- who uses the only squat rack in the entire place to do his freaking pull-ups. This is bad etiquette, folks, especially on Abu Muqawama's leg day. Don't be that guy.
  • Andrew Hammond, who speaks wickedly good Arabic and is a close friend of Abu Muqawama's violent Pashtun flatmate, has an article up on the Reuters wire on the thaw in relations between Saudi Arabia and Qatar.* This is bad news for consumers of the Arabic-language media, because Qatar-owned al-Jazeera was one of the few places where you could read or see anything critical of the Saudi regime. Rich Saudi princes have bought controlling interests in pretty much every newspaper (al-Hayat, ash-Sharq al-Awsat, an-Nahar, etc.) and television station (al-Arabiyya, LBC, etc.) in the Arab world. So a country that sends hundreds of suicide bombers to Iraq to kill "Shia apostate dogs" (read = innocent civilians), provided 15 of the 19 9/11 hijackers and spreads the most extreme interpretation of Islam through the Islamic world never has anything bad written or said about it in the Arabic-language media. Great.

    *Abu Muqawama has never actually seen his flatmate do anything violent, but he is Pashtun and asks Abu Muqawama to post entries describing him as "violent" every so often in order to boost his "street cred" with the Islamist militants among whom he spends his days drinking tea.

Search