May 27, 2025

The U.S. Military Needs to Relearn Nuclear Signaling

By: Philip Sheers

For decades, the United States’ extended nuclear deterrent has backstopped nuclear stability and supported nuclear nonproliferation among U.S. allies. Nuclear-sharing agreements and security guarantees have solidified nuclear deterrence, and combined conventional exercises have helped allies and partners feel secure in the face of hostile adversaries.

However, as the Trump administration openly reexamines the extent and depth of its alliance commitments, the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent is fading. In response, the acquisition of sovereign nuclear capabilities has emerged as a legitimate policy pursuit in Japan, Korea, and Ukraine. These trends portend nuclear proliferation, threatening the nuclear balance and increasing the likelihood of nuclear use.

This deterioration matters because beyond the quantity and quality of the United States’ nuclear forces, nuclear deterrence will rest on the country’s ability to effectively signal.

To address these assurance challenges and bolster deterrence, the Trump administration should restore a long-deteriorated aptitude: U.S. nuclear operations and signaling. Nuclear signaling is the visible, credible communication of a nation’s nuclear capability and resolve. Reinvigorating this skill means restoring the United States’ ability to quickly exercise or deploy tailored, visible, and flexible nuclear forces in a crisis.

Much has been written on expanding and reshaping the United States’ nuclear arsenal to contend with a two-near-peer (2NP) nuclear environment and manage the associated assurance challenges. But developing new nuclear weapons will take years, cost billions, and may only contribute marginal deterrent value.

Read the full article on Foreign Policy.

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