June 27, 2025
The Pentagon’s AUKUS Review is an Opportunity — If Done Right
In ordinary times, a new administration’s review of a major defense partnership such as the Australia–U.K.–U.S. (AUKUS) trilateral security pact would be seen as more or less routine. But these are not ordinary times.
The review recently announced by the Pentagon has prompted bipartisan anxiety in the United States, as well as in Canberra and London. The review reportedly was prompted by concerns that the agreement, which includes the sale of U.S.-made submarines to Australia until the latter can develop its own production capacity, will leave the United States without enough boats of its own given the state of America’s submarine industrial base. These concerns, and related worries about the slow pace of the technology-cooperation agenda under the agreement’s second pillar, are not unfounded, and the review also may be an attempt to generate leverage on Australia to increase defense spending. But the anxiety is understandable that the review is an excuse to downsize, or even abandon, one of the most far-reaching security agreements that the United States has struck over the last two decades.
The reality is that U.S. military assistance to Ukraine and Taiwan has starkly highlighted for policymakers the real limits of the U.S. industrial base to meet demand across a range of capabilities.
One of us (Jennifer) served as the lead negotiator for the AUKUS implementing legislation in the U.S. Senate, and the other (Stephen) held the defense industrial strategy portfolio on the National Security Council staff through January 2025. Having seen up-close the progress and challenges of carrying out the early phases of AUKUS, we recognize that there are sensible reasons for the Trump administration to pose hard questions in its review. But we also believe it would be a grave mistake for the United States to walk away from AUKUS. There are three reasons why AUKUS can and should, with appropriate revisions, be a compelling “America First” priority.
The first is that the strategic logic of Australia acquiring its own advanced submarine capabilities to deter China’s coercion in the region (known as “Pillar I” of the partnership) remains fundamentally sound. Providing the Australians with this capability would enable them to increase their contributions to deterrence against China and to the U.S. military if deterrence fails. The idea of a regional ally spending money to enhance its own military capabilities and contribute more to advancing shared national security interests is very much in keeping with an America First approach. Similarly, providing the United States with access to skilled maintenance and rotational basing in the Indo-Pacific theater will increase the resiliency of the U.S. submarine fleet, and enable the United States to overcome operational problems in the Indo-Pacific in the event of a contingency.
Read the full article on Just Security.
More from CNAS
-
Quad: The Next Phase
Reports
Executive Summary The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) among the United States, Australia, India, and Japan is becoming the focal point for economic and technological co...
By Lisa Curtis, Kareen Hart, Ryan Claffey, Keerthi Martyn & Thomas Corel
-
On Alliances in Northeast Asia
Commentary
For the U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan to thrive — or merely survive — under the next administration, policy makers need to consider different options for different...
By Dr. Duyeon Kim
-
The China-Russia Entente in East Asia
Reports
Executive Summary Closer cooperation between China and Russia is a major force driving global geopolitics. But how relations between the two authoritarian powers are shaping s...
By Jacob Stokes, Evan Wright & Nathaniel Schochet
-
Addressing a Human Rights and Looming Terrorism Crisis in Afghanistan
Reports
Pursuing the same harsh policies as it did during its previous stint in power in the 1990s, the Taliban has increasingly clamped down on the rights of women and girls since re...
By Lisa Curtis & Annie Pforzheimer
