Blurring the Line

In 2014, images of police in military camouflage carrying assault rifles and riding in mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles through Ferguson, Missouri, sparked a national debate over the militarization of police. That debate produced limited reform. Since then, the militarization of domestic law enforcement has only intensified—driven in part by a surge in immigration enforcement. The result is a growing crisis of identification: citizens can no longer reliably distinguish a soldier from a police officer or a federal agent. That distinction is foundational to accountability, legitimacy, and the rule of law.

This analysis focuses on two developments that have accelerated this blurring of roles:

1. The Department of Defense’s (DoD) Section 1033 program, which transfers military equipment to federal, state, and local law enforcement.
2. The rapid militarization of federal immigration enforcement, facilitated via “287(g)” agreements between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and state and local law enforcement (as well as several of the nation’s largest National Guard units).

These trends have produced what might be called a crisis of identification on America’s streets.

The 1033 Program: A Decade of Executive Branch Policy Swings

Named after Section 1033 of the Fiscal Year 1997 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the program allows the DoD to transfer excess military property to law enforcement agencies—originally to support counterdrug and counterterrorism operations. Expanded by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan since its inception, the program has transferred an estimated $7.6 billion in equipment since its inception.

The 1033 program is now codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2576a. Congress has made some changes to the statute, but federal responses have been marked by policy swings via executive order.

• In 2015, President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13688, restricting certain “controlled” items, including tracked armored vehicles, grenade launchers, bayonets, and military-pattern camouflage uniforms.
• In 2017, President Donald Trump rescinded the order, restoring broader transfer authority.
• In 2022, President Joe Biden reinstated many restrictions through Executive Order 14074.
• In 2025, Trump rescinded the Biden order on his first day in office.

Most 1033 transfers involve routine items—office furniture, vehicles, and medical supplies. But significant “controlled transfers” of weapons and ammunition remain, with oversight governed largely by policy. Receiving agencies are often not required to report how equipment is used or justify acquisitions against operational need. A Government Accountability Office investigation famously exposed this oversight gap by creating a fictitious law enforcement agency that received $1.2 million in controlled military equipment—including items modifiable into lethal weapons. Fake cops got real military gear.

The Uniform Problem: When Clothing & Equipment Shape Identity

Among the 1033 program’s most consequential—and underappreciated—effects is its influence on how officers look. Camouflage clothing serves no functional law enforcement purpose on a city street; it signals military identity. Research in psychology and criminology supports the “uniform effect”—officers in tactical military gear may adopt behavioral postures consistent with that uniform, with implications for use-of-force rates and community relations.

From the public’s perspective, an officer in military camouflage and an armored vehicle is harder to approach, question, or hold accountable than an officer in a standard duty uniform with a visible badge, name tag, and agency patch. This is the antithesis of community policing, which has significant benefits and helps build trust between law enforcement and its citizenry. Although the 1033 program and, at various times, executive orders prohibit uniform transfers, it is not embedded in the text of 10 U.S.C. § 2576a. The prohibition is therefore vulnerable to being reversed. And ICE agents wear clothing from third-party websites (Rogue, Grunt Style), creating even greater uncertainty.

Immigration Enforcement: A New Frontier of Militarization

Since 9/11, immigration enforcement has operated within a national-security framework that increasingly expresses itself through military-style equipment, tactics, and appearance. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) are eligible for 1033 transfers. Over 1,500 state and local agencies—and two National Guard units—have joined the 287(g) program, further blurring the line between military and civilian authority. The Texas and Florida National Guards, comprised of 19,000 and 12,000 members respectively, have both signed 287(g) agreements with ICE. These National Guard forces are now empowered to enforce federal immigration law.

By 2025, the scale of this militarization had few domestic precedents. The One Big Beautiful Bill Act allocated approximately $171 billion for immigration and border work, including $30 billion for enforcement—a massive increase in ICE’s prior annual budget.

Agents in tactical gear and face masks have conducted operations in neighborhoods, outside courthouses, and near schools. Unmarked vehicles have been used in detentions. Agents have, in numerous reported instances, failed to display visible identification, despite a DHS regulation requiring identification “as soon as it is practical and safe to do so.” Again, that identification requirement is an agency regulation, not a statute—and no clear remedy exists for noncompliance. Perhaps not surprisingly, a February 2026 poll found that 62 percent of Americans believed ICE was operating too aggressively.

The widespread deployment of masked agents in unmarked vehicles also has created cover for criminal actors impersonating federal officers—with documented cases from multiple states involving robbery, sexual assault, and human smuggling. The FBI has issued warnings urging communities to demand that officers prove their identity—a sign of how badly current practices have eroded public trust.

The Legal Framework: Gaps, Ambiguities, and Existing Tools

Under 10 U.S.C. § 2576a, only four items are ineligible for 1033 transfer: bayonets, grenades (other than stun and flash-bang), weaponized tracked combat vehicles, and weaponized drones. The 2016 NDAA introduced modest improvements (a public transfer website, agency training certification) but stopped short of requiring use reporting or operational justification for acquisitions.

Nearly everything else is governed by executive policy and agency-imposed restrictions.

Existing law governing officer identification offers some tools, but still falls short. 10 U.S.C. § 723 requires identification during “civil disturbances,” but does not cover routine immigration operations or border security operations. A bill introduced in Congress in 2025 would require that CBP and ICE officers have “bold and visible” identification “during a time of action.” This reflects bipartisan recognition that the current identification laws for immigration officers are lacking.

The federal government’s failure to act has prompted states to fill the void. But that path has structural limits. New Jersey recently passed legislation prohibiting ICE agents from wearing masks during enforcement operations within the state. Federal officials promptly announced they would not comply, invoking federal supremacy. The resulting standoff illustrates a deeper problem: State attempts to impose identification and uniform standards on federal officers will almost certainly be preempted under the Supremacy Clause, leaving affected communities without a remedy unless Congress acts. State legislation can generate political pressure and highlight the accountability gap, but it cannot substitute for a federal statutory floor. That is precisely why congressional action—not executive order, not agency regulation, and not state law—is the only durable solution.

Indeed, the deeper structural problem is that executive orders and agency regulations have been the primary vehicles for regulating both programs, and executive orders can be reversed overnight.

Policy & Legal Recommendations

Congress should pass the following reforms, grounded in the principle that law enforcement operating domestically must be identifiable, distinguishable, and accountable.

Congress should enact a statutory identification requirement for all federal law enforcement operating domestically, not just “civil disturbance” operations. Building on 10 U.S.C. § 723, legislation should require agents to display, at a minimum, agency affiliation, a unique officer identifier, and a mechanism for public complaints or credential verification—across all domestic operations, not just civil disturbances. Face coverings should be prohibited absent a documented, supervisory-approved threat justification.

Federal immigration enforcement agencies should adopt uniform standards that clearly signal civilian law enforcement identity. ICE and CBP agents should operate in standard duty uniforms—not military-pattern tactical gear—during routine domestic enforcement. Purchasing from third-party military apparel websites should be strictly off limits, absent exigent circumstances. Officers should be unmasked and be required to show their faces—a requirement under an existing proposal from Virginia’s senators. Body-worn cameras should be mandatory, with activation required at the outset of enforcement activities and meaningful penalties for noncompliance. Such measures would enhance transparency and reduce impersonation risks.

The 1033 program should be restructured by statute to distinguish civilian law enforcement equipment from inherently military equipment. Congress should codify the Defense Logistics Agency’s existing 133-item prohibition list—covering aircraft and vessels with integral weaponry, crew-served weapons, military uniforms, body armor, Kevlar helmets, and explosives. Permissible controlled transfers should require approval by elected local officials, mandatory public notice, and annual use-of-force reporting. And it should be made clear that military uniforms are expressly off limits and ineligible for transfer.

Conclusion

The debate over law enforcement militarization is often framed in partisan terms. It should not be. The underlying principle is straightforward: Citizens must be able to identify the government officials exercising authority over them. Law enforcement derives its legitimacy from public consent, and consent depends on trust. Trust depends on transparency. Personnel who cannot be identified cannot be held accountable. Equipment that blurs the line between soldier and police officer corrodes a distinction that American constitutional law has treated as essential since the founding.

That distinction is now under pressure from multiple directions simultaneously: a 1033 program that transfers military uniforms and gear to civilian agencies, immigration enforcement conducted by masked agents in unmarked vehicles, and National Guard units deputized to make civil arrests. Ferguson revealed what happens when the line blurs in a single city for a few days. What is happening now is not a single incident in a single city. It is a nationwide, sustained erosion of the boundary between military and civilian authority, enabled by statutory gaps that executive orders alone cannot permanently close. Congress has the tools to act. Will it choose to do so?

About the Author

Mark Nevitt is currently an associate professor of law at Emory University School of Law and a CNAS adjunct senior fellow. He previously served as a Navy judge advocate general and tactical jet aviator with assignments around the world.

About the Series

Building on its prior work on issues at the intersection of federalism, national security, domestic deployment, and law enforcement activities, the CNAS National Security Law Program is publishing a commentary series that assesses the legal and policy considerations for improving the framework governing law enforcement use of military uniforms and gear. Read more about the series here.

The CNAS project on federalism and national security was initiated with support from the Democracy Innovation Fund, Defending Democracy Together Institute. Continued work on domestic deployment and related issues has been made possible by support from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.

About the Center for a New American Security

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