Quad: The Next Phase

Executive Summary

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) among the United States, Australia, India, and Japan is becoming the focal point for economic and technological cooperation in the Indo-Pacific as the competition between the United States and China intensifies and regional power dynamics continue to evolve. The Quad nations share democratic values and seek to advance an affirmative vision for the region that promotes an inclusive regional architecture and offers options for regional partners, which are charting their economic and security futures in the face of growing great power competition.

The second Trump administration is signaling its commitment to deepening Quad cooperation to counter China’s efforts to dominate the region and to ensure other countries in the region remain prosperous, peaceful, and free from coercion. However, the administration also has indicated that it wants to streamline the work of the Quad and whittle down its dozens of different working groups to focus on a handful of priorities. With the need to deliver tangible results, the administration is interested in maintaining fewer—yet more active—working groups that produce substantial outputs.¹

While the Quad has made notable progress since it was revived nearly eight years ago, there is opportunity to expand and deepen its work to fulfill its promise of promoting a free, open, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific. To achieve its goals moving forward, the Quad should:

Expand the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) initiative via use of regional information fusion centers, particularly in the western Indian Ocean. The 2022 IPMDA initiative has been largely successful in providing a maritime common operating picture to track illegal activities, but coverage in the western Indian Ocean has remained sparse.² The Quad should investigate expanding information-sharing agreements with the Seychelles’ Regional Fusion and Law Enforcement Center for Safety and Security at Sea and the Madagascar Regional Maritime Information Fusion Center to develop a better picture of the entire Indian Ocean.³

Expand the Quad-at-Sea Ship Observer Mission to other regional nations. The member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have long been hesitant to align with the Quad, fearing the perception of an Asian NATO and the implications for their relationship with China. However, maritime security is a common goal of most Asian nations. Therefore, a common coast guard and border patrol exercise that teaches skills in law enforcement would provide opportunities to pair with regional partners, enhancing their capabilities, without them formally joining the group.

Pool resources and coordinate investments in regional subsea cable infrastructure, including repair and maintenance capabilities, to reduce dependence on Chinese-operated vessels. Quad countries should use collective resources to lease cable repair ships while harnessing Japan’s shipbuilding capacity to build new ones if needed—reducing the region’s reliance on China.⁴ Together, Quad members also should explore streamlining their respective licensing and regulatory processes to facilitate faster deployment of subsea cables.

Develop a mechanism through which the Quad maritime working group can collaborate with Southeast Asian countries to focus on addressing enforcement gaps in international law related to the intentional severing of subsea cables. To deter subsea cable sabotage, the Quad and ASEAN should increase multilateral monitoring of the South and East China Seas and compile a shared database of subsea cable incidents to detect and apprehend saboteurs.

Strengthen public-private sector cooperation on critical minerals through the Quad Investors Network (QUIN). The QUIN, launched in 2022, is a private sector–led platform that brings together investors, corporations, and public institutions from Quad countries to accelerate investment in critical and emerging technologies across the Indo-Pacific.⁵ Among its nearly 10 intra-Quad partnerships, the issue of critical minerals has emerged as a top priority for strategic collaboration. The QUIN serves as a mechanism to align private investment with government demand, helping to strengthen supply chain resilience in key sectors like critical minerals, including rare earth elements.

Develop a Quad-led supply chain crisis response network, building on the framework established in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Given recent global shocks—including the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and rising U.S.-China economic competition—Quad partner countries should take the lead in operationalizing the supply chain crisis response network that was outlined in the IPEF under Pillar II. A Quad-led approach to securing supply chains in strategically vital sectors such as critical minerals, clean energy, and semiconductors would enable faster coordination, sharing of intelligence, and joint crisis response among trusted partners with aligned economic and security interests.⁶

Elevate engagement with ASEAN. Institutionalizing regular track 1 and track 2 dialogues, including an annual Quad-ASEAN forum, could help spur ASEAN action, dispel misperceptions about the Quad, and build long-term trust between the groups.⁷ Inviting ASEAN secretariat officials to relevant meetings would further reinforce the Quad’s recognition of ASEAN’s important role in regional architecture.⁸

Expand dialogue with other subregional organizations. The Quad countries should seek ways to collaborate with other Indo-Pacific subregional groupings, like the Indian Ocean Rim Association and the Pacific Islands Forum. Partnerships with these organizations can significantly enhance the Quad’s effectiveness, especially in areas such as maritime domain awareness, disaster risk reduction, and resilient supply chains.

Introduction

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) among the United States, Australia, India, and Japan is becoming the focal point for economic and technological cooperation in the Indo-Pacific as the competition between the United States and China intensifies and regional power dynamics continue to evolve. The Quad nations share democratic values and seek to advance an affirmative vision for the region that promotes an inclusive regional architecture and offers options for regional partners charting their economic and security futures in the face of growing great power competition.

The second Trump administration is signaling its commitment to deepening Quad cooperation to counter China’s efforts to dominate the region and to ensure other countries in the region remain prosperous, peaceful, and free from coercion. U.S. President Donald Trump has mentioned his interest in visiting India later in 2025 to attend a Quad summit in New Delhi, India, while U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio held a Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting his first day on the job on January 21, 2025.⁹