July 22, 2025

Countering the Digital Silk Road: Kenya

Project Overview

This year marks the 10th anniversary of the Digital Silk Road (DSR), China’s ambitious initiative to shape critical digital infrastructure around the world to advance its geopolitical interests and technology leadership. A decade after its launch, digital infrastructure and emerging technologies have only grown more vital and contested as demand for connectivity, digital services, and emerging technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) expand. Against this backdrop, the DSR has become increasingly central to China’s broader strategy to challenge and ultimately supplant the U.S.-led digital order, and in doing so, reap potentially vast security, economic, and intelligence advantages. To assess the DSR’s impact 10 years after its inception—and explore how the United States and its allies can offer a more compelling and coherent alternative—the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) Technology and National Security team has undertaken a major research project that produces in-depth case studies of four diverse and geostrategically critical nations—Indonesia, Brazil, Kenya, and Saudi Arabia—and culminates in a full-length report.

The third case study focuses on Kenya. For the study, researchers from the CNAS Technology and National Security team spent a week in the country interviewing U.S. and Kenyan policymakers, journalists, technology firms, civil society, and academics. Drawing on these interviews and desk research, this case study seeks to shed light on the current dynamics and stakes of the U.S.-China competition to shape Kenya’s digital ecosystem. It assesses the effectiveness of China’s DSR campaign vis-à-vis U.S. and allied efforts to align Kenya’s digital ecosystem with theirs in a way that advances U.S. security, economic interests, and values.

Executive Summary

In the escalating U.S.-China technology competition, policymakers too often overlook Africa. By midcentury, Africa’s digital economy could hit $712 billion. The continent holds a third of the world’s critical mineral reserves, which are vital for semiconductors, batteries, and other advanced technologies. Africa’s fast-growing workforce and digital economy offer significant market opportunities and first-mover advantages, comparable to Southeast Asia at the turn of the century.

Within Africa, Kenya stands out for its strategic importance. Kenya is East Africa’s political and economic leader, its finance and logistics hub, and the regional headquarters for major international organizations and foreign technology companies. The country's relative macroeconomic stability, robust democracy, internet connectivity, and business climate have all drawn significant foreign direct investment and venture capital. Kenya’s economy is now projected to exceed Ethiopia’s in 2025, despite having less than half the population. The country’s digital sector, although small compared with established sectors such as agriculture and tourism, shows great promise. Kenya rightly touts its “Silicon Savannah,” given the breakout success of M-PESA, a mobile payments platform, along with other homegrown tech successes like Semiconductor Technologies Limited, Odoo, and Kyosk.

Kenya’s technology potential and geopolitical importance have caught the attention of both the United States and China, which now vie to become Nairobi’s preferred partner. Both countries have ties dating back to Kenya’s independence in 1963. The United States held the early edge with more active development assistance and security cooperation following the 1998 embassy bombings in Nairobi. An early focus on counterterrorism expanded to intelligence-sharing and maritime security, and in 2024, Kenya became the only African country Washington has designated as a “Major Non-NATO Ally.” Rare among African countries, the United States remains Kenya’s largest export market.

For its part, Kenya has resisted outright alignment with either Washington or Beijing. With that said, China made clear inroads with signature infrastructure projects and high-level political engagement. When Kenyan presidents Daniel arap Moi, Mwai Kibaki, and Uhuru Kenyatta pursued a “Look East” policy for alternatives to Western development financing, they found a willing partner in Beijing. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang visited Nairobi in 2014, and Kenya joined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s state-backed global infrastructure project, four years later. Through the BRI, Beijing has financed major projects, such as the Nairobi Expressway and the Standard Gauge Railway. China is now Kenya’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade rising more than 40-fold between 2000 and 2023. Deepening investment and economic ties helped Chinese officials and firms learn local regulations, build relationships, and close key bids, bestowing powerful market advantages.

China made technology and telecommunications an early focus of its engagement with Kenya. Indeed, Kenya helped launch Beijing’s Digital Silk Road in Africa. Huawei’s very first project on the continent was a mobile network in Kenya it started in 1998. Today, Huawei is the dominant provider for Safaricom, the country’s national telecommunications network. Generous state support has since extended China’s Digital Silk Road from telecommunications into Kenya’s smart cities, fiber-optic cables, and data center ambitions.

Growing Chinese investment and infrastructure has undoubtedly benefited many Kenyans, but it has also sparked controversy over allegations that it fueled corruption and an unsustainable debt burden. Against this backdrop, Kenyan President William Ruto has signaled greater openness to deepening partnerships with the United States, embracing market-friendly reforms and courting American tech firms. Although Chinese companies built much of Kenya’s physical digital infrastructure, U.S. firms continue to dominate the software and platforms Kenyans use every day, from WhatsApp to ChatGPT. Now, U.S. companies are expanding their footprint to meet Kenya’s surging demand for digital services. Google, Microsoft, Amazon, and Cisco have ramped up investments, including a $1 billion geothermal-powered data center, expanded cloud services, and skilling opportunities for AI, cybersecurity, and more. Washington has reinforced these efforts diplomatically—President Joe Biden invited President Ruto to the White House for the first official state visit by an African leader in 16 years, where the leaders touted “a new era of technology cooperation. Until her departure in 2024, U.S. Ambassador to Kenya Meg Whitman actively championed U.S. tech partnerships with Kenya.

The Trump administration has an opportunity to build on this progress, and it has little time to waste. Beijing has sought to capitalize on backlash to Washington’s tariff and trade policies to cast itself as a more reliable partner. In April 2025, President Ruto made his first official visit to China, during which both countries pledged to upgrade ties to “a new level” and touted nearly $1 billion in new investments in Kenya.

President Ruto has said he looks neither East nor West, but “forward. To move forward, Kenya will need strong and reliable partners to bridge connectivity gaps, strengthen cybersecurity, and support its transition to the cloud and emerging technologies like AI. In each of these domains, the United States offers formidable strengths that, if properly harnessed, can loosen Beijing’s grip on this strategic gateway to sub-Saharan Africa.

To that end, this case study offers the following recommendations for U.S. government officials and technology companies:

  • Strengthen commercial diplomacy with a focus on technology. The White House should nominate an ambassador with private sector tech experience, following the model of former Ambassador Whitman. The U.S. Embassy in Nairobi should expand tech “road shows” that bring senior Kenyan officials and business leaders to U.S tech hubs and expand working-level, tech-focused trade missions to and from Kenya. At the same time, the Foreign Service Institute should provide deeper technology training so diplomats can identify and win strategic digital projects abroad, and the Foreign Commercial Service should add staff in Kenya to match China’s active presence on the ground.
  • Seize the short-term opportunity in Kenya’s cloud migration. Kenya’s 2024 Cloud Policy mandates that all public entities adopt cloud-based solutions for information and communications technology (ICT) investments, creating an opportunity for U.S. hyperscalers to secure key public sector bids. U.S. Embassy Nairobi should support by proactively engaging Kenyan policymakers and business leaders to emphasize the security, reliability, and long-term AI advantages of U.S. cloud services.
  • Surge partnership for Kenya’s Digital Superhighway Initiative. As Kenya seeks to connect every home to the internet with 62,000 miles of new fiber and 25,000 Wi-Fi hotspots, the Trump administration should prioritize diplomatic and other support for U.S. and allied firms to secure bids and loosen Huawei’s current dominance.
  • Prepare for Kenya’s telecommunications modernization. Aging Huawei-built telecommunications infrastructure will eventually require replacement. The United States and its allies should lay the groundwork to offer more secure and trusted alternatives by working now to connect key Kenyan government and industry leaders with U.S. and allied vendors to explore viable alternatives, like Open Radio Access Networks (Open RAN) and low Earth orbit satellites, as well as financing options from the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation.
  • Expand models like the Microsoft-G42 partnership to strengthen U.S. technology offerings in Kenya. The United Arab Emirates has become a valuable if imperfect partner for expanding U.S. influence in African markets. While taking precautions to safeguard sensitive U.S. technology, Washington should expand vetted partnerships like the Microsoft-G42 deal that leverage foreign capital, networks, and derisking to help U.S. firms scale in Kenya and beyond.
  • Pilot a network of “Silicon Savannah Incubators” to support tech entrepreneurs and startups. These U.S.-backed tech incubators would play to America’s strengths in innovation, entrepreneurship, and fair competition. The U.S. Embassy could partner with U.S. technology firms to provide not only financial support, but also mentoring, hardware, compute access, and opportunities for tech upskilling. Alternatively, the U.S. Embassy could help scale existing incubators from American tech companies in Kenya, such as the Google for Startups Accelerator.
  • Scale support for market-driven ICT skilling. The U.S. Embassy should partner with the U.S. International Trade Administration and private sector to conduct detailed forecasts of the tech sector and expand support for tech skilling initiatives that align with market trends, the needs of U.S. and allied companies, and U.S. interests, such as diversifying its supply chain for legacy chips.
  • Support Kenyan cybersecurity. In response to surging cyber threats, the Trump administration should foster partnerships between U.S. cybersecurity companies and the Kenyan government, critical infrastructure operators, and other key sectors. The United States and Kenya should also continue the U.S.-Kenya Cyber and Digital Dialogue, prioritizing capacity building, joint efforts to combat cybercrime, and the exchange of best practices.
  • Promote transparency in dealmaking through enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and support for Kenyan procurement reform. Competing with China on bribery is a losing game. The United States should double down on transparency and fair procurement. At the same time, the United States should encourage procurement reforms, fund capacity-building programs for Kenyan regulators, attach stronger transparency conditions to U.S. development financing, and leverage U.S. technology solutions where appropriate.
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Authors

  • Vivek Chilukuri

    Senior Fellow and Director, Technology and National Security Program

    Vivek Chilukuri is the senior fellow and program director of the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). His areas of focus ...

  • Ruby Scanlon

    Research Assistant, Technology and National Security Program

    Ruby Scanlon is a research assistant for the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), supporting the Center’s research on US-...