Changing the Culture of Pentagon Contracting
Author(s): Maria Figueroa Küpçü, Michael A. Cohen, Roger D. Carstens
Original Post: Changing the Culture of Pentagon Contracting
Type: Blog Post
Date: 11/05/2008
While the U.S. military has long relied on private contractors, the outsourcing of key national security functions has increased dramatically over the past five and a half years. From intelligence gathering and logistical support to personal security services, training, and operational support tasks, the efforts of contractors are now integral to the success of America’s security and stabilization missions around the world. Since the beginning of the Iraq War, one dollar out of every five has been spent on private contractors. By most estimates, there are more private contractors in Iraq than uniformed military.
Numerous observers have raised questions about the legal accountability of contractors and the efficacy of utilizing private actors in an active battle space, but few studies have examined the culture of contracting and the larger failure of the military to effectively account for and integrate contractors into U.S. military planning, training, and operations. This report in intended to help policymakers, both in the executive and legislative branches as well as the uniformed military, develop solutions to the growing challenge of integrating contractors more effectively into U.S. national security operations.
A failure to accept the inevitability of contractors as a key element of the military force structure has contributed to inertia and an abdication of responsibility for managing the interaction between government departments and private contractors. While it is important to acknowledge that in recent years there have been significant improvements in oversight of private contractors, particularly by the Department of Defense, serious systemic and institutional problems persist.
A cultural shift is required in which civilian and military leaders take steps to fully integrate private contractors not only into the force structure but also into mission requirements. Without this sort of institutional change, the problems we have experienced in connection with contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan will continue, significantly retarding the military’s ability to adjust to the evolving security challenges of the 21st century.
The U.S. government should:
* Transition away from the use of private security contractors in the battle space and build up the capabilities of the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the military police to take on security responsibilities. As this transition takes place, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act should be expanded to govern the actions of private security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan not currently covered by the Uniform Code of Military Justice; improved training of security contractors, vetting of third-country nationals, and third-party accreditation of contractors should be instituted; and interagency coordination between the military and other government agencies should be strengthened.
* Move away from reliance on the flawed and widely misunderstood term “inherently governmental” in deciding how and when to use private contractors, and instead focus on the question of core competencies and mission success. Congress should permit government agencies to use broad discretionary leeway in determining where and how contractors should be used. Congress should establish red-lined activities that must not be outsourced and require the military to maintain a “resident capacity” for any function it outsources, particularly as it relates to the ability to conduct proper contractual oversight.
* Designate a high-ranking official in each branch of the military to conduct a top-to-bottom review of how that branch interacts with contractors and where there are areas for greater or lesser reliance on contractors.
* Strengthen the contractor and acquisition workforce so that it is better equipped to make contracting decisions and to conduct robust oversight and management of contractors. In addition, the Army should develop and support its newly created contracting career field for enlisted personnel and officers.
* Create a clear chain of command from Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and service departments that lays out the responsibilities for contracting and holds commanders accountable for the integration of contractors into the Total Force.
* Integrate contractor oversight into officer training in all branches of the military.
* Include contingency contracting as an “area of emphasis” in the 2010 QDR.
* Create and sustain an enforcement arm of the FBI to conduct overseas investigations of private contractors as well as an extraterritorial U.S. attorney to prosecute criminal behavior.
Topic(s): U.S. Military Forces & Operations
Project(s): Special Operations Forces
People: Roger Carstens
