Center for a New American Security

World Politics Review: Strategy for the Next American President: An Interview with Ivo Daalder and Bruce Jentleson

Thu, 24 Jul 2008 14:00:00 GMT

Strategy for the Next American President: An Interview with Ivo Daalder and Bruce Jentleson

Media: World Politics Review
Author: The Editors
Date: July 24, 2008

Today, the Center for a New American Security releases a report, "Strategic Leadership: Framework for a 21st Century National Security Strategy," that sketches the broad outlines of a recommended U.S. national security strategy for the next president of the United States. The centrist but Democratic-leaning CNAS, founded by two former senior staffers of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, has existed for a little more than a year. But the report grew out of a project known as the Phoenix Initiative, which according to CNAS began three years ago as a collective effort of a number of U.S. foreign policy experts to develop a policy-focused framework for "advancing America's interests and values" in the world. The report's authors, which include 10 eminent scholars and experts on U.S. foreign policy, start from a position of opposition to many of the policies of the Bush administration, and from the assumption that "now, more than at any time since the late 1940s, it is vital to chart a new direction for America's global role."

World Politics Review asked two of the report's co-authors -- Ivo Daalder and Bruce Jentleson -- to answer questions via e-mail about the report, and they graciously agreed. Ivo Daalder was the director for European Affairs on the National Security Council during the Clinton Administration and is now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Among other books, he is the author, with James Lindsay, of "America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy." Bruce Jentleson is a professor of public policy studies and political science at Duke University. His latest book is "American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century."

World Politics Review: The report indicates that the goal of the Phoenix Initiative is to "marshal the best practices and ideas of the progressive tradition in U.S. foreign policy and adapt them to a changing world." How would you describe the "progressive tradition" in U.S. foreign policy?

Ivo Daalder and Bruce Jentleson: Progressive ideas are as old as our Republic. The American Revolution was founded on the fundamental principle that all people are created equal and enjoy certain unalienable rights -- among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Our government was founded to secure and protect these rights -- for every American. Our greatest leaders -- from Jefferson to Wilson to Truman to Kennedy -- have believed that the only true way to secure these fundamental rights for Americans is to advance them for others as well. American democracy would be more secure if others in the world could live in liberty and within democratic societies. American security would be enhanced if others were secure. American prosperity would expand if others were prosperous. Most Americans would accept this insight -- where they may differ is in how to bring it about. Progressives believe that America has no monopoly on wisdom, and that none of our essential goals can be achieved on our own. America needs the cooperation of others, it needs to work within institutions and organizations not only to advance our interests and perspectives but those of others as well. And while force has a role to play in defending our interests against attack, it is not the preferred instrument for advancing any of our objectives overseas.

WPR: The report emphasizes the need for "strategic leadership" in formulating a U.S. foreign policy for the new global landscape. Is the kind of long-term thinking required of strategic leaders possible in a four- or eight-year administration, and how can strategic continuity be maintained in our democracy?

I.D. & B.J.: In the early days of the emerging Cold War, Dean Acheson described the mindset among those that shaped American foreign policy as "to look ahead, not into the distant future, but beyond the vision of the operating officers caught in the smoke and crises of current battle; far enough ahead to see the emerging form of things to come and outline what should be done to meet or anticipate them." We did it in that time of global transition; we can and need to do it again amidst these times of transition.

WPR: The new security environment, according to the report, is characterized by both an increasingly interconnected world and the diffusion of power "within, between and beyond states." Is U.S. power destined to decline relative to other states (and non-state actors) in this new security environment? Or, can the United States sufficiently retool its instruments of national power such that its relative decline can be halted or even reversed?

I.D. & B.J.: Our focus is less on who has how much power than how international peace and prosperity can best be achieved in a 21st century world. Clearly, others are gaining power -- China and India are rising; Brazil and South Africa are becoming more pivotal players in their regions and beyond; new actors -- neither states nor sovereign, yet truly powerful nonetheless -- are emerging, be they global NGOs, companies, crime syndicates, or terrorists networks. But America remains powerful -- more powerful than any other country -- and it is destined to be such for many years to come. Of course, its relative influence will wax and wane; and the degree of effectiveness depends importantly on what it does, both at home and abroad. A sound economy, a strong, educated workforce, a sustainable infrastructure, a superb and rapidly deployable military, nimble statecraft, a concern for the interests and perspective of others -- all these will help America to remain powerful and influential in a world of where power is diffusing.

WPR: The section of the report on "exercising strong statecraft" seems to focus heavily on traditional diplomacy to the exclusion of other (non-military) instruments of statecraft. Is this emphasis a function of what you see as the current administration's relative neglect of diplomacy, or should it be read as a statement about the superior merits of traditional diplomacy in general? What role should other instruments of soft power or so-called "smart power" play in future U.S. strategy?

I.D. & B.J.: Our report does seek to redress the imbalance between force and diplomacy that has prevailed in the current administration. But we by no means are confined to what you call "traditional diplomacy." In the section on statecraft we speak of "an array of instruments and strategies." The sections on enhancing prosperity and development and encouraging democracy and human rights encompass many aspects of what often gets referred to as soft power, smart power and by other conceptualizations. The diffusion of power we speak of at the outset is not just among states but also stressing the role of NGOs and other non-state actors.

WPR: In the section on 21st century military strength, the report states that "the Bush administration confused the need to adapt deterrence to post-9/11 strategic conditions with claims of inapplicability." What would "a deterrence strategy adapted to the nature of the threat" look like? Given the gap between the U.S. military's current capabilities and those required for such missions as counterterrorism, what demands would adapting deterrence to the 21st century security environment make on already strained military budgets?

I.D. & B.J.: The broad answer starts with recalling that deterrence always has needed to be adapted to the nature of threats. It took one form before the Cold War and the nuclear age, and other forms during that period. While well short of a fully fleshed out strategy -- this report is intended as a framework not an operational plan -- our section on counterterrorism (pp. 20-22) does provide some key parameters. As to the budgetary implications, part of the answer of course is effective deterrence can avert much larger costs from threats escalating and conflict and war breaking out. The other part is that priorities would need to be set both within the defense budget for adapting military doctrine, weaponry and force structure to the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency mission, and across all national security areas broadly conceived: see, e.g., Defense Secretary Gates' speech at Kansas State University last November for a start on this.

WPR: The report calls for making global poverty reduction a priority in U.S. national security strategy, and specifically calls for deploying "foreign aid as a key instrument of U.S. soft power." Given the need to, as the report says, draw on the lessons of recent history about how to make foreign aid more effective, to what extent should U.S. development efforts be subject to practical considerations about the likelihood of success? Is there a danger of overreach when it comes to what Walter McDougall has called "global meliorism"?

I.D. & B.J.: A key essence of strategic leadership is to understand that America isn't omnipotent -- that it cannot do everything it wants or even all that much on its own. It needs to use its leadership -- and its power -- strategically, deploy it in a way that enables others to do more in support of common interests. Nowhere is this more clearly the case then when it comes to states in need. Foreign assistance and financial aid can help give countries a leg up, create the opportunities they need to become stable, functioning, and contributing members of the international society of states. A small initial investment can have a large, lasting payoff.

WPR: The report states that "the United States must adopt an expanded view of democracy that goes beyond the promotion of individual liberties and national elections to encompass the indigenous development of political institutions such as an independent media, and independent judicial system, a robust civil society and a competitive party system." Is such state-building best accomplished with a U.S. presence on the ground, or from a distance, through proxies? Is there a need for some kind of new "state-building" bureaucracy or agency?

I.D. & B.J.: By its very nature, democracy cannot be imposed from the outside. Every state is in one stage or another of building a viable, stable, strong form of democratic government -- including the United States of America itself. And every state can sometimes use a helping hand -- be it assistance, direct participation, or just the force of example. Strong, capable states like the advanced democracies in Europe, Asia, and the Americas, including ours, will need less help and can offer more direct assistance to those in a different stage of state-building. When desired by the local population, this can involve a direct, on-the-ground presence; but often it will be more temporary and done from a distance.

WPR: What role does culture play in encouraging democracy and human rights? Are some societies better culturally equipped to embrace liberal norms than others?

I.D. & B.J.: There is universality in the core principles and practices of democracy as well as variations based on history, culture and other factors that shape societies. History and culture do make for different paths and different paces, but ultimately all peoples expect their political systems to be by, of and for the people -- as we say in the report, popular, accountable and rights-regarding.

WPR: The report speaks of spurring U.S. innovation in green technologies and reducing oil consumption. How does U.S. dependence on foreign oil affect U.S. national security? Is U.S. energy independence a realistic goal, or should we be focused on facilitating the proper kind of energy interdependence?

I.D. & B.J.: Foreign oil dependence makes for a three-way negative synergy: states that are among those that threaten our security get enriched; global warming and other aspects of the environmental crisis that pose their own threat to our security get worsened; and we self-inflict greater indebtedness and economic insecurity. While it's misleading to talk about energy independence in an inherently interdependent world, we can and should make it a major priority to reduce our oil dependence and overall energy vulnerability.

WPR: Beyond the Middle East and East Asia, which are the two regions included among the five strategic priorities listed in the report -- the other three priorities being counterterrorism, nuclear nonproliferation, and climate change and oil dependence -- are there other areas of the world that are in need of greater U.S. foreign policy focus?

I.D. & B.J.: We believe our five strategic priorities meet the three criteria we set out in the report: the urgency of the issue; its importance to U.S. national security and the global good; and the transformational potential of successful policy outcomes. Setting priorities doesn't mean neglecting other issues or regions; it means being clear where the attention and resources and energy must be directed first. A full national security strategy as developed when we have a new administration of course will have to address the full range of issues.

24-Jul-08 10:00 AM

Boston Globe Op-ed: America's new global challenge

Thu, 24 Jul 2008 14:00:00 GMT

Op-ed: America's new global challenge
Media: Boston Globe
Authors: Ivo Daalder and Anne-Marie Slaughter
Date: July 24, 2008

AS BARACK OBAMA travels abroad this week, he is finding a world that still wants America to be engaged, but no longer necessarily waits for America to take the lead. The challenge for the next president is to understand how much has changed and how America can best pursue its national interests in such a different international environment.

It isn't just the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that have changed the world, nor other aspects of the Bush legacy that have weakened America's power and position. The world itself has changed. Ours is the era of global interconnectedness. The fate of the average American is increasingly connected to the fate of people around the world creating unparalleled opportunities but also great dangers from which no nation can be immune. Ours is also an era of increasingly diffuse power, as more powers rise to demand influence and a say over global affairs and more actors of many different kinds affect the course of global politics.

Such a world requires a new kind of leadership - one that is clear on how, when, and with whom America leads. Call it strategic leadership. A leadership that understands that while much of the world still believes that international peace and prosperity are most likely to be achieved if Washington plays a significant and constructive role, key actors no longer simply defer to or automatically prefer what America wants. A leadership that focuses on effective action rather than who is in the lead. A leadership that relies on clear judgment as much as demonstrating resolve. A leadership that grasps that however great our power, America cannot meet today's challenges all on its own.

Strategic leadership requires a commitment to statecraft as both an alternative and a complement to military force. Although diplomacy has its limitations, US strategic interests are often best served by leveraging its potential for enhancing security, reducing tensions, resolving conflicts, achieving peace, and transforming adversarial relationships.

With regard to nuclear proliferation, for instance, the best hope lies not in striking possible proliferators, but in working with countries around the world to renew the essential bargain at the core of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. On this issue, America will have to lead, by reducing reliance on nuclear weapons and committing to seeking a world free of nuclear weapons. Only then can it convince others to do likewise and gain the benefits of nuclear power without risking wider proliferation of nuclear weapons and capabilities.

Strategic leadership demands a strong military, but also the wisdom to know when and how to employ it. For example, US withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq cannot be a military withdrawal from the region. A regional military posture that deters adversaries and reassures allies must remain in place. The conflict in Afghanistan must get greater priority. But so too must diplomatic initiatives. Militarily and diplomatically, the United States needs regional and European partners to do their part. America should take the lead where it can play the most constructive role and support others when their roles are most promising.

Strategic leadership also requires that the United States work to ensure that all the relevant actors have a seat at the table. Take climate change. America must go from laggard to leader both in domestic energy and environmental policies and as a global leader in development of emissions standards that are fair and viable.

The United States is late to this party, so it will not be easy to convince all the important actors - not least China and India - that they, too, will have to be part of any solution. But in both doing its own part and being open to others also playing leading roles in forging common solutions, America has much more credibility in pressing others to do their part.

Strategic leadership applies to other policy priorities, including enhancing prosperity and development, encouraging democracy and human rights, and reshaping relations in East Asia.

These are detailed in our new report, which we and our fellow members of the Phoenix Initiative released today (cnas.org/phoenixinitiative).

The essential objective of strategic leadership is to achieve the same goals envisioned by the Founders: a nation that would secure life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness for all Americans. In this interconnected world, doing so depends increasingly on helping others to secure the same goals.

The doctrine of strategic leadership shows us how, together with our partners and friends around the world, we can create a better, more secure, and prosperous world for all.

Ivo Daalder, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Bruce Jentleson (a co-author) are members of the Phoenix Initiative.

24-Jul-08 10:00 AM

USA Today: Advisers may face long stay in Iraq

Wed, 23 Jul 2008 18:00:00 GMT

Advisers may face long stay in Iraq

Media: USA Today
Author: Charles Levinson
Date: July 21, 2008

Can Iraqi troops fight and win on their own? That question has become even more urgent after President Bush, Democratic presidential candidate Sen. Barack Obama and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki all spoke in recent days about setting either vague or specific time frames for withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraq.

Recent evidence suggests that although the Iraqi military has made enormous progress, it is still dependent on small teams of American advisers who can rein in overly aggressive Iraqi commanders, call in U.S. airstrikes and help coordinate basic supplies such as food, rifle-cleaning kits and even printer cartridges.

The advisers could remain on the ground in Iraq long after most U.S. combat troops have left. Col. John Nagl, who resigned last month as commander of the Armys school for military advisers, said they are the key to our exit strategy in Iraq. A prime example: a battle in March that has become known as the Gates of Basra. In that firefight, a battalion of 250 Iraqi soldiers had been ambushed during a broad offensive to retake Basra, Iraqs second-biggest city, from Shiite militants. Facing a barrage of mortars and gunfire from all sides, the Iraqi troops took refuge in an abandoned police station and called U.S. advisers for help. The Iraqi forces were pinned in the compound, said Maj. Tim Bleidstel, one of eight Marines who responded to the call. No one could get out. The team of Marines rushed to the scene in two Humvees. Using surveillance photos, they were able to pin down the exact location of the militia mortar teams and snipers. Minutes later, F-18s buzzed overhead, strafing their targets and silencing the enemy fire.

That allowed Iraqi commanders to venture out and negotiate a deal with local tribal leaders. The following day, Iraqi soldiers and their U.S. advisers watched as tribesmen beat back the militias in a six-hour gun battle that raged until sunset, said Lt. Col. Chuck Western, another of the advisers present. Our presence and the air cover we provided got the militia off the Iraqi commanders back just enough to allow him to engage the people in the area, and he convinced them to turn on the militias, Western said. Western said the episode was a turning point in the broader battle for Basra, which the Iraqi government has hailed as a landmark, coming-of-age victory for the countrys military. After establishing control of the city and its crucial oil fields, Iraqs military began offensives against militants in Amarrah, Mosul and the Baghdad neighborhood of Sadr City.

It is those military victories, and the political clout that came with them, that have emboldened al-Maliki to press Bush for a timetable for U.S. troop withdrawals. Yet al-Maliki and his top aides have been careful to say they want U.S. combat troops to depart, leaving the door open for advisers to stay indefinitely.

Sami al-Askary, one of al-Malikis closest advisers, said in a recent interview with USA Today that U.S. soldiers should pull back to a supporting role. Army Gen. David Petraeus, the U.S. commander in Iraq, said last fall that adviser teams probably will be the backbone of the U.S. presence there in the years to come.

Such a shift could have long-term benefits for both parties. If the U.S. military shifted to an advisory role in Iraq, as many as 100,000 troops could be brought home, according to a study published last year by the Center for a New American Security, a Washington-based think tank. Iraqs military would have more time to address its shortcomings. A June report by the Government Accountability Office said only 10 percent of Iraqi units are capable of fighting without U.S. assistance.

The lone Iraqi division in Basra that had no U.S. advisers crumbled as soon as the battle started. An entire brigade of the 14th Division dissolved after 1,500 soldiers turned over weapons, vehicles and uniforms to the militias, according to Iraqi Brig. Gen. Baha Hussein Abed.

There are some questions about whether the U.S. military devotes enough resources to the adviser teams which often operate in primitive conditions hundreds of miles away from the nearest U.S. base.

Last month in Basra, the Marine advisers were showering by pouring bottles of water over their heads. Electricity generators flickered on and off. Maj. Frank Shelton said that, nearly three months after rushing to the aid of the Iraqi troops, his unit still lacked basic life support equipment. Similar difficulties have surfaced elsewhere. In Amarrah, a team of U.S. advisers to the Iraqi National Police was forced to operate without a promised support battalion. The support arrived days later. The advisers drove three hours each way to refuel their Humvees and relied on Iraqis for hot meals. If anyone gets hurt, its going to be a long wait for a medevac, Col. David Boslego, the commander of the advisers in Amarrah, cautioned before one patrol.

Nagl, formerly the head of the Armys adviser school, said the military must find a way to continue providing air support and quick-reaction forces to advisers. That could be difficult since the U.S. reduced troop levels as last years troop escalation drew to an end. The military needs to put their money where their mouth is, said Erin Simpson, a professor at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College in Quantico, Va. Bolstering the advisers effectiveness is the most important mission of the operation in Iraq, and we need to start acting like it.

23-Jul-08 2:00 PM

Army Times: Iraq approach likely in Afghanistan

Wed, 23 Jul 2008 18:00:00 GMT

Iraq approach likely in Afghanistan

Media: Army Times
Author: Sean D. Naylor
Date: July 23, 2008

An adviser to incoming U.S. Central Command boss Gen. David Petraeus predicts that the general will seek to re-create his Iraqi success in Afghanistan, using many of the same methods that appear to have turned the tide in Iraq over the last 18 months.

“It can be safely assumed that he will apply many of the lessons learned from Iraq to what has until recently been a forgotten war” in Afghanistan, retired Lt. Col. John Nagl told a packed audience at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., on Tuesday. Nagl, who retired this year to become a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, was speaking as part of a panel on “Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare,” held to promote a book of the same name edited by two of the other panelists, Daniel Marston, a research fellow at the Strategic and Defense Studies Center at the Australian National University, and Carter Malkasian, director of the Center for Naval Analyses’ Stability and Development Program.

Nagl, who is headed to Iraq July 25 to advise Petraeus and who co-authored the Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual produced under the guidance of Petraeus when the latter commanded the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., highlighted one lesson in particular from Iraq: “Foreign powers cannot win counterinsurgency campaigns, but they can enable and empower host nation governments to do so, and one of the most important tools they have to accomplish this task is the use of combat advisers.”

With that in mind, he said, “perhaps the single most pressing need is for a larger Afghan National Army and police force, and additional American and allied advisers to help them fight our common enemies.”

Malkasian also focused on the important role played by “police and other community self-defense forces” in quelling the violence in Iraq, particularly in the Sunni areas. “The thing that made them more effective than anything else … was their ability to collect intelligence,” he said, adding that by late 2006 police and community self-defense forces in the Sunni areas “were capturing and killing twice as many insurgents per policeman as their counterpart was in the Iraqi army.”

However, he said, Afghans are still waiting for a similar model to be implemented in their country.

“The lessons of Iraq have not fully been transferred over to Afghanistan to learn how to do this the right way,” Malkasian said.

“The ANP [Afghan National Police] … have potential, a potential that has not been exploited,” he continued, noting that the Afghan government and coalition governments had capped ANP strength at 82,000 police. “Even combined with the ANA [Afghan National Army], which is projected to be 86,000 people, that is not enough to protect a population of 33 million.”

23-Jul-08 2:00 PM

McClatchy Newspapers: U.S. military advisers say they're treated as misfits

Wed, 23 Jul 2008 18:00:00 GMT

U.S. military advisers say they're treated as misfits

Media: McClatchy Newspapers
Author: Nancy A. Youssef
Date: July 22, 2008

FORT RILEY, Kan. — Standing next to a screen illuminating a long list of tips, Maj. Anthony Nichols looked out at the classroom of neophyte military trainers and began a lecture about the ways that fellow soldiers will look down at them while they serve in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Other soldiers will call them "undesirables," sent in because they had no other place on the battlefield, the instructor said. Some units will kick military advisers out of security briefings. One recommendation: to "patch swap," carry alternative military insignia for their uniforms so they can pretend to be members of other units. It will help them get supplies and equipment more easily. Or at least more respect.

"I came armed with a stack of patches. . . . Who am I going to be today?" Nichols said about his time in Iraq.

Nichols' depiction is in stark contradiction with Pentagon rhetoric. Top Pentagon officials say that developing a new corps of military advisers is a priority as part of the new emphasis on counterinsurgency. But the military, which continues to use the Army Special Forces to train foreign troops for combat in Iraq and elsewhere, hasn't fully embraced the program to train trainers in counterinsurgency.

At Fort Riley, former military advisers are building the curriculum ad hoc, and their place in the military's pecking order is ambiguous. Advisers don't get promoted as fast as their combat counterparts do, according to soldiers at Fort Riley. And the work of advisers in the field depends on the will of the brigade commander who's securing the area, they say.

Resolving the role of advisers has never been timelier. The U.S. military is considering a drawdown in Iraq. As brigades leave, advisers will stay behind to deter corruption and abuse among the Iraqi forces, track weapons confiscated by Iraqi soldiers and monitor the state of the local forces.

Troops in Afghanistan are stretched thin, and military advisers often are the sole presence in isolated communities. Adm. Michael Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has said that the military needs at least 3,000 more advisers there. Last year, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called training Afghan security forces "arguably the most important military component."

In Iraq, trained advisers are serving with Iraqi combat brigades. As the Iraqi forces are increasingly capable, traditional U.S. brigades are supporting their Iraqi counterparts and monitoring how they take the lead. American soldiers who came expecting combat are watching their Iraqi counterparts take charge. At one base in the southern city of Amara, a U.S. soldier told McClatchy, speaking on condition of anonymity in order to talk candidly: "I keep looking around, wondering what I am supposed to be doing here."

Regardless, there's a pushback throughout the ranks from those who think that the next wars won't demand such cerebral officers, Nichols said. The Army should train to kill enemies, not train large militaries. That job should stay with the special forces, soldiers often complain.

One soldier returning to Fort Riley from a yearlong rotation in Iraq's restive Diyala province told McClatchy of his experience: "I didn't join the Army to be an adviser." He asked not to be identified so that he could speak about his experiences without fear of retribution.

At Fort Riley, some of the Army's best-known innovators are fighting for the advising program. Retired Lt. Col. John Nagl, who helped craft the counterinsurgency manual with current Iraq commander Gen. David Petraeus, has proposed that the military develop a permanent 20,000-member "advisory corps."

Here, soldiers who worked as advisers in Iraq and Afghanistan have developed an in-depth training program. Soldiers learn basic Arabic or Dari — one of the Afghan languages — along with the fundamental tenets of Islam and cultural norms of Iraqis and Afghans. Near the end of two months of training, they're sent to a mock town, where native Iraqi and Dari speakers pose as residents and local forces and test the U.S. soldiers on what they've learned.

Col. Jeffrey Ingram, the commander here, has been building the military adviser training program since 2006. Before that, soldiers such as Nichols learned on the job.

In his office, among books such as "Islam for Dummies" and the Quran, Nichols keeps a photo of Col. Yahya Hameed al Zubaidi, an Iraqi police officer he was training near the Syrian border in 2006. Nichols is convinced that tribal leaders killed Zubaidi because the police commander didn't include them enough in his security efforts.

Nichols said that had he known the importance of the tribal system to Iraqis, he would've encouraged officers such as Zubaidi to reach out more.

"He represents the effect you are having on your counterparts," Nichols said, holding the flier that announced the colonel's death. "We push them very hard, and they become vulnerable. I could have been a better transition leader if I had known that then."

Fort Riley trains roughly 40 percent of Army, Navy and Air Force military advisers, and the rest train with their units. Marines train their troops at Twentynine Palms, their base near San Diego. The Army training center is scheduled to move to Fort Polk, La., sometime next year.

Trainers are slowly getting respect. Last month, Gen. George Casey, the Army chief of staff, said that advisory work by senior officers would be taken into account at promotion boards. The test, Ingram said, is if the promotions come through.

23-Jul-08 2:00 PM

The New Republic: What Does Karadzic's Capture Mean?

Wed, 23 Jul 2008 17:00:00 GMT

What Does Karadzic's Capture Mean?

Media: The New Republic
Author: Derek Chollet
Date: July 23, 2008

After Radovan Karadzic's capture earlier this week, we asked Derek Chollet--who worked with Richard Holbrooke on a book about the Dayton Accords and is also a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and co-author of America Between the Wars--to assess the fallout. Here are his thoughts:

Seeing the pictures of the former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, with the mane of white hair and enormous beard, one could easily mistake him for some over-the-hill hippie, not the "Himmler of his generation," as a top American diplomat once described him. What's remarkable is how ordinary his life had become, and how public he remained--treating patients in alternative medicines, publishing poetry, speaking at conferences, all under an alias. For years most Balkan watchers believed that Karadzic was hidden in some remote monastery in the hills of his native Montenegro, while it was his henchman, Ratko Mladic, who was supposedly hiding in downtown Belgrade. Earlier this year, I met with several senior Serbian government officials who promised that Karadzic was "somewhere in the hills," while he in fact he was living right under their noses.

Karadzic's capture is a major event for the Balkans--seeing him behind bars, and watching his upcoming trial unfold at The Hague, will be an important step in healing the wounds created by the Bosnia War. For the relatives and loved ones of the thousands who were massacred in Srebrenica in July 1995 (when Karadzic issued the stunning order to "kill all the men"), or for those living in Sarajevo besieged by Serb artillery and snipers while Karadzic watched from the mountains, this will be justice delivered. For the Serbs throughout the former Yugoslavia, in Bosnia and Serbia, it will be a moment to confront a difficult and painful past. For the Serbian government in Belgrade, which aspires to be closer to Europe, this is an important step in getting it there (but the process cannot be complete until Mladic is behind bars as well).

This is also good news for the United States. It is easy to forget that in the months after the Dayton accords brought peace to Bosnia, American-led NATO troops refused to arrest Karadzic for fear of sparking violence--even as he drove through NATO checkpoints. But since then, U.S. diplomats made Karadzic's capture a major priority in America's relations with Serbia, so they too deserve credit for keeping up the heat.

Finally, the coincidence of Karadzic's arrest with the most hyped event in U.S.-European relations in quite some time--Barack Obama's visit to Europe this week--reminds us of the lessons of the Balkan Wars of the 1990s. Then, America and Europe failed because we did not take action against the likes of Karadzic until the bloodshed had spun out of control. We did not work together, and it almost brought down the relationship just years after the Cold War victory. Eventually the U.S. did take charge, using tough diplomacy and military force to end the Bosnia war, sparking the chain of events that sent Karadzic into his hirsute glory and a new career in alternative medicine, and now to jail. The lesson for today is one that I believe Obama understands: that American power can be a force for good--and that not using it often gives a free pass to evil.

--Derek Chollet

23-Jul-08 1:00 PM

Reuters: America, Iran and faulty intelligence

Wed, 23 Jul 2008 17:00:00 GMT

America, Iran and faulty intelligence

Media: Reuters
Author: Bernd Debusmann
Date: July 23, 2008

WASHINGTON, July 23 (Reuters) - "Iran is not in a revolutionary or even pre-revolutionary stage."

That was the assessment of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in August 1978, at a time when Iran's ruler was America's closest ally in the Middle East. The Defense Intelligence Agency, a month later, predicted that the Shah of Iran, "is expected to remain actively involved in power over the next 10 years."

Famous last words. The Shah fled into exile four months later, forced out by increasingly violent demonstrations against his autocratic rule. An estimated 6 million people massed in Tehran to greet the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the elderly cleric who had rallied opposition against the Shah, on his triumphant return from exile in February 1979.

Later that year, Iranian students stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran, beginning a 444-day crisis in which 52 Americans were held hostage. Washington broke off diplomatic relations in 1980, and they have yet to be restored.

If U.S. intelligence on Iran was bad in the 1970s, when the United States had a sizable embassy and officials could move freely around the country, how is it now, after 28 years without official contacts and no American presence on the ground? Just as bad? Very bad? Barely there?

To hear U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice tell it: "You ... never know what you don't know, particularly in a fairly opaque place like Iran. And you would be surprised what it does to both your diplomatic and intelligence capability to not be in the country ... We don't really have very good veracity or a feel for the place."

That was Rice's assessment after an unsuccessful attempt in 2006 to open talks with Iran on its nuclear program. The U.S. condition: Iran must stop enriching uranium, a process that can be used for generating electricity, the purpose claimed by Iran, or nuclear weapons, which the United States and its Western allies say is the point of the enrichment. Iran rejected the precondition. It denies it wants a bomb and says it has the right to enrich uranium under the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, or NPT.

Last weekend, to no one's surprise, the Iranians again refused to stop their enrichment centrifuges at talks in Geneva that brought together envoys from Iran, the European Union, Russia, China, France, Britain, Germany and -- for the first time -- a senior U.S. diplomat, William Burns.

Burns ranks third in the State Department's hierarchy and his presence was a policy U-turn after years of shunning direct contact with Iran, a country President George W. Bush has branded part of an "axis of evil."

DIPLOMATIC EXCUSE FOR MILITARY STRIKE?

Did Washington expect that the attendance of Burns, without a change in the U.S. and Iranian positions, would lead to a breakthrough? Or was there a hidden agenda? The word most widely used to describe Iran's multilayered power structure is "opaque." But the Bush administration is also no model of openness and transparency, which is why there is speculation on what prompted the sending of Burns.

Was it a display of U.S. flexibility to highlight Iranian rigidity and prepare the ground for a military strike? A bid to keep the sextet of countries involved in the talks from backing off tougher sanctions? A way for Rice to polish her credentials after 7-1/2 years of limited achievements in two Bush administrations?

Or simply because the lame-duck administration, in the absence of a coherent plan, felt it needed to show some action? That is the most likely explanation according to Jim Miller, director of studies at the Center for a New American Security, a Washington think tank that has just completed a voluminous report assessing U.S. strategic options in dealing with Iran.

Still in draft form, the report suggests that the United States, after acknowledging that Iran has the right to enrich uranium under the NPT, should make an urgent priority of getting into place extensive verification with full-scale International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. "After years of failed multilateral efforts, it should be clear that Iran will not accept a permanent ban on enriching uranium; continuing this option is a prescription for policy drift with much worse outcomes."

Those include air strikes to knock out Iran's nuclear reactors. That's the preferred solution by neoconservative American hawks and their Israeli counterparts. There is no appetite for military strikes against Iran in the U.S. military, which has its hands full in Iraq and Afghanistan. "I'm fighting two wars and I don't need a third war," Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said this week.

He worried about the unintended consequences, he said, and did not need to spell them out. Apart from possible Iranian retaliation on various fronts, a U.S. or Israeli attack might double or triple the price of oil and push not only the United States but the world into recession.

Those pushing for a military solution would do well to take guidance from Sun Tzu, the 6th century BC Chinese military strategist whose book "The Art of War" is required reading at U.S. war colleges. The key to success, according to Sun Tzu, is to know your enemy and know yourself.

If recent history is any guide, America's knowledge of Iran is less than complete.

23-Jul-08 1:00 PM

NPR's Fresh Air: In Iraq, Tactical Theory Put Into Practice

Wed, 23 Jul 2008 16:00:00 GMT

In Iraq, Tactical Theory Put Into Practice

Media: NPR’s Fresh Air from WHYY
Date: July 22, 2008 (FYI, Audio for this story will be available at approx. 3:00 p.m. ET)
URL: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=92750254

Lt. Col. John Nagl argues that there is a need for a permanent Army Advisory Corps in places like Iraq.

Fresh Air from WHYY, July 22, 2008 • After years spent studying counterinsurgency, Lt. Col. John Nagl recently put his knowledge of rebellion suppression into practice while serving in Iraq. Nagl was part of the team that drafted the latest edition of a U.S. Army field manual on counterinsurgency, and he was able to turn his own recommendations into action while in combat.

In Iraq, Nagl served as the operations officer of a tank battalion task force. This was not his first tour in the region: Nagl led a tank platoon in the Gulf War, more than a decade earlier.

A West Point graduate and Rhodes Scholar, Nagl earned his doctorate in international relations from Oxford University. His research at Oxford was turned into a book, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Nagl has also taught national security studies at West Point.

Now retired from the military, Nagl is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security.

Listen Now

23-Jul-08 12:00 PM

Radio Interview with Derek Chollet on the Diane Rehm Show: Senator Obama's Trip Abroad

Wed, 23 Jul 2008 16:00:00 GMT

Senator Obama's Trip Abroad

Media: NPR's Diane Rehm Show
Host: Diane Rehm
Date: July 23, 2008
URL: http://www.wamu.org/programs/dr/

Senator Barack Obama leaves war-torn Iraq and Afghanistan for stops in Jordan and Israel as he continues his high-profile trip abroad. Diane and her guests assess the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee's trip and the McCain campaign's critique of Senator Obama's policy proposals.

Guests:

Dan Senor, Former Bush Administration foreign policy advisor, based in Iraq (2003, 2004) Currently founding partner of Rosemont Capital, a global private equity firm; and Fox News Middle East Analyst

John Dickerson, chief political correspondent for Slate.com and author of "On Her Trail: My Mother, Nancy Dickerson, TV News' First Woman Star On Her Trail: My Mother, Nancy Dickerson, TV News' First Woman Star."

Nancy Youssef, Pentagon correspondent, McClatchy newspapers

Karen Tumulty, reporter, "Time" magazine

Derek Chollet, senior fellow, Center for a New America Security; author, "The Road to the Dayton Accords: A Study of American Statecraft."

Kori Schake, foreign policy adviser to Sen. John McCain's presidential campaign

23-Jul-08 12:00 PM