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Abu Muqawama

Abu Muqawama retains its autonomy and the views and beliefs expressed within the blog do not reflect those of CNAS. Abu Muqawama retains the right to delete comments that include words that incite violence; are predatory, hateful, or intended to intimidate or harass; or degrade people on the basis of gender, race, class, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or disability. In summary, don't be a jerk.

  • Fellow mil-blogger Blackfive, whose politics are decidedly right-of-center, has a hilarious report from a David Horowitz event for Islamo-Facism Week. He discovers a) David Horowitz is a clown, even if you agree with much of what he says, and b) nothing unites Americans across the political and religious spectra like our universal dislike of crazy 9/11 conspiracy theorists. This post is so worth reading.

    And for those of you looking for a slightly (read: much) more intelligent discussion of political Islam, try this long essay from the New York Review of Books. (h/t Martin Kramer) Oh, and for a longer treatment of the subject, Abu Muqawama has been recommending Hourani's timeless Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 to anyone and everyone who has asked him for a primer on political Islam.
  • Somebody forgot to tell the Colorado Rockies it was Game 1 of the World Series. Man, have they sucked tonight. They've just walked in the 11th and 12th runs of the night. Make that 13! Anyway, it's four in the morning in East London and Abu Muqawama is going to bed.
  • Charlie asked her students to read this New York Review of Books article in class today. In it, Rory Stewart,* reviews several biographies of Gertrude Bell, the (in)famous British Arabist forever associated with the founding of modern Iraq. Stewart's survey of her life (and the books about it) is not surprisingly masterful. He has a certain, small, amount of sympathy for Bell, saying her
    strength lay not in her political success--she did not succeed in forming a sustainable, stable, unified, Iraqi state--but in the clarity and imagination with which she explored its failure.
    But he is completely unsparing in his criticism of her policy recommendations for Iraq. Stewart argues she should not have acquiesced to either the establishment of a British Mandate (TE Lawrence wanted to send all the troops home) or the inclusion of Kurdish Mosul. But the heart of the article is the understanding of her failings alongside our own. Stewart concludes:

    Bell is thus both the model of a policymaker and an example of the inescapable frailty and ineptitude on the part of Western powers in the face of all that is chaotic and uncertain in the fashion for "nation-building." Despite the prejudices of her culture and the contortions of her bureaucratic environment, she was highly intelligent, articulate, and courageous. Her colleagues were talented, creative, well informed, and determined to succeed. They had an imperial confidence. They were not unduly constrained by the press or by their own bureaucracies. They were dealing with a simpler Iraq: a smaller, more rural population at a time when Arab national-ism and political Islam were yet to develop their modern strength and appeal.

    But their task was still impossible. Iraqis refused to permit foreign political officers to play at founding their new nation. T.E. Lawrence was right to demand the withdrawal of every British soldier and no stronger link between Britain and Iraq than existed between Britain and Canada. For the same reason, more language training and contact with the tribes, more troops and better counterinsurgency tactics—in short a more considered imperial approach—are equally unlikely to allow the US today to build a state in Iraq, in southern Afghanistan, or Iran. If Bell is a heroine, it is not as a visionary but as a witness to the absurdity and horror of building nations for peoples with other loyalties, models, and priorities.

    Charlie is reluctant to follow Rory all the way down this rabbit hole (which ends with him saying that unless local leaders are "literally eating babies," we shouldn't intervene). But there's a sobering history lesson here that suggests that treating these efforts as engineering problems in need of slight tinkering at the margins (tighten up the language here, add a bit more culture there) can actually be worse in the long run. It looks as though we will now have twice learned that lesson in Mesopotamia.

    *Stewart himself is the author of two fantastic books: The Places in Between (a travelogue about his walk through Afghanistan in Jan-Feb 2002 that's sure to make our upcoming reading list) and The Prince of the Marshes (a memoir of his year as a CPA official in southern Iraq). A former British Foreign Service Officer, Black Watch soldier, and occasional host of Charlie in Kabul, Stewart doesn't come to his policy conclusions lightly.
  • Regular Abu Muqawama readers know this blog avoids all things Israeli-Palestinian like the plague. The politics are so poisonous that you can't say much of substance without everyone immediately breaking down into two polarized camps. That said, the U.S. military studies the IDF quite a bit. They are a 'western' Army that fights with American-style equipment and American-style small-unit tactics. So it's only natural that we study their counterinsurgency performance in the West Bank and Gaza in the same way we study the British experience in Malaya or the French experience in Algeria.

    A report released by an Israeli psychologist is making waves in Israel at the moment. The report details the way in which the occupier (the IDF) has systematically brutalized the Palestinian population. Now relax, everybody, because Abu Muqawama isn't taking sides here, but even the most green E-1 in the U.S. Army these days understands Israeli military behavior in the Occupied Territories to be pretty crappy counterinsurgency.

    Some say Israel -- because of the settlers, because of the unique history between the Israelis and the Palestinians, because of religious claims on both sides -- can never practice truly effective COIN. Fair points. But then, the behavior of the IDF certainly doesn't set the conditions for a negotiated political settlement either. The Observer reports:

    A study by an Israeli psychologist into the violent behaviour of the country's soldiers is provoking bitter controversy and has awakened urgent questions about the way the army conducts itself in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.

    Nufar Yishai-Karin, a clinical psychologist at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, interviewed 21 Israeli soldiers and heard confessions of frequent brutal assaults against Palestinians, aggravated by poor training and discipline. In her recently published report, co-authored by Professor Yoel Elizur, Yishai-Karin details a series of violent incidents, including the beating of a four-year-old boy by an officer.

    The report, although dealing with the experience of soldiers in the 1990s, has triggered an impassioned debate in Israel, where it was published in an abbreviated form in the newspaper Haaretz last month. According to Yishai Karin: 'At one point or another of their service, the majority of the interviewees enjoyed violence. They enjoyed the violence because it broke the routine and they liked the destruction and the chaos. They also enjoyed the feeling of power in the violence and the sense of danger.'

    In the words of one soldier: 'The truth? When there is chaos, I like it. That's when I enjoy it. It's like a drug. If I don't go into Rafah, and if there isn't some kind of riot once in some weeks, I go nuts.'

    Another explained: 'The most important thing is that it removes the burden of the law from you. You feel that you are the law. You are the law. You are the one who decides... As though from the moment you leave the place that is called Eretz Yisrael [the Land of Israel] and go through the Erez checkpoint into the Gaza Strip, you are the law. You are God.'

    The soldiers described dozens of incidents of extreme violence. One recalled an incident when a Palestinian was shot for no reason and left on the street. 'We were in a weapons carrier when this guy, around 25, passed by in the street and, just like that, for no reason - he didn't throw a stone, did nothing - bang, a bullet in the stomach, he shot him in the stomach and the guy is dying on the pavement and we keep going, apathetic. No one gave him a second look,' he said.

    The soldiers developed a mentality in which they would use physical violence to deter Palestinians from abusing them. One described beating women. 'With women I have no problem. With women, one threw a clog at me and I kicked her here [pointing to the crotch], I broke everything there. She can't have children. Next time she won't throw clogs at me. When one of them [a woman] spat at me, I gave her the rifle butt in the face. She doesn't have what to spit with any more.'

    Yishai-Karin found that the soldiers were exposed to violence against Palestinians from as early as their first weeks of basic training. On one occasion, the soldiers were escorting some arrested Palestinians. The arrested men were made to sit on the floor of the bus. They had been taken from their beds and were barely clothed, even though the temperature was below zero. The new recruits trampled on the Palestinians and then proceeded to beat them for the whole of the journey. They opened the bus windows and poured water on the arrested men.

    The disclosure of the report in the Israeli media has occasioned a remarkable response. In letters responding to the recollections, writers have focused on both the present and past experience of Israeli soldiers to ask troubling questions that have probed the legitimacy of the actions of the Israeli Defence Forces.

    The study and the reactions to it have marked a sharp change in the way Israelis regard their period of military service - particularly in the occupied territories - which has been reflected in the increasing levels of conscientious objection and draft-dodging.

  • A few weeks ago, Abu Muqawama met with a friend in London who was reading Alistair Horne's "A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962.". He -- a reporter whose dispatches from Iraq have been a tremendous resource to this blogger -- told Abu Muqawama he was reading it because of the COIN reading list posted to the right on this blog.

    Abu Muqawama penned that reading list relatively quickly when he first set up this blog, and since then, he and Charlie have been thinking about writing up a proper COIN reading list that includes not only the books to the right but also relevant articles (such as Sepp's "Best Practices" and others) and maybe -- gasp! -- a little theory too.

    When our schedules relax a bit, we promise to buckle down, write one up, and then post it on the blog. So, stay tuned, and if any of you have suggestions you think we might miss, post a comment before the weekend.

    Cheers,

    Abu Muqawama
  • The Medal of Honor (America's highest military honor) was awarded 124 times during World War I and 464 times during World War II. It was awarded 246 times during the Vietnam Conflict. Yesterday, President Bush awarded the Medal of Honor (posthumously) to a veteran of the war in Afghanistan for the first time. It has been awarded only twice to veterans of the Iraq conflict.

    What's wrong with this picture?

    Well, either veterans of previous wars were a whole hell of a lot braver than soldiers today, or we have a problem. Personally, Abu Muqawama believes the military has built up a cult around the Medal of Honor such that every Medal of Honor recipient has to be an Alvin York or Audie Murphy -- men whose actions went beyond that of the "normal" Medal of Honor recipient. (Hell, they made Hollywood movies about both men.) But the nation's highest military honor should not be reserved for that small pantheon of super-heroes. The officer corps needs to fix this, because we have obviously we've been giving out the Medal of Honor too infrequently over the past six years.

    Or ... we're just pussies. Unlike our grandfathers. Who, I'll have you know, were hard and ate nails for breakfast on their way to go fight the Japanese. With chopsticks. Because they couldn't afford bullets. (It was the Depression.) And did they complain? F*** no. We whine about not having enough body armor -- they cursed because some jerk put filters on their cigarettes.

    Update: Charlie is intrigued by Abu Muqawama's comments on medal of honor winners (though she has always been told by her grandfather that he just went ahead and smoked the nails instead of eating them). One further piece of evidence that standards have somehow changed is the fact that since Vietnam medals of honor have only be awarded posthumously (2 in Somalia, 2 in Iraq, and now 1 in Afghanistan).

    One could make an argument about lower overall troop levels, fewer troops deployed, and different modes of combat in the modern era. Charlie knows better than to go looking for logic in the medals and awards department, but something does seem off here.
  • Abu Muqawama appreciates the space the New York Times has been giving to Roger Cohen on its online op-ed page, which means readers get to hear views on foreign affairs not penned by Nicholas Kristof or Tom Friedman. (Which is, we can all agree, a wonderful and necessary thing.) Today, Cohen takes a break from writing about his favorite subject -- France -- to report from Afghanistan.

    Nations are built one village at a time. Or so Colonel Bramble has come to believe. He is a thoughtful man, commanding a NATO provincial reconstruction team, one of 25 across the country, at a base in Qalat, between Kandahar and Kabul. His team is supposed to deliver the development and good governance that will marginalize the Taliban.

    That’s the theory. The practice looks like this. Seven armored U.S. Humvees form a “perimeter” on the edge of the village and newly trained members of the Afghan police — the “Afghan face” on this mission — are dispatched to bring out village elders.

    Looking apprehensive, the Afghans appear swathed in robes and headgear whose bold colors mock dreary U.S. Army camouflage. Staff Sgt. Marco Villalta, of San Mateo, Calif., steps forward: “We would like to ask you some questions about your village.”

    The following is elicited: There are 300 families using 25 wells. Their irrigation ditches get washed away in winter. A small bridge keeps collapsing. They send their children to a school in nearby Shajoy, but it’s often closed because of Taliban threats to teachers.

    Sergeant Villalta takes notes. “We’ll share this information with the governor and make sure that something is done.”

    “No! No!,” says Sardar Mohammed. “We don’t trust the governor. If he gets food, he gives it to 10 families. He puts money in his pocket. We trust you more than him. Bring aid directly to us.”

    Bramble’s view is that the governor is as good as officials get around here. The U.S. officer, like his country and NATO, is caught in the hall of mirrors of contested nation-building. The exchange at the village has traversed cultures, civilizations and centuries. For Western soldiers trained to kill, and now in the business of hoisting an Islamic country from nothing as fighting continues, that’s challenging.

  • Pedroia , you ****ing beauty.

    Update: Bring on the Rockies.
  • Abu Muqawama is under the mistaken impression that Charlie knows something about strategy (he has no such misconceptions regarding her knowledge of tactics). To the extent that she thinks more "strategically," she does tend to worry more about Pakistan and Iran than Iraq and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, unlike her counterpart on this blog, she is not an area expert (unless that area is NE Kansas or the shoe department at Nordstrom's). Corrections and comments from veteran Pakistan watchers are welcome.

    And as readers of this blog likely already know, there was serious news out of Pakistan this past week as a suicide bomber killed 134 people in an effort to assassinate former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Bhutto responded by accusing Pakistani military officials of ignoring warnings about the attack, suggesting senior members of the Army and ISI were complicit.

    This follows a miserable summer for the Pakistani Army, as Musharraf bent to US pressure and ordered a new offensive in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Apparently, it's not only the US Army that has difficulty in COIN campaigns:
    In late August, for instance, some 250 Pakistani soldiers, including officers, surrendered to a smaller group of militants without firing a shot. Since then only 30 have been released. Meanwhile, conservative estimates suggest that 1,000 of the 90,000 soldiers deployed in the three-month operation have been killed.

    [snip]

    But now, an Army built to counter the massive threat of the Indian military is being asked to fight its own citizens in an unpopular counterinsurgency campaign that it has neither the will nor the skill-set to fight.
    So to recap, Pakistan has 1) a military dictator who relies on; 2) a moribund army; 3) a corrupt former prime minister, back with a bang, and; 4) suicide bombers.

    Apparently, US officials have taken notice of this confluence of events and also remembered "Omg, these guys have nukes!" Unfortunately, it appears as though policy makers in Washington are about as unskilled at strategy as Charlie:
    “It never stitched together,” said Daniel Markey, a State Department official who dealt with Pakistan until he left government earlier this year. “At every step, there was more risk aversion — because of the risk of rocking the boat seemed so high — than there was a real strategic vision.”
    Should the US ease up its pressure on Musharraf in the FATA? Back the political parties opposed to both Bhutto and Musharraf? Write them all off and go it alone in our anti-Taliban CT campaign? Readers with suggestions for the State Department (and this blogger) are invited to submit them in the comments page, alongside come good reading recommendations for Charlie.

    Update: Excellent analysis and reading suggestions in the comment section.
  • [Serious COIN / USMC inside baseball follows; actual baseball fans should go here instead.]

    Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. James Conway, spoke at the Center for a New American Strategy last week. Most of the coverage focused on his concern that the Corps was growing too heavy and abandoning its expeditionary history:
    “We’ve simply gotten heavier....We’ve become in many ways a second land army....
    We now have a generation of officers who has never stepped aboard a ship, and that concerns us with our naval flavor and ability to launch amphibious support,” he said.
    These comments wouldn't raise an eyebrow amongst the broader COIN community. One of Charlie's favorite retired generals, LtGen Paul Van Riper, offered this by way of elaboration*:
    It seems to me that General Conway is trying to restore some balance to what the Corps will be doing in the next few years. Like the Army who has armor captains that have never maneuvered as part of a battalion, let alone a brigade, the Corps has captains who have never participated in an amphibious operation. I'm not implying an amphibious assault, but simple ship to shore movement in support of non-combatant evacuation operations or a raid. This is one of many examples of skill sets that are atrophying. Marines have always taken pride in their ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations. I don't think our leadership is moving away from that. These leaders, however, do recognize a need to begin to develop other competencies in our young officers and Marines before they reach more senior ranks. At the same time, I'm sure there is a desire to regain the expeditionary mindset that has long typified Marines.
    Charlie is actually quite sympathetic to these concerns, particularly with regard to training and education. These skills are hard to maintain, quick to diminish, and unique to the Marine Corps. She assumes most readers of this blog would find it hard to disagree with the rationale presented here.

    But while PKVR mades the best case for flexibility and adaptability, Gen. Conway does himself no such favors. Instead he suggests:
    In dialogue with those folks, the point came out that you can have a major contingency operation kind of capability, and still do the lesser included things to include counterinsurgency. The reverse of that statement is probably not true. So we need to either make sure that we get that balance right, whatever that balance may in time need to be.
    With all due respect (and all evidence to the contrary), Charlie would like to call BS. It's comments like these that lead many to the sad conclusion that the current commandant doesn't "get it." (One wonders how differently Gen. Mattis would have phrased his thoughts on the subject.) It's pretty clear that our general purpose forces (not to mention significant elements of their leadership) have found COIN challenging to say the least.

    Now it may be that the senior leadership decides that no COIN or CT threats actually constitute an existential threat to the US and therefore it's ok if we flounder around for 3 or 4 years everytime. This blogger thinks they're wrong, but it's a defensible position. But it's not one that the Commandant is making.

    We're not anywhere close to over-correcting toward COIN for the military at large. And so long as Gen. Conway thinks they're "lesser included things," Charlie thinks we're probably all safe from that fate.

    (*excerpted with permission)
  • ISTANBUL, Oct. 21 — At least 12 Turkish soldiers were killed in an ambush by Kurdish militants shortly after midnight on Sunday, in an audacious attack that sharply increased the pressure on Turkey’s government to send troops into northern Iraq.

    In light of this most recent cross-border attack, Abu Muqawama doesn't see how, exactly, Turkey doesn't send troops now into Northern Iraq. There are two possibilities that have sprung into the mind of this blogger as he's thought about why the PKK would have done something like this -- something they must surely know will cause Turkey to react militarily:

    1. The PKK is just stupid. This is, after all, a guerrilla organization that has failed to motivate the vast majority of Kurds -- currently enjoying their newfound economic and political freedom in Iraq -- to join the revolutionary struggle and attack Turkey. They have alienated the population they claim to be fighting for and have failed to build up any real support from Kurdistan's leadership. This is just the latest in a long line of stupid decisions.

    2. The PKK is really smart. This cross-border raid is straight out of the insurgent's handbook in that is is designed to provoke a violent military reaction from the other side -- the kind of military reaction that inflames the Kurdish population of Iraq in a way that the PKK's message has failed to do. The PKK can't unite the Kurds. But a Turkish invasion would. The PKK, then, forces the Kurds to take a side -- the PKK or the Turks?

    Abu Muqawama is leaning toward #2 being the correct answer. Especially in light of the recent fall-out between the USA and Turkey over the House of Representatives' stupid vote on the Armenian Genocide, the USA is in no position to discourage either the Turkish government or the Turkish population from going to war. (The PKK has killed over 30,000 Turks since 1984 -- Turkey wants war badly.)

    This will all, of course, end badly for the Kurdish people. In the end, the PKK is a bigger problem for them than it is for the Turks. It threatens what they have built up in Iraq and also the welfare of the Kurds living there.

    But here's something else that will be interesting to watch. The Turks are members of NATO. How will the other NATO member states re-act if Turkey invades Kurdistan and -- Turkey being Turkey (a la Manny being Manny) -- is considerably more cavalier about civilian casualties than the US? Will NATO/US pressure have an effect if things get out of hand?

  • For those readers interested in light weekend reading, look no further this special issue of Mother Jones. Yes, that's right, Mother Jones, erstwhile opponent of the Iraq War.
    But as General Anthony Zinni, former head of U.S. forces in the Middle East, told us, "Your conscience is not clean just because you're a peace demonstrator." In other words, just because you weren't in favor of going in doesn't mean you're not responsible for what happens when we pull out.
    Charlie hasn't had a chance to carefully read through all of it just yet, but the breadth of interviews alone is astounding. To wit: TX Hammes, Paul Hughes, HR McMaster, Jim Miller, John Nagl, Paul Pillar, Barry Posen, Ike Skelton, and Tony Zinni, among others.

    Each were asked questions along these lines:
    What's your schedule for withdrawal, and what consequences do you foresee? Which comes first—withdrawal, a functioning Iraqi government, or a solid international peacekeeping force? What concessions would you make to get Iraq's neighbors to help? What degree of bloodshed are you prepared to stand by and watch?
    If our military and civilian leaders had (honest) answers to even half these questions, Charlie would feel a lot better about the way forward. More thoughts later in the weekend.
  • The idea that the U.S. would want permanent or semi-permanent bases in Lebanon is silly -- for all the reasons mentioned previously by this blogger. And while Abu Muqawama doesn't want to be a water-carrier for Jeff Feltman, there is no reason to believe any of the following isn't true:

    Suleiman told the Naharnet Web site Thursday that the purported request for basing rights "has not been discussed with the Lebanese Army."

    US Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman described the As-Safir article as a fabrication and an insult to the Lebanese Army.

    "The purpose of the visit was very clear ... What he discussed was our commitment to help Lebanon to build a strong state and a strong army, especially after the great sacrifices this army has made in Nahr al-Bared," Feltman told reporters after visiting Beirut Maronite Bishop Boulos Matar Thursday.

    "We are working hand in hand with the army commander and the minister of defense to strengthen Lebanon's defensive capabilities," Feltman said. "The Lebanese people, at all levels, expressed a desire to establish a strong state and a strong army capable of defending Lebanon as happened in Nahr al-Bared." (more)

    Eric Edelman is, as diplomats go, tits on a bull (useless) and should have known that his visit would arouse all kinds of suspicion and rumors. But that doesn't change Abu Muqawama's belief that the U.S. is more worried about the spread of Islamist radicals out of Iraq and into the camps in Lebanon -- and that the summer fight at Nahr al-Bared was just the first of many clashes we can expect -- than they are about the bleeping Russians in Syria. (Do the Cold Warriors as-Safir think this is 1985?) It makes all the sense in the world, then, to aid and help reform the Lebanese Army as soon as possible.
  • From Inside Defense (via Small Wars Journal blog):
    Defense Secretary Robert Gates today shot down Marine Commandant Gen. James Conway's proposal to shift Marines from Iraq to Afghanistan, which would leave the Army to handle operations in Iraq.
    Gates dismissed the idea when asked about it at a Pentagon media briefing.
    "I have pretty much literally, up until this point, heard one sentence about it, that they were thinking about it," he said. "So I would say that if it happens it will be long after I'm secretary of defense." …
    Charlie heard a lot of pushback from folks across the spectrum after the Marine proposal leaked last week. Perhaps most interesting was that much of the opposition was framed in terms of "jointness." Namely, that handing Afghanistan over to the Marines would be a retreat from all the gains made in service cooperation and interoperability (aka, jointness) in the Goldwater-Nichols era. Charlie doubts this was the sole reason for Secretary Gates' decision, but it does reveal a major shift in service culture if senior Army leadership thinks that appeals to jointness serve as legitimate grievances in opposing the assignment of particular areas of operations.
  • A reader sent this story along, which Abu Muqawama had seen in as-Safir, a decidedly anti-U.S. (Angry Arab prefers "independent, leftist") newspaper, today.* (Arabic) The following translation is courtesy of Mideastwire.com:

    ...it was learned that the draft for the military treaty between Lebanon and the Pentagon notes the formation of joint Lebanese-American military and intelligence committees as well as coordination and supervision committees. The treaty also entails the establishment of land, aerial, and naval training centers. It specifies the location of land bases in the Arz mountain, northern Lebanon, and Ba'lbek, and in Al-Damur. The aerial bases are to be located in the military airport in Riyaq while the naval base is to be established in Tripoli and Nahr Al-Barid

    Does Abu Muqawama think this is true? In a word, no. There are two air strips to the north and south of Tripoli that might be of some use for evacuations if the airport in Beirut was shut down, but that's about it. Is the U.S. Air Force going to establish a massive base in Lebanon? Are you f***ing kidding me? Yeah, tell the U.S. Marine Corps they're being sent into Lebanon (again) and watch for their reaction. Anyway, this news item is getting a lot of play by the media with anti-U.S. editorial slants in Lebanon. The first link was to the story on the al-Manar website, for example. (al-Manar is Hizbollah's TV station.) Calm down, everybody. (At least until the BBC reports it.)

    *Just because Abu Muqawama considers as-Safir to have an anti-U.S. slant doesn't mean he doesn't read it -- or that others don't consider it Beirut's best newspaper, which many do.

    UPDATE: Okay, the IHT is now covering as-Safir's claims. Abu Muqawama never thought he would agree with Ahmed Fatfat, but he does in this instance. The U.S. aid is all about building up Lebanon's Army, which is not a recent development, even if it has been a more pressing concern after the fiasco at Nahr al-Bared. The No. 1 U.S. priority in Lebanon since the end of the Civil War has been to strengthen and develop the Lebanese Army. And if you don't believe Abu Muqawama, follow the money. Look where U.S. aid has gone since 1990. Does the U.S. hope the Lebanese Army will one day be strong enough to render militias (read: Hizbollah) irrelevant? Yes. But they also want a capable force that can deal with the internal threats like militant groups in the Palestinian camps. This whole nonsense about countering Russia seems silly: the U.S. already has bases in Turkey (a NATO member state), the British have bases in Cyprus, and Israel is allied with both of them. Why would the U.S. need to build a base in Lebanon?
  • "The University of Chicago Press, publisher of scholarly works since 1891, just filled a rush order for a third 5,000-copy printing of 'Instructions for American Servicemen in Iraq During World War II.'"

    Lt. Col. John Nagl, this blog's hero and virtual Doktorvater, wrote the preface to the new Chicago edition.

    One of the pamphlet's more insightful bits of wisdom:
    Of the schisms in Iraqi society, which have contributed to much of the violence since the U.S.-led invasion, the book advises, 'The Iraqis have some religious and tribal differences among themselves.'"
    Which Herr Profesor Oberst Nagl described as "a stunning understatement."

    (Charlie wonders if Bodleian Library has an Iran edition waiting to be reprinted.)
  • Abu Muqawama enjoyed a long conversation with an academic colleague yesterday regarding the ethics of conducting research in the social sciences in the service of national ends. In political science, this isn't such a big deal, and political scientists go on to serve in government and then return to the academy to teach.* Right this very moment, for example, Condoleezza Rice (a political scientist by training) employs a political scientist (this guy) as her counselor who will go back to his teaching post (just like this guy) once the administration changes out in early 2009.

    But in anthropology, serving "empire" by working in the Departments of State or Defense can spell an end to one's career. In this blog post by anthropologist Marcus Griffin, the author does a nice job explaining the history behind this animosity toward government service and makes an eloquent defense of anthropologists who risk their academic careers to serve in the Department of Defense as part of Human Terrain Teams or helping Marines and soldiers understand foreign cultures.**

    The debate in a nutshell is as follows. The general objection to anthropologists working with the military is that research will be used to facilitate the capture, torture, and killing of Iraqis. The professional code of ethics we abide by states that we must not conduct research that will cause harm to research subjects or the subject population. This code came out of the Vietnam War experience whereby some anthropologists used social network analysis to identify tribal leaders that the CIA apparently then assassinated. The second objection is that by using the anthropological perspective, US Forces will be in a position to more effectively prolong their “illegal occupation of Iraq.” I am embarrassed to say that academia is taking this issue very seriously, with some anthropologists writing in the blogosphere to get the national association to consider certain sanctions that include denying the publication of any research conducted in association with the military. That is serious because it leads to ignorance generally and specifically denies faculty like me avenues to measure scholarship and service for purposes promotion and merit pay. Read on...

    * Reading Elizabeth Kier's book Imagining War, her study of French Army doctrine between the world wars, Abu Muqawama was shocked and pleased to read a short selection of policy recommendations at the end. You would never see that in an anthropological study written in the post-Vietnam era.
    ** Abu Muqawama owes the website Small Wars Journal for the discovery of many references and articles, this blog being one of them.
  • Fred Kaplan returns to his bread and butter of civil-military relations, with a sober assessment of the options of dissenting senior officers faced with a possible war against Iran. The broader topic of whether generals should salute smartly or fall on their swords has been discussed in nearly every corner of military echo chamber. (Charlie insists that her students read Paul Yingling's article, and you should too.) Kaplan asks,
    So, if President George W. Bush starts to prepare—or actually issues the order—for an attack [on Iran], what should the generals do? Disobey? Rally resistance from within? Resign in protest? Retire quietly? Or salute and execute the mission?
    Like most who have written on this subject, Charlie is understandably torn. Civilian control of the military is one of the cornerstones of Anglo-American democracy (to the point that when we discuss reform or training of foreign militaries we forget that for many their biggest fears are coups, not invasions). But what do you do when the civilians seem to be auditioning for Dr. Strangelove? (You can't fight in here! This is the War Room!)

    Kaplan caveats that any of the 3R's must only be considered in the most extreme circumstances, and even then "perhaps at the behest of, civilian officials who agree with their positions—say, the secretaries of defense and state." In the end he concludes (a la HR McMaster):
    They should arrange to be called before congressional committees and to be asked awkward questions, which would elicit their critical replies. At the final hour, they should threaten to retire or resign en masse and, if that didn't work, they should follow through. (Even if they quietly retired, the fact that three or four or six or eight generals did so at once would have some impact.)
    This strikes Charlie as reasonable given the extraordinary circumstances. But in her more ornery moods, she wants to push Kaplan one further: if the Merkwürdigeliebe civilians are hell-bent on invasion, why shouldn't the Generals stand strong and wait to be fired? No constitutional violations (on either side), and the civilians get to put their money where their mouth is. Obviously this is a near impossibility, but so is three or four or six generals "retiring."

    Unfortunately, this is no laughing matter (Charlie's alter ego is on record saying she expects the civil-military fall-out from the Iraq war to last throughout the next generation). And certainly recalcitrant generals have used "reasonable" arguments well "within their lane" to oppose operations in places like Bosnia and Kosovo (leading Charlie to be somewhat sanguine on civilians falling hook, line, and sinker for all military advice). But if the generals, because of their learned fecklessness or deep, unwavering belief in the sanctity of civilian control, aren't able to put the brakes on seriously destructive military and security policies, who will?
  • As you all know, Abu Muqawama is written by two youngish folks who focus almost exclusively on counterinsurgency theory and tactics as well as some larger issues relating to the military such as pol-mil affairs. (Okay, with Abu Muqawama's occasional post on Lebanese politics thrown in there for a little extra seasoning.) For the writings of several youngish folks working at the other end of the spectrum -- in strategy and geo-politics -- click here. There's some good stuff written by dangerous young people with master's degrees and time on their hands. Abu Muqawama, meanwhile, calls it "strategery" like President Bush because operations at anything higher than the battalion level confuse him. (That's why we have Charlie.)
  • Abu Muqawama has not had much nice to say about the U.S. Air Force recently, so it's important to note when they get something right. Yesterday, they did:

    The Air Force has decided to relieve at least five of its officers of command and is considering filing criminal charges in connection with the Aug. 29 "Bent Spear" incident in which nuclear-armed cruise missiles were mistakenly flown from North Dakota to Louisiana, two senior Air Force officials said yesterday.

    Although senior Defense Department officials have not been fully briefed on the results of an Air Force probe of the incident, the sources said that at least one colonel is expected to lose his position and that several enlisted personnel will also be punished as part disciplinary actions that could be among the toughest meted out by the Air Force in years.

    The Bush Administration and the rest of the politicos in the Beltway should take this as a lesson in accountability from the U.S. Air Force.
  • The New York Times links to a video op-ed by Steve Connors and Molly Bingham on the insurgency in Iraq during the early phases of the war. Abu Muqawama has met and spoken with the film-makers a few times -- no, reader, he wasn't one of the insurgents they filmed -- but disagrees with their op-ed, which he think overestimates the power of the insurgents in the first year of the war relative to the U.S. forces and perhaps romanticizes the insurgents as well. They don't address, example, the very real sectarian hatred and potential for violence within Iraq. Sure, 100% of Iraqis disapprove of attacks against Iraqis. Easy questions, easy answer. But scratch beneath the surface a bit and you get a different story. (To some Sunnis, the Shia aren't even real Iraqis.) Abu Muqawama doesn't think it helps here that neither film-maker speaks Arabic and thus relied on translators the whole time. He also doesn't think it helps they spent most of their time with the insurgents. No, they don't become partisan, per se, but they can't help but internalize the narrative of the insurgent, who sees himself as part of a legitimate, national movement against the occupation. Alas, after the fall of Saddam and the incompetence of the U.S. military in the first few months, the only thing "national" left in Iraq was the football team.*

    But come up with your own opinions. You can find out more on the film here and watch a sneak preview here.

    *When Abu Muqawama criticizes the performance of the U.S. military in the first few months after the invasion, it should go without saying that he includes his own performance in that criticism. Like most tactical leaders in the 2003 and 2004, he wonders what he could have done better. Unlike most tactical leaders, though, and because he is now a specialist in COIN, he knows what he could have done better.
  • First it was seven Army sergeants. Now it's twelve Army captains.

    Today marks five years since the authorization of military force in Iraq, setting Operation Iraqi Freedom in motion. Five years on, the Iraq war is as undermanned and under-resourced as it was from the start. And, five years on, Iraq is in shambles.

    As Army captains who served in Baghdad and beyond, we've seen the corruption and the sectarian division. We understand what it's like to be stretched too thin. And we know when it's time to get out.

    At first, Charlie thought this shot across the bow was the most startling statement in this op-ed today. But then she saw:
    U.S. forces, responsible for too many objectives and too much "battle space," are vulnerable targets. The sad inevitability of a protracted draw-down is further escalation of attacks -- on U.S. troops, civilian leaders and advisory teams. They would also no doubt get caught in the crossfire of the imminent Iraqi civil war.
    So what they're saying is our exit strategy (such as it is) will only make things worse for Americans on the ground (to say nothing of that imminent civil war)? Why didn't they say anything while they were still in uniform?
    This is Operation Iraqi Freedom and the reality we experienced. This is what we tried to communicate up the chain of command. This is either what did not get passed on to our civilian leadership or what our civilian leaders chose to ignore. While our generals pursue a strategy dependent on peace breaking out, the Iraqis prepare for their war -- and our servicemen and women, and their families, continue to suffer.
    Oh, snap! They did! (We'll leave for another day the question of if and how this information was willfully disregarded.) Well, are there any options left on the table?

    There is one way we might be able to succeed in Iraq. To continue an operation of this intensity and duration, we would have to abandon our volunteer military for compulsory service. Short of that, our best option is to leave Iraq immediately. A scaled withdrawal will not prevent a civil war, and it will spend more blood and treasure on a losing proposition.

    America, it has been five years. It's time to make a choice.

    To many this will seem simplistic. And it is. (Charlie, for one, is reluctant to fetishize the tactical observations of boots on the ground) . But that doesn't mean it's wrong. Fellow traveler Phil Carter has been beating the draft drum for some time. And Steve Biddle has highlighted similar problems with a Goldilocks-like desire to chart a middle course of advisors and phased draw-down. We can either fight a proper counter-insurgency campaign, or we can come home.

    Any chance we could get 17 generals to agree?

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