With U.S. politics as polarized as at any point in modern history, it would seem an unlikely moment for a new bipartisan consensus about U.S. foreign policy to emerge. Yet that’s precisely what has happened over the past 18 months, as Democrats and Republicans alike have embraced the idea of “great-power competition,” with China and Russia as a common framework for thinking and talking about the world.
There is much to commend about this shift. For starters, it has the virtue of reflecting reality — a belated recognition that Beijing and Moscow are not becoming “responsible stakeholders” in a U.S.-led liberal world order, as Washington long hoped, but rather have entrenched interests and values that are profoundly at odds with those of the United States and its allies.
What’s less commendable is the way U.S. national security circles have so far framed great-power rivalry with China and Russia: describing the problem almost exclusively as a competition for technological and military superiority.
Read the full article in The Washington Post.
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