Center for a New American Security

Last night, we hosted a top secret, off-the-record, “this didn’t happen” energy event with government and private sector experts who have a broad range of energy and national security expertise. Okay, so maybe it wasn’t as top secret as we’re making it out to be given the fact that we’re touting it on the blog this morning. But for the 42 of you reading this post this morning, certainly consider yourself in the know.

What follows below are some brief thoughts on the future of the military, the Department of Defense and our energy needs. We offer these points up as some food for thought as we take a step back from the event last night and go easy on the writing this morning:

We are all here because we care about energy security – finding reliably available, affordable, and sustainable supplies sufficient to meet our demand. DOD’s energy security is a more complex concept perhaps than that of the rest of the economy: our operations depend on global supply availability, adaptability for use in multiple platforms, and infrastructure resiliency. The ability of our soldiers, sailors and Marines to do their jobs is on the line. And as we were reminded last week by the news of refined fuel being smuggled from our allies in Iraq to Iran, in defiance of new U.S. sanctions, the geopolitical impacts of our current energy system often hit U.S. security and foreign policy interests particularly hard.

In recognition of the new, thought provoking CNAS publications released yesterday ahead of our Fourth Annual Conference, the Natural Security team will be analyzing our colleagues’ work this week on the blog, providing, of course, a Natural Security spin on the reports. Today’s featured report: To Serve the Nation: U.S. Special Operations Forces in an Era of Persistent Conflict, by Michele L. Malvesti.   

“[Special Operations Forces] are in the midst of a resurgence, with their core capabilities aligning with the irregular and potentially catastrophic security threats of today’s geostrategic environment,” writes Michele L. Malvesti in her recent report, To Serve the Nation: U.S. Special Operations Forces in an Era of Persistent Conflict.

When it comes to Natural Security, it may not be obvious how natural resources issues and climate change engage Special Operations Forces (SOF), their interests and core capabilities. But as Malvesti points out in her report, “U.S. Special Operation Forces are ideally suited to help protect and advance U.S. security interests in an increasingly complex geostrategic environment,” including, perhaps, the complex challenges associated with climate change and natural resource issues.  

Take climate change in particular. We have reported here on the blog before that SOF already play a role in responding to humanitarian crises in the wake of severe natural disasters, such as tropical storms. In fact, in a previous post here, I shared a Defense Department photo of U.S. Navy SEALs providing humanitarian relief to Filipinos in the aftermath of Tropical Storm Ketsana that left nearly a half-million displaced in the Philippines last September.

• The U.S. Army awards $3.5million in contracts for energy security initiatives on installations, reports UPI.
• Check out this interesting project idea on utilizing solar energy for U.S. Coast Guard vessels on Tech Brief's design contest.
• President Obama looks to build ties with Azerbaijan, declaring "Azerbaijan's leadership in the development for a Southern Corridor for energy has also increased regional prosperity and enhanced global energy security," according to Reuters. 
• The Business Standard discusses water issues between India and Pakistan amidst the failure of last week's water dialogue between both nations.
• China has overtaken the United States in new energy investments, reports Investor's Business Daily.

We take today to remember the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces who have sacrificed their lives in service to our nation. And we thank the U.S. military men and women who, every day, continue to risk their lives to protect the United States - and their families who endure.

Photo: Flags of the U.S. Navy's Task Force Trident fly at half-mast in respect of two American and one Romanian NATO service members at Camp Mogensen at Forward Operating Base Lagman, Afghanistan on May 13, 2010. Courtesy of Chief Mass Communication Specialist Jeremy L. Wood and the U.S. Navy.

Hey all. Not too much of a blog today, as we're a little preoccupied setting up for just about the most epic event to hit D.C. since Lady Gaga was last here in September.

The Willard's sure to be packed with the 450+ who have already confirmed their attendance for the event, hope you're one of them. You're not? We can make an exception for our blog reader faithfuls. Just RSVP here and we'll make sure you get a chance to check out the event that's been a topic of discussion all around town.

Taking part in the dialogue over issues of natural security (as featured in one of our latest publications, Broadening Horizons) will be the likes of Rear Admiral Philip H. Cullom, Director of Fleet Readiness Division on the Navy Staff, David Kilcullen, President and CEO of Caerus, and CNAS' own Bob Kaplan and Christine Parthemore.

Want to know the big news? The event is going to feature a keynote address from the Honorable Carol Browner, Assistant to the President for Energy and Climate Change.

Check out some live tweeting action on the CNAS twitter page. Hope to see you there!

Of the geeky interests I pass the time with, perhaps none are as odd as my interests in reading old technical documents and outdated architecture. You can imagine the nerd-tastic joy I experienced when I discovered I could combine both those interests with my work with the natural security team, not only in the blog post to follow, but also featured in one of our upcoming reports.

While reading through the National Defense Authorization Act from this and previous years, I found that the last two have included similar requirements to examine siting nuclear reactors on military bases:

FY2010

The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study to assess the feasibility of developing nuclear power plants on military installations. . . consider the potential energy security advantages of generating electricity on military installations through the use of nuclear power plants.

FY2009

The Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report evaluating the feasibility of using military installations selected for closure under the base closure and realignment process as locations for the construction of petroleum or natural gas refineries or nuclear power plants.

Looking back into our fragmented memory hard drives, we all seemed to remember there having been a time when the DOD had dabbled in nuclear power at its facilities. With the standards for research support being set slightly higher than simply taking our word for it, I checked back to see what all was out there.

As it turns out, not only did the Department toy with the idea of nuclear power, it had an entire Army program giving it a go -- the Army Nuclear Power Program (ANPP).

Yesterday we released the third installment of our Promoting the Dialogue series on how climate change may affect DOD missions, equipment and capabilities. We’ve focused the resulting writings on ground, air and maritime forces, COCOMs, and the QDR and strategic planning processes. The most recent piece covers the ground forces, which for the purpose of this paper (and regardless of precision) includes the Army, Marine Corps and National Guard.

I will admit that one of the driving themes in my mind as I wrote this paper was the increasing frequency with which commentators are putting forth this answer to the question of how climate change will affect the U.S. ground forces: it will drive an increase in terrorism.

Now, I’m no terrorism expert, but you can’t hang out at CNAS and not at least understand the basics, even if it’s just by osmosis. I think that the leap to stating that it will directly drive an increase in terrorism is a bit of a distraction (and note that this suggestion often specifies Islamic extremism-based terrorism, not the Midwestern kind that seems to have been taking place in my hometown lately). I’m not saying that I fully understand the dynamics of what this linkage could be, but I do know enough to know that it would be complex and take a great deal of study to determine. Meanwhile, there may be more direct linkages between climate change and security challenges that are more important to focus our research efforts toward.

Yesterday I made the journey over to the Hill to check out an interesting hearing for the House Armed Services Committee Readiness Subcommittee over energy management and initiatives on military installations. The hearing, overseen by Chairman Solomon Ortiz (D-TX), heard the testimony of four Defense Department officials: Dr. Dorothy Robyn, Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment; Mr. L. Jerry Hansen, Army Senior Energy Executive; Mr. Roger M. Natsuhara, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Environment; and Mrs. Debra K. Tune, Performing the Duties of Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations, Environment and Logistics.

The opening testimonies from the four defense representatives can be accessed here: DOD; Army; Navy and Air Force. The hearing can be viewed here.

Rep. Ortiz started on two colossal renewable energy projects that the military services have undertaken, at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada and Fort Irwin, California. Despite his evident pride in renewable projects such as this, the initial concern of the hearing was how these and other energy initiatives have the potential to affect DOD operations and readiness negatively. Specifically, he cited the potential for wind farms and solar arrays to disrupt military training and radar, weakening both in-theater and homeland effectiveness.  Each witness named this as a potential concern in their respective testimonies, which prompted Ortiz to inquire as to any established basis of information or study to support these concerns. Dr. Robyn noted that, to her knowledge, no projects have gone forward that have created any such problems.  Natsuhara followed later with a reasonable statement what concerns them most is what is not known about the effects of most projects, but none of the panelists were able to offer any data supporting, or disproving, the concern for radar disruption.

At the risk of having this new feature labeled a complete cliché, I will save you the overly used George Santayana quote, and simply state that sometimes it is pertinent to look back, in order to better assess the present. Though “natural security” as a study, like your four-year-old niece, can still count its age on one hand, in practice it has been a timeless and vital key to the success of empires, war machines, revolutions and development—for those that understood its pivotal role. In this new blog feature, I’ll be sifting through the pages of the great war “how-tos”—from Sun Tzu's The Art of War to today’s feature, U.S. Army FM 3-24, a.k.a., “The Counterinsurgency Manual”— looking back to see what role natural security held in conflicts contemporary to the manual, and what its words of natural security wisdom hold in current engagements.

The COIN Manual was drafted at a time that the U.S. military had found itself in a war it had not entirely planned for, and whose outlook seemed to grow more grim every day. The United States had not exactly come with a knife to a gun fight, but in a sense had walked into a swarm of bees after gearing up to slay a dragon. The U.S. armed forces were prepared to fight a conventional war, but found that the game had changed since they last took a stroll through Baghdad’s front gate. It was time for a reassessment, the Army dug into working on it, and thus in 2006, U.S. Army FM 3-24 was born.

The manual gave a new hope for success in Iraq, as it won hearts and minds within DOD with its heightened focus on the Iraqi people and the cancerous roots of insurgency. Though penned years before the launch of natural security here at CNAS, the manual included important natural security-relevant mentions:

• “In Iraq, for example, an issue that motivated fighters in some Baghdad neighborhoods in 2004 was lack of adequate sewer, water, electricity, and trash services.”
• “The stability a nation enjoys is often related to its people’s economic situation and its adherence to the rule of law. . . In a rural society, land ownership and the availability of agricultural equipment, seed, and fertilizer may be the chief parts of any economic development plan.” 
• “. . .failed and failing states with rich natural resources like oil or poppies (which provide the basis for heroin) are particularly lucrative areas for criminal activity.”

Currently, the Obama administration’s 2010 3D Afghanistan strategy boasts a COIN approach which prominently features coordinated agricultural efforts between the military and USAID, water and energy projects, and additional natural security-esque initiatives supported by the COIN Manual's guidance. Having risen from the ashes of earlier failures only to help guide the current U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, the COIN Manual was as much a product of its environment, as it has now made the environment a product of itself.

Yesterday was full of fun with the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the FY2011 budget. Here are the natural security-related exchanges from the transcript, beginning with Secretary Gates confirming that DOD is indeed working on alternative energy:

Senator Begich (D-Alaska): I'm trying to rapid-fire these, knowing my time is limited. Do you still -- in your DOD presentation of the budget, do you still have a very robust -- another issue separate -- alternative renewable energy program?  I know that's been a big plus, to be very frank with you, with the military. You have been leaders in this area.  Are you still fairly in your mind aggressive in this arena?  

Sec. Gates:  Yes.  

*            *            *
In this line of inquiry, Senator Jeff Sessions seems quite concerned with fuel costs. Rather than drilling Admiral Mullen on this point, he could refer to page 87 of the QDR, which states that “DoD must integrate geostrategic and operational energy considerations into force planning, requirements development, and axquisition processes. To address these challenges, DoD will fully implement the statutory requirement for the energy efficiency Key Performance Parameter and fully burdened cost of fuel…”

Senator Sessions (R-Alabama):  With regard to our procurement of major weapons systems, I know that the Department of Defense, Admiral Mullen, has focused on life- cycle cost. And I guess you would agree that things such as fuel and maintenance are important factors to evaluate if you're going to evaluate the cost of a weapons systems over a period of years.

Adm. Mullen:  Yes, sir.  

Senator Sessions:  I know we did that on the tanker aircraft, and in fact, fuel and that sort of things are counted as evaluating that aircraft. Are you -- should that be applied to a procurement program like the Littoral Combat Ship, that the cost of fuel over its lifespan, should that be accounted for?

Adm. Mullen:  I've long been concerned about lifecycle costs; I think, Senator Sessions, you know that, long before now.  And the secretary pointed out, and I think very importantly, in his opening statement, that the programs that he cut last year actually had some lifecycle value, focused on about $330 billion.  As far as what's in an RFP and what it's going to be focused on, that's something that I really can't comment on if that RFP is --

Senator Sessions:  Well, I don't know, we've got our RFP in the Littoral Combat Ship that I'm told does not have factor for fuel costs.

Adm. Mullen:  But you know more about it than I do.  I haven't seen it.

Senator Sessions:  Well, if that's so, would you be willing to look at it and ask questions, if that's a wise decision?

Adm. Mullen:  Again, I've -- as I've said, I've been -- long time I've been concerned about lifecycle costs.  Actually, one of the, I think, weaknesses of the acquisitions system is typically the line is not involved in it.  The uniform side is not involved in it.  So I'm not involved from that -- from that point of view --