May 13, 2009 — Karl Marx once wrote that history repeats itself, first as tragedy, and second as farce. North Korea, one of the few remaining states to follow Marx's theories to their nightmarish reality, is demonstrating how repeating history can actually be both tragedy and farce at the same time.
Responding to international condemnation of its thinly veiled April 5 test of a three-stage ballistic missile, North Korea announced that it had begun to reprocess spent fuel rods from the nuclear power plant in Yongbyon.
The North also expelled both U.S. and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors from its nuclear facilities, declared any United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions to be an act of war, and threatened uranium enrichment and additional nuclear weapon tests and ballistic missiles.
We've been down this road before. The first U.S. president to confront this issue was George H.W. Bush in 1993, whose administration pushed the IAEA to request special inspections of the North's nuclear facilities.
Then-North Korean leader Kim Il-sung announced North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which allowed the North to unload the core of a nuclear reactor to retrieve the ingredients for several nuclear weapons.
We later gave North Korea various inducements (primarily food, oil, and cash) to return to the negotiating table, only to have them back away and threaten a few months later.
We need to be clear here ― the only reason North Korea acts this way is because it works. North Korea remains independent, Kim Jong-il and his horrific political system remain in place, the world is still paying attention, and the North Korean people continue to suffer with no hope in sight.
President Obama's immediate reaction to the early April missile test was spot-on ― addressing a crowd in Prague's central square, he exclaimed, ``Rules must be binding. Violations must be punished. Words must mean something … Now is the time for a strong international response.''
The follow-through, however, has so far been lacking. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton responded to the latest North Korea provocation by signaling a commitment to the six-party talks.
The international response has been even more disappointing ― Chinese and Russian statements reduced the UNSC reaction to a stern statement that, while not toothless, lacked the significance of a UNSC resolution. It appears as if the international will to address this problem is running out of steam.
The lack of movement on the North Korea crisis gives President Obama an opportunity to re-examine the utility of the six-party talks, and specifically the decision by the Bush administration to rely on China to resolve the crisis.
Beijing has played a leading role in the talks, both as host and (supposedly) as the only party with enough influence inside Pyongyang to convince North Korean leader Kim Jong-il to abandon his course of action.
However, history has demonstrated that China will work to block or soften international attempts to hold North Korea accountable with UNSC resolutions and sanctions.
Even after approving the UNSC Resolution 1718, which targeted luxury goods destined for North Korea, international monitors have seen a dramatic increase over the last six years of luxury goods flowing from China to Pyongyang.
Pyongyang's October 2006 test of a nuclear weapon and its recent ballistic missile test should have been a strategic moments of clarity in Washington: Beijing apparently does not have sufficient influence in Pyongyang, and is unwilling to hold North Korea accountable for its actions.
Even after North Korea's nuclear test, China still watered down the international response out of fear that strong sanctions could cause instability in North Korea.
Beijing's reaction to North Korea's recent ballistic missile test shows that the old habits die hard. Beijing has yet to demonstrate the will or ability to influence its neighbor and ally to act responsibly, nor has it yet acted responsibly itself by holding Pyongyang accountable for its actions.
Instead, immediately after the recent missile test, the Chinese Foreign Ministry called for all parties to ``exercise restraint,'' and refused to even acknowledge that the test was, in fact, a missile test.
Almost exactly as it did following the nuclear test in 2006, Beijing has again demonstrated that Pyongyang can flaunt international agreements and play on China's fear of instability without fear of repercussions.
While Beijing may not be able to expand its influence over Pyongyang, it can decide to hold North Korea accountable for its actions. Due to China's central role in the six-party talks, it is up to Beijing to recognize that Pyongyang's actions violate UNSC resolutions and follow up by supporting and stringently enforcing sanctions until North Korea changes its behavior.
The U.S. needs to re-evaluate what is truly best for its interests and those of its allies. The six-party talks are not an end, but a means. Repeatedly bribing Pyongyang to return to the table is not a victory, or even a step forward, but a failure of policy.
Washington should send a clear message to Beijing that its patience is wearing thin, and this may be Beijing's last change to salvage the denuclearization talks and China's international image.
If North Korea conducts additional missile tests or another nuclear test, the U.S. and its allies should conclude that the talks have failed and that relying on China's influence and willingness to abide by international agreements was a mistake.
If China wants to be seen as a great power and a responsible international stakeholder, it must demonstrate the ability to make tough decisions and solve problems. The ball is in Beijing's court.