April 30, 2009

Flournoy on COIN in Pakistan

Her testimony from the House yesterday (.pdf).

The problems, as she (and Old Boy Vikram, I guess) sees them:

  1. Threat perception.
  2. A trust deficit.
  3. A lack of COIN/CT capabilities on the Pakistani side.

The solution? Something called the PCCF -- the Pakistani Counterinsurgency Capability Fund. This sounds a lot like a CERP in that it would give a lot of funds to the combatant commander -- with very little oversight.

And while I understand the need to not have to ask Congress for money for each and every expense, I have some reservations:

  1. The American people have already invested $10 billion in the Pakistani Army since 9/11. What do we have to show for our investment? (Answer: very little.) So maybe oversight provided by representatives of the U.S. tax-payer, while undesired, is warranted.
  2. Is the Department of Defense asking for this money to fund military-military partnerships because it doesn't have the authorization to do military-police partnerships? Or because this is, honestly, where we see the most pressing need?

Personally, I think we need to be investing more in the Pakistani 5-0 than in a military that has proved incompetent -- when not, you know, HELPING THE OTHER SIDE. So there are a few things -- aside from Admiral Mullen's weird man crush on General Kiyani -- that I cannot figure out. And I worry that the reason OSD is asking for this money to fund the military is because they know they cannot do anything aside from what they are allowed to do under 1206 authorization and don't trust State or whoever to get the job done vis a vis the Pakistani police.