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Abu Muqawama

Abu Muqawama retains its autonomy and the views and beliefs expressed within the blog do not reflect those of CNAS. Abu Muqawama retains the right to delete comments that include words that incite violence; are predatory, hateful, or intended to intimidate or harass; or degrade people on the basis of gender, race, class, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or disability. In summary, don't be a jerk.

  • "The University of Chicago Press, publisher of scholarly works since 1891, just filled a rush order for a third 5,000-copy printing of 'Instructions for American Servicemen in Iraq During World War II.'"

    Lt. Col. John Nagl, this blog's hero and virtual Doktorvater, wrote the preface to the new Chicago edition.

    One of the pamphlet's more insightful bits of wisdom:
    Of the schisms in Iraqi society, which have contributed to much of the violence since the U.S.-led invasion, the book advises, 'The Iraqis have some religious and tribal differences among themselves.'"
    Which Herr Profesor Oberst Nagl described as "a stunning understatement."

    (Charlie wonders if Bodleian Library has an Iran edition waiting to be reprinted.)
  • Abu Muqawama enjoyed a long conversation with an academic colleague yesterday regarding the ethics of conducting research in the social sciences in the service of national ends. In political science, this isn't such a big deal, and political scientists go on to serve in government and then return to the academy to teach.* Right this very moment, for example, Condoleezza Rice (a political scientist by training) employs a political scientist (this guy) as her counselor who will go back to his teaching post (just like this guy) once the administration changes out in early 2009.

    But in anthropology, serving "empire" by working in the Departments of State or Defense can spell an end to one's career. In this blog post by anthropologist Marcus Griffin, the author does a nice job explaining the history behind this animosity toward government service and makes an eloquent defense of anthropologists who risk their academic careers to serve in the Department of Defense as part of Human Terrain Teams or helping Marines and soldiers understand foreign cultures.**

    The debate in a nutshell is as follows. The general objection to anthropologists working with the military is that research will be used to facilitate the capture, torture, and killing of Iraqis. The professional code of ethics we abide by states that we must not conduct research that will cause harm to research subjects or the subject population. This code came out of the Vietnam War experience whereby some anthropologists used social network analysis to identify tribal leaders that the CIA apparently then assassinated. The second objection is that by using the anthropological perspective, US Forces will be in a position to more effectively prolong their “illegal occupation of Iraq.” I am embarrassed to say that academia is taking this issue very seriously, with some anthropologists writing in the blogosphere to get the national association to consider certain sanctions that include denying the publication of any research conducted in association with the military. That is serious because it leads to ignorance generally and specifically denies faculty like me avenues to measure scholarship and service for purposes promotion and merit pay. Read on...

    * Reading Elizabeth Kier's book Imagining War, her study of French Army doctrine between the world wars, Abu Muqawama was shocked and pleased to read a short selection of policy recommendations at the end. You would never see that in an anthropological study written in the post-Vietnam era.
    ** Abu Muqawama owes the website Small Wars Journal for the discovery of many references and articles, this blog being one of them.
  • Fred Kaplan returns to his bread and butter of civil-military relations, with a sober assessment of the options of dissenting senior officers faced with a possible war against Iran. The broader topic of whether generals should salute smartly or fall on their swords has been discussed in nearly every corner of military echo chamber. (Charlie insists that her students read Paul Yingling's article, and you should too.) Kaplan asks,
    So, if President George W. Bush starts to prepare—or actually issues the order—for an attack [on Iran], what should the generals do? Disobey? Rally resistance from within? Resign in protest? Retire quietly? Or salute and execute the mission?
    Like most who have written on this subject, Charlie is understandably torn. Civilian control of the military is one of the cornerstones of Anglo-American democracy (to the point that when we discuss reform or training of foreign militaries we forget that for many their biggest fears are coups, not invasions). But what do you do when the civilians seem to be auditioning for Dr. Strangelove? (You can't fight in here! This is the War Room!)

    Kaplan caveats that any of the 3R's must only be considered in the most extreme circumstances, and even then "perhaps at the behest of, civilian officials who agree with their positions—say, the secretaries of defense and state." In the end he concludes (a la HR McMaster):
    They should arrange to be called before congressional committees and to be asked awkward questions, which would elicit their critical replies. At the final hour, they should threaten to retire or resign en masse and, if that didn't work, they should follow through. (Even if they quietly retired, the fact that three or four or six or eight generals did so at once would have some impact.)
    This strikes Charlie as reasonable given the extraordinary circumstances. But in her more ornery moods, she wants to push Kaplan one further: if the Merkwürdigeliebe civilians are hell-bent on invasion, why shouldn't the Generals stand strong and wait to be fired? No constitutional violations (on either side), and the civilians get to put their money where their mouth is. Obviously this is a near impossibility, but so is three or four or six generals "retiring."

    Unfortunately, this is no laughing matter (Charlie's alter ego is on record saying she expects the civil-military fall-out from the Iraq war to last throughout the next generation). And certainly recalcitrant generals have used "reasonable" arguments well "within their lane" to oppose operations in places like Bosnia and Kosovo (leading Charlie to be somewhat sanguine on civilians falling hook, line, and sinker for all military advice). But if the generals, because of their learned fecklessness or deep, unwavering belief in the sanctity of civilian control, aren't able to put the brakes on seriously destructive military and security policies, who will?
  • As you all know, Abu Muqawama is written by two youngish folks who focus almost exclusively on counterinsurgency theory and tactics as well as some larger issues relating to the military such as pol-mil affairs. (Okay, with Abu Muqawama's occasional post on Lebanese politics thrown in there for a little extra seasoning.) For the writings of several youngish folks working at the other end of the spectrum -- in strategy and geo-politics -- click here. There's some good stuff written by dangerous young people with master's degrees and time on their hands. Abu Muqawama, meanwhile, calls it "strategery" like President Bush because operations at anything higher than the battalion level confuse him. (That's why we have Charlie.)
  • Abu Muqawama has not had much nice to say about the U.S. Air Force recently, so it's important to note when they get something right. Yesterday, they did:

    The Air Force has decided to relieve at least five of its officers of command and is considering filing criminal charges in connection with the Aug. 29 "Bent Spear" incident in which nuclear-armed cruise missiles were mistakenly flown from North Dakota to Louisiana, two senior Air Force officials said yesterday.

    Although senior Defense Department officials have not been fully briefed on the results of an Air Force probe of the incident, the sources said that at least one colonel is expected to lose his position and that several enlisted personnel will also be punished as part disciplinary actions that could be among the toughest meted out by the Air Force in years.

    The Bush Administration and the rest of the politicos in the Beltway should take this as a lesson in accountability from the U.S. Air Force.
  • The New York Times links to a video op-ed by Steve Connors and Molly Bingham on the insurgency in Iraq during the early phases of the war. Abu Muqawama has met and spoken with the film-makers a few times -- no, reader, he wasn't one of the insurgents they filmed -- but disagrees with their op-ed, which he think overestimates the power of the insurgents in the first year of the war relative to the U.S. forces and perhaps romanticizes the insurgents as well. They don't address, example, the very real sectarian hatred and potential for violence within Iraq. Sure, 100% of Iraqis disapprove of attacks against Iraqis. Easy questions, easy answer. But scratch beneath the surface a bit and you get a different story. (To some Sunnis, the Shia aren't even real Iraqis.) Abu Muqawama doesn't think it helps here that neither film-maker speaks Arabic and thus relied on translators the whole time. He also doesn't think it helps they spent most of their time with the insurgents. No, they don't become partisan, per se, but they can't help but internalize the narrative of the insurgent, who sees himself as part of a legitimate, national movement against the occupation. Alas, after the fall of Saddam and the incompetence of the U.S. military in the first few months, the only thing "national" left in Iraq was the football team.*

    But come up with your own opinions. You can find out more on the film here and watch a sneak preview here.

    *When Abu Muqawama criticizes the performance of the U.S. military in the first few months after the invasion, it should go without saying that he includes his own performance in that criticism. Like most tactical leaders in the 2003 and 2004, he wonders what he could have done better. Unlike most tactical leaders, though, and because he is now a specialist in COIN, he knows what he could have done better.
  • First it was seven Army sergeants. Now it's twelve Army captains.

    Today marks five years since the authorization of military force in Iraq, setting Operation Iraqi Freedom in motion. Five years on, the Iraq war is as undermanned and under-resourced as it was from the start. And, five years on, Iraq is in shambles.

    As Army captains who served in Baghdad and beyond, we've seen the corruption and the sectarian division. We understand what it's like to be stretched too thin. And we know when it's time to get out.

    At first, Charlie thought this shot across the bow was the most startling statement in this op-ed today. But then she saw:
    U.S. forces, responsible for too many objectives and too much "battle space," are vulnerable targets. The sad inevitability of a protracted draw-down is further escalation of attacks -- on U.S. troops, civilian leaders and advisory teams. They would also no doubt get caught in the crossfire of the imminent Iraqi civil war.
    So what they're saying is our exit strategy (such as it is) will only make things worse for Americans on the ground (to say nothing of that imminent civil war)? Why didn't they say anything while they were still in uniform?
    This is Operation Iraqi Freedom and the reality we experienced. This is what we tried to communicate up the chain of command. This is either what did not get passed on to our civilian leadership or what our civilian leaders chose to ignore. While our generals pursue a strategy dependent on peace breaking out, the Iraqis prepare for their war -- and our servicemen and women, and their families, continue to suffer.
    Oh, snap! They did! (We'll leave for another day the question of if and how this information was willfully disregarded.) Well, are there any options left on the table?

    There is one way we might be able to succeed in Iraq. To continue an operation of this intensity and duration, we would have to abandon our volunteer military for compulsory service. Short of that, our best option is to leave Iraq immediately. A scaled withdrawal will not prevent a civil war, and it will spend more blood and treasure on a losing proposition.

    America, it has been five years. It's time to make a choice.

    To many this will seem simplistic. And it is. (Charlie, for one, is reluctant to fetishize the tactical observations of boots on the ground) . But that doesn't mean it's wrong. Fellow traveler Phil Carter has been beating the draft drum for some time. And Steve Biddle has highlighted similar problems with a Goldilocks-like desire to chart a middle course of advisors and phased draw-down. We can either fight a proper counter-insurgency campaign, or we can come home.

    Any chance we could get 17 generals to agree?
  • Don Rumsfeld had it all wrong. He famously said, "you have to go to war with the Army you have, not the Army you want." But that's not true: we all go to war with the military Boeing and other big defense contractors want us to have.

    The Pentagon not only left new C-17 transport planes out of its budget request this year, it set aside half a billion dollars to halt the planes' production. Officially, the Air Force took the same view, swearing off any more C-17s, which cost $250 million apiece.

    Behind the scenes, however, Air Force officials and Boeing, which makes the C-17, have been lobbying Congress to get more of the planes built, key lawmakers said. Seven House members have responded by inserting into the defense bill one of that chamber's largest single earmarks -- a demand that the Air Force give Boeing $2.42 billion for new C-17s.

    The Air Force "made it very clear to me that they needed the C-17 and could use the aircraft," said Rep. Todd Akin (R-Mo.), a fiscal conservative and one of the seven sponsors. "But we were going to have to stick it into the budget" because the Air Force was not going to allocate the money itself.

    What are the worries, though? I'm sure we couldn't have used that $2.42 billion anywhere else. Abu Muqawama readers, should they be so inclined, can reach Rep. Akin's office at the following number: 202-225-2561. Give him a call and ask him how that fiscal conservativism's going.

    Meanwhile, the lily-white U.S. Air Force procurement program goes rolling along.

    Update: Charlie, here. This is eerily similar to how the Air Force builds airbases: housing first, runways last. That way when they run out of money, they march (fly?) back to Capitol Hill asking for additional funds. Because you can't have an airbase without runways, right? Here, the boys in blue know that the Army can't function without USAF lift support, so there will be plenty of pressure to fund the unsexy C-17s at the end of the day (whether USAF requests them or not). This way they get all their fun toys, and the army gets its lift. Just like how they get golf courses.
  • How much fun do you think Nic Blanford had researching this article?

    Bekaa Valley, Lebanon - Ali plucks a sprig of the cannabis sativa plant and sniffs its distinctive leaves with appreciation. This Lebanese farmer's field of marijuana, a splash of bright green on the sun-baked plains of eastern Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, will yield around 15 kilograms (33 pounds) of cannabis resin, or hashish, which he will sell for about $10,000, many times more than he could hope to earn from legitimate crops and for almost no work at all.

    "All I have to do is throw the seeds on the ground, add a little water, and that's it," says Ali, who spoke on the condition that his full name was not used. "I would be crazy not to grow [marijuana]."

    It has been a bumper year for marijuana cultivation in the Bekaa Valley, the largest, growers say, since the "golden years" of Lebanon's 1975-1990 civil war, when marijuana and heroin grown and processed here flooded the markets of Europe and the United States.

    Hashish production is illegal in Lebanon, and each year since the early 1990s police backed by troops bulldoze the crops before they can be harvested, leaving farmers penniless. But the failure of United Nations and government programs to encourage the growth of legitimate crops, coupled with months of political crisis, deteriorating economic prospects, and a frail security climate have encouraged farmers to return to large-scale marijuana cultivation.

    "The worse the security situation is in Lebanon, the more we can grow," says Ali.

  • ... but torture still doesn't work. Abu Muqawama doesn't mean to get all partisan today, but those of you who read this blog regularly know that Abu Muqawama went through the roof a few months ago when -- out of all the GOP candidates for president -- only John McCain and Ron Paul came out firmly against torture during a live debate. Meanwhile, some idiots in the South Carolina audience cheered loudly when Mitt Romney said he would double the size of Guantanamo -- never mind the fact that most people in the Bush Administration (including the Secretaries of Defense and State) are now firmly in favor of closing the camp as soon as possible. Watch the whole sordid affair here, and pay close attention to the verbal gymnastics in play as the candidates try to avoid the word "torture" -- using instead "enhanced interrogation techniques" and whatever else to describe ... the act of torture. McCain calls them all out on that at the very end of the clip, also pointing out that those who have served in the military are far less likely to support the use of torture than those who have not. Mitt Romney and Rudi Giuliani have no more worn the uniform than Hillary Clinton or Barack Obama, so maybe that explains their views.

    This was all the subject of Tom Ricks's Inbox, a regular feature in the Washington Post on Sundays where Tom prints some of the better email correspondence he's received over the week. Abu Muqawama is re-printing this in full, but if you read nothing else, read what Kyle Teamey had to say on the subject:

    Does torture work? The Bush administration has argued that, at a minimum, tough interrogation tactics do. But in the e-mail discussion below, four U.S. military experts with very different life experiences explain why they concluded that torture doesn't work. The exchange is excerpted with their permission.

    First is Army Capt. Kyle Teamey, a current military intelligence officer:

    Subject: INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES

    When I was in the officer's basic course, one of the instructors, only half-jokingly, proclaimed, "Beatings and drugs are for fun, not for information." His point was you can get anyone to say anything you want through torture. Good information came from psychology, interpersonal skills, and long hours with your prisoner. The best interrogators I've worked with tended to be very good at reading people and very good at using their understanding of the person and their culture to get them to talk -- no waterboarding required. . . .

    We should be developing an ideological alternative (or alternatives) to jihad and are instead alienating our allies, enraging the populations from which the terrorists arise, and most importantly, alienating our COG [center of gravity] in the form of the U.S. electorate. A liberal democracy, such as the US, operating in an environment with pervasive media cannot afford to dally in tactics that may provide some short term gains at the expense of long term success.

    It is not just the US that has made this error in judgment. The Brits and French did the same in their COIN [counterinsurgency] campaigns in 20th century and suffered for it. We should learn from their mistakes -- and ours.

    That provoked this comment from retired Air Force Col. Robert Certain, who was held as a prisoner of war after being shot down over North Vietnam:

    We ex-POWs don't look kindly on sadistic behavior, especially when it degenerates into torture. Kyle is right, it doesn't do much to get useful info, it only gives the sadist some thrills.

    Retired Army Lt. Col. Terry Daly, a veteran of military intelligence operations in the Vietnam War, then added:

    I have yet to speak with an experienced, successful interrogator who advocates mistreating their subjects. As personally satisfying as it may seem to beat the hell out of detainees, it doesn't usually get you what you want -- accurate, reliable information that you can trust and upon which you can act.

    In Vietnam the Provincial Interrogation Centers routinely used skilled Vietnamese interrogators to obtain accurate, detailed information on the organization, personnel and structure of the Vietnamese Communist Infrastructure -- exactly the type of information Guantanamo should be producing by the pound on radical Islamic terrorism.

    I think we make a major strategic error when we support such would-be macho men as we see in this administration showing their supposed toughness by advocating torture, when we know it doesn't work.

    Finally, Air Force Col. William Andrews, who was a POW during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, added:

    . . . when I was shot down over Iraq in 1991, I expected to be tortured . . . because I was in the hands of the bad guys. As I was beaten, I had a sense of moral superiority over brutal men who had a monopoly on physical power in the interrogation room. This moral superiority came from the knowledge that we were the good guys and we didn't treat our prisoners that way. We were better than they were. I believe we cannot ever afford to give that up.

  • Goodness me. Afghanistan Watch and afghanistanica have posted the in-flight voice recorder transcript to a Blackwater-piloted flight that killed three U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan. This makes for harrowing and morbid reading. Blackwater apologists and U.S. tax-payers -- not to mention the families of the soldiers -- will not want to read what follows. The full transcript is even more disturbing than this excerpt:

    The transcript and recording start at 0318:37 (7:18:37 a.m. local time)

    PILOT: I hope I'm goin' in the right valley.

    CO-PILOT: That one or this one?

    PILOT: I'm just gunna go up this one.

    CO-PILOT: Well, we, we've never or at least I've never done this Farah.

    PILOT: We'll just see where this leads.

    CO-PILOT: Twenty seven million people in this country, boy, you wouldn't wouldn't guess that cause there just everybody's scattered out.

    PILOT: Yeah.

    PILOT: But I'm now I mean I was really surprised at how you can almost always look down and see somebody or somethin' er.

    CO-PILOT: Yeah, yeah, there's seem to be dwellings just about every where you go.

    CO-PILOT: Yeah this is fun!

    PILOT: We're not suppose to be havin' fun though.

    CO-PILOT: Exactly.

    PILOT: No fun allowed god-(expletive).

    CO-PILOT: It's supposed to be all work we can't enjoy any of it.

    PILOT: Exactly.

    CO-PILOT: Cause we're getting' paid too much to be havin' fun.

    PILOT: You're god-(unintelligible) right.

    ...

    (Sound similar to stall warning tone single beep)

    MECHANIC: Got a way out?

    PILOT: Yeah.

    PILOT: We we can do a one eighty up in here.

    MECHANIC: Yeah, I'd pick one side or the other to... ah.

    PILOT: Drop a drop a quarter flaps.

    PILOT: (expletive).

    MECHANIC: Okay, yeah, you're... ah.

    CO-PILOT: Yeah let's turn around.

    PILOT: Yeah, drop a quarter flaps.

    MECHANIC: Yeah you need to--ah--make a decision.

    (Sound of heavy breathing starts)

    PILOT: God (expletive)!

    MECHANIC: Hundred, ninety knots, call off his airspeed for him (unintelligible).

    (sound similar to stall warning starts and continues until end)

    PILOT: Ah (expletive, expletive)!

    MECHANIC: Call it off, help him out, call off his airspeed for him (unintelligible) butch.

    CO-PILOT: You got ninety-five.

    CO-PILOT: Ninety-five.

    PILOT: Oh God!

    PILOT: Oh (expletive)!

    MECHANIC: We're goin' down.

    UNIDENTIFIED VOICE: God!

    UNIDENTIFIED VOICE: God!

    (End of recording: 0350:00, 7.50 a.m. local time)

    Source: National Transportation and Safety Board (NTSB)

    The original article from Der Spiegel.
  • ... the great Colonel McCallister has squeezed into a pamphlet. 72 pages, folks. Short enough for even a Marine to read. (Thanks, Small Wars Journal!)
  • ... is this book.
  • Charlie hopes that the proposal to move Marine units out of Anbar province and re-orient the Corps to Afghanistan sparks some serious debate. It's both controversial and potentially a very good idea.

    Abu Muqawama is justly nervous about the Army getting stuck with the sinking ship that is Iraq (even if things are getting better at the tactical and operational level, we're so far from a political solution not even the Hubble telescope could help us see it). But there are advantages to having the Marines operating in Afghanistan, especially with regard to airpower. Now both Charlie and Abu Muqawama are self-identified airpower skeptics, in so far as that involves warheads on foreheads. But there's much more to airpower than just bomb dropping (persistent ISR, transport, etc.), and that's where the Marine Air Ground Task Force comes in.

    Marines train to fight in what is called a Marine Air-Ground Task Force. That term refers to a Marine deployment that arrives in a combat zone complete with its own headquarters, infantry combat troops, armored and transport vehicles and attack jets for close-air support, as well as logistics and support personnel.

    “This is not about trading one ground war for another,” said one Pentagon official briefed on the Marine concept. “It is about the nature of the fight in Afghanistan, and figuring out whether the Afghan mission lends itself more readily to the integrated MAGTF deployment than even Iraq.”

    See, the Marines are the only service that coming ground forces with rotary and fixed winged aircraft (the Army can't have planes; the Air Force can't have helos; and the Navy's ground force is called the Marines). This unique force structure generally allows for better integration of the air and ground elements. In particular, the Marine air community is used to playing a supporting role. Charlie hasn't come across many Marine F-18 or Cobra pilots who think that airpower alone can win wars. They're used to being team players, and they're damn good at it.

    That doesn't mean there won't be some second and third order effects from the proposed mission shift. (Never underestimate the Army's resentment of the Marine Corps' perfectly oiled propaganda machine.) But color Charlie optimistic at the idea of more Marines in Afghanistan.

    Update: Charlie has been told that one hitch in this plan is the potential difficulty of some Marine helicopters operating at altitude in Afghanistan (often above 10000 ft). We may still get a joint fight if the Marines come to rely on Army Blackhawks for air assault support.

    Update II: Charlie puts her finger on a real problem. But it will be twin-rotored Chinooks they rely upon, not Blackhawks. --Abu Muqawama
  • ...sorry that Abu Muqawama missed the only back-to-back homers from Manny and Ortiz this season. Love that dirty water!

    And she would have enjoyed the game more if Abu Muqawama hadn't ruined her afternoon by reminding her that Megan O'Sullivan is now licking her wounds at Harvard's Institute of Politics. Charlie offers a rounds of beer to any Boston area readers who are able to attend Megan's talk at the Belfer Center later this week; shots for anyone who refuses to pull punches in the Q&A. She has a lot to answer for.
    ::Charlie
  • My goodness, what on Earth is Abu Muqawama going to do? Scotland in quarterfinals of the World Cup, the Red Sox in the ALDS, and both games on at the same damn time. He's just going to have to run to the local pub, watch 80 minutes of rugby, and get back for the final innings of the Sox game. (Sorry, Charlie) Or, he could always stay in and read a 32-page journal article titled Historical Review of School-Based Randomized Trials for Evaluating Problem Behavior Prevention Programs... Er, no.

    UPDATE: Oh, for the love of all that is holy. If you're going to lose, boys, don't give Abu Muqawama hope until the last minute of the game and then crush his dreams.

    UPDATE II: Ah, that's more like it.
  • Now, this is what Abu Muqawama likes to see. Abu Muqawama has long said he doesn't really mind the British pulling out of Iraq as long as they beef up their presence in Afghanistan.

    The whole of one of the army's most elite regiments, supported by the RAF's latest fighter bombers, is to be sent to Afghanistan in a military operation unprecedented since the second world war.

    For the first time since 1945, all three regular battalions of the Parachute Regiment - about 2,000 troops - will be deployed for combat. The Eurofighter/Typhoon, equipped with new missiles for a ground attack role, will be deployed for the first time in a hostile mission.

    That's sending a message.

    The decision by the heads of all three branches of the armed forces to deploy so much manpower and weaponry to southern Afghanistan also reflects their conviction, shared by ministers, that unlike Iraq, Afghanistan is on the frontline of the fight against international terrorism and that the conflict there is a "noble cause".

    Abu Muqawama will know they're really serious, though, when they re-activate Harry Paget Flashman, VC KCB KCIE.
  • Charlie isn't sure how Abu Muqawama feels about Christopher Hitchens, but she's always been rather conflicted about him. Is he the most irritating ex-pat British commentator this side of Andrew Sullivan? Or is he the most literate enfant terrible of our day? Maybe both. Perhaps some of her deep ambivalence derives from his witch's brew of righteous indignation and masterful prose. He can draw you in despite yourself.

    But none of that prepares your for his most recent piece (free, online) in Vanity Fair--a gut-wrenching-sucker-punch if ever there was one. (Charlie has now been brought to tears by it on three separate occasions.) Hitch tells the story of a UCLA honors grad who joined the Army upon graduation, partially as a result of reading one of his columns. In his own words Lt. Mark Daily joined with full knowledge of the dangers in Iraq:
    Anyone who knew me before I joined knows that I am quite aware and at times sympathetic to the arguments against the war in Iraq. If you think the only way a person could bring themselves to volunteer for this war is through sheer desperation or blind obedience then consider me the exception (though there are countless like me).…
    For those concerned with the growing civil-military divide in America, he could be the poster child of an ideal recruit. Smart, deft, eager, and dedicated, he is exactly who we say we want in the Army today. Lt. Daily was killed by an IED in Mosul in January of this year. And while his death is no more or less tragic than the other 3,000 of this war, it hurts in a different way.

    Upon reading Hitch's mournful recounting, Charlie felt much the same way as she did up on learning of the death of Andy Bacevich, Jr. in May. Hollow and unworthy. Perhaps it is because she knows these boys...not them personally, but the others like them who instead of going to law school or Wall Street go to Benning and Quantico. Boys she taught, boys she mentored, boys she loved. Boys who might not come home.

    At the end of the article Hitchens notes the lines from Macbeth he was invited to read at the family's private memorial service, alongside the family's other words of remembrance. He concludes far better than I:
    Well, here we are to perform the last honors for a warrior and hero, and there are no hysterical ululations, no shrieks for revenge, no insults hurled at the enemy, no firing into the air or bogus hysterics. Instead, an honest, brave, modest family is doing its private best. I hope no fanatical fool could ever mistake this for weakness. It is, instead, a very particular kind of strength. If America can spontaneously produce young men like Mark, and occasions like this one, it has a real homeland security instead of a bureaucratic one. To borrow some words of George Orwell's when he first saw revolutionary Barcelona, "I recognized it immediately as a state of affairs worth fighting for."
    Amen. And Semper Fi.
  • Well, the Sox announced their presence with authority on Wednesday. The Yanks? Not so much. (Maybe they should try breathing through their eyelids.) And while Charlie doesn't believe in curses, she does believe in jinxes, so she's gonna stop while she's ahead.

    Sox and Angels play again Friday night; Yanks v. Tribe are up Friday afternoon.

    (And, yes, she knows Major League references are much more apt here. But other than "Hits like Mays, runs like Hayes" there's really not a lot to work with.)

    Just remember, the rose goes in front.
  • While I'm at it...

    The flip side of the reading list below might be a compilation of books that an interested civilian would read in order to better understand the military. Charlie's graduate coursework included approximately nothing on the military itself (only the brilliant SWAMOS curriculum rescued her). Given the lack of day-to-day interaction between civilians and military personnel, most folks don't have the opportunity to listen to war stories over beer (for which there really is no substitute).

    And imperfect, but not irrelevant, solution: reading the books the services say are important. This amounts to something of an anthropology exercise. Sometimes this information can be found on Commandant's and Chairman's reading lists. Other times, certain books just come to be revered by a service. (Unfortunately, Charlie's knowledge is rather narrowly limited to the Army and Marine Corps.)

    The quintessential Army saga is Once an Eagle. Charlie realized she had to read this when she overheard someone referring to a third-party as "a real Courtney Massengale." Ouch.

    The Marines are a little more self-conscious in their propa-- I mean, mythmaking. (Krulak's First to Fight is on the Commandant's reading list at every grade.) Two modern classics: Jim Webb's Fields of Fire and Stephen Pressfield's Gates of Fire. Charlie's personal favorite is Tom Ricks' Making the Corps (which she read after Nate Fick claimed he joined the Marines largely because of it.)

    In the realm of lighter fare, WEB Griffin's Brotherhood and Corps series provide a good cultural history of each service (under the guise of war stories).

    There's no substitute for the real thing, but sometimes books tell you things that soldiers and Marines won't.

    Update: Charlie's favorite Army strategist writes in with two more suggestions for the Army list (which she can't believe she overlooked): Gen. Moore and Joe Galloway's We Were Soldiers Once...and Young and (of course) Michael Shaara's Killer Angels.
  • Does the much maligned field of Political Science have anything to offer practitioners or analysts of counter-insurgency? My Marine colleagues would be quick to say no and go back to reading First to Fight. Perhaps that's because the academic world is typically much more interested in asking questions than answering them.

    But there is one standard academic question that every warfighter and policy-maker should learn to ask themselves: how would I know if I'm wrong? Academics call this falsifiability; leaders call it humility. It's the difference between an ideologue and a problem solver. Either way, it's a pretty serious intellectual undertaking, requiring a lot of history and a dash of theory. Abu Muqawama keeps a great reading list in the column just to the right of his usual pithy banter. Great history. Zero theory. So here's a dash of academia, in the hopes that we'll all put it to good use someday.
    • Hanna Arendt, On Violence and On Revolution. Charlie first read these in college, and has yet to find a better theory of power, violence, and legitimacy. Skip the tomb on totalitarianism, and start here.
    • Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars. Kalyvas suggests that civil wars (and insurgencies) political support for both sides is created on the ground, not some static opinion drawn from the antebellum ether. (Worth it for the amazing bibliography if nothing else.)
    • Scott Gartner, Strategic Assessment and War. When do senior political and military leaders change wartime strategies? When things are getting FUBAR, and fast. Gartner offers several telling vignettes from WWI convoys to rice tallying Marines in Vietnam.
    • James Scott, Moral Economy of the Peasant. Charlie won't lie, this book is a hard slog. But it reveals the rational decision-making logic of people who live a life of subsistence. They're not crazy, and they're not ignorant. But they parse things differently.
    Finally, two friend's of Charlie's offer these suggestions:
    • David Warsh, Knowledge and the Wealth of Nations. What if the entire way your field thought of the world was wrong? How would you know? And how would you change it? "New Growth Theory" may not be as fun as taking pot shots at the Air Force, but there's a serious lesson here.
    • Mary P. Callahan, Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma. Never underestimate the power of a detailed and careful comparative history. Burma isn't Iraq or Afghanistan, but it's not hard to figure out why it's still relevant.
    What other books help you understand insurgencies, terrorism, and political violence?
  • Abu Muqawama's alter ego is otherwise occupied for a few days, so frequent reader Charlie has the ball until his return. Her nearly finished PhD is in political science, not astro-physics. And while the Pentagon rarely listens to her, the Marines occasionally do. Stay tuned.
  • It's hard to think of a more effective weapon than the IED (Improvised Explosive Device). Thought it can take the form of a roadside bomb or jury-rigged land mine, the U.S. military uses the acronym IED to describe all the bombs, little and large, manufactured by amateurs for use against the U.S. military and its partners in Iraq.

    The IED is effective for a number of reasons. First and foremost, it's a cheap, easy way to inflict casualties on a fighting force whose home front and officer corps is casualty-averse. Second, it's a great way -- when placed in a populated area -- to draw a disproportionate response from the targeted patrol. (Example: remember when that Marine special operations unit was hit with an IED in Afghanistan in the spring and they proceeded to shoot their machine guns into a crowd of civilians, killing over a dozen?) And third, it's a low-tech weapon that frustrates a military that wants technical, high-tech solutions.

    "Americans want technical solutions. They want the silver bullet," said Rear Adm. Arch Macy, commander of the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Washington, which now oversees several counter-IED technologies. "The solution to IEDs is the whole range of national power --political-military affairs, strategy, operations, intelligence."

    If you have some time today, read Rick Atkinson's profile of the IED -- and the U.S. military's efforts to counter its use -- in today's Washington Post. Abu Muqawama especially enjoyed the criticism of the way in which America's military culture -- and military industry -- has failed to adapt to the COIN era:

    The IED struggle has become a test of national agility for a lumbering military-industrial complex fashioned during the Cold War to confront an even more lumbering Soviet system. "If we ever want to kneecap al-Qaeda, just get them to adopt our procurement system. It will bring them to their knees within a week," a former Pentagon official said.

    "We all drank the Kool-Aid," said a retired Army officer who worked on counter-IED issues for three years. "We believed, and Congress was guilty as well, that because the United States was the technology powerhouse, the solution to this problem would come from science. That attitude was 'All we have to do is throw technology at it and the problem will go away.' . . . The day we lose a war it will be to guys with spears and loincloths, because they're not tied to technology. And we're kind of close to being there."

    Or, as an officer writing in Marine Corps Gazette recently put it, "The Flintstones are adapting faster than the Jetsons."

    One sentence this blog took (minor) issue with was this sentence:

    Insurgents often post video clips of their attacks on the Internet, the equivalent of taking scalps.

    Well, it's slightly more complicated than that. Conventional thinking says the damage done by the IED was the objective of the operation. Abu Muqawama, though, believes the videotape is the real objective in many cases. Yes, it's nice to kill a few Americans. But even if you don't kill any Americans, you can post your video on the internet anyway (claiming that you killed two, or a dozen, or twenty) and radicalize and inspire others. It's viral warfare, and the most important thing you will have gotten out of your operations is not the enemy BDA (Battle Damage Assessment) but the image of the destruction.

    Roland Barthes would have a had a field day with this war, wouldn't he?
  • Speaking of Phil Carter, he sent along this article by Damien Cave from Iraq, knowing the unit profiled -- the most deployed unit in the U.S. Army since 9/11 -- was the first unit with which Abu Muqawama went to combat, in Afghanistan. His advice was to take a stuff drink before reading this article, and though it's the Lord's Day, Abu Muqawama has to pass on that advice to you as well. This is depressing stuff:

    Specialist Herb, a member of the unit searching for nitric acid, said that when he moved into his trailer in July, his trailer’s blinds were still spotted with dried blood from the lieutenant who killed himself. After cleaning the mess, he said, he now sleeps just fine. “Me and my roommate flipped for who was going to live on that side,” he said, sitting behind the wheel of a grumbling Humvee. “I lost.”

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