How Russia Could Exploit a Vacuum in Europe

This article was originally published on Foreign Affairs.

The NATO summit held two weeks ago in The Hague delivered on the low expectations the allies had set for it. Amid fears that U.S. President Donald Trump would blow up a normal agenda, NATO leaders significantly pared back the program, taking hard discussions on issues such as support for Ukraine, NATO’s relations with Russia, and Russian hybrid attacks in Europe off the table. But the summit did close with a historic agreement by most allies, Spain being a notable exception, to increase members’ defense spending to five percent of GDP over the next ten years, with 3.5 percent earmarked for core military spending and 1.5 percent for hardening civilian infrastructure and overall resilience. The pledge to spend more on defense, in addition to NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s sycophantic praise of Trump at the summit, smoothed the way for Trump to stick largely to the summit’s highly choreographed script, keeping the alliance’s cohesion intact. Trump even appeared to leave The Hague with a newfound appreciation for NATO members, telling reporters: “These people really love their countries. It’s not a rip-off, and we’re here to help them.”

Any sense of relief among the allies, however, may be short-lived. The relatively positive headlines coming out of the summit obscure the storm brewing across the Atlantic. The Trump administration is undertaking a sweeping force posture review slated for release in late summer or early fall that could fundamentally reshape the U.S. military’s global footprint. If that process results in a significant and swift reduction of U.S. forces in Europe, an outcome that administration officials have publicly suggested is possible, the alliance will become more vulnerable to further Russian aggression.

Europe is stepping up in a big way, and defense budgets are rising, but it will take time to ramp up production and deliver the capabilities that the United States currently provides on the continent. The United States may see fit to make some force adjustments in Europe that allow it to bolster its defense posture in Asia to counter rising threats from China. But Washington must carefully plan any such shift, leaving U.S. forces in place long enough that Europeans can work to fill the coming gaps and retain their credible deterrent against Russia. It is critical that any drawdown be closely coordinated with NATO military authorities and that allies agree in advance to cover lost capabilities. Otherwise, Russian President Vladimir Putin will be tempted to take advantage of a weakened alliance.

The political signals surrounding the U.S. Defense Department’s force posture review have only increased European allies’ fears that a rapid drawdown is coming. In a speech at his first NATO defense ministers meeting in February, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth underscored the Trump administration’s view that Europe could no longer be a U.S. priority, saying that given the “strategic realities,” European NATO leaders “should take primary responsibility for defense of the continent.” Those comments contrasted sharply with the message Hegseth delivered in Singapore in May, when he underscored the U.S. commitment to the Indo-Pacific and called it the United States’ “priority theater.” Media coverage of the Pentagon’s 2025 Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance—issued this spring as a placeholder for the National Defense Strategy, which is expected to be released late this year—suggests that the department intends to fund a military buildup in the Indo-Pacific by diverting resources from other places, including Europe, and accepting greater risk in those areas. Even Matthew Whitaker, the U.S. ambassador to NATO, said in May that Washington was “not going to have any more patience” when it came to reducing the U.S. presence in Europe.

Read the full article on Foreign Affairs.