Home › Abu Muqawama
Syndicate content
 

Abu Muqawama

Abu Muqawama retains its autonomy and the views and beliefs expressed within the blog do not reflect those of CNAS. Abu Muqawama retains the right to delete comments that include words that incite violence; are predatory, hateful, or intended to intimidate or harass; or degrade people on the basis of gender, race, class, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or disability. In summary, don't be a jerk.

  • Kafkaesque primaries
    February 6, 2008 | Posted by Charlie - 1:15am | 0 Comments
    It's coming on 1230am at Charlie's house in DC. (She's back from her Super Tuesday nerdfest party awaiting results from California.) So far it's a good night for McCain fans, with the former POW assuming the role of presumptive favorite (though Huckabee's near sweep of the South is v. interesting).

    The Dems continue to be neck and neck, with Obama winning more states and Clinton slightly ahead in the delegate count (so far). Speaking of delegates, jesus nuts this is some kafkaesque shit!
    This may well lead to some serious head-scratching. In California, for example, if Clinton wins with 50.1 percent of the vote in a congressional district that has three delegates, then she gets to take two delegates, and Obama gets to take one. But if she wins a congressional district with four delegates 60 percent to 40 percent, she gets two and Obama gets two. (The number of delegates allocated to each district depends on the Democratic vote for president last time around.) In this and just about every midsize and large state, it is possible to win more votes than your opponent—and fewer delegates. (See College, Electoral, Baleful Potential of.)
    So maybe our American readers should keep that in mind next time their rolling their eyes at someone else's Byzantine election process. As it stands now, neither race is yet decided. But don't hold your breath for meaningful foreign policy debates as the primaries taper off: as before, it's the economy stupid. Iraq (much less Afghanistan) will have to wait.

    Update: Networks are calling Cali for Clinton. But the projected delegate math for the night works out to Obama's advantage: Obama 841, Clinton 837. (H/T: Josh)
    Election '08

  • Strange women, lying in ponds, distributing swords is no basis for a system of government.
    February 5, 2008 | Posted by Abu Muqawama - 4:24pm | 0 Comments
    Just as the genocide in Darfur has refused to confine itself within the borders of the Sudan, but has now destabilised neighbouring Chad, so anything that happens in Pakistan or Afghanistan, whether we cause it or not, will come back to us in the shape of fleeing people, apocalyptic ideologues, weapons proliferation and the export of terror.

    Fortunately, it isn't just David Miliband who recognises this. Today America may decide that the next presidential election will be between John McCain and Hillary Clinton or Barack Obama. All three recognise that America must continue to be the ideological and physical arsenal of democracy. Thank God.

    Voices of sanity returned to the Times of London editorial page today after this past weekend's back-to-back calls for an immediate withdrawal from Afghanistan (neither of which seemed to spend much time thinking about the consequences of such action). That's not to say, however, that everyone here in London is watching what they say:

    Prince Andrew has accused the Bush administration of failing to listen to Britain on post-invasion tactics.

    In a rare and outspoken interview with the International Herald Tribune, the Duke of York said the Iraq war had induced a "healthy scepticism" towards America.

    He said there was a feeling in Britain of "why didn't anyone listen to what was said and the advice that was given".

    Here's a tip for Prince Andrew from the crew at Abu Muqawama, free of charge: in the United States, we view you royalty with great affection. But that affection is very different from the respect we give to elected representatives.

    We've only had one king back home in Tennessee, and his name was Elvis. We don't need another one. In fact, we kinda thought you lot would have figured that out around, oh, 1776.

    Now if you were Gordon Brown or David Cameron or someone with an actual popular mandate, we would be happy to accept and criticism or suggestions you might have. But come on, dawg, you're not even really in line for the crown anymore, are you? You're tits on the proverbial boar.

    And what you're doing spouting off about Iraq, something about which you know nothing, is beyond us. Do you really want to get into the recriminations game here? Do you? Because before you do that, you might want to interview your boys about their experiences in southern Iraq. Ask the younger officers -- not the generals -- if they're happy with the way things turned out and whether or not the British Army was covered in glory.

    Afghanistan, Iraq, UK

  • Getting Things Right in Iraq ... Even in 2005
    February 5, 2008 | Posted by Abu Muqawama - 5:34am | 2 Comments
    For those of you who followed last week's debate on Iraq strategy and tactics between Gian Gentile and Pete Mansoor, one of the things worth highlighting is that Gentile is, Abu Muqawama would venture to guess, a little ticked off by the way in which popular opinion divides events in Iraq into two phases: pre-Petraeus and post-Petraeus. Pre-Pretraeus, popular thinking goes, the U.S. military was more %$#@ed up than a football bat, getting everything wrong and trying to fight Desert Storm all over again. Post-Petraeus, meanwhile, the U.S. military has supposedly been officered by a corps of David Galulas who can do no wrong on the counter-insurgency battlefield. Abu Muqawama, in this case, sympathizes with Gian Gentile 100%. It ain't so black and white, gang.

    It is important to see the U.S. military's experience in Iraq -- or any military's combat experience, for that matter -- as a continual learning process. There were some things the U.S. Army and Marine Corps were doing right from the get-go. And there were other things that the military figured out in, say, 2005 or 2006 before Gen. Petraeus returned to direct the war effort and implement population-centric COIN across the board. Exhibit A is a leaked, classified ROE from 2005 that Abu Muqawama read over the weekend and that Shaun Waterman of UPI reported on yesterday.

    WASHINGTON, Feb. 4 (UPI) -- The U.S. military's rules of engagement in Iraq in the fall of 2005 forbade troops from entering mosques, even during a firefight, without the permission of senior commanders who would consult Iraqi authorities. ...

    In a special section on mosques and religious structures, the rules specify that -- though commanders on the ground may return fire, or even call in airstrikes, against a mosque that is being used by enemy forces -- U.S. troops will not enter such buildings, even during fighting, "without the approval of the (senior regional commander) in coordination with (the Iraqi ministries of defense and interior)."

    If approval is granted, the rules say, Iraqi security forces will enter the building, "with cordon support from U.S. forces."

    Similar restrictions govern the detention of clerics or imams.

    "This is a very encouraging document," said Andrew Exum, a U.S. Army Ranger and counterinsurgency specialist who fought in Iraq and is now studying Islamist groups at King's College, London.

    "It shows that somebody's done some thinking about how to deal with a very complex and confusing kinetic and cultural battleground … They are really trying to get their head around" a new type of warfare, he said.

    The 2005 ROE highlights, in short, some very serious thinking being done by smart staff officers and commanders -- pre-Petraeus -- trying to adjust to the combat and challenges they faced in Iraq. Read Shaun's entire article -- the ROE went beyond just what U.S. forces can and can't do with regard to mosques.

    But here is where we get onto graduate-level thinking about Iraq. Just as U.S. military efforts in Iraq weren't 100% messed up before David Petraeus got there at the head of the surge, things aren't on some inevitable path toward victory now. Nor is everything going swimmingly. Keep that in mind as you hear the black-and-white debate on Iraq take place between America's two political parties and in the news media anxious to either bury the U.S. effort in Iraq or prop it up in perpetuity. And by all means -- and along the same lines -- read the excellent post by one of our super-intelligent friends that Charlie highlighted earlier today. This is the kind of analysis you get when you send really smart people to Iraq and then allow them to explain the reality there.
    COIN, Iraq

  • Super Duper Special Crazy Tuesday! Or, alternately, the 5th of February
    February 5, 2008 | Posted by Abu Muqawama - 4:27am | 5 Comments
    Abu Muqawama steers clear of presidential politics on most days, but today is the closest thing the U.S. has to a national primary, and from what this blogger has seen, our democratic process has actually been followed with a great deal of interest by the rest of the world and might be restoring a little faith in American democracy. Incredibly, three of the four viable candidates for president are not torturing nutjobs. And people back home in the States are fired up too, especially those who have contracted Obamania. One of Abu Muqawama's high school English teachers composed a "Miltonic Sonnet" for Barack Obama and sent it to everyone he knows trying to get them to vote for the Illinois senator. Abu Muqawama's own mother excitedly told him over email last night that she's walking into the voting booth today with her middle finger extended to her fellow middle-aged white female voters and casting her ballot for Obama as well. (And she actually likes Hillary. A lot. Note to HRC, though: Messing with Jim Cooper wins you few friends in the Volunteer State. You might as well slap Howard Baker in broad daylight.) That said, if you are a U.S. citizen and happen to live abroad, you might still be able to vote.

    If you are Democrat, go to Democrats Abroad and find out where your closest voting center is. If you're in London (like Abu Muqawama), that voting center would be near Paddington:

    UNITED KINGDOM – London
    Tuesday, February 5 18:00 – 22:30
    Porchester Hall, Porchester Road, Bayswater
    Contact: chair@democratsabroad.org.uk

    If you're a Republican... WTF... Abu Muqawama looked and looked on the Republicans Abroad for a polling station in London last night, but apparently, there isn't one. Can't a man cast his vote for John McCain and Freedom from abroad? You can, however, register to vote for the general election. Which is cool as, unlike the Democrats, you pretty much already know who your nominee is.

    Update: FFT (Former Flatmate Theo) reports Democrats Abroad is better organized than Republicans Abroad and that Republicans abroad cannot vote in the primaries. Hmph. (This is perhaps the first time the words "Democrats" and "better organized" have ever been used together in a sentence.)

    Update II: Abu Muqawama's Louisiana relatives would be horrified if he did not mention it is Fat Tuesday (or, Mardi Gras for all our francophone/fraternity readers) in addition to Super Duper Special Crazy Tuesday. Just 24 hours until we get to wander around with a smudge mark on our foreheads that people on public transportation offer to rub off for us. Last year, this drunk guy was being a jerk to all the passengers on a bus in DC and Abu Muqawama was about to deck him when he remembered the ashes on his forehead and that it would probably be sending the wrong message about Jesus if he started a fistfight on the S2 bus going up 16th Street on Ash Wednesday.

    Update III: McCain, for his part, has refused to engage with Limbaugh, telling reporters: "I don't listen to him. There's a certain trace of masochism in my family, but not that deep."
    Election '08

  • Winning, But Not Won?
    February 5, 2008 | Posted by Charlie - 1:17am | 9 Comments
    Many of our readers likely came across Max Boot's article this past week, arguing that we're winning the war in Iraq but that victory is only possible if we maintain troop strength. And that kind of logic is pretty typical of most Iraq analysis:

    current assessment + hand waving = conclusion you came to three years ago

    Fortunately, one of Charlie's favorite people emailed in with his own thoughts* (forgive the length, the University of Chicago teaches many things, but brevity is not among them).

    This is a good piece, but I would argue on a couple of points. For one, the political solution in Iraq is not about extending security to all corners of the country. That is what security operations are for. The political strategy should be about taking this brief pause in violence and using it to build institutions that will lessen the risk of future violence. Anyway, this article is all about how we've almost achieved a balance but we're not quite there yet... With the implicit argumentbeing that once we get to that balance we can declare victory. But a balance of power is a MEANS, NOT AN END. We have achieved a balance, now what are we going to do with it? In civil war settlements that last, institutions are formed that provide the credible commitment and which help lessen the security dilemma. This works because institutions are"sticky," and have independent power to affect behavior.

    We have achieved a precarious equilibirum in Iraq. It is a balance of power, but balances of power are inherently unstable. They last as long as all parties believe time is on their side. When one side no longer believes time is on its side, the whole thing comes apart. So right now we should be institutionalizing the balance, rather than trying to figure out how to expand it to the far corners of the state. Provincial elections (WHICH WE SHOULD TAKE A STAKE IN) and accelerated con-federalism are good places to start. The structure of these provincial and regional governments are, institutionally, where we have the most room to manuever, because they weren't well defined in that mess of a constitution.

    Internal balances of power in civil conflict require a credible outside commitment from an external balancer. This ameliorates the security dilemma and allows for compromises to be madeand institutions to be formed. INSTITUTIONALIZING OUR GAINS IS THE IMPORTANT PART (and I don't mean by forming more extra-governmental militias.) The external balancer can't stay forever, (and balances themselves don't last because they are all about expectations and perception of future relative balances.)

    On a different note, I think it is important not to confuse concerned local citizens' groups with the Anbar Awakening. The Awakening is a tribal movement, instantiated in the Anbar Salvation Councils, while the CLCs are insurgent groups being turned into local militias. As Marc Lynch has pointed out elsewhere, there are huge tensions between the two, as CLCs claim that the tribal leaders are "reaping the fruits of the jihad," without having fought for it. This will only get worse as the tribal leaders make overtures to SCIRI/SIIC, which has angered the former insurgents in some of the original CLCs. We shouldn't conflate insurgent movements with tribal movements.

    *Excerpted with permission; and with the hope it may convince a reader or two that PhDs are not always a complete waste of time (sadly, you won't get top notch training in causal inference anywhere else).
    Iraq, tribes

  • Reverse Darwinism
    February 4, 2008 | Posted by Abu Muqawama - 3:06pm | 10 Comments
    The second bomber failed to detonate his explosive belt and was shot dead by a police officer, a police spokesman said.

    As insurgencies progress, the insurgents -- and the counter-insurgents, often -- tend to get better and better tactically if for no other reason than natural selection. The bad insurgents -- guys who take unnecessary risks, commanders who think frontal assaults are a good idea, etc. -- tend to have been killed off early. Which is why Abu Muqawama can't wrap his head around suicide bombing. About a year ago, he attended a lecture by an Israeli psychologist who spoke of the "traits of the suicide bomber" based upon her numerous interviews with failed suicide bombers in Israeli prisons. At the end of the lecture, Abu Muqawama asked the obvious: "Um, based on your sample, don't your characteristics only apply to stupid suicide bombers? Wouldn't the successful suicide bombers, uh, not exactly be available for an interview?"

    So taking today's news from Israel, where one suicide bomber killed an Israeli while another failed to detonate, can we say that the guy who failed to detonate his vest would be, had he lived, a bad insurgent or terrorist? And if you're in the S1 or HR Department of Islamic Jihad, doesn't that mean all your best people end up dead as part of the plan?

    Of course, one of these days some sick bastard is going to get the idea to remotely detonate mentally retarded people. But that would be plumbing the depths of depravity, so we probably don't have to worry about that ever happening ... What's that? ... Really? Oh...
    Israel, Palestine, Terror

  • But what will happen this summer?
    February 4, 2008 | Posted by Abu Muqawama - 2:56pm | 3 Comments
    [via Slate] Early in the afternoon, unknown assailants fired shots into the demonstration. The protesters claim either that the army opened fire or that snipers in Ain Roummaneh targeted them. Hezbollah and AMAL both immediately demanded an investigation but—unlike in past tense encounters—didn't make a clear call for their supporters to stand down. By Monday, at the funerals for two of the AMAL activists, furious residents of the southern suburbs openly called for revenge against the army, Siniora, and, more generally, Christian political figures once linked to civil-war-era militias.

    And then it started to rain. Freezing sheets of rain fell on Beirut Monday night, and if anything can act as a kind of Kryptonite to the angry Arab street, it's a good dousing of winter rain.

    Gang, when weather is the only thing stopping you from breaking out into another civil war, it's time to go searching for your passports.
    Lebanon

  • Post Another One For the Insurgents
    February 4, 2008 | Posted by Kip - 8:55am | 0 Comments
    An underdog team beats the undefeated New England cheaters in a prolonged struggle through the fourth quarter.

    Neither a Manning nor a Brady fan, but happy to see that New England can't win without a videographer.
    Super Bowl

  • Bob Bateman's Combat Trauma Bibliography
    February 4, 2008 | Posted by Abu Muqawama - 7:13am | 7 Comments
    [via Small Wars Journal] Combat trauma, in the abstract, is something about which Bob Bateman knows a lot. (LTC Bateman is a combat veteran himself, but his interest in combat trauma is academic, we hope.) Abu Muqawama had previously been treated to an earlier version of this excellent bibliography. If anyone has interest in PTSD or combat trauma, check it out. Some of you might have read Achilles in Vietnam, but as The Bateman points out, the full corpus of literature goes far beyond -- and improves upon -- that book.

    Abu Muqawama has never really been adversely affected by his combat experiences in Iraq or Afghanistan. Abu Muqawama knocks on wood a lot.
    Veterans

  • Musharraf the Menace
    February 4, 2008 | Posted by Abu Muqawama - 4:22am | 4 Comments
    “Al-Qaeda does not exist in Pakistan any more … We have shattered and eliminated their command system there.” – Pervez Musharraf, 2005

    How many times have we heard that? Honestly, how many times has Pervez Musharraf come to a place like London and chastised the British people for not managing their terror problem as well as the Pakistanis manage theirs? How many times has he insisted to his American protectors that Al-Qaeda doesn't exist in Pakistan or that Al-Qaeda's leadership is all in Afghanistan?

    And then these stories keep popping up in the daily press:

    A Libyan al-Qaeda commander who was killed last week in northwestern Pakistan had lived there for years and, despite a $200,000 U.S. bounty on his head, felt secure enough to meet officials and visit hospitals, according to officials and residents of this city.

    As he organized suicide bombings and other attacks in neighboring Afghanistan, Abu Laith al-Libi found a comfortable refuge in Pakistan's border region, the sources said in interviews. He met openly with a Pakistani politician and a Libyan diplomat and called on foreign fighters recovering from their wounds.

    The Pakistani government contends it has been doing everything possible to capture al-Qaeda figures within its borders. But Libi, who was killed in a missile attack last week, moved unchallenged around the heart of Peshawar, a city of about 1.2 million people, underscoring how freely he and other al-Qaeda leaders have been able to operate in Pakistan.


    If Pervez Musharraf were capable of being embarrassed, he would be. TIME Magazine -- who knew TIME was still published weekly? We thought they went the way of LIFE -- has it right when they argue the killing of Libi is a blow to Musharraf as much as it to Al-Qaeda. Over his objections, the U.S. is killing the Al-Qaeda operatives -- in Pakistan -- that he says do not exist.

    In the end, of course, only one Western journalist has ever properly grilled Musharraf. Enjoy:





    P.S. You're either a "Tom Brady" fan or a "Peyton Manning" fan, and never the twain shall meet. Abu Muqawama is from Tennessee, so no points for guessing which one is his guy. It's always nice to see a Manning end the Pats' season. Well done, Eli. British newspapers, by the way, sound as hilariously awkward trying to describe an American football "match" as American newspapers do when writing about soccer. Exhibit A.
    Al-Qaeda, Pakistan

  • WTF, Giants Win?
    February 3, 2008 | Posted by Charlie - 11:07pm | 4 Comments
    To quote the irascible TX Hammes: sell everything, convert your dollars to gold, and move to Montana.

    (But before you go: dig up the numbers of all those girls who told you they'd go on a date when hell freezes over. It's your lucky day.)

    PS 10 days to pitchers and catchers...

  • Scotland Are Rubbish ... And the Very Best of Last Week
    February 3, 2008 | Posted by Abu Muqawama - 2:13pm | 2 Comments
    Let's just say that by the end of the match, Abu Muqawama's friend Jamie was trying to figure out some way in which New Zealand is actually a lost colony of Scotland whereby we have Dan Carter & Co. at our disposal for next week's match. As it was, we were embarrassed.

    Abu Muqawama (the blog) had a good week, though, and for those of you who missed some of it, here are the highlights:

    Saturday: The Debate To Which You Should All Be Paying Attention

    Friday: Afghan Study Group: The Wheels Done Come Off

    Thursday: Afghanistan a failed state? (Again?)

    Wednesday: Lipstick on a Pig

    Tuesday: Surge to Victory?

    Monday: Big Changes for Big Army

    The best debate, meanwhile, took place in the post on Arab Unity, while the best comment was afghanistanica's, which inspired a whole 'nother post.
    Best of the Best

  • Lazy Sunday Reading ... and Tesco Value Lager-Swilling Surrender Monkeys
    February 3, 2008 | Posted by Abu Muqawama - 5:34am | 7 Comments
    We here at Abu Muqawama had another great week of high reader figures, which is especially nice as we will be celebrating our one-year anniversary this coming week. When Abu Muqawama started this blog last year, he was lucky to have 50 readers in a day. Now, together with Charlie and Kip, we average closer to 1,500.

    There is some good reading material out there to keep you occupied today as you wait for either the Super Bowl's kickoff or, like Abu Muqawama, the kickoff to France-Scotland at Murrayfield.

    First up arrives via Dave over at Small Wars Journal, and that's Frank Hoffman's new article on hybrid wars. Col. Hoffman -- a proud product of the University of Pennsylvania -- was kind enough to send along a late draft of this paper a few weeks ago, so we can already confirm that it is excellent and well worth your time reading. Also, Dave Kilcullen chimed in at SWJ with this comment:

    I'd also like to acknowledge the person I believe first used the term "hybrid wars" -- Assistant Professor Erin Simpson of the Marine Corps Staff College, who delivered a paper to the Midwest Political Science Association conference in Chicago in April 2005, entitled "Thinking about modern conflict: hybrid wars, strategy, and war aims".

    This is the earliest use of "hybrid wars" that I have come across, and as the apparent originator of this extremely valuable conceptual framework, Erin's paper is well worth reading in full -- it's at http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~esimpson/papers/hybrid.pdf

    Good old Dave: giving credit where credit is due.

    For lighter reading, Robert Fisk, the Independent's reliably pompous Middle East correspondent, has an absolutely delightful article on what happened to him when he realized a bogus Saddam Hussein biography -- allegedly written by him -- started surfacing on the streets of Cairo. Seriously, put aside your aversions to Fisk and read this. Really, really funny.

    Continuing in Cairo, Michael Slackman has a curious travel guide to that city, where Abu Muqawama himself lived for a time. There are two reasons everyone who is able must visit Cairo: the pyramids at Giza and the treasures of the national museum. The great pyramids and the golden mask of Tutankhamun are two things that live up to their hype 100% and then some. Oddly, Slackman only mentions the pyramids in passing and leaves no room on the schedule for them. (Let no one write in to say the pyramids are in Giza and thus aren't actually in Cairo. Ridiculous. They're closer to Midan Tahrir than the airport!)

    A Washington Post article, meanwhile, makes an important and often forgotten point: there is not a war in Iraq. There are wars in Iraq. Three, if you're counting.

    And finally, the normally dignified Times of London has now featured lead columnists in both its Saturday and Sunday editions waving the white flag in Afghanistan. Unbelievable. Here's Matthew Paris on Saturday and Simon Jenkins today. Has any mainstream columnist in the United States yet argued in favor of withdrawal from Afghanistan? No wonder this lot folded against the Welsh yesterday. We're going to have to coin the phrase Tesco Value Lager-swilling surrender monkeys soon enough.
    Afghanistan, COIN, Iraq, Middle East

  • And for today's heart-warming story from Iraq...
    February 3, 2008 | Posted by Abu Muqawama - 2:12am | 8 Comments
    Abu Muqawama was reading the Economist's review of Marc Sageman's new book yesterday when he came across this passage (which also refers to Daniel Byman's new book):

    Both authors believe that in the war of ideas Americans should focus on jihadist brutality rather than trying to burnish their own image.

    Abu Muqawama then glanced down at the front page of Saturday's Times of London:

    Baghdad’s fragile peace was shattered yesterday when explosives strapped to two women with Down’s syndrome were detonated by remote control in crowded pet markets, killing at least 91 people in the worst attacks that the capital had experienced for almost a year.

    Iraqi and American officials blamed al-Qaeda, and accused the terrorist organisation of plumbing new depths of depravity. Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, said that al-Qaeda’s use of mentally-handicapped women as bombers showed that it had “no political programme here that is acceptable to a civilised society and that this is the most brutal and the most bankrupt of movements”.

    Ryan Crocker, the US Ambassador, said: “There is nothing they won’t do if they think it will work in creating carnage and the political fallout that comes from that.”

    It's too bad the U.S. and its allies have only a primitive IO campaign, because stories like this should be a goldmine.

    Update: Taking advantage of those of you joining us through Instapundit, does anyone out there know how Islamic law differs among the four major schools with respect to the mentally retarded and incapacitated? Abu Muqawama knows there is a section in Bakhtiar's Encyclopedia of Islamic Law: A Compendium of the Major Schools on this, but, wouldn't you know it, doesn't happen to have that in front of him at the moment. It sure would be nice for the public affairs officers at CENTCOM to keep an Islamic law scholar on speed dial, though. (That would be a great conversation to listen in on, wouldn't it? "Salaam alaykum. Shlonak? Al-hamdu lillah. Ya hajj, we have a situation in Baghdad that we're pretty sure ain't 'halal' if you know what I mean...)
    IO, Iraq, Terror

  • The Debate To Which You Should Be Paying Attention
    February 2, 2008 | Posted by Abu Muqawama - 6:32am | 5 Comments
    Gang, the most important debate this past week was not the one between McCain and Romney or the one between Obama and Clinton. The most important debate this week was the debate, still ongoing, within national security circles on how we manage commitments in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

    Senior Pentagon leaders said yesterday that Gen. David H. Petraeus's call for a pause in troop withdrawals from Iraq this summer represents only one view on the issue -- albeit an important one -- and that they would recommend that President Bush also consider the stress on U.S. ground forces and other global military risks when determining future troop levels.

    "I find all the talk about a freeze or a pause in Iraq so interesting," said Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

    "I know General Petraeus has said publicly he wants to be able to assess the situation after the surge brigades come home," Mullen said at a Pentagon news conference. But he stressed that the Joint Chiefs and Adm. William Fallon, chief of U.S. Central Command, are also working on recommendations for force levels in Iraq, not in opposition to Petraeus but "from different perspectives."

    Here's what that means: David Petraeus is going to make recommendations to the president and the joint chiefs based on what he thinks is necessary for the U.S.-led mission in Iraq to continue its newfound successes. He will lobby, Abu Muqawama is guessing, for as many troops to stay in Iraq as is possible. His idea of what is possible, however, may be very different from what the joint chiefs think is possible. Why? It's not because they want to "lose" in Iraq. They have two other huge concerns on their minds: Afghanistan and the health of the ground forces (especially the U.S. Army).

    The ultimate decision-makers here, of course, are Sec. Gates and President Bush. Arriving hot on the heels of two major reports suggesting the Afghanistan mission is in serious danger of failing, Abu Muqawama is guessing that Admirals Mullen and Fallon and Sec. Gates are going to be very wary of extending the troops levels in Iraq -- their reasoning going something like this: If troop levels in Iraq stay the same, there is still no guarantee we are going to get the kind of political reconciliation and reforms necessary for our transitory military successes to be turned into anything concrete. We haven't even tried, by contrast, to be successful in Afghanistan yet. Nor have we seriously thought about the effect Iraq is having on the long-term health of the Army, which Gen. Casey and others keep warning us about.

    Thus Abu Muqawama's guess is that some serious decision-makers are going to say no to Gen. Petraeus. Once again, this will not be because they are unpatriotic or want Hillary Clinton to be president: they just have to balance the needs of Afghanistan and the long-term health of the ground forces against what is still a long-shot in Iraq.

    So all that is going to land on President Bush's desk. What is he going to decide? Well, on the one hand, Abu Muqawama cannot see him not giving Gen. Petraeus, the savior of 2007, whatever he wants. On the other hand ... well, there is no other hand.

    This is most unfortunate. President Bush may very well see his presidency wrapped up in Iraq and Afghanistan/Pakistan as the next president's worry. That is not, however, the way he should be looking at things. The occupant of the White House may change next January 20th, but national security risks and threats will not. The president, for the long-term sake of the country and not for his legacy, needs to seriously weigh the opinions of his joint chiefs right now. If we cut troop levels in Iraq, it is not a given that the country will descend into chaos. (That may happen anyway.)

    The NATO mission in Afghanistan, by contrast, is most certainly failing. Iraq has sucked up both the material and intellectual resources of the United States, and our European allies are losing the will to expend any more of their hard power. If we lose in both Iraq and in Afghanistan, history will never forgive this president, and neither will the American people. If we're going to maintain troop levels in Iraq through the summer, Abu Muqawama wants a damn good explanation of how policy-makers see that affecting both the long-term health of the ground forces and the mission in Afghanistan.

    Finally, on a lighter note, the big game is tomorrow. No, not that one. This one. Allez ... l'Ecosse!

    Update: Charlie, here. Check out the most recent developments on the NATO side of things: Die deutsche Regierung sagt nein to sending more troops to Afghanistan (and they've got their Lederhosen in quite a twist about it). Stay tuned for what that means for the Canadian contingent. Oh, and for any who've ever rolled your eyes at the striped-pants, cocktail-circuit diplomats of European capitols, let this be a lesson to you. Our diplomatic work there is just as important as what goes on in Islamabad and Kabul, especially if you care at all about the future of NATO.
    Afghanistan, COIN, Iraq, Strategy

  • McCallister Responds
    February 2, 2008 | Posted by Charlie - 1:20am | 3 Comments
    Seems Afghanistanica hit a nerve. Mac McCallister reponds to his criticism (via SWJ):

    I take great pains not to advertise this model as a predictive tool in the sense that Afghanistanica’s comments seem to imply. Afghanistanica and I differ because I accept intuitively that effects resulting from all individual and group interactions are “determined not simply by preceding causes but are part of a continuous process of evolution. These complex interactions are too numerous to predict, identify and observe as they manifest themselves in their various end states along the historical timeline.”

    [...]

    I apologize for my primitive outlook on the human condition and readily accept that my position might be anathema to those that embrace the idea that reason and rational thinking is the only mechanism to create a social order. I therefore want to strongly reinforce the point that the model is not an attempt to predict individual or group behavior but an attempt to recognize patterns of behavior and why this pattern may exist.

    [...]

    On the other hand, I can’t disagree more with the insinuation that the lens “requires” one to see culture as static. It is as if I was told that a given professional football game is static because the players follow a set of simple rules. The game remains the same but the actions expressed on any given game day certainly do not.

    Read the full post at SWJ. McCallister focuses mostly Afghanistanica's concern about "predicting" behavior, but that wasn't the sum total nature of the objection. For Charlie's money, the real heart of the argument lies in the opening salvo:
    The majority of the Taliban and Jihadists are radically removed from the "older concepts of community and traditional codes of behavior." Of those that aren't foreign, most are products of refugee camps that have very little resemblance to traditional village life, and their behavior reflects this. And others have used "jihad" as an excuse to overthrow or marginalize the traditional leadership.

    That sounds to this blogger like it would be difficult to discern any "pattern" of human behavior in this shifting cultural landscape. (This of course also dovetails with Kip's argument that there is no monolithic pashtunwali.) Now, no one would ever confuse Charlie with a Middle East or South Asian tribal expert, but would it be correct to say that the tribal dynamics in Pakistan are more fluid and in a greater state of "shock" than those found in Anbar in 2004-2007? And as a result, we're just a whole helluva lot less sure wtf is going there? Or is there a way to sufficiently tailor any tribal program to take these different levels of variation and disruption into account?

    (Hope you're enjoying Space Mountain, Kip. Charlie's just going to continue with the WAGs until you get back.)

    Pakistan, pashtunwali, tribes

  • Afghan Study Group: The Wheels Done Come Off
    February 1, 2008 | Posted by Abu Muqawama - 4:54pm | 16 Comments
    WASHINGTON -- The international effort to stabilize Afghanistan is faltering and urgently needs thousands of additional U.S. and coalition troops, an influential group of American diplomatic and military experts concluded in a report issued Wednesday.

    The independent study finds that the Taliban, which two years ago was largely viewed as a defeated movement, has been able to infiltrate and control sizable parts of southern and southeastern Afghanistan, leading to widespread disillusionment among Afghans with the mission.

    "The prospect of again losing significant parts of Afghanistan to the forces of Islamic extremists has moved from the improbable to the possible," the study says, warning that Afghanistan could revert to a "failed state."

    The report is critical of nearly every governmental and international organization involved in Afghanistan, including the Bush administration, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, calling their efforts inadequate, poorly coordinated and occasionally self-defeating.

    Kip is on his way to Disney World right now (What, did he win the %$#@ing Super Bowl? Oh, he just got back from Afghanistan. Have fun, Kip!), so it's up to Abu Muqawama to post excerpts from the recently released Jones/Pickering report into our continuing failures in what may soon be a failed state. Again. Anyway, the report starts out cheery enough:

    The progress achieved after six years of international engagement is under serious threat from resurgent violence, weakening international resolve, mounting regional challenges and a growing lack of confidence on the part of the Afghan people about the future direction of their country. The United States and the international community have tried to win the struggle in Afghanistan with too few military forces and insufficient economic aid, and without a clear and consistent comprehensive strategy to fill the power vacuum outside Kabul and to counter the combined challenges of reconstituted Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, a runaway opium economy, and the stark poverty faced by most Afghans.

    Lovely! Some key recommendations, then:

    Appoint a high-level international coordinator under a UN mandate to: advise all parties to the mission in Afghanistan on needed changes to their policies, funding and actions; ensure that all international assistance programs have a coordinated strategy that aims to bolster the central government’s authority throughout the country and is closely coordinated with the Afghan government; advise on the implications to and needs for security coordination; and conduct dialogue with Afghanistan’s neighbors. Assign to this individual a joint professional staff representing a wide range of partnering countries and organizations in Afghanistan.

    (Guess we shouldn't have slammed the door in Paddy Pantsdown's face this week.)

    Work to increase the number of NATO troops and military equipment in Afghanistan to the levels requested by the commanders. Ensure that the increase in quantity of forces is matched with the quality of the forces that is needed for the mission they need to perform. We endorse the recommendation of the Iraq Study Group that “It is critical for the United States to provide additional…military support for Afghanistan, including resources that might become available as combat forces are moved from Iraq.”

    (This will not help.)

    While “zero civilian casualties” may not be an attainable goal given the nature of the enemy and the battlefield, the U.S. and NATO should, as a matter of policy, continue to publicly reinforce their goal of minimizing civilian casualties, as well as being judicious in the frequent use of air power, erring on the side of caution when civilian casualties are probable.

    (You might want to consider getting rid of Bomber McNeill if you're serious about this. By the way, readers, google "Bomber McNeill" sometime. Hilarious.)

    Embark on a sustained, long-term diplomatic effort to reduce antagonisms between Pakistan and Afghanistan. As part of that, the international community should: encourage Kabul to accept the Durand Line as the international border; work with Pakistan to make every effort to root out Taliban ideology from its own society and close down the extremist madrassahs (religious schools) and training camps that perpetuate the Taliban insurgency and cross-border activities; and encourage Pakistan to remove burdensome restrictions that inhibit the transportation of goods through Pakistan to and from Afghanistan, including from India.

    (Is that all? Shit, we would have that done by next week if you put Abu Muqawama, Kip, and Charlie in charge. But can you wait for Kip to get back from Disney World? He's kinda got his hands tied with Mr. Toad's Wild Ride at the moment.)

    The bottom line?

    The mission to stabilize Afghanistan is faltering.

    Great. Next time, tell us something we don't know. If someone can find an html link to this damn thing, let us know. We only have the pdf version.

    By the way, have you guys read this book yet?

    Abu Muqawama and his roommate are in a vicious fight over it at the moment.

    Update: Be sure to check out the debate to which you should all be paying attention right now. Hint: it doesn't involve any presidential candidates.
    Afghanistan

  • Winograd Special at Middle East Progress
    February 1, 2008 | Posted by Abu Muqawama - 4:50pm | 0 Comments
    Middle East Progress, a project of the Center for American Progress, has a special newsletter this week compiling analysis on the Winograd Commission's report into Israeli performance during the 2006 war with Hizbollah. Go to their website if you haven't quite scratched that Winograd itch.
    Hizbollah, Israel, Lebanon

  • Newsflash: Violence in Africa
    February 1, 2008 | Posted by Kip - 7:41am | 7 Comments
    Kip has long believed that the US military ignores Africa at its peril. The colonial legacies, the cornucopia of failed states, meaningless borders between countries, myriad ethnicities, little infrastructure, and large conflicts over natural resources all provide a fertile ground for us to understand 21st Century conflict.

    Yesterday, NPR ran an excellent, if very general, article on the background to what I regard as a growing insurgency in Kenya based on a fraudulent election. Kenya was, until this recent bout of violence, one of Africa's better success stories with a relatively successful and peaceful transition in 2002 to an opposition candidate Mwai Kibaki after 14 years of Presidential rule by Daniel Arap Moi.

    Africom, which Kip thinks has tremendous potential (although it has realized almost none of it), has had nothing to say regarding the recent violence or US policy in the region.

    Update: Abu Muqawama here. If any hard-core nerds out there -- and this blog is edited by three confirmed hard-core nerds in case you haven't figured that out yet -- want to read some more on Kenya, they could do much worse than to check out Colin Kahl's States, Scarcity, and Civil Strife in the Developing World. (Abu Muqawama recently became the first person to check this book out from the University of London's central library.) There is some very good stuff in there on ethnic clashes in the Rift Valley in the 1990s.
    africa, insurgency, kenya

  • Mansoor and Gentile on SWJ
    February 1, 2008 | Posted by Abu Muqawama - 6:49am | 7 Comments
    As CK and Abu Aardvark have both pointed out to your blogging team, there's a pretty heated (and intelligent) debate going down on the Small Wars Journal message boards on counterinsurgency strategy. No points for guessing who Abu Muqawama sides with in the debate between Gian Gentile and Pete Mansoor, but like we said, the debate is high quality and thought-provoking on both sides.

    Some excerpts:

    Gentile: During the year I commanded a combat battalion in West Baghdad in 2006, some of the soldiers in our outfit were wounded and some were killed, but we did not fail. In my opinion we succeeded.

    We cleaned up garbage, started to establish neighborhood security forces, rebuilt schools and killed or captured hostile insurgents, both Shiite and Sunni. Our fundamental mission was to protect the people. Other combat outfits we served alongside did the same.

    In this sense there is little difference between what American combat soldiers did in 2006 and what they are now doing as part of the "surge." The only significant change is that, as part of the surge strategy, nearly 100,000 Sunnis, many of them former insurgents, were induced to stop attacking Americans and were put on the U.S. government payroll as allies against Al Qaeda...

    Mansoor: The troops did not fail in 2006, but the strategy did. Gian Gentile is wrong when he writes about 2006, "Our fundamental mission was to protect the people." In fact, the fundamental mission in 2006 was to transition the mission to Iraqi forces. And there were not just "fewer Combat Outposts" in Iraqi neighborhoods in 2006; in fact, there were almost none.

    Gentile's troops were forced to try to protect the Iraqi people by commuting from Camp Victory and other large bases on the periphery of the city. I contend that this is the reason why the local Iraqis did not side with his battalion, or others in the city, and why were willing to side with U.S. forces in the same neighborhoods a year later. The fact is that a year after his battalion left, our troops were living among the local inhabitants, not driving by on periodic patrols. Gian Gentile and his troops may have tried to do the right things, but they could not replicate the successes of 2007 because they did not live in the neighborhoods they professed to protect. Those successes required more than a surge in forces; they required a change in our doctrine and strategy.

    Gentile: My mission was to protect the people; period!! General Casey told my Brigade commander Colonel Mike Beech shortly after the Samara shrine bombng when he gave him a combat battalion coming up from Kuwait to use it to stop the violence and protect the people. If i was not committed to protecting the people then why did my stomach get tied up in knots when dead bodies showed up on the streets?

    Mansoor: Our strategy failed in 2006, just as it failed in 2003-2004 when my brigade was stationed in Rusafa and Adhamiya (not Sadr City). I have admitted as much in a book I have written on that experience, "Baghdad at Sunrise," which will be published this fall. This statement has nothing to do with units being "goofed up." Rather, it has everything to do with strategy and doctrine. In the spring of 2004, we withdrew from our forward operating bases inside Baghdad to the super-bases on the city's periphery. The fear was that our continued presence inside Iraq's cities would cause the Iraqi people to view us as occupiers. News Flash - they already did. But by withdrawing to the large bases on the outskirts, we ceded the streets to the insurgents and militias. And I disagree with you that patrols conducted from Camp Victory are as effective as combat outposts positioned 24/7 amidst the neighborhoods of Baghdad.

    The 2006 Campaign Plan stated, "Our actions during liberation, occupation and partnership have enabled the Coalition and successive Iraqi governments to set the conditions for the stabilization of Iraq and for the transition to Iraqi self-reliance. Completing this transition during the tenure of this Consitutionally-elected government is the focus of the Campaign Plan."

    Not "a focus," Gian, but "the focus." This statement is the reason why the commander of Multi-National Force-West in Al Anbar could state publicly that he did not have enough troops to protect the people of the province, but he did have enough to accomplish his mission.

    CavGuy (to Gentile): I think you're letting your emotion get out of control. You're not the only one that has buried soldiers over there doing the best they know how. I know COL Mansoor has, I have, and several others you have passively dismissed and taken barbs at in this forum and in print. Your vitrol filled posts against those who have sought smarter ways to do this, and a doctrine more in tune with successful COIN in the past, don't do credit to yourself, your argument, or your soldiers. It really is coming across as sour grapes rather than substantive argument for the forums it’s in. We’re all fiercely proud of our units and the Soldiers who we fought, suffered, and worked beside. Mixing your policy critique with emotional bromide isn’t helping.

    One can be proud of his unit's performance and sacrifice and still be able to recognize one's shortcomings, that's why it was a learning army. 1/1 (and many others) didn't do everything perfect in OIF1, especially in the early months. I'm sure COL Mansoor would tell you the same. But they did learn, and get better, which culminated in its ability to re-take Kerbala and design a peace that has held to this day using the principles that later went into FM 3-24. Like your unit, every man of that BDE tried hard, the best they can, but sometimes it just wasn't enough.

    You know how Abu Muqawama grew interested in counterinsurgency? By being a bad, ineffective counterinsurgent on the streets of Baghdad in 2003. It's no great dishonor to admit you were part of a losing effort and then to commit yourself to doing things better the next time around.

    [Note: We've only posted excerpts of this debate. To fully consider what Gentile & Co. have to say, please go to the original thread on SWJ.]
    COIN

  • Londoners Spend More on a Month on Public Transportation Than These Guys Do on Rockets...
    February 1, 2008 | Posted by Abu Muqawama - 4:55am | 5 Comments
    It's a long journey through the pitch-dark night as the taxi heads towards the secret rocket factory in the Gaza Strip. Since Abdul and his two friends got in, it has become a life-threatening trip. The young men produce rockets for the Islamic Jihad. Day after day, their rudimentary bombs land on Israeli villages, fields and kibbutzim. Israel responds by using air strikes to kill the Qassam commandos.

    Okay, you guys know the deal: we stay out of the politics of the Israeli/Palestinian issue. But when we can find good asymmetric warfare or counterinsurgency lessons to be learned, we don't hesitate to draw those out. As such, what you'll want to note about this article in Der Speigel is the way in which a bunch of jokers with decidedly low-tech means have thrown Israel's national security community into fits of incoherence with their homemade rockets.
    Israel, Palestine

  • Waterboardin' USA
    January 31, 2008 | Posted by Abu Muqawama - 6:33pm | 0 Comments
    The number of regular Americans who have waterboarded themselves is small. Some do it out of curiosity, some as a prank. All are voluntarily experimenting with something the U.S. military – along with most human-rights organizations -- considers torture.

    Abu Muqawama favorite Yochi Dreazen has an excellent piece in the Wall Street Journal on people in the U.S. who waterboard themselves. Seriously. WTF, people.

    Alas, the WSJ password-protects all of its content. As a service to his readers, then, Abu Muqawama is extending a giant middle finger to Rupert Murdoch and re-printing Yochi Dreazen's piece, in full, in the comments section of this post.

    P.S. "Wesley Sherwood, a teenager in Knoxville, Tenn., says he and his friends decided to try it to win an online dare contest hosted by the Web site Makemeking.com." East Tennessee: Leading the nation in dumbassery since 1796...
    Tennessee, Torture

  • A Monolithic Pashtunwali?
    January 31, 2008 | Posted by Kip - 6:18pm | 5 Comments
    A quick note on the ongoing discussions about engaging the tribes in Pakistan and Afghanistan:

    Much I have seen written in the press and by military authors on the tribal code known as pashtunwali suggests some sort of monolithic code upon which we can project group behavioral expectations.

    However, pashtunwali is highly varied across Pakistan and Afghanistan and highly dependent on both tribe and location. The requirements of hospitality, the power of the tribal meetings, the empowerment of tribal militia, the extent, boundaries, and power of individual tribes (e.g., large contiguous tribal areas in the southeast versus small pockets of tribes running from Pakistan to Iran in the south and similarly dispersed tribes in the east), and the source of authority for elders (religion versus wealth versus military prowess versus hereditary) all vary.

    Few things may prove as dangerous as generalized conceptions of pashtunwali in the hands of those who establish our strategy--especially given that two recents heads of CENTCOM's tribal engagement team in Afghanistan had no background whatsoever in either tribes or Afghanistan.
    Afghanistan, pashtunwali, tribes

  • Oh, so it's okay when the Times says it?
    January 31, 2008 | Posted by Abu Muqawama - 6:17pm | 15 Comments
    Following Sec. Gates's ill-advised comments about NATO soldiers deploying to Afghanistan poorly trained for counterinsurgency, this was the lead headline in the Times of London today: Half-trained Troops to Fight the Taliban

    So maybe it wasn't the Dutch Army about which Gates was speaking.

    On the other hand, there is nothing wrong with sending half-trained troops to fight the Taliban. Taliban fighters are only half-trained as well, and so long as you value the life of a British soldier as much as you do that of a Taliban militant, no problem!
    Afghanistan, UK

  • More on McCallister and Pakistan
    January 31, 2008 | Posted by Charlie - 5:25pm | 0 Comments
    Fellow blogger Afghanistanica makes an excellent point in our comments:
    "Political and military planners must therefore take into account that the overall tribal sociopolitical blueprint and those in use by present day jihadist operating in the tribal areas are based on much older concepts of community and traditional codes of behavior."
    I'll have to disagree with McCallister on this point. The majority of the Taliban and Jihadists are radically removed from the "older concepts of community and traditional codes of behavior." Of those that aren't foreign, most are products of refugee camps that have very little resemblance to traditional village life, and their behavior reflects this. And others have used "jihad" as an excuse to overthrow or marginalize the traditional leadership.

    The traditional community is no longer able to provide economic security and meaning in an society that is increasingly resource-poor in relation to the growing population. The younger, less established guys are going to look elsewhere for status, meaning and security.

    Trying to predict behavior through the lens of traditional community and Pashtunwali requires one to see culture as static and unchanging. That is a recipe for failure.
    PS McCallister has received (taken?) most of the credit for working the tribal issue in Anbar before the surge. In actuality, the original paper, The Iraqi Insurgency Movement, published in Nov 2003 (!), had two additional authors: SGT Chris Alexander and CPT Charles Kyle. And while McCallister subsequently did yeoman's work with the Marines in Anbar for several years, the credit should probably be shared a little. (The paper, btw, is excellent.)

    (Danger Room readers: see also, Kip's thoughts on pashtunwali.)

    Update: McCallister responds.
    COIN, Iraq, Pakistan

Search