November 26, 2009 —
In hosting Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh this week for the first state visit of his administration, President Barack Obama can claim to be taking India seriously as a partner and rising power. But Indian doubts remain.
U.S.-India relations are currently drifting, rather than surging forward as they had been for a decade. Bilateral ties developed an unprecedented intimacy under President George W. Bush, capped by an agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation that required both countries to take considerable political risks and overcome stubborn international opposition. Building on work begun by President Bill Clinton, Bush and his Indian counterparts unshackled the relationship from its troubled past and implemented a forward-looking agenda -- on defense cooperation, high-tech trade, energy, and other areas -- consonant with India's status as a natural ally of the United States and a rising force in world affairs.
Obama has sought to build on these achievements, dispatching Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to New Delhi and reorganizing various bilateral dialogues. Singh's visit to Washington features, as such summits do, the unveiling of new initiatives like a U.S.-India Education Council and a revitalized forum for American and Indian CEOs.
Nevertheless, doubts about Washington's reliability have shaken the confidence of Indian leaders. They had welcomed Bush's "de-hyphenation" of America's India-Pakistan policy, by which the U.S. instead approached India as a unique partner with an eye on its intrinsic importance to American strategy. For all of the Obama team's reassurance, rhetoric dating back to the presidential campaign -- including some loose talk about Kashmir -- has provoked suspicions about a U.S. attempt to "re-hyphenate" the relationship.
This is partly a result of different presidential priorities. Whereas Bush promoted India as an Asian balancer and global player, Obama's focus on "AfPak" has threatened to treat India as an adjunct of American policy toward its troubled neighbors, rather than as the centerpiece of American strategy. This tendency was reinforced by Obama's joint statement with Chinese President Hu Jintao in Beijing, in which the two leaders appeared to call on China to play a mediating role in South Asia -- anathema to an Indian leadership that has watched China provide nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan expressly to check India's regional influence.
To correct this imbalance, Obama should make it clear that his administration will deal with India in a way commensurate with its size, its economic and military potential, its legitimate security concerns in both South and East Asia, and its global ambitions. On an array of issues -- including the fight against violent extremism, global trade talks, the implications of China's rise, the future of the global nonproliferation regime, and the impacts of climate change -- India is a first-order international player. It has no intention of playing second fiddle to China in Asia, and believes it should enjoy a qualitatively different, more intimate relationship with Washington as a result of its democratic values and shared security outlook. The administration should make clear that it has internalized this fact.
Doing so suggests concrete paths ahead in policy. It means avoiding pressuring India to make concessions to Pakistan over Kashmir, a conflict that has come closest to resolution when the United States enjoys strong relations with both Islamabad and New Delhi -- and stays out of the way of their bilateral negotiations. It calls for finalizing civilian nuclear cooperation and moving forward in other areas like missile defense. It means reassuring New Delhi that Washington will not put its interests at risk through any understanding -- with Islamabad on one side, or Beijing on the other -- that disadvantages Indian security. And it requires putting to rest growing Indian fears about being left with a Talibanized, terror-exporting state next door, by announcing a credible, properly resourced U.S. strategy for success in Afghanistan -- which in turn would help stabilize Pakistan, thereby dramatically improving Indian security.
America has its share of relationships with nations to which it is bound by overlapping interests but divided by conflicting values. Until recently, the United States and India have had the opposite -- a relationship built on shared values of democracy and diversity that has been in search of areas of common interest.
In fact, India and the United States share a convergence of interests that may be unmatched by any two great powers in the 21st century. These include defeating Islamist terrorism; stabilizing Afghanistan and Pakistan; sustaining a pluralism of power in Asia; expanding gains from globalization by liberalizing flows of goods, services, investment, and skilled workers; securing Indian Ocean sea lanes for safe transit of commerce and energy supplies; and bolstering the rules-based international system.
In all of these matters of vital interest to the United States, India is a latent ally. The task of Obama's diplomacy must be to make it an active one. Singh's visit this week is an excellent place to start.
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