June 24, 2025

What Happened to the U.S. ‘Asia First’ Doctrine?

By: Adham Sahloul

President Donald Trump made the United States a direct party to the Iran-Israel conflict through a series of strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 21. That decision has forced the Asia policy community on both sides of the Pacific to ask whether the Trump administration is truly committed to an “Asia First” approach to U.S. national security strategy. The U.S. is deepening its engagement in the over 16-month-long Middle East conflict even as Trump is straining its network of allies and partners over trade and pressuring its Indo-Pacific allies on defense spending. This backsliding on prioritizing the Indo-Pacific theater is compounded by cuts to foreign assistance offices, U.S. information and media programs, and key China staff at the National Security Council.

U.S. policy in the Middle East has impacted Washington’s alliance management in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Japan’s Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru’s decision to skip the NATO Summit can be read as linked to the escalation in Iran. This, along with reports that Tokyo is rescheduling July 2+2 talks with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth over the Trump administration’s mixed messaging on Japan’s defense spending, suggests that Trump’s call sheet should include leaders well beyond the Middle East and Europe.

U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific should observe that the Trump administration’s strategic approach to foreign policy is a moving target.

What happens in the Middle East has historically yielded global ripple effects, from oil shocks and mass migration to spikes in terrorist attacks. U.S. allies Japan, Australia, and South Korea and burgeoning partner India – to say nothing about China – will be directly impacted by any strain on oil and liquified natural gas (LNG) exports caused by a prolonged conflict. More broadly, it is well recognized by both sides of the political aisle – albeit ignored by policymakers in successive U.S. administrations – that U.S. overextension in the Middle East comes at the expense of focusing on the Indo-Pacific and China, by siphoning away finite military and political resources.

What is less discussed is how U.S. resolve and credibility, often on display in the Middle East as the predominant theater of U.S. military action – be it in Iran, Gaza, Syria, or Libya – impacts decision-making, defense planning, and political alignment among U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. Years ago, colleagues in Japan shared with me how they had interpreted then-President Barack Obama’s 2013 “red-line” moment in Syria, where the U.S. did not respond militarily to the former Bashar al-Assad regime’s chemical weapons massacre. The decision was justified as the U.S. not wanting to repeat the mistakes of Iraq, but this perceived weakness, which ultimately gave Russia a stronger strategic foothold in the Middle East, gave foreign policy thinkers and decision-makers pause in East Asia.

Read the full article on The Diplomat.

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