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Abu Muqawama

Abu Muqawama retains its autonomy and the views and beliefs expressed within the blog do not reflect those of CNAS. Abu Muqawama retains the right to delete comments that include words that incite violence; are predatory, hateful, or intended to intimidate or harass; or degrade people on the basis of gender, race, class, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or disability. In summary, don't be a jerk.

  • From a Washington Post staff editorial:

    An incident in which five Egyptian guards were killed when Israeli forces pursued terrorists crossing the border helped to trigger the upsurge in tensions with Cairo.

    Were killed? Who or what killed them? Did they fall into a pit of vipers? Did God smite the Egyptian guards? Were they, perhaps, swallowed up by the Red Sea? Because, hey, these kinds of things have happened before, right?

    Media reporting on the incident informs us that the IDF in fact killed these five Egyptian guards. Israelis and Israeli allies can all surely agree this was a bit of an own goal on the part of the IDF, since Israel and Egypt are in the process of renegotiating the terms of their relationship after the fall of Hosni Mubarak and -- keep your fingers crossed -- the return of democratic politics in Egypt.

    The recent events in which Egyptian protesters stormed the Israeli embassy in Cairo were shocking. The Egyptian government's failure to protect the embassy of a government with whom it has full diplomatic relations was unforgivable. And, as the editorial points out, the way in which Arab regimes deflect attention away from their own problems toward Israel is both pathetic and habitual. But does it actually serve any useful purpose to pretend our Israeli friends are just passive by-standers to what is taking place in the Middle East? Sometimes, in their efforts to counter terrorism, Israel is its own worst enemy.

    The tactical and operational decisions of Israeli commanders often have negative strategic effects or are taken in a strategic vacuum. Surely we can and should just admit this, right, and help our Israeli friends to realize this as well? 

    Update: Here is the original Washington Post report on the incident, which followed an attack that killed eight Israelis. Note how, in the original report, the murder of Israelis is described in the active voice, whereas the killing of Egyptians is, again, described in the passive voice.

    The Egyptian government had demanded an Israeli apology for and joint investigation into the border skirmish, in which an Egyptian military officer and two policemen were killed. It had also criticized statements by Israeli officials about Egypt after the attack in southern Israel, which killed eight people.

    When Arabs kill Israelis, the reader can understand their frustration and anger because agency is established. By contrast, since Arabs are killed by ... Magic? The Hand of God? Too many bad Egyptian cigarettes? ... the reader is left to wonder why these irrational Arabs are so angry and frustrated. I don't mean to go all Orwell on you kids, but language matters. The Washington Post can dismiss Egyptian popular anger toward Israel as something ginned up by cynical Arab leaders in part because it never honestly describes an Israeli action that killed five Egyptians. 

  • If you are like me, you mostly avoided the television and the op-ed pages today. I am not sure it is entirely healthy that we force ourselves, as a society, to grieve anew ten full years after a traumatic event like the September 11th attacks. Surely the best rebuke to an organization like al-Qaida would have been to have simply gone about our business as a nation, worshipping with our neighbors in the morning, watching football in the afternoon at the local bar, and in the evening preparing for a new workweek. Although my own path in life was in part set in motion by the attacks in 2001, I believe the best American response to the anniversary would have been to have simply enjoyed one another while hoping and planning toward tomorrow rather than mourning anew those lost in yesteryear.

    But the tenth anniversary of the September 11th attacks does, I must say, give us a moment to pause and reflect on what lessons, if any, we have learned over the past decade. So while dining with Norwegian expert-on-all-things-jihadi Thomas Hegghammer in Oslo last week, I came up with the idea of asking him to participate in a special interview with the blog for the anniversary.

    How much do I respect Thomas and his scholarship? I even changed the way I normally spell al-Qaeda al-Qaida for this post because honestly, who the heck am I to tell Thomas what's what?

    A few years ago, you wrote a great essay in the Times Literary Supplement arguing that the trauma of the September 11th attacks retarded the development of dispassionate scholarship on jihadi movements. 10 years after the attacks, how are we doing? Has the field of study evolved in the United States? (While you’re at it, explain to us why it seems as if every tenth Norwegian has published peer-reviewed scholarship on al-Qaida.)

    First of all, thank you for inviting me to contribute to your blog on this special day. Allow me also to take off my “dispassionate scholar hat” and extend my sympathy to the families of those killed on 9/11 and of the many who fell in the wars that ensued.

    Ten years after 9/11, I am sorry to report that the academic study of jihadi movements is still underdeveloped. Things have improved a little bit since I wrote the TLS piece in 2008. There is a core of specialists who continue to do fantastic work, and we see some new recruitment to the field. But the community is still very small and populated mostly by people who are on the fringes of the academy, institutionally speaking (and that includes myself).

    The fundamental problem is still the same, namely that the incentive structure in the universities, especially in America, is set against people specialising in the study of jihadi gorups. Studying al-Qaida usually involves qualitative methods and requires high-level skills in Arabic or some other oriental language. Graduate students with an interest in jihadism thus work against two strong biases: the quantitative methods hegemony in the social sciences and the skepticism in American Middle East Studies toward the study of hard security issues. These biases affect hiring decisions and have some striking aggregate effects: for example, there are virtually no tenured faculty specialising in terrorism (let alone jihadism) in any Ivy League school or in any Middle East Studies department in America. Rational graduate students with academic ambitions see this and wisely stay clear of the topic.

    A related problem is that jihadism studies in the US lack an institutional home. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point has partly filled this role, but even the CTC has rarely had more than one or two Arabic-speaking al-Qaida specialists based at West Point at any one time; several of the CTC’s best reports were written by off-site contractors. Another potential hub for al-Qaida studies was the Centre on Law and Security at New York University, but it recently scaled down its activities and looks set to close down. How America – with its huge academic workforce and enormous counterterrorism budget – in ten years has failed to produce a research institution with more than two permanent jihadism specialists is beyond me. As far as Norway is concerned, we actually only have around five scholars focusing on al-Qaida, but we have put them all in one place – the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) – and given them stable working conditions. By having 3-4 academics working on closely related subjects and interacting every day you get tremendous synergy.

    Our friend Will McCants has been arguing that the Arab Spring is a disaster for al-Qaida. Do you agree?

    The Arab spring is certainly bad for al-Qaida, but I would not call it a disaster, because the uprisings have so far only affected parts of the Muslim world. Important countries like Pakistan remain largely unaffected, as do the conflicts in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and elsewhere. In some places such as Yemen and Libya, jihadi groups arguably have more opportunities now than before the Arab spring. The short and mid-term security implications of the Arab spring are highly unpredictable. At the moment we see a decline of al-Qaida central, but it is difficult to disentangle the effect of the Arab spring from the effect of the concurrent tactical breakthroughs, such as the killing of top al-Qaida commanders and the capture of internal AQ documents. That said, I do think the overall net effect of the Arab spring is negative for the jihadi movement in the long term.

    The United States has enjoyed some stunning successes against al-Qaida’s senior leadership in 2011. In Oslo, we discussed the possibility that al-Qaida Central might in fact collapse with a speed that could surprise us all. Sketch out a scenario by which that might happen. What does the rapid collapse of al-Qaida Central look like, and under what conditions might we expect it?

    It is difficult for me to say, because academics like myself know precious little about the current inner workings of al-Qaida Central. The only people who have a chance of knowing what is going on are in the intelligence community, and whatever I say about the subject is sure to make someone in that community laugh. My overall impression, though, is that al-Qaida central has been severely weakened over the past six months.

    Your award-winning book on al-Qaida and Islamism in Saudi Arabia has been justly praised. Tell us about your thesis, and also why al-Qaida’s insurgency was such a failure in Saudi Arabia in 2004 and 2005.

    The book is basically a history of violent Islamism in Saudi Arabia after 1979. It tries to explain the ebbs and flows of militant activism in the Kingdom, focusing on the 2003-2006 terrorism campaign by al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula. I show that the campaign was not an organically developed domestic rebellion, but rather the work of an foreign-trained network of militants who had returned to Saudi Arabia after al-Qaida’s eviction from Afghanistan in late 2001. The rebels never enjoyed much popular support and failed to recruit outside a closed network of jihad veterans and their acquaintances. This made them an easy prey for the Western-supported security services.

    A key argument in the book is that we have tended to overestimate the level of political opposition to the Saudi regime, because we have equated Islamism with anti-government activism. Observers have assumed that because Saudi Arabia has many Islamists, anti-regime sentiment must run very deep. But there are different types of Islamism and not all have regime change as their priority. The Kingdom has produced a lot of jihadists over the years, but most have been what I call extreme pan-Islamists rather than revolutionaries; that is, they preferred to fight non-Muslims rather than fellow Muslims. In fact, the normative barriers to revolutionary violence appear to be higher in Saudi Arabia than in the Arab republics. The non-revolution in Saudi Arabia earlier this year seems to bolster this hypothesis.

    One of the more horrifying things I have seen recently was at your house: a DVD of jihadi propaganda and music sitting alongside a Norwegian children’s DVD. Tell us about your latest project examining jihadi culture. And please, also assure my readership (and your wife) that you do not sometimes get your DVDs confused and show your children jihadi propaganda.

    Well, the two worlds are closer than you think. Some children’s entertainment is so bad it must be the work of al-Qaida. I have reason to suspect that Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri created the Teletubbies to destroy Western society from within.

    The project you are referring to is about jihad culture, or “the things jihadis do when they don’t fight.” It is inspired by the observation that militants in the underground spend a lot of time doing things that appear to serve no immediate military purpose, like singing songs, reciting poetry, or discussing dreams. They also do unexpected things like weep on a regular basis, notably when reciting the Qur’an. The infamous Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, for example, was known among fellow militants as both “the butcher” (al-dhabbah) and “a weeper” (baki). All this “soft matter” of jihadism remains virtually unstudied; one reason, I think, is that it has been considered less consequential than the hard stuff of terror, such as attacks, resources, organizational structures and the like. My hypothesis is that jihad culture is not inconsequential at all; instead I think it may shed important new light on the processes by which jihadi groups recruit, exercise organizational control and make tactical decisions. I am sure that the military men and women reading this blog will find all this rather intuitive, because they have experienced the important role of music and rituals in their own organization.

    As a first step in the inquiry, I am currently working with a great team of scholars on an edited volume that will explore various dimensions of jihad culture. I have recruited subject specialists – including a musicologist, an Arabic poetry expert, and an anthropologist of dreams – to help document and decipher al-Qaida’s internal culture. We are only scraping the surface of this vast topic but hopefully it will inspire others to dig deeper. Eventually I hope to write a monograph on some aspect of this topic, but that’s a few years down the line.

    I usually end these Q&A’s with a list of the interviewee’s favorite drinking holes. And I imagine it must be depressing to be such a leader in your field of study yet still be only the second-brightest scholar in your own home. This, perhaps, explains your excellent taste in spirits. Tell us the best places to sip a gin-and-tonic from Princeton to Oslo to, er, Riyadh.

    Princeton: The Triumph Brewing Company – a decent microbrewery and the least bad place in town for a drink.

    Cambridge: The Conservatory in the Harvard Faculty Club – extremely preppy, but that is the whole point.

    Oslo: For beer, I prefer Olympen, a 120-year old beer hall on the city’s east side. For G&Ts, I guess I would go for the deep leather couches of the Bristol Bar.

    Riyadh: If I could sneak in a bottle of gin, I would drink it in either on the bridge of the Mamlaka Tower or in the golden ball of the Faysaliyya Center.

    Takk! I knew there was a reason I went to school in Philadelphia (with its excellent bars and pubs) rather than New Jersey! (Or Riyadh -- not entirely sure which would be worse, honestly.) As for the rest of you, go buy the man's book here.

  • A few weeks back, I was asked by the U.S. embassies in Helsinki and Oslo to visit each city to lead a series of informal roundtable discussions and particpate in formal think tank events on a variety of issues touching on both the anniversary of the September 11th attacks and the lessons learned -- or not learned -- over the past decade. As I wrote earlier, I jumped at the chance to visit each city because I think interacting with our allies is really important, and I am honored to help out the State Department with their public engagement activities abroad.

    To begin, I was really impressed with the foreign service officers and other diplomatic staff working for the United States abroad. Without fail, our foreign service officers are smart, funny, and great ambassadors to the rest of the world. Second, I was just as impressed by the many scholars, journalists and other people with whom I interacted. The purpose of this post is to highlight some of the really smart people I met with and the work they are doing.

    31 August 2011

    What better way to begin a visit to Helsinki than with a drink with Finnish journalist Jari Lindholm? Jari has done some great reporting from Afghanistan to Libya and introduced me to the fine folks expertly mixing drinks at the American Bar in the Hotel Torni. I read about as much Finnish as I read Mandarin Chinese, but Jari gave me a copy of his most recent reporting from Misurata for Suomen Kuvalehti, and his pictures alone -- including one two-page color photograph of Tripoli Street during a lull in the fighting -- were stunning.

    1 September 2011

    I led a series of informal roundtable discussions on Thursday with the Finnish Min. of Defense among others but started out the day the Finnish Institute for International Affairs leading a conversation about post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization in Libya with Timo Behr. Timo and I used to live in the exact same building in Washington, DC but had never met until five minutes before the event began. I began my presentation talking about the challenges the United States has had in responding to post-conflict stablization operations and shared some lessons we have learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. I then, echoing both Mona el-Ghobashy and especially Lisa Anderson, talked about how the challenges of Libya will be harder and different than the challenges facing Egypt and Tunisia. The question and answer session that followed was a good one, with question ranging from the Saudi-Syrian relationship to issues relating to R2P.

    2 September 2011

    I led another series of informal roundtables on Friday, including one at the Min. of Foreign Affairs with their very experienced and knowledgable team working on Afghanistan. I ended the day with a more formal presentation to the Atlantic Council of Finland. I spoke about the ways in which the conflicts in both Afghanistan and Libya has revealed strengths and weaknesses in the trans-Atlantic alliance and in NATO. I then spoke about the economic pressures that will lead to cuts in the U.S. defense budget and what that means for the alliance. The question and answer session included some really good questions, including several from Leif Blomqvist, the former Finnish ambassador to NATO.

    3 September 2011

    I arrived in a rainy Oslo on Saturday and started off with a tour of the city by famed Norwegian tour guide and sometime scholar of jihadist movements Thomas Hegghammer. (But seriously, you all need to read the man's book.) I visited the Viking ship museum and also the Arctic exploration museum and then dined Chez Hegghammer, which is a gastronomically satisfying but intellectually humbling experience considering Thomas isn't even the smartest scholar in his own house

    5 September 2011

    After spending Sunday going to church and drinking lots of coffee in Oslo's many and excellent coffee shops, I paid a visit to the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, where Hans-Inge Langø introduced me to some of the great scholars working there. We had an informal roundtable discussion on, primarily, the Arab Spring and security sector reform. I ended the evening with beers with some scholars working on Afghanistan. (Allow me to recommend the Havrestout from Nøgne Ø.)

    6 September 2011

    The embassy in Oslo scheduled two formal events for me on Tuesday. The first event was a talk at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment on issues related to the transition in Afghanistan. This event was particularly fun for me because it allowed me to pick the brains of people like Thomas and Anne Stenersen, possibly the world's leading expert in the relations between al-Qaeda and the insurgent groups active in Afghanistan. A formal presentation evolved into a broader conversation that began at nine in the morning and lasted through lunch. I then visited the Norwegian Defense Command and Staff College, where I delivered a formal lecture to the students there on the development of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine and operations. I began with an exploration of theories of military transformation and then talked about the ways in which the U.S. military has learned -- or, again, has not learned -- in both Iraq and Afghanistan. I concluded with a few remarks about the future of both insurgencies and counterinsurgency and then opened things up to the students, many of whom had spent time in Afghanistan and wanted to talk about the transition.

    Overall, I had a great visit to both Helsinki and Oslo and am grateful to the State Department for both inviting me to visit and coordinating the logistics upon my arrival. Now ...

    Coffee and Food

    The best place to get an espresso in Helsinki is, hands down, Kaffecentralen. The best meal I had, meanwhile -- and I think Finnish food is underrated and quite excellent -- was the Helsinki Menu at Grotesk. Oslo, for its part, has some of the best espresso bars in the world. Try Fuglen while you're there, and I myself also had a good cappucino at Stockfleths. The best espresso, though, is to be found at Tim Wendelboe. I was myself seriously impressed. I saved up my per diem in Oslo, finally, for a really good meal on my last night. And I'm here to tell you that the 10-course menu at Maaemo was pretty much the most incredible dining experience of my life. Just stunning, stunning food.

  • 1. Jeremy Scahill in the Nation.

    2. Elizabeth Rubin in Tablet.

    Have a great weekend digesting those two challenging pieces.

  • Understatement of the Year? Fouad Ajami on the United States after 9/11:

    America ... wasn't brilliant at everything it attempted in Arab lands.

  • I have been away from the blog this week because I am in Finland at the invitation of our embassy here and will next be traveling to Norway. Over the past few days, I have been speaking with local think tanks in Helsinki as well as leading roundtable discussions on everything from Afghanistan to the Arab Spring with Finnish parliamentarians, local diplomats from other allies countries, and representatives from Finland's Ministry of Defense. I will do more of the same in Oslo. When the embassies here in Scandinavia asked me to visit in exchange for a plane ticket and small per diem to cover my expenses, I jumped at the chance. I have worked with Finns and Norwegians in Afghanistan but have have never visited either country. It's important for Americans, I believe, to show our appreciation for our friends and allies in the international community, because we rely on those allies to get things done, and many of our allies have fought and bled alongside U.S. soldiers and Marines from Normandy to Basra.

    On the way here, though, I read a transcript of Gov. Rick Perry's recent speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars. I respect the fact that Gov. Perry has little foreign policy experience on account of his long political career in Texas, and I do not expect him to yet be as savvy or as wise an observer of international affairs as his fellow Aggies Ryan Crocker or Bob Gates. My head dropped in anguish, though, when I read this:

    We respect our allies, and must always seek to engage them in military missions. At the same time, we must be willing to act when it is time to act. We cannot concede the moral authority of our nation to multi-lateral debating societies. And when our interests are threatened, American soldiers should be led by American commanders.

    To the best of my knowledge, U.S. soldiers and Marines have served under the command of Dutch, Italian, Canadian, German and British commanders in Afghanistan. (I'm sure I could add more countries to the list.) Several countries have sacrificed mightily in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and I myself fought under a Canadian battalion commander in 2002 in Afghanistan and under a British special operations commander in 2003 in Iraq. Most of our allies -- and especially our friends in the ANZUS Pact, the 60th anniversary of which we just celebrated -- are as blunt-speaking as any Texan and would have rather preferred Gov. Perry come right out and insult them to their faces rather than obliquely insult them while professing to respect them.

    I'm actually shocked that Gov. Perry's foreign policy advisors allowed this text to make it into his speech, but I can see how this jingoistic populism might prove politically effective in the battle for the Republican nomination. What might make for short-term political gains, though, also amounts to bad long-term foreign policy.

    Gov. Perry's defenders will argue most Americans do not care about foreign affairs, and I somehow doubt Gov. Perry cares whether or not members of the Council on Foreign Relations will vote for him anyway. But this isn't about politics: as important as getting elected president is displaying the temperament and intelligence to be a good president once elected. And Gov. Perry may dismiss the United Nations, but our allies do not. (Don't believe me? Go ask any Israeli what "September" means to them and why their prime minister has been asking our president to scurry around asking for votes from our European allies of late.)

    If any foreign policy advisor to Gov. Perry is reading this, I would recommend them schedule a trip for the governor to Japan, Australia and South Korea -- just three of the allies on which the United States will depend over the next eight years. He should take the time to hear their concerns and listen to the way in which they have each served alongside and supported the United States. He should then take a trip to Afghanistan, where U.S. soldiers serve with and under troops from over 40 foreign countries (including the Marine Corps!).

    Because some of us egg-head multilateralists are also lifetime members of the Veterans of Foreign Wars and understand both the skill and sacrifice with which our allies have helped us meet the challenges of the past ten years. Gov. Perry should too, because, again, as important as populist rhetoric is to winning president elections, so too is temperament and experience to being a good president once elected.

    ***

    I have joked before, quoting a certain retired Marine colonel, that the only strategic lesson we have learned from our experiences in Vietnam and Iraq is not to elect Texans president. But the best Americans I know are Texan. I have a friend from San Antonio, for example, who I admire above nearly all other non-Tennesseans on Earth: he is smart, humble, God-fearing, knows frightful amounts about guns and hunting, and is the kind of guy who will grab a bottle of Buffalo Trace, pour you a glass, and sit around the campfire talking about everything from Jesus Christ to Cormac McCarthy to Townes Van Zandt. He is the best kind of Texan -- and American. The worst Americans, though, are also Texans: they are loud, prone to bragging at length and volume, ignorant and intolerant of others, and indulge in a kind of Little America-ism that makes our country less welcoming and more provincial. (They also get Tennessee into wars with Mexico, but that is another matter.) I can vote for the former, of course, but not for the latter. I'll reserve judgment, for now, about which one Gov. Perry is.

  • I spent part of my vacation reading the new book by Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, Counterstrike: The Untold Story of America's Secret Campaign Against Al Qaeda. Thom and Eric wrote the book while on a writing fellowship here at the Center for a New American Security, so I'm relieved that I a) very much enjoyed reading it and b) can recommend it to the readership. It's a brisk read -- short enough to read while trapped in your houses as a hurricane blows over, for example -- and has all the hallmarks of the great reporting you have come to expect from two of the NYT's finest. 

    This will come as no surprise to those who have followed your reporting for the New York Times, but this book was carefully and exhaustively reported. You guys face a tough dilemma, though: when reporting on secret programs, the best sources will often not talk. And although you have managed to interview some of the key decision makers, are you worried that your reporting is limited by its sources? How do you write “The Untold Story of America’s Secret Campaign Against Al Qaeda” and not “The Untold Story of America’s Secret Campaign Against Al Qaeda As Told To Us By The People We Got To Speak On The Record?”

    It’s wonderful to be asked why we had so many people on the record! Usually we are criticized for too many confidential sources. In Counterstrike, we used both, extensively. Our book is drawn from more than two hundred interviews conducted with current and former military personnel, diplomats, and intelligence officers, as well as law enforcement, Pentagon, and White House officials who participated in the operations, intelligence analysis, and policy making in the decade following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. When possible, we named the sources. But because of the nature of reporting on sensitive operations and policies, often involving classified information, many of our sources spoke to us on the condition that they remain anonymous. In each case where we used anonymous sources, we carefully weighed the trade-offs between the need for transparency in reporting this book and the important information that confidential sources could provide. We also found that many sources who might be otherwise reluctant to talk to us for an article for the daily newspaper agreed to speak to us for the book. They wanted to ensure that their perspective on this historic period was understood and chronicled.

    You guys cover a lot of breaking, Page A1 news. How difficult is it to step back and write a more reflective piece of journalism looking at a decade-long era?

    The hardest part was time-management. We found that to make it all work we had to give 50 percent of our time to our reporting for the Times; 50 percent of our time to the book; 50 percent of our time to our loving and long-suffering wives; and 50 percent of our time to our kids (we each have two). Fortunately, all the time left over was ours, and we could use it to relax. In many ways, we began reporting the book on 9/11, even though we didn’t begin considering a book until about three years ago. But this is what we have done for the past decade. What we discovered in our first work of long-form narrative was the incredible amount of detail a reporter can develop when working on a two-year book project: The ability to return to sources not just once, but multiple times. The ability to check and cross-check stories, and really dig for details. The ability to trace a tip about an important counterterrorism raid and have time to track down participants from the small unit up to the senior commanders – and trace the effect and impact across the inter-agency. The ability to identify characters who had significant counterterrorism roles throughout the decade after 9/11, and were willing to talk to us. Those things you simply cannot do on a daily deadline.

    If I had a complaint about the book, it’s that it often read, especially in the middle chapters, like a list of inputs and not effects. This is a real and common problem we researchers have in evaluating counter-terror programs. We know what we are doing. What’s tougher to tell is, what effect are we having on the enemy? To that end, what programs do you think are having the biggest effects on al-Qaeda? What is working? What is not?

    You are a smart reader. The insurmountable problem is that we are covering counterterrorism missions from only one side. For obvious reasons, we could not bounce our reporting off of some Al Qaeda press spokesman or operations officer or financier to say, “Hey, we are writing about this mission. Is this how it went down against you? Is this how successful it was?” But we did our due diligence by comparing what sources told us to what responses appeared on jihadist Web sites, and it usually tracked with what we heard from sources here. Clearly, the kinetics have had an impact, as have missions to dry up sources of finances. What remains in the D- department, if not failing, are the efforts to counter the message of violent extremism. If the United States and its allies have been forced to offer an effective counterposing narrative to those who bomb and behead innocents, then the United States has lost before it has even started.

    Along the same lines, you guys don’t outright grade the performance of the past few administrations on counter-terror, so I’m going to give you the chance to do that. On an A-F scale, what grade would you assign …

    a. The Bush Administration, 2001-2003?

    b. The Bush Administration, 2003-2005?

    c. The Bush Administration, 2005-2007?

    d. The Bush Administration, 2007-2009?

    e. The Obama Administration, 2009-2011?

    We think readers of our book would come away seeing that the Bush administration adopted a muscular if clumsy capture-kill strategy in the months after 9/11. Understandable, necessary, but not sufficient. And, as Rumsfeld noted in his famous October 2003 memo, kinetics alone risked creating more jihadists than were taken off the battlefield. By the second Bush administration, officials were adopting a more nuanced strategy, one that involved the whole of government to try and counter violent extremism with every tool available. Although Obama was certainly the un-Bush, it is historic fact that his administration has been as much continuity in the CT world as change. Drone strikes? Embraced and expanded. SOF raids? Tempo increased. But Obama certainly has changed the tenor of the discussion with the Islamic world, and even with European allies, and his efforts to close Gitmo, while still unsuccessful, set him apart, to be sure.

    This book covers a lot of ground. What chapter do you wish you could have expanded on or dug deeper into?

    Cyber and counter-messaging.

    I usually end these interviews by asking people to name their favorite bars and such. For you guys, I’ll ask a different question: what are the three weirdest places you have ever met a source for an interview?

    Thom:

    1. Radovan Karadzic’s chalet at Pale, his mountain redoubt above Sarajevo. He was not yet an indicted war criminal, but we were reporting extensively on the atrocities he had ordered, so it was difficult to get an interview with the Bosnian Serb leader. So we drove from Belgrade up into the mountains, and while my translator was speaking with his aides, I tried to strike up a conversation with his bodyguards, who were playing poker. “Hey guys. What’re the stakes?” I asked. One responded: “Winner gets to shoot the guy from the Trib.” At the time, I was the guy from the Trib.

    2. When I was a Moscow bureau chief, dissidents and underground artists always wanted to meet foreign correspondents. So you’d choose a big public location, with signals to identify one another. One spot was a big toy store across Dzerzhinsky Square from the old Lubyanka KGB prison. Sort of hiding in plain sight, I guess. Many of those I met were legitimate outsiders who had a bona fide story to tell about the crimes of the Soviet state. But not always. And I guess the KGB didn’t want to send its stooges too far, because over the course of five years and hundreds of such meetings I went to Children’s World several dozen times -- and among those I met were a Ukrainian nationalist, a Jewish refusenik and a formerly imprisoned poet; but all three of these were the same guy, who obviously couldn’t keep track of which reporters he had tried to set up.

    3. I have one defense industry source who likes quick meetings. He will drive up in front of our bureau on Farragut Square, roll down the darkened windows of his SUV and toss me documents. One day our bureau chief was heading out to lunch and saw the exchange, which was too bad. It made the job of Pentagon correspondent look way too easy.

    Eric:

    1. Inside a sweltering reed hut in Al Turaba, Iraq, a dust-choked village 20 miles from the Iranian border. I was traveling with Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz in July 2003. He had flown to the village to listen to a dozen wizened tribal elders from the area who asked him to restore a way of life that Saddam Hussein had taken away. Sitting cross-legged in his stocking feet on a Persian rug, Wolfowitz nodded in agreement as the old men chronicled the plight of the marsh Arabs, an ancient people whose homeland in southeastern Iraq had been drained into desert as punishment for their independence and Shiite faith. It was 120 degrees outside the hut and even hotter inside, but Wolfowitz still wore a blue blazer and red tie, both coated with dust. It was hard to hear him and the elders over the raucous banter of scores of villagers jammed inside the hut and a donkey's braying outside.

    2. Several hundred feet below the surface of the Atlantic Ocean inside the U.S.S. Kentucky, one of the Navy’s Trident II ballistic-missile. When I was a young Pentagon correspondent in the early 1990’s, I tried to get out with troops as much as possible. I flew in an Air Force fighter jet. I rode in Army M1-A1 tank. But inside the submerged submarine on a training run in 1993 was eerie. Capt. Mike Riegel and his crew were amenable to talking about their vessel. But no loud voices, please. The cold war was over by then, but there were still reminders of a time when crew members feared that the slightest racket on board could give away a submarine’s position to the Soviets. Equipment was lined in plastic or rubber to avoid pings or banging. Signs in toilet stalls sternly warned crew members: "Don't Drop That Seat. Shhhhhh!"

    3. On a very sensitive story several years ago that involved American spies, commandos and scandal, one of our main sources agreed to meet periodically at a coffee shop along a major Interstate freeway in a Western state. But we never met him in the same place twice. The source gave me and my colleague a cell phone. We never knew exactly when he was going to call. But when he did, he gave us the name of a highway exit and a coffee shop there. We met several times over about many months, each time collecting new information from him and corroborating (or rejecting) tips we heard from other sources. He was always spot on. After the article was published, we received a cryptic message, “Well done.” We never heard from him again.

    Wow, who knew John McCain had gotten so paranoid about reporters! Anyway, thanks for the interview, guys. Buy Counterstrike here.

  • I have a tremendous amount of admiration for Gen. Marty Dempsey, but his professional reading list for the U.S. Army (.pdf) leaves a lot to be desired. As a service to the readership, I am offering my own professional reading list. I have kept the general categories used by Gen. Dempsey but have replaced the "leadership" category with one on civilian-military relations. My reading list is automatically superior to Gen. Dempsey's because mine does not include one of the worst novels ever written. I have denoted those books on which Gen. Dempsey and I agree with an asterisk. 

    History and Heritage

    The War for America, 1775-1783

    Empire of the Summer Moon: Quanah Parker and the Rise and Fall of the Comanches, the Most Powerful Indian Tribe in American History

    Foote's The Civil War (YES, ALL THREE VOLUMES, DAMMIT)

    The Killer Angels: A Novel of the Civil War*

    The First World War

    With the Old Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa (YES, I KNOW HE WAS A MARINE)

    This Kind of War*

    Street Without Joy: The French Debacle In Indochina

    Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age

    Surprise, Security, and the American Experience

    Civilian-Military Relations

    The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations

    Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime

    The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War

    Critical Analysis and the Global Context

    On War*

    (read alongside Michael Howard's Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction)

    Soldier's Heart: Reading Literature Through Peace and War at West Point*

    The Culture of National Security

    Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do And Why They Do It

    Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy

    The Tragedy of Great Power Politics

    Arms and Influence

  • I have been on vacation for the past week, largely away from both the internet and television in rural Tennessee, and I missed most coverage of the rebel advance into Tripoli. I must say, I was shocked when I read the news. I had expected the fall of Tripoli to drag out for weeks. I had reasoned that both parties to the conflict were continuing to fight a more-or-less zero-sum game and that the loyalists around Tripoli could be expected to mount a fierce and organized defense. I had also been privy to all kinds of pessimistic assessments of the combat abilities of the rebel fighting forces and thought they would have a much tougher time advancing on prepared defenses than they ended up having. In the end, I perhaps overestimated the competence of the loyalist forces (among whom we have not had the luxury of embedded reporters to assess their quality). I might have also underestimated the effectiveness of discrete allied advisory teams and the tactical application of air power. If you are someone who saw this coming, though, feel free to pipe up in the comments and tell me what else I missed.

    Given my poor record of prognostication this year -- which includes my opinion, expressed in January, that Hosni Mubarak would retain the loyalty of his military (!) -- you can be forgiven for doubting any other predictions I have for 2011. I'll make, instead, a few observations.

    1. It has been said before and ad nauseum but bears repeating: the war in Libya does not stop with the fall of the Qadhdhafi regime. The war in Libya stops when Libya's new rulers a) train and field enough security forces of their own to maintain public order and then b) create institutions to redistribute the resources of the state and address popular grievances. So let's hold off on the celebratory handshakes, eh?

    2. Some, knowing #1, are already suggesting NATO provide ground forces to serve as peacekeepers and advisors. I am not sure how wise this would be. Given how few U.S. interests are at stake in Libya, it makes more sense -- to me, at least -- for other nations and coalitions to take the lead in partnering with Libya's new government. I am thinking, especially, of the Mediterranean countries. (Not that Italy did such a hot job creating enduring public institutions the last time they were around.) At the least, I think the calls for NATO peacekeeping forces (or even advisors) is premature. Serious questions to which I do not know the answer: have the rebels even requested such forces? What would the mission of these forces be? What kind of mandate, if any, would they enjoy from the United Nations?

    3. The single most important issue for me, which I was screaming about several days ago when the defenses of Tripoli began to collapse, concerns the status of Libyan munitions -- especially Libya's anti-aircraft weaponry. I hope the United States and its allies have a good plan to buy back or otherwise seize all those man-portable air defense systems that have walked off the Libyan battlefield over the past few months...

    4. Many members of the Obama Administration, especially the veterans of the Kosovo Campaign, were more sanguine about the open-ended application of U.S. military power in Libya than I was. I am glad the Qadhdhafi regime has fallen, but I worry we have reinforced a precedent where we do not feel the need to carefully think through our strategic goals (to include our desired end states) and assumptions before going to war. Because giving the U.S. military unclear guidance to prosecute open-ended military interventions is a recipe for a serious crisis in civil-military relations, we might not want to do that next time.

    I'll conclude with linking to several smart and relevant articles that you have probably already seen. The first is a Steve Negus post on Arabist concerning the question of whether the rebels are ready to now rule Libya. The second was a brief on post-Qadhdhafi planning considerations by Daniel Serwer.

    It's good to be back.

  • I am off for a week's vacation on the family farm in East Tennessee and will be away from the blog during that time, so I wanted to highlight a few reading suggestions while I am away.

    1. I took a little good-natured teasing for suggesting over Twitter that I can often find policy-relevant research in the American Political Science Review and the International Journal of Middle East Studies, but this month's IJMES really does have a great roundtable discussion that will be of interest to those studying the Middle East from a policy perspective and, specifically, what is taking place in the "Arab Spring."

    In Foreign Affairs a few months back, Greg Gause wrote:

    Scholars did not predict or appreciate the variable ways in which Arab armies would react to the massive, peaceful protests this year. This oversight occurred because, as a group, Middle East experts had largely lost interest in studying the role of the military in Arab politics.

    A number of scholars do, though, take the study of Arab militaries quite seriously. And this month's IJMES features a roundtable discussion on "Rethinking the Study of Middle East Militaries" with short essays by Yezid Sayigh, Roger Owen, Robert Springborg, Oren Barak and others. I highly recommend policy-interested scholars of the region check it out.

    [Warning: what follows has nothing to do with the topics normally considered on this blog. Proceed at your own risk.]

    2. I am getting a little tired of political journalists and their thumb-nail deep understanding of trends within and strands of evangelical and fundamentalist Christian thought in America. Even as good an article as Ryan Lizza's profile of Michelle Bachmann -- which I enjoyed -- left something to be desired in its treatment of Francis Schaeffer and evangelical theology. Most treatments of the religious beliefs of Bachmann and also Rick Perry that I have been reading over the past few weeks are clumsy at the least and intolerant and ignorant at the worst. Watching Bachmann on Meet the Press on Sunday, for example, I was shaking my head in disbelief as the candidate advanced her "understanding" of "economics," but once David Gregory started grilling her on her theological beliefs, I started considering the whole exchange unfair, uninformed and inappropriate.*

    If political journalists are going to start writing about the theological beliefs of people like Bachmann and Perry, they should first take the time to study evangelicalism and fundamentalisms within American Christianity in a serious way. One great, pithy (just 224 pages!) introduction to the subject, even if it is a bit dated, is George Marsden's Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism. Another great book, which is really a criticism of evangelical anti-intellectualism and should be read by believers and non-believers alike, is Mark Noll's The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind. Reading these books -- or, at the very least, the first book -- will better equip Americans of all trades and political stripes to speak intelligently about the evangelical and, in cases, fundamentalist beliefs of some candidates for the presidency.

    I suspect that as many of these politicians have been as influenced by John Stott and Martyn Lloyd-Jones as by R. J. Rushdoony and J. Gresham Machen, and it's important for political reporters to know the differences and similarities between them all if they are going to start throwing out names and ideas as being relevant to the election.

    *Look, I realize that it's the politicians who have opened to door to a discussion of their faiths by making such a big deal out of them in front of prospective voters. But last Sunday, it seemed as if David Gregory was telling Michelle Bachmann she was theologically wrong, and it just struck me as terribly unfair. For one brief moment, such did Gregory's line of questioning bother me, I found myself actually rooting for Bachmann.

  • The following is the unedited, full text of Hizballah's statement condemning the Syrian Navy's shelling of the Palestinian refugee camp at ar-Ramel:

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

  • I am very reluctant, as I have written, to provide any analysis of Israeli domestic politics based on such limited time spent in Israel and an inability to speak Hebrew and thus study the popular and elite discourse.* But if Tom Friedman is going to start writing 842-word newspaper columns explaining each and every popular protest of 2011, I should at least summon the courage to write a blog post on what I was able to observe traveling through Israel last week speaking to everyone from politicians and newspaper editors to the good-natured folks camping out on the Boulevard Rothschild.

    Macro-economically, I should start by pointing out, Israel is in a fantastic position. Blessed with strong growth, booming technology and defense industries, and probably the smartest central banker in the world, Israel should be the envy of both its neighbors and most Western countries. Underneath all that, though, a few grievances stand out:

    1. There is no consensus on how much Israel should pay to continue to support infrastructure in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. By one calculation, Israel had spent $79 billion in the West Bank and Gaza since 1967 by the mid-1990s and has obviously spent much more since then. Had Israel merely decided to keep a permanent military presence in both territories, by contrast, that would have cost just $10 billion. So a lot of those protesters in Tel Aviv who could care less about Judea and Samaria but care a lot about social services wonder why Israel is spending so much on the former while the latter amounts to less and less despite increasing national wealth. "The people made the state rich, and the state abandoned the people," goes one popular complaint.

    2. Israel has poor people. These poor are, predominantly, Arab and Ultra-Orthodox. The former have, in general, limited employment opportunities, while the latter often elect not to work. By one estimate shared with me by an Israeli political scientist, just 36% of Ultra-Orthodox men work. These same men are also far less likely to serve in the Israeli Defense Forces. You can see how this annoys people in Tel Aviv who both serve in the military and pay income taxes, right?

    3. Imagine the United States in the Robber Baron Era of the 19th Century. Now multiply the degree to which the U.S. economy was dominated by a handful of men by a factor of three and you get a sense for Israel's economy. Many Israelis with whom I spoke are frustrated by the real or at least perceived way in which a handful of 15 or so families controls their entire economy and exerts a tremendous degree of political and economic influence over their daily lives.

    Bear in mind, of course, that all of these grievances are, as one Israeli said to me, about "the fruits of success and not the fruits of failure." And also note, as Benny Morris did in this National Interest essay, that an external security threat could yet cripple these protests. But finally, remember that these protesters have yet to make a lot of the hard choices they will need to make if they actually want to see change. Explicitly calling out subsidies for the Ultra-Orthodox or calling for an end to support for settlement infrastructure will not be as popular as complaining about the price of cottage cheese and will require political lines in the sand to be drawn. It remains to be seen whether or not the people of the Boulevard Rothschild have the stomach or the discipline for that.

    *So what does an East Tennessean who does not speak Hebrew do when stuck in the middle of a crowd of 250,000 in Tel Aviv? Everytime the crowd began to cheer and chant, I just repeatedly screamed "FREEBIRD!" at the top of my lungs. Obviously.

  • Yesterday, I wrapped up a really fun and interesting trip to Israel and, briefly, the Palestinian Territories. For a long time, I have insisted that there is really no substantive connection between the way in which the United States has waged counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the way in which the Israelis have waged what I will call, for lack of a better term, stabilization operations in the Palestinian Territories.

    Others, of course, have claimed the United States and Israel have both waged highly similar operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan and the Palestinian Territories, respectively. Often this claim is made in some clumsy leftist "America and Israel are evil colonial powers" kind of way and is ignorant of the ways in which each country's military has independently developed doctrine as well as tactics, techniques and procedures. Sometimes, though, this claim is made by serious scholars, such as Laleh Khalili in her recent IJMES article -- with which I strongly disagreed but recommend because I think her argument is carefully researched and interesting.

    Balloons have made me reconsider my earlier position.

    Last Saturday night, I was walking around the protests in Tel Aviv with Jason Reich and noticed a tethered aerostat high above the crowd. He mentioned Israel had been using the balloons for years, long before we Americans, and sure enough, the following Friday, as crowds flooded into the Old City of Jerusalem for Friday prayers, I saw another aerostat. Bing West has argued U.S. use of aerostat systems in southern Afghanistan has had a revolutionary effect on the battlefield, and I'm pretty sure this is something we either borrowed from the Israelis or learned long after the IDF.

    The Israelis learned other lessons from their 2002 campaign in the Palestinian Territories that have also been learned by the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan. These lessons include the need to push independent intelligence capabilities down to the company level and also to provide miniature UAVs to rifle companies. I'm not sure, but I think the Israelis beat the U.S. military to both of these innovations by a couple of years.

    All of this, of course, concerns tactical innovation. U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine developed without much input from the IDF or Israeli scholars and practitioners. But on further reflection, I think it is unfair to say, as I have, that the U.S. military has learned little from the Israeli experience in stabilization operations. I also may have underestimated the informal relationships that have been built between officers in the U.S. and Israeli militaries over the years. All of this, of course, would make for a really interesting case study on military innovation and learning.

  • When Sen. Barack Obama was running for president, it emerged that one of his informal advisors, former Clinton official Rob Malley, had met with members of Hamas as part of his work with International Crisis Group. The right-wing media went bezerk, and the Obama campaign distanced itself from Malley, a respected scholar and former diplomat.

    Now we learn one of Perry's informal advisors, Gen. (Ret.) Peter Pace, has been shilling for the terrorist group Mujahedeen Khalq along with a boatload of other people from both sides of the aisle -- including former Obama Administration National Security Advisor Gen. (Ret.) Jim Jones. 

    What is the appropriate response here? Should Gov. Perry distance himself from those who have associated with and advocated on behalf of Mujahedeen Khalq?

  • I just returned from Israel today and will have a few days in Washington this week before traveling to the Holy Land* with my wife for some vacation on the family farm. I will post some observations on and thoughts about my latest trip over the next few days. I apologize for the lack of posts over the past week, but this next week should have more.

    *East Tennessee

  • I just read a sentence in the International Herald Tribune that will have no doubt caused some British Army veterans a high degree of consternation:

    [Water cannons] have not previously been used in Britain, but they have been regularly deployed by the British against crowds in Northern Ireland.
  • I rarely if ever comment on Israeli domestic politics, and I would not be so bold to offer comment on something like this had I not been testing this hypothesis out on people since I arrived. But there is an interesting similarity between the popular protests in Israel right now and the Tea Party in the United States.

    On the surface, of course, the two movements could not be more different. The Tea Party is a movement that wants to limit the size and scope of the U.S. government. There is nothing "socialist" about the Tea Party -- quite the opposite, in fact. The popular protests in Israel, by contrast, are in part agitating for a return to the kind of old-school socialist policies that Israel had in large part left behind over the past few decades. At the least, they are a protest against the capitalist system that has enriched Israel but squeezed the Middle Class through rising prices.

    But if the two movements are opposites in terms of motivation, they are similar in their effect. In the United States, because the Republican Party refuses to ever raise taxes and the Democratic Party refused to cut entitlements, the only thing left to cut out of the budget was discretionary spending -- especially defense spending. In Israel, the popular protests here have thus far declined to demand the government end its subsidies to the ultra-Orthodox or its investments in infrastructure in the Occupied Palestinian Territiories. The government, meanwhile, could not cut those subsidies and investments even if it wanted to without breaking apart its own coalition. The effect of all this is to put a squeeze on the one place the Israeli government can go looking for to find more money -- the Ministry of Defense.

    So in Israel and in the United States, the political effects of two very different movements has been to make people in the defense establishments of both countries very nervous. That alone makes these protests worth watching for anyone looking at long-term security developments in the Middle East.

  • I landed in Tel Aviv today and spent tonight checking out the popular protests that have been in the news. It was interesting, after having seen Tahrir Square in February, how some of the protesters here in Tel Aviv are consciously aping the Arab Spring protests. ("Irhal!" read one sign in Arabic, and underneath, in Hebrew, "Egypt is Here."*)

    I suspect I will have more observations to relate over the next few days, and most of the questions I have for policy-makers here concern, naturally enough, the security situation along the Blue Line. But for now, let me just say how cool it was to see Israeli civil society alive, well and in full voice tonight.

    *Special thanks to Jason Reich of "War is Boring" fame for serving as my translator tonight.

  • I should have noted, when I first posted this, that Erin/Charlie and I first wrote this after getting a lot of requests of Twitter for advice on Ph.D. programs. After you read this post, be sure to read the excellent comments.

    Disclaimer: this advice is geared toward individuals interested in conflict studies and national security -- with some applicability to the broader social sciences. Your mileage may vary. If you’re looking at getting a PhD in Comparative Literature or Bio-Physics, it should go without saying that you may not want to take career advice from a blog with a Lego insurgent as its avatar. For that matter, why the hell are you even reading this blog? Also, long-time readers remember we used to write this blog in the third person and use handles that protected our real identities. We have reverted back to that habit for this post because we wrote this post together, and because Erin started it with the whole Charlie business.

    To begin, a few questions to ask yourself:

    1. Why do I want a PhD? Do I need one? Is a master's degree or bachelor's degree sufficient for what I want to do?

    2. What kind of training am I looking for? Or do I just want the credential?

    3. Am I willing to spend money? How much?

    4. What’s my time commitment?

    But here’s the dirty secret about DC. Everybody wants to hire PhDs, but most people don’t know anything about them. They won’t read your dissertation, they aren’t going to call your advisor (thank goodness), and most won’t know until it’s too late whether you’ve actually been trained in anything useful. So if you just want the credential, stop reading now and just find the cheapest, quickest program and git ‘er done.

    On the flip side, if you’re going this direction, why not go all-in? For one, the better the program, the better the financial support. (The only thing Charlie paid for her PhD was library fines.) Make the commitment, get the best training you can possibly find, and be a rockstar. Full-time programs don’t fit everyone’s circumstances, but be creative and think long-term.

    Else, your options:

    Full-time, full-on traditional American PhD program (likely Political Science)– this is what Charlie did and anyone who knows her knows she didn’t exactly enjoy it. Huge variety of programs from super-theoretical (Chicago), old-school guns and bombs (MIT, Columbia), to political economy driven (Stanford, Princeton). These programs typically require two years of full-time coursework.

    Pros: state of the art training in research methods (quant / qual), world-class faculty, amazing resources (libraries, research funds), solid tuition assistance (often including stipends).

    Cons: takes freaking forever (4-6 year full-time commitment), professors are training their replacements and are often hostile to / dismissive of policy work (preferring academic debates to real world ones). Worse still, they’ll spend 6 years convincing you that no, you don’t want to be a DASD; you’ll be failure if you never publish in the APSR.

    Examples: Princeton, Columbia, Stanford, Michigan, Wisconsin, UCSD, Penn

    Full-time, full on Policy School PhD program – similar to the above but with less disdain for working in DC. Most are better known for the masters programs and have relatively small PhD classes.

    Pros: Oriented toward policy related research. Some have very good quant / econometrics training. Often located in and around major cities.

    Cons: Many are overly narrow in their focus on security studies. Lots of combined classes with Masters students. Few options for rigorous qualitative research. Funding may be less robust than larger, traditional programs.

    Examples: SAIS, Georgetown, George Mason, Harvard Kennedy School

    2a) Part-time American PhD – these programs are mostly found in policy schools in and around DC. Sadly, just not that may options. George Mason and Georgetown come to mind.

    Full-time UK PhD – this is what Abu Muqawama did. This experience really depends on your relationship with your advisor. People ask Abu Muqawama all the time about the Department of War Studies at King's College London, but honestly, the department or university matters less than the advisor. Abu Muqawama had completed an American-style master's degree at the American University of Beirut in Middle Eastern Studies and started some research on Hizballah in 2006 that he wanted to explore further. There was basically one dude on Earth he wanted to work with -- a guy named Yezid Sayigh, who did some of the first really serious work on Palestinian military organizations. Yezid happened to have just left Cambridge for the Department of War Studies in London, so Abu Muqawama went to London. Had Yezid been at the University of Fisheries and Mines in Northern Wales, he would have gone there.

    Pros: If you already have a master's degree and have a subject you really want to work on for about three years, this is the program for you. This is basically one long supervised research project, so it appealed to Abu Muqawama, who admirers would describe as a "disciplined self-starter" and everyone else would describe as "a bit of a loner."

    Cons: Abu Muqawama had done the majority of his language training and course work prior to matriculating. Since he's an area studies geek, he more or less had what he needed in terms of skills to complete his dissertation project. But he got next to nothing in terms of methodological training beyond that, so he has to partner with people like Charlie whenever he wants to apply quantitative methods to his research. Also, the great thing about U.S. programs is that you take enough course work to where, if you enter the academy, you can teach Political Science 101 in a pinch. If you get a history Ph.D. in the United States and specialize in 19th Century France, you have probably also taken enough graduate courses to where you could teach an introductory course covering stuff like, the English Industrial Revolution. This makes you more competitive than a UK-trained dude on the academic job market. Also, these programs can be really expensive for Americans and other non-Euros. Most people are self-funded. I got some generous assistance that helped pay for both my master's degree and Ph.D., but I was the exception.

    Examples: Again, for a Ph.D., ignore the program. Pick an advisor you want to work with, contact that advisor, and ask that advisor if he or she would like to work with you.

    A note on Master’s degrees: Charlie went straight through to a PhD program, skipping the MA. Abu Muqawama got his master's degree at American University of Beirut, which he loved, but mainly because he was just out of the U.S. Army and was basically a sponge, intellectually speaking. (He thought it was really cool -- and continues to think it is really cool -- that he could just walk into Tarif Khalidi's office hours and chat about the medieval Islamic world or about Beirut during the war.) He spent a lot of time on his Arabic and graduated a semester early so he could concentrate full-time on his language training. (He also learned French during this period, which has been really useful as a research language.) Perhaps then it’s not a surprise that neither of us are huge fans of the IR / Security Studies MA racket. Frankly, we just don’t think the training is that good. (If the training was good, maybe there’d be less demand for PhDs in Washington!) Look for MAs that give specific training – language + regional studies, focused research + analysis, or similar. Else, go to a PhD program for 2 years, complete your coursework, ask for the master’s, and get out of Dodge.

  • ...Mark Milley, who will be taking over command of the famous 10th Mountain Division. Always nice to see an Ivy Leaguer (Princeton, Columbia) in the general officer corps, if only because it confounds the West Pointers. Climb to Glory.

  • Each year, around this time in the (lunar) calendar, Western newspapers are usually filled with stories about the latest exciting Ramadan soap opera everyone is watching. Nothing happens during Ramadan, the story goes, so most reporting on the Arabic-speaking world is of the human interest variety.

    It's worth pausing to consider, then, how remarkable this year has been and continues to be. I woke up this morning to images of Hosni Mubarak in a cage, on trial in Egypt. This is a stunning image for me to see, so I can only imagine the effect it has on 83m Egyptians and about 250m other people in the region.

    Elsewhere in the Arabic-speaking world, meanwhile, violent civil wars and upheavals continue to press for the fall of the Qadhdhafi regime in Libya, the al-Asad regime in Syria, and the Saleh regime in Yemen. If I had to place my bets, I would bet all will ultimately and bloodily be successful.

    Remarkable. Ramadan mubarak indeed.

  • Uh, no. In his column today, Joe Nocera writes:

    You know what they say: Never negotiate with terrorists. It only encourages them.

     

    These last few months, much of the country has watched in horror as the Tea Party Republicans have waged jihad on the American people.

    Terrorism is defined by Bard O'Neill as "the threat of physical coercion, primarily against noncombatants, especially civilians, to create fear in order to achieve various political objectives." That's a pretty solid definition, and though the Tea Party has certainly relied on other forms of coercion to get its way, in effect threatening to destroy the global financial system, it has never resorted to force or the threat of force. Calling Tea Partiers terrorists is, at the very least, incorrect. Using the term "jihad," meanwhile, is even more fraught with peril. I often suggest people go consult the Encyclopedia of Islam entry for the word before using it themselves. Nocera, meanwhile, is just using it to score cheap rhetorical points.

    I have a lot of trouble saying anything good about the Tea Party. The Tea Party -- and the obstructionism and rigid adherence to orthodoxy it represents -- has done more to undermine U.S. economic, diplomatic and military power than al-Qaeda.* That is no exaggeration. But using words like "terrorists" and "jihad" to describe the Tea Party helps no one. They further poison the American discourse, and they also make life really difficult on people like me who spend a lot of time parsing terms like "terrorism" and "jihad" in the face of others who throw those terms around carelessly.

    Joe Nocera should continue to criticize the Tea Party, but he should apologize for the language in his op-ed today.

    ***

    Earlier this morning, I approvingly linked to Nocera's op-ed on my Twitter account. And indeed, I largely agree with everything in the op-ed aside from the language in the introductory and concluding paragraphs. But I should have stated more clearly, from the beginning, that Nocera's clumsy use of such loaded language was at best unhelpful and at worst as irresponsible as the language so often used by Nocera's antagonists.

    *I actually did back-of-the-envelope calculations based on the amount the United States will pay over a 10-year period if our debt is downgraded (about $1 trillion), the number of projected cuts to our national defense budget ($700+ million), etc. And I cannot estimate the degree to which the international system -- to include the markets -- now has a lack of faith in the ability of the United States to govern itself. Or the degree to which economic growth will now slow because we are cutting discretionary spending but not making the long-term structural changes (cutting entitlements, raising revenues) necessary for long-term fiscal health. I mean, if you think that we can cut short-term public expenditures and it's not going to have an effect on the private sector, I sell bottles of snake oil that might interest you. But don't just take my word -- take the word of the guy who helps run PIMCO. More on the market fall-out here. More here.

  • As I said yesterday, the deal that passed through the House of Representatives last night stinks. Both parties continued to embrace this fiction arguing discretionary spending is that which ails our budget, and so programs for the poor as well as defense spending went to the chopping block while taxes remain at ridiculously low levels and entitlement programs remain untouched. Our collective refusal to realize we need to trim our entitlements is maddening, as is our collective refusal to raise taxes -- ever -- on even the wealthiest Americans, who can and in many cases are willing to pay more. (Count me among those willing to pay more, by the way, in the name of fiscal sanity, even if I am not in the top 2%.)

    I thus have a degree of sympathy for the defense hawks in the House of Representatives, including my friends serving on and working in the House Armed Services Committee. Some representatives on the HASC voted "no" last night, which in my mind was an incredibly irresponsible thing to do that late in the game, but overall, the HASC gets high marks for both its commitment to transparency, for which it has been justly lauded, and its commitment to rebuilding our ground forces after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan while at the same time funding the Dept. of Defense to prepare for future security challenges.

    Most of us defense analysts, though, can agree that whatever happened last night and in the budget negotiations, cuts to the defense budget were inevitable and even make sense. As we draw down in Iraq and Afghanistan, it's a perfectly reasonable thing to wonder why we have as many ground troops as we do, and it's also a perfectly reasonable thing to wonder why retirement benefits in the military outpace those in the private sector or why health care premiums are so low for servicemen while they continue to rise for everyone else. So I have no problems with intelligent cuts to the defense budget, though I do have problems with blind swipes of the ax to the defense budget, and I worry we're going to see more of the latter than the former.

    Here's the thing, though: if defense hawks want to prevent other law-makers from gutting the defense budget in a clumsy way, they should play offense instead of defense. The path of least resistance now will be to fight some valiant rear-guard action protecting this or that weapons system, but the smarter play will be to convince other law-makers and the public at large that it makes more sense to re-invest in our nation's exhausted military for the next few years than to continue to fund entitlement schemes that we are going to need to eventually cut anyway. And it might even make sense for someone to suggest we all pay an extra $20 "thank you tax" to our nation's Army and Marine Corps this year to replace some of the equipment those soldiers and Marines have used in Iraq and Afghanistan while most of the rest of us have sat on the couch eating Cheetos and worrying about the NFL lock-out. I think most Americans would be down with that -- if they were assured this extra $20 would go to our exhausted Army and Marine Corps.

    Because if you want to fix the debt, you're going to have to eventually raise taxes and cut entitlements anyway. You might as well do so now in the name of national security rather than wait until the next crisis. The burden that falls on defense hawks is to convince other Americans that it makes sense today (paradoxically, considering we're winding down our involvement in two wars) to re-invest in the defense budget rather than continue to live in this blissful happy land where you can have both low taxes and cushy entitlements.

    ***

    Now, I understand some of you want us to have a smaller defense budget so politicians will not be so tempted to use our military power in places like Iraq and Libya. I understand that. But I do not think that trying to shackle policy-makers by having a smaller military makes a lot of sense, even if smart people sometimes argue that. My brief experience in the U.S. military taught me that policy-makers, most of whom have no military experience, will usually throw the military into stupid situations (see: Iraq) whether or not it's prepared and that "clever" means* designed to shackle policy-makers from doing stupid things don't ultimately work. So all things being equal, I would rather have a capable, effective military ready to respond to whatever damn fool idea some president from Texas (LBJ, George W., ... Perry?) gets into his head. What constitutes a "capable, effective military" is then another discussion, and a fun one to have as we think about the military after Iraq and Afghanistan.

    *Clever but ultimately misguided means include the way the service chiefs gamed the system after Vietnam and stuck a bunch of essential capabilities in the reserves, making a call-up of the reserves necessary in the event of war. Andrew Bacevich and others have correctly noted this was an attempt by the service chiefs to limit the options of their political masters, which really isn't cricket. Or Huntington, for that matter.

  • Two things to start your week:

    1. Nick Blanford and Bilal Saab have a great article in Foreign Policy about the next war between Israel and Lebanon. I have read the paper from which this article was adapted and will be moderating a public discussion of the paper in early September at the Brookings Institution. For now, read the shorter article.

    2. Nick Schmidle, the son and brother of steely-eyed Marines, has a must-read article in the New Yorker on the raid that killed Osama bin Laden. This is excellent long-form journalism. I only ding Nick twice: First, for using the cliche "an eerie calm" in the first page of the article. (Are we sure it wasn't a "preternatural calm"? Or maybe it was just quiet and there was nothing "eerie" about it?) Second, Nick is a first-class analyst of Pakistani politics, and I would have loved to have seen more of his analytical reporting than what I read at the end. Overall, though, brilliant stuff.

  • Because Republicans refuse to raise taxes (ever) and Democrats refuse to cut entitlements (ever), the big loser in yesterday's deficit reduction deal is defense spending. As Ezra Klein explains,

    ...[The] real hit comes in stage two: if the second round of deficit reduction isn’t signed into law, the “trigger” that will make automatic spending cuts absolutely savages defense spending.

     

    Let’s stop there and talk about the trigger, as it’s arguably the most important part of the deal. In his remarks on Friday, President Obama said he would support a trigger if it was done in “a smart and balanced way.” The implication was that it had to include tax increases as well as spending cuts, as a trigger with just spending cuts wouldn’t force Republicans to negotiate in good faith. The trigger in this deal does not include tax increases.

     

    What it includes instead are massive cuts to the defense budget. If Congress doesn’t pass a second round of deficit reduction, the trigger cuts $1.2 trillion over 10 years. Fully half of that comes from defense spending. And note that I didn’t say “security spending.” The Pentagon takes the full hit if the trigger goes off.

     

    The other half of the trigger comes from domestic spending. But Social Security, Medicaid and a few other programs for the poor are exempted. So the trigger is effectively treating defense spending like it comprises more than half of all federal spending. If it goes off, the cuts to that sector will be tremendous -- particularly given that they will come on top of the initial round of cuts. Whether you think the trigger will work depends on whether you think the GOP would permit that level of cuts to defense.

    On the one hand, I am among those who think you can really cut a lot of money from the Dept. of Defense budget over the next 10 years by trimming personnel costs -- paring down the force structure of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps after Afghanistan, raising TriCare premiums and adjusting retirement and pension programs. On the other hand, I can't help but shake this sinking feeling that the United States became Europe a little bit yesterday, and not in the good our-espresso-is-now-better way. Democrats and moderate Republicans have decided they would rather keep expensive entitlements than rebuild our military after two exhausting ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and turn our focus to the security challenges of East Asia. And conservative Republicans claim to value the military and believe in more robust defense spending, but they refuse to raise taxes to pay for the advanced military capabilities they want. 

    So we're left with defense spending that will almost certainly decline precipitously over the next decade, and those of us who work as defense analysts will remain usefully employed, ever scrambling to explain to policy-makers how they need to match their ambitions to their available resources, and how if they reduce their available resources, they will need to adjust the scale of their ambitions as well.

    As a younger voter, I continue to be alternately depressed and angered by the selfishness of the generation older than me. Just a few decades ago, the United States was the largest creditor nation. We are now the world's largest debtor nation. The older generation continues to draw more from entitlement programs than they ever contributed and also refuses to raise taxes, meaning the burden for both perpetually doing more with less and paying for entitlement programs we ourselves will never enjoy falls to my generation and the one below me. It's just incredibly frustrating. But hey, it's a democracy, and if that older generation of voters wants a United States that is less ambitious but fatter and happier, okay.

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