American policy in Iraq will undergo two critical transitions throughout the remainder of 2008 and into early 2009: movement to a new U.S. posture in Iraq; and a wartime transition to a new administration. It is vital that both are handled in a way that best advances U.S. interests in Iraq and the region. Yet neither is being paid sufficient attention. Shaping the Iraq Inheritance outlines America’s interests in Iraq and the region, analyzes recent security and political trends, presents a framework for understanding U.S. strategic options, and makes recommendations for how the Bush administration, the military, and Congress can best prepare for the dangerous period ahead.
The report places America’s interests in Iraq within a regional and global context, and suggests that the United States must simultaneously attempt to avoid a failed state in Iraq while not strategically over-committing to Iraq. The report examines current security and political trends, and suggests that success in Iraq requires additional steps toward political accommodation and improved governance. The report then outlines a policy of conditional engagement—a strategy that initiates a phased, negotiated redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq while conditioning residual support to the Iraqi government on continued political progress—and argues that it offers the best chance of achieving sustainable stability in Iraq while balancing U.S. commitments worldwide.
Finally, the report outlines steps that must be taken to smooth the handover of Iraq policy from this administration to the next. The Bush administration must prioritize prepara tion in three areas over the next six months: the development of an interagency transition plan; enhancing the situational awareness of both the Republican and Democratic Presidential candidates and their top national security advisers on Iraq; and hand-tooling personnel transitions for senior positions critical to Iraq policy and operations.
Watch the panel discussion on this report from the CNAS Annual June Conference in June 2008:
More from CNAS
CommentaryWhy did the Pentagon ever give Trump the option of killing Soleimani?
Sending the U.S. military to use force is among the most consequential decisions presidents can make. Matters may get out of control even with the most careful and deliberate ...
By Alice Hunt Friend, Mara Karlin & Loren DeJonge Schulman
CommentaryWar with Iran is still less likely than you think
In the wake of the U.S. attack that killed Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani, head of Iran’s Quds Force, many are concerned yet again about the potential for escalation between the Un...
By Michael Horowitz & Elizabeth N. Saunders
CommentaryHow will Iran respond to Soleimani’s killing — and where will the escalation end?
After the U.S. drone strike last week that killed powerful Iranian Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani, many thoughtful analyses have discussed what might come next. Response is inevita...
By Elisa Catalano Ewers & Ariane Tabatabai
How to increase the pressure on the Syrian government
Five years into Syria’s bloody civil war, it is clear that there is no appetite in Washington or European capitals for a more muscular military intervention to stop the Assad ...
By Peter Harrell