'Hard Is Not Hopeless' in Afghanistan
CNAS Author: Dr. John A. Nagl
Original Post: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703720504575377280878634658.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_LEFTTopOpinion
Type: Op-Ed
July 21, 2010 — During the darkest hours of the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus testified before Congress that "hard is not hopeless." Those words ring true again today as he begins another turnaround attempt in Afghanistan—a war not going well, but not yet lost. If Gen. Petraeus again plays the cards that led to success in Iraq, an outcome favorable to U.S. interests is still possible.
In Iraq, Gen. Petraeus's efforts to build professional host-nation security and local protection forces, as well as advise political leadership, eventually paid off. It allowed the country to stand on its own against internal and external threats with only minimal outside assistance—the definition of victory in a counterinsurgency campaign. Several years from now, Afghanistan could be in similar condition, with al Qaeda defeated and Afghan security units protecting their own country with the help of U.S. advisers and air support. It’s getting there that’s the hard part.
Gen. Petraeus was tasked with building an Iraqi army in 2004 after we had demobilized Saddam Hussein’s forces. The assignment was enormously difficult, but he had good raw material to work with. The Iraqi population is literate and the Iraqi army had been very competent by regional standards.
The Afghan population, meanwhile, is rich with combat experience but short on soldiers who have graduated from staff colleges. They know how to fight, but not how to read. NATO efforts to build up the Afghan army and police have suffered from a lack of resources until late in 2009, when Lieutenant General Bill Caldwell was ordered to bring them up to speed. Talented as LTG Caldwell is, he’s still short on trainers, and he has to teach his Afghan recruits to read for them to become effective counterinsurgents. That will take time.
Napoleon Bonaparte once said, “All my generals are good—I want generals who are lucky!” Gen. Petraeus was fortunate when he took command in Iraq that years of outreach to the Sunni tribes was beginning to bear fruit. Former insurgents decided to join the Awakening movement to fight against al Qaeda. He organized them into “Sons of Iraq” militias that served as community police and drastically reduced violence levels. Recently deposed Afghan commander General Stanley McChrystal tried to follow the same script and succeeded on a small scale, but was unable to win Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s approval to expand the program nationally.
Yet within two weeks of taking charge in Afghanistan, Gen. Petraeus convinced President Karzai to back what a NATO official described as a “community watch on steroids.” While it is far too soon to predict whether this local security initiative might ultimately break the back of the Taliban, counterinsurgency efforts that employed such community militias have succeeded far more often than those that have failed to do so.
Gaining Mr. Karzai’s acceptance of the community security initiative—after he had resisted it for a year—may be just as important for Gen. Petraeus as are the militias themselves. One of the hardest parts of a counterinsurgency campaign is the need to work by, with and through the political leadership of the host country. A combination of carrots, sticks and cajoling is always required, but not always fruitful.
Gen. Petraeus diligently mentored Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, who was derided as weak and ineffective until he suddenly decided to send Iraqi Army units to clear insurgents from Basra, and personally took charge of the fighting there. Few signs suggest that Mr. Karzai will assume field command of the pending effort to squeeze the Taliban out of Kandahar. But Gen. Petraeus has already demonstrated the ability to get the Afghan president to do things that he would rather not. How well Gen. Petraeus is able to use that talent to improve the performance of Mr. Karzai’s government—and that of Pakistan’s—will likely prove decisive.
The other significant factor is the continuing support of the American people for the Afghan campaign, despite the increasing cost in blood and treasure of what is now America’s longest war. Gen. Petraeus was able to put more time on what he called “the Washington clock” by demonstrating clear progress in Iraq over the course of his first year in command. He will have to do so again, but the task will be made easier by the extraordinary public reputation he earned by turning Iraq around.
The country is fortunate to have David Petraeus available to call upon again to fight a counterinsurgency campaign that will be messy and slow and hard—but not hopeless.
John A. Nagl is the president of the Center for a New American Security. A retired Army officer, he served in both wars in Iraq and helped Gen. Petraeus write the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual.
Topic(s): Iraq, Regional Security Challenges, Terrorism, Irregular Warfare and Crime, Development and Diplomacy, U.S. Military Forces & Operations, U.S. National Security and Defense Policy
Project(s): Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S. Military Forces and Operations, Iraq, Military Wellness
People: Dr. John A. Nagl
