By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Purpose. Artificial intelligence (AI) holds extraordinary potential for both promise and peril. Responsible AI use has the potential to help solve urgent challenges while making our world more prosperous, productive, innovative, and secure. At the same time, irresponsible use could exacerbate societal harms such as fraud, discrimination, bias, and disinformation; displace and disempower workers; stifle competition; and pose risks to national security. Harnessing AI for good and realizing its myriad benefits requires mitigating its substantial risks. This endeavor demands a society-wide effort that includes government, the private sector, academia, and civil society.
My Administration places the highest urgency on governing the development and use of AI safely and responsibly, and is therefore advancing a coordinated, Federal Government-wide approach to doing so. The rapid speed at which AI capabilities are advancing compels the United States to lead in this moment for the sake of our security, economy, and society.
In the end, AI reflects the principles of the people who build it, the people who use it, and the data upon which it is built. I firmly believe that the power of our ideals; the foundations of our society; and the creativity, diversity, and decency of our people are the reasons that America thrived in past eras of rapid change. They are the reasons we will succeed again in this moment. We are more than capable of harnessing AI for justice, security, and opportunity for all.
Sec. 2. Policy and Principles. It is the policy of my Administration to advance and govern the development and use of AI in accordance with eight guiding principles and priorities. When undertaking the actions set forth in this order, executive departments and agencies (agencies) shall, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, adhere to these principles, while, as feasible, taking into account the views of other agencies, industry, members of academia, civil society, labor unions, international allies and partners, and other relevant organizations:
(b) Promoting responsible innovation, competition, and collaboration will allow the United States to lead in AI and unlock the technology’s potential to solve some of society’s most difficult challenges. This effort requires investments in AI-related education, training, development, research, and capacity, while simultaneously tackling novel intellectual property (IP) questions and other problems to protect inventors and creators. Across the Federal Government, my Administration will support programs to provide Americans the skills they need for the age of AI and attract the world’s AI talent to our shores — not just to study, but to stay — so that the companies and technologies of the future are made in America. The Federal Government will promote a fair, open, and competitive ecosystem and marketplace for AI and related technologies so that small developers and entrepreneurs can continue to drive innovation. Doing so requires stopping unlawful collusion and addressing risks from dominant firms’ use of key assets such as semiconductors, computing power, cloud storage, and data to disadvantage competitors, and it requires supporting a marketplace that harnesses the benefits of AI to provide new opportunities for small businesses, workers, and entrepreneurs.
The term “dual-use foundation model” means an AI model that is trained on broad data; generally uses self-supervision; contains at least tens of billions of parameters; is applicable across a wide range of contexts; and that exhibits, or could be easily modified to exhibit, high levels of performance at tasks that pose a serious risk to security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters, such as by:
(i) substantially lowering the barrier of entry for non-experts to design, synthesize, acquire, or use chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons;
(ii) enabling powerful offensive cyber operations through automated vulnerability discovery and exploitation against a wide range of potential targets of cyber attacks; or
(iii) permitting the evasion of human control or oversight through means of deception or obfuscation.
Sec. 4. Ensuring the Safety and Security of AI Technology.
4.1. Developing Guidelines, Standards, and Best Practices for AI Safety and Security. (a) Within 270 days of the date of this order, to help ensure the development of safe, secure, and trustworthy AI systems, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), in coordination with the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the heads of other relevant agencies as the Secretary of Commerce may deem appropriate, shall:
(i) Establish guidelines and best practices, with the aim of promoting consensus industry standards, for developing and deploying safe, secure, and trustworthy AI systems, including:
(A) developing a companion resource to the AI Risk Management Framework, NIST AI 100-1, for generative AI;
(B) developing a companion resource to the Secure Software Development Framework to incorporate secure development practices for generative AI and for dual-use foundation models; and
(C) launching an initiative to create guidance and benchmarks for evaluating and auditing AI capabilities, with a focus on capabilities through which AI could cause harm, such as in the areas of cybersecurity and biosecurity.
(i) Companies developing or demonstrating an intent to develop potential dual-use foundation models to provide the Federal Government, on an ongoing basis, with information, reports, or records regarding the following:
(A) any ongoing or planned activities related to training, developing, or producing dual-use foundation models, including the physical and cybersecurity protections taken to assure the integrity of that training process against sophisticated threats;
(B) the ownership and possession of the model weights of any dual-use foundation models, and the physical and cybersecurity measures taken to protect those model weights; and
(C) the results of any developed dual-use foundation model’s performance in relevant AI red-team testing based on guidance developed by NIST pursuant to subsection 4.1(a)(ii) of this section, and a description of any associated measures the company has taken to meet safety objectives, such as mitigations to improve performance on these red-team tests and strengthen overall model security. Prior to the development of guidance on red-team testing standards by NIST pursuant to subsection 4.1(a)(ii) of this section, this description shall include the results of any red-team testing that the company has conducted relating to lowering the barrier to entry for the development, acquisition, and use of biological weapons by non-state actors; the discovery of software vulnerabilities and development of associated exploits; the use of software or tools to influence real or virtual events; the possibility for self-replication or propagation; and associated measures to meet safety objectives; and
(ii) Companies, individuals, or other organizations or entities that acquire, develop, or possess a potential large-scale computing cluster to report any such acquisition, development, or possession, including the existence and location of these clusters and the amount of total computing power available in each cluster.
(b) The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall define, and thereafter update as needed on a regular basis, the set of technical conditions for models and computing clusters that would be subject to the reporting requirements of subsection 4.2(a) of this section. Until such technical conditions are defined, the Secretary shall require compliance with these reporting requirements for:
(i) any model that was trained using a quantity of computing power greater than 10^26 integer or floating-point operations,
or using primarily biological sequence data and using a quantity of computing power greater than 10^23 integer or floating-point operations; and
(ii) any computing cluster that has a set of machines physically co-located in a single datacenter, transitively connected by data center networking of over 100 Gbit/s, and having a theoretical maximum computing capacity of 10^20 integer or floating-point operations per second for training AI.
(c) Because I find that additional steps must be taken to deal with the national emergency related to significant malicious cyber-enabled activities declared in Executive Order 13694 of April 1, 2015 (Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities), as amended by Executive Order 13757 of December 28, 2016 (Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency With Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities), and further amended by Executive Order 13984, to address the use of United States Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) Products by foreign malicious cyber actors, including to impose additional record-keeping obligations with respect to foreign transactions and to assist in the investigation of transactions involving foreign malicious cyber actors, I hereby direct the Secretary of Commerce, within 90 days of the date of this order, to:
(i) Propose regulations that require United States IaaS Providers to submit a report to the Secretary of Commerce when a foreign person transacts with that United States IaaS Provider to train a large AI model with potential capabilities that could be used in malicious cyber-enabled activity (a “training run”). Such reports shall include, at a minimum, the identity of the foreign person and the existence of any training run of an AI model meeting the criteria set forth in this section, or other criteria defined by the Secretary in regulations, as well as any additional information identified by the Secretary.
(iii) Determine the set of technical conditions for a large AI model to have potential capabilities that could be used in malicious cyber-enabled activity, and revise that determination as necessary and appropriate. Until the Secretary makes such a determination, a model shall be considered to have potential capabilities that could be used in malicious cyber-enabled activity if it requires a quantity of computing power greater than 10^26 integer or floating-point operations and is trained on a computing cluster that has a set of machines physically co-located in a single datacenter, transitively connected by data center networking of over 100 Gbit/s, and having a theoretical maximum compute capacity of 10^20 integer or floating-point operations per second for training AI.
4.3. Managing AI in Critical Infrastructure and in Cybersecurity.
(a) To ensure the protection of critical infrastructure, the following actions shall be taken:
(i) Within 90 days of the date of this order, and at least annually thereafter, the head of each agency with relevant regulatory authority over critical infrastructure and the heads of relevant SRMAs, in coordination with the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency within the Department of Homeland Security for consideration of cross-sector risks, shall evaluate and provide to the Secretary of Homeland Security an assessment of potential risks related to the use of AI in critical infrastructure sectors involved, including ways in which deploying AI may make critical infrastructure systems more vulnerable to critical failures, physical attacks, and cyber attacks, and shall consider ways to mitigate these vulnerabilities. Independent regulatory agencies are encouraged, as they deem appropriate, to contribute to sector-specific risk assessments.
4.4. Reducing Risks at the Intersection of AI and CBRN Threats. (a) To better understand and mitigate the risk of AI being misused to assist in the development or use of CBRN threats—with a particular focus on biological weapons—the following actions shall be taken:
(ii) Within 120 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Director of OSTP, shall enter into a contract with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine to conduct — and submit to the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Director of the Office of Pandemic Preparedness and Response Policy, the Director of OSTP, and the Chair of the Chief Data Officer Council — a study that:
(A) assesses the ways in which AI can increase biosecurity risks, including risks from generative AI models trained on biological data, and makes recommendations on how to mitigate these risks;
(B) considers the national security implications of the use of data and datasets, especially those associated with pathogens and omics studies, that the United States Government hosts, generates, funds the creation of, or otherwise owns, for the training of generative AI models, and makes recommendations on how to mitigate the risks related to the use of these data and datasets;
(C) assesses the ways in which AI applied to biology can be used to reduce biosecurity risks, including recommendations on opportunities to coordinate data and high-performance computing resources; and
(D) considers additional concerns and opportunities at the intersection of AI and synthetic biology that the Secretary of Defense deems appropriate.
(b) To reduce the risk of misuse of synthetic nucleic acids, which could be substantially increased by AI’s capabilities in this area, and improve biosecurity measures for the nucleic acid synthesis industry, the following actions shall be taken:
(i) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Director of OSTP, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of other relevant agencies as the Director of OSTP may deem appropriate, shall establish a framework, incorporating, as appropriate, existing United States Government guidance, to encourage providers of synthetic nucleic acid sequences to implement comprehensive, scalable, and verifiable synthetic nucleic acid procurement screening mechanisms, including standards and recommended incentives. As part of this framework, the Director of OSTP shall:
(A) establish criteria and mechanisms for ongoing identification of biological sequences that could be used in a manner that would pose a risk to the national security of the United States; and
(B) determine standardized methodologies and tools for conducting and verifying the performance of sequence synthesis procurement screening, including customer screening approaches to support due diligence with respect to managing security risks posed by purchasers of biological sequences identified in subsection 4.4(b)(i)(A) of this section, and processes for the reporting of concerning activity to enforcement entities.
4.6. Soliciting Input on Dual-Use Foundation Models with Widely Available Model Weights.
When the weights for a dual-use foundation model are widely available — such as when they are publicly posted on the Internet — there can be substantial benefits to innovation, but also substantial security risks, such as the removal of safeguards within the model. To address the risks and potential benefits of dual-use foundation models with widely available weights, within 270 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, and in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall:
(a) solicit input from the private sector, academia, civil society, and other stakeholders through a public consultation process on potential risks, benefits, other implications, and appropriate policy and regulatory approaches related to dual-use foundation models for which the model weights are widely available, including:
(i) risks associated with actors fine-tuning dual-use foundation models for which the model weights are widely available or removing those models’ safeguards;
(ii) benefits to AI innovation and research, including research into AI safety and risk management, of dual-use foundation models for which the model weights are widely available; and
(iii) potential voluntary, regulatory, and international mechanisms to manage the risks and maximize the benefits of dual-use foundation models for which the model weights are widely available; and
(b) based on input from the process described in subsection 4.6(a) of this section, and in consultation with the heads of other relevant agencies as the Secretary of Commerce deems appropriate, submit a report to the President on the potential benefits, risks, and implications of dual-use foundation models for which the model weights are widely available, as well as policy and regulatory recommendations pertaining to those models.
4.8. Directing the Development of a National Security Memorandum. To develop a coordinated executive branch approach to managing AI’s security risks, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy shall oversee an interagency process with the purpose of, within 270 days of the date of this order, developing and submitting a proposed National Security Memorandum on AI to the President. The memorandum shall address the governance of AI used as a component of a national security system or for military and intelligence purposes. The memorandum shall take into account current efforts to govern the development and use of AI for national security systems. The memorandum shall outline actions for the Department of Defense, the Department of State, other relevant agencies, and the Intelligence Community to address the national security risks and potential benefits posed by AI.
Sec. 5. Promoting Innovation and Competition.
5.1. Attracting AI Talent to the United States. (a) Within 90 days of the date of this order, to attract and retain talent in AI and other critical and emerging technologies in the United States economy, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall take appropriate steps to:
5.2. Promoting Innovation. (a) To develop and strengthen public-private partnerships for advancing innovation, commercialization, and risk-mitigation methods for AI, and to help promote safe, responsible, fair, privacy-protecting, and trustworthy AI systems, the Director of NSF shall take the following steps:
(i) Within 90 days of the date of this order, in coordination with the heads of agencies that the Director of NSF deems appropriate, launch a pilot program implementing the National AI Research Resource (NAIRR), consistent with past recommendations of the NAIRR Task Force. The program shall pursue the infrastructure, governance mechanisms, and user interfaces to pilot an initial integration of distributed computational, data, model, and training resources to be made available to the research community in support of AI-related research and development. The Director of NSF shall identify Federal and private sector computational, data, software, and training resources appropriate for inclusion in the NAIRR pilot program. To assist with such work, within 45 days of the date of this order, the heads of agencies whom the Director of NSF identifies for coordination pursuant to this subsection shall each submit to the Director of NSF a report identifying the agency resources that could be developed and integrated into such a pilot program. These reports shall include a description of such resources, including their current status and availability; their format, structure, or technical specifications; associated agency expertise that will be provided; and the benefits and risks associated with their inclusion in the NAIRR pilot program. The heads of independent regulatory agencies are encouraged to take similar steps, as they deem appropriate.
(iii) within 270 days of the date of this order or 180 days after the United States Copyright Office of the Library of Congress publishes its forthcoming AI study that will address copyright issues raised by AI, whichever comes later, consult with the Director of the United States Copyright Office and issue recommendations to the President on potential executive actions relating to copyright and AI. The recommendations shall address any copyright and related issues discussed in the United States Copyright Office’s study, including the scope of protection for works produced using AI and the treatment of copyrighted works in AI training.
(i) issue a public report describing the potential for AI to improve planning, permitting, investment, and operations for electric grid infrastructure and to enable the provision of clean, affordable, reliable, resilient, and secure electric power to all Americans;
(ii) develop tools that facilitate building foundation models useful for basic and applied science, including models that streamline permitting and environmental reviews while improving environmental and social outcomes;
(iii) collaborate, as appropriate, with private sector organizations and members of academia to support development of AI tools to mitigate climate change risks;
(iv) take steps to expand partnerships with industry, academia, other agencies, and international allies and partners to utilize the Department of Energy’s computing capabilities and AI testbeds to build foundation models that support new applications in science and energy, and for national security, including partnerships that increase community preparedness for climate-related risks, enable clean-energy deployment (including addressing delays in permitting reviews), and enhance grid reliability and resilience; and
(v) establish an office to coordinate development of AI and other critical and emerging technologies across Department of Energy programs and the 17 National Laboratories.
10.2. Increasing AI Talent in Government. (a) Within 45 days of the date of this order, to plan a national surge in AI talent in the Federal Government, the Director of OSTP and the Director of OMB, in consultation with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the Assistant to the President and Domestic Policy Advisor, and the Assistant to the President and Director of the Gender Policy Council, shall identify priority mission areas for increased Federal Government AI talent, the types of talent that are highest priority to recruit and develop to ensure adequate implementation of this order and use of relevant enforcement and regulatory authorities to address AI risks, and accelerated hiring pathways.
(d) To meet the critical hiring need for qualified personnel to execute the initiatives in this order, and to improve Federal hiring practices for AI talent, the Director of OPM, in consultation with the Director of OMB, shall:
(i) within 60 days of the date of this order, conduct an evidence-based review on the need for hiring and workplace flexibility, including Federal Government-wide direct-hire authority for AI and related data-science and technical roles, and, where the Director of OPM finds such authority is appropriate, grant it; this review shall include the following job series at all General Schedule (GS) levels: IT Specialist (2210), Computer Scientist (1550), Computer Engineer (0854), and Program Analyst (0343) focused on AI, and any subsequently developed job series derived from these job series;
(ii) within 60 days of the date of this order, consider authorizing the use of excepted service appointments under 5 C.F.R. 213.3102(i)(3) to address the need for hiring additional staff to implement directives of this order;
(iii) within 90 days of the date of this order, coordinate a pooled-hiring action informed by subject-matter experts and using skills-based assessments to support the recruitment of AI talent across agencies;
(iv) within 120 days of the date of this order, as appropriate and permitted by law, issue guidance for agency application of existing pay flexibilities or incentive pay programs for AI, AI-enabling, and other key technical positions to facilitate appropriate use of current pay incentives;
Sec. 11. Strengthening American Leadership Abroad. (a) To strengthen United States leadership of global efforts to unlock AI’s potential and meet its challenges, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the Director of OSTP, and the heads of other relevant agencies as appropriate, shall:
(i) lead efforts outside of military and intelligence areas to expand engagements with international allies and partners in relevant bilateral, multilateral, and multi-stakeholder fora to advance those allies’ and partners’ understanding of existing and planned AI-related guidance and policies of the United States, as well as to enhance international collaboration; and
(ii) lead efforts to establish a strong international framework for managing the risks and harnessing the benefits of AI, including by encouraging international allies and partners to support voluntary commitments similar to those that United States companies have made in pursuit of these objectives and coordinating the activities directed by subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) of this section, and to develop common regulatory and other accountability principles for foreign nations, including to manage the risk that AI systems pose.
(b) To advance responsible global technical standards for AI development and use outside of military and intelligence areas, the Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the heads of other relevant agencies as appropriate, shall lead preparations for a coordinated effort with key international allies and partners and with standards development organizations, to drive the development and implementation of AI-related consensus standards, cooperation and coordination, and information sharing.
In particular, the Secretary of Commerce shall:
(i) within 270 days of the date of this order, establish a plan for global engagement on promoting and developing AI standards, with lines of effort that may include:
(A) AI nomenclature and terminology;
(B) best practices regarding data capture, processing, protection, privacy, confidentiality, handling, and analysis;
(C) trustworthiness, verification, and assurance of AI systems; and
(D) AI risk management;
(i) The Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the director of NIST, shall publish an AI in Global Development Playbook that incorporates the AI Risk Management Framework’s principles, guidelines, and best practices into the social, technical, economic, governance, human rights, and security conditions of contexts beyond United States borders. As part of this work, the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall draw on lessons learned from programmatic uses of AI in global development.
Sec. 12. Implementation. (a) There is established, within the Executive Office of the President, the White House Artificial Intelligence Council (White House AI Council). The function of the White House AI Council is to coordinate the activities of agencies across the Federal Government to ensure the effective formulation, development, communication, industry engagement related to, and timely implementation of AI-related policies, including policies set forth in this order.