Beyond the Sahel

This paper explores Russia’s engagement with four key “swing states” in Africa—Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa. These states make up 34 percent of Africa’s population, constitute a significant proportion of its economy, and are influential within their region of Africa. All four are multialigned, to greater or lesser extents, maintaining relations with the United States and Western allies as well as with Russia. Russia is attempting to deepen its engagement with these swing states in order to amplify its influence on the continent and is using different tools and approaches in each. Egypt’s relationship with Russia is centered on their strong and growing economic relationship; Ethiopia looks to Russia for security support and to counter Western isolation; Nigeria lacks a close substantive relationship with Russia but is a target for Russian disinformation campaigns; and South Africa shares the closest ideological alignment regarding an alternative world order with Russia.

The United States can and should enhance its relationship with Africa by developing a comprehensive Africa strategy, supporting civil society and local media outlets, enhancing educational opportunities and partnerships, partnering with key states to tackle terrorism, and increasing public diplomacy efforts to more clearly communicate U.S. engagement. Focusing on the swing states identified in this report offers a framework for U.S. prioritization and would allow limited resources to have greater impact.

Introduction

Global politics are in a period of intense competition and upheaval. Many of the rules and conventions that previously governed how states behaved are being ignored, and great powers are working to revise the international system to their advantage. Russia and China are seeking a multipolar world order where they have more influence, and the United States is pursuing an aggressive foreign policy that favors unilateral action over multilateral and allied cooperation.

Africa is one region where this competition is playing out. China has engaged heavily in Africa for decades, through both its Belt and Road Initiative and the Digital Silk Road, but Russia has also been increasing its footprint in Africa.² While much of Russia’s visible effort has gone into shoring up authoritarian regimes in the Sahel through mercenary forces such as the Wagner Group and Africa Corps, Russia is also focusing its efforts on key regional African states—including Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa—to varying degrees of success.³ Building relationships with these states, and others, is allowing Russia to expand and amplify its influence across Africa.

Russia cannot compete economically in Africa with China, or even the United States and Europe. Instead, Russia acts as a disruptor on the continent, using extensive media and cultural outreach to spread a narrative about an alternative world order that it claims will benefit Africa, but which in reality serves Moscow’s own aims. In countries outside the Sahel, Russia’s approach is coupled with economic and security cooperation in niche areas—such as the promise of nuclear power plants—which seek to bind African states more closely to Moscow. Collectively these efforts seek to disrupt the status quo and turn states away from the West and toward Russia—at a relatively low cost for Russia. Engagement with Russia also offers some relief from Western geopolitical isolation for states such as Ethiopia (and at times Egypt), which can undermine Western efforts to encourage reform.

This matters for the United States because an increased Russian presence in Africa harms the United States’ own objectives there, including its ability to tackle terrorism and secure economic deals on the continent—the focus of the current administration. Russia’s extensive disinformation campaigns on the continent also undermine democracy and reduce the ability of African governments and Western countries to communicate truthful and clear information about a range of issues, from public health to the war in Ukraine. Ultimately, Russia’s actions also impact longer-term efforts to reduce conflict and improve security and prosperity for African citizens.

Africa has never been a high priority for the United States, but Russia’s expansion is happening at a time when the United States is further reducing its engagement with the continent. U.S. development funding to Africa, including the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), has been scaled back significantly; Voice of America is no longer broadcasting; the Global Engagement Center at the State Department (which monitored disinformation, including Russian activity in Africa) was closed in April 2025; and the long-term fate of the African Growth and Opportunity Act currently hangs in the balance. (At the beginning of the year, Congress extended it just until the end of 2026.)⁴ Furthermore, the United States and South Africa (a key African state, both in the region and globally) had a public falling-out in 2025 that resulted in South Africa’s withdrawal from the G20 for the duration of the United States’ 2026 presidency of the group. Washington’s decision to scale back its engagement with Africa is likely to hurt U.S. influence on the continent in the short and long term; both China and Russia will seek to capitalize on the United States’ absence to build their influence and attempt to bring more countries into alignment with their own worldviews.

This report examines Russia’s approach to Africa, focusing on its tools for influence in countries where it does not have a significant security presence (as in the Sahel). It then focuses on Russia’s outreach to four key states—Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa—African “swing states,” which have an outsize influence due to their multialigned political orientation.⁵ The report considers the tools Russia has used to build relationships with these states, the future trajectory of those relationships, the implications of Russia’s engagement for Western security interests, and recommendations for how the United States and its partners can more effectively strengthen their relationships with these key states and therefore Africa overall. In an era of finite resources, building strong U.S. partnerships with key regional states will likely have a significant knock-on effect across the continent more broadly, including in countering Russia.